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Abstract
This thesis is based on a case study of a Brazilian urban social movement that campaigns 
for state provision of low-income housing and that posits its demands in the language of 
citizenship and social rights. It makes a contribution to the study of state-society relations 
by detailing how understandings of citizenship shape the movement’s interaction with 
different levels of the Brazilian state. The empirical data on which the thesis is based was 
gathered over the course of a year’s fieldwork with the movement, involving participant 
observation and approximately seventy semi-structured interviews with movement leaders 
and members, politicians and professionals associated with the movement. It examines 
the activities of the movement in the context of Sao Paulo, a city characterized by high 
levels of income inequality, spatial segregation and illegally occupied land. Analysis of the 
movement’s discourse highlights the link made by members and leaders between adequate 
housing and citizenship and their continued highly antagonistic stance towards the 
Brazilian state. Through the use of a ‘politics of rights’ the movement stresses the 
disjuncture between the constitutional right to housing and the state’s wilful neglect of the 
housing needs of its poorer populations, developing the idea of limited citizenship. The 
movement’s interactions with the state are then discussed in light of this disjuncture: these 
involve engagement in participatory policy councils, pursuit of legal cases against the state 
and acts of civil disobedience through occupations of empty buildings. The study concludes 
that in a context of illegality and exclusion it is through acts o f‘transgressive citizenship’ 
that the movement establishes its identity vis-a-vis the state and most successfully 
highlights the state’s failure to provide housing.
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Acronyms
ABC Santo Andre, Sao Bernardo do Campo and Sao Caetano do Sul 
municipalities
ARENA Alliance for National Renewal
BNH National Housing Bank
CDHU Sao Paulo State Housing and Urban Development Company
CEB Christian Base Community
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G lossary
a luta the struggle (for housing)
abertura political liberalization process begun in 1979
assembleia constituinte constituent assembly
assessor de gabirtete politicians assistant
autentico independent trade union leader
caravana campaigning bus trip
clausula petrea an article in a legal document that cannot be removed
cortigo slum tenement, generally in the centre
Diretas Ja campaign for direct elections
favela shanty town
grileiro land swindler
grupo de origem neighbourhood or grassroots group
higienista discourse that equates poverty with crime and disease
inversao de prioridades reversal of priorities - referring to the PT’s commitment to
locaqao social
prioritizing the needs of marginalized groups in Brazilian 
society
social rental housing
ministerio publico equivalent to prosecution service
mutirantes people involved in the mutirao
mutirao collaborative house building
ocuparpara morar to occupy a building in order to live in it
pastoral de moradia the housing support programme of the Catholic Church
paulistano something or someone from Sao Paulo city
pelego someone who does deals with the authorities
propositivo the ability to propose housing policy
protocolado the process whereby a document is stamped and officially
sem terra
received by an official body
landless movement or people, short for Movimento dos
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sem teto
sonho da casa propria 
vereador
Trabalhadores Rurais Sem Terra (MST)
general term for the housing movement, literally 'roofless'
the dream of owning one's own home
city councillor
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Figure 1: B razilian p resid en ts, Sao Paulo m ayors, and Sao Paulo state  
govern ors sin ce  d em ocratisation
President of the Republic
1985-1990 Jose Sarney
1990-1992 Fernando Collor de Mello
1992-1994 Itamar Franco
1995-2003 Fernando Henrique Cardoso
2003- Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva
Sao Paulo state governor
1987-1991 Orestes Quercia
1991-1994 Luiz Antonio Fleury Filho
1995-2001 Mario Covas
2001-2006 Geraldo Alckmin
2006-2007 Claudio Lembo
2007- Jose Serra
Sao Paulo mayor
1986-1988 Janio Quadros
1989-1992 Luiza Erundina
1993-1996 Paulo Maluf
1997-2000 Celso Pitta
2001-2004 Marta Suplicy
2005-2006 Jose Serra
2006- Gilberto Kassab
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Figure 2: Map o f Sao Paulo m unicipality  show ing d istric ts  and  
su b prefec tu res  (num bered). Source: w w w .capital.sp.gov.br
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Chapter One
Social movements and the state 
Introduction
This thesis examines the relationship between the state and the urban poor in Sao Paulo, 
Brazil, through a case study of a social movement that campaigns for low-income housing. 
This movement, the Uniao de Movimentos de Moradia (UMM -  Union of Housing 
Movements) makes demands on the state specifically to benefit its members, as well as for 
general policy change on social housing provision. Tracing the link between citizenship, 
housing and social movement activity this study analyses the perception of the state held 
by movement members and how this is channelled into a collective response to lack of 
affordable housing and social segregation in a city that has developed irregularly due to 
calculated state negligence. The research charts the interaction of the movement with the 
state, and details the micro-processes of negotiation that occur between social movement 
spokespeople and representatives of the state in response to demands for low-income 
housing. It examines formal channels for movement participation in the workings of 
government, and the movement’s use of the law, but gives special focus to the process of 
‘occupations’: forced entry by movement members into abandoned buildings in the centre 
of Sao Paulo that draw attention to the housing deficit and the degradation of the central 
districts of the city. It analyses occupations through the lens of civil disobedience, and 
examines the response of the state to what is theoretically an illegal act. Exploring the 
overlap between the legal and the illegal both in terms of movement activity and the state’s 
failure either to provide housing to its citizens or to regulate city growth, the thesis draws 
conclusions on the way in which a discourse of limited citizenship impacts upon social 
movement strategy and state response. Finally, it puts forward the idea o f‘transgressive’ 
citizenship as a way of understanding how the movement regulates its relationship with 
the state through its calculated acts of civil disobedience.1
1 U n d e r sta n d in g s  o f  th e  s ta te  a n d  o f  c it iz e n sh ip  w ill b e  e x a m in e d  in  d e ta il in  C h ap ter  tw o .
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This study seeks to address two related absences in the social movement literature. The 
first is the relative lack of study of the impact of collective action. The second omission 
concerns a specific type of impact or consequence of social movement action: the 
interaction with the state that which will result from movement demand-making. 
Movement demands maybe repressed, but unless they are completely ignored, some type 
of dialogue between representatives of the state and of the movement will be established, 
as negotiation processes commence. However, in the main, social movement theory does 
not give great import to the role of the state either as a target of ‘claim-makers’ (Tilly and 
Tarrow 2007) or how the state comes to respond to these claims. Indeed, many currents of 
social movement theory draw attention away from the active role of the state, through a 
close analysis of the internal workings of social movements, a discussion of the historical 
conditions necessary for mobilization of collective action or by presenting movements as 
vehicles for the exploration of identity and culture. Furthermore, the issue of how 
movement demands result in changes to policy, and the micro-processes of negotiation 
involved, are rarely assessed. In sum, the study of collective action has not been employed 
as a lens through which to examine state-society relations. This is an omission that this 
thesis attempts to address. The thesis also contributes to academic debates on state-society 
relations through its examination of the concept of citizenship, in particular the way in 
which the discourse of citizenship and social rights is employed by the housing movement 
in Sao Paulo. And finally, it builds on literature from the anthropology of the state cannon, 
through an exploration of how the ‘elusive line’ (Mitchell 1991) between state and society is 
drawn.
Beginning with an overview of social movement theory, this introduction demonstrates the 
need for research into the consequences of collective action, and in particular, the 
movement-state interface that results from collective demand-making on governmental 
authorities. It then presents briefly the reasons for choosing Brazil as a site for an 
empirical study of state-society relations. It also explains the specific choice of the Uniao 
de Movimentos de Moradia in Sao Paulo. The chapter then provides a discussion of
15
methodology and research methods used, and closes with summaries of the remaining 
chapters.
Social m ovem ent theory
Before commencing a review of social movement theory, a brief definitional discussion is 
required. Definitions of what constitutes a social movement have a tendency to reflect 
distinct theoretical approaches. With the rise of new social movement theory and its 
emphasis on culture and identity (see below) it has become common to stress the shifting 
and relational character of social movements, based on their internal structure and the 
web-like way in which they are composed, rather than what they aim to do. In this vein, 
movements are not defined simply as formal organizations that coordinate protest. 
Definitions reflect a focus on the way movements can provide the space for the 
consolidation of new or alternative identities against dominant perspectives or attempts at 
social categorization, and the pursuit of goals outside the traditional political arena. An 
example of this is provided by Whittier (2002: 289),
Social movements are neither fixed nor narrowly bounded in space, time, or 
membership. Instead, they are made up of shifting clusters of organizations, 
networks, communities, and activist individuals, connected by participation in 
challenges and collective identities through which participants define the 
boundaries and significance of their groups.2
However, given that this thesis will focus mainly on one movement’s external relationships 
with the state, rather than the complexities of its internal composition, it would seem 
appropriate to adopt Tilly’s classic definition of a social movement as:
A sustained challenge to power holders in the name of a population living under the 
jurisdiction of those power holders by means of repeated public displays of that 
population’s worthiness, unity, numbers and commitment (Tilly 2003b: 247).
2 S im ila r  d e f in it io n s  o f  so c ia l m o v e m e n ts  a s  re la t io n a l g r o u p s  o f  n e tw o r k e d  a c to r s  w ith  b lu rred  
b o u n d a r ie s  are  a lso  u s e d  b y  B eb b in g to n  e t  a l. ( 2 0 0 8 ) ,  D ia n i ( 2 0 0 3 )  a n d  S ta g g en b o rg  (2 0 0 2 ) .
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As will become evident over the course of this thesis, Tilly’s emphasis on the challenging 
nature of collective action finds resonance with the UMM’s own conceptualization of its 
relationship to power holders. Strictly speaking, the UMM should be referred to as a ‘social 
movement organization’ (McAdam, McCarthy and M. Zald 1988) -  a body that has 
gradually coalesced around ad hoc protest -  since it is fully institutionalized and 
registered as an organization with a legal identity in Sao Paulo. However, members and 
leaders themselves refer to the UMM as a social movement or movimento social and this 
thesis mirrors their usage.
Most overviews of trends in social movement research highlight the 1960s as a time of 
considerable innovation in the field of investigation into collective action, with the first 
steps towards the development of resource mobilization and new social movement 
theories. It was at this time that sociologists examining the agitations of the civil rights and 
student movements started to acknowledge the organized nature of collective action. Prior 
to this, there had been a tendency to define such protests in terms of individual 
psychological or behavioural traits, which were often classified as deviant (McAdam 2003). 
Alternatively, it was argued, collective action that manifested itself in peasant revolts or 
revolutions had been examined within a narrowly determinist Marxist paradigm, that 
posited social conflict as a historical necessity (Foweraker 1995). The emerging research 
trends are often divided into two broad camps: in Europe the new social movement 
approach reacts against Marxism and is encapsulated in the focus on identity and culture. 
In North America, psychological reductionism is replaced by the resource mobilization 
approach which seeks to understand how detached individuals manage to coalesce as a 
coherent social actor (Cohen and Arato 1994). Both these theories have led to a focus on 
internal issues of movement emergence and resilience. Resource mobilization examines 
issues of leadership, organization and strategic decision-making. New social movement 
theory considers the establishment of new collective identities and is concerned with how 
voice is achieved by minority or excluded groups. In neither type of theoretical 
investigation does the state play an important role.
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Much of the work on collective action against which the ‘new* social movement theorists 
were reacting had been focused on trade unions or political parties as the traditional sites 
of working class insurgency (Katznelson 1993). In some of this work there was a tendency 
to view the poor as the ‘builders of tomorrow’: the marginalized masses, particularly in 
urban areas, who would rise up against an oppressive social order (Portes and Walton 
1976:110). Alternatively, uprisings that had already occurred were explained as a direct 
consequence of the way in which capitalism restructures traditional economies (cf. Wolf 
1969). But the assertion that ‘old’ social movement research, with its focus on labour, 
collective consumption and peasant rebellion, is essentially deterministic is perhaps a 
useful simplification for those who choose not to examine the role that inequality, 
deprivation and state policies can play in mobilizing social movements. A number of 
Marxist scholars and historians have taken a considerably more nuanced approach to the 
study of collective action, rejecting determinist aspects of class struggle (Susser 2002) and 
highlighting the fact that reform, rather than revolution, can guide collective action that 
targets the state. Particularly salient in this literature is the argument that it is precisely 
interaction with the state that is constitutive of social movements. Hobsbawm’s rebels 
cease to be primitive, when they become involved in national level struggles against the 
state and, as such, take their part in modern politics (Hobsbawm 1959). In a similar way, 
E.P. Thompson perceives the working classes as fully ‘made’ once they become self­
consciously organized in trade unions in opposition to the state. And, far from being wholly 
determined by the capitalist means of production, the working classes set out to define 
themselves through collective action (Thompson 1980). Although new social movement 
theory and resource mobilization approaches have broadened out the field of research by 
privileging a focus on the internal workings of mobilization and collective action, this 
chapter argues that this should not involve a rejection of the role of the state.
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Im pacts o f  collective action
The relative neglect of the impact of social movements or the consequences of collective 
action within the social movement canon is observed by Foweraker (1995). Elsewhere, he 
describes it as the great ‘incognitus’ (Foweraker and Landman 1999). This neglect is 
perhaps in part due to concerns with attribution in complex institutional contexts where 
social movements are just one of an array of competing actors (Tarrow 1999). Scholars 
may also have been discouraged by Piven and Cloward’s classic study that concludes that 
most social movements fail, and that ‘protestors win, if they win at all, what historical 
circumstances has already made ready to be conceded’ (Piven and Cloward 1977: 36). 
Tarrow (1994) is similarly dismissive of the likelihood of individual movements having any 
impact on governments. He argues that governments do not respond to single social 
movements, rather, elites are more likely to respond to a general ‘context of contention’ 
(Tarrow 1994:8).
There are a few exceptions to this general trend; perhaps most frequently cited is Gamson’s 
(1975) study of social movement impact. This work examines movement strategy and 
involves analysis of the outcomes of 53 American movements active from 1800 to 1945. He 
compares the impact of movements that use disruptive tactics with those that remain 
moderate, and measures the extent to which their demands are incorporated by 
government. His conclusion, that disruptive movements are more likely to be successful, is 
contradicted by a study carried out by Schumaker (1975) who further argues that a 
supportive arena is more important for movement success than movement strategy. The 
work of these two authors supports Guigni’s critique that discussion of movement impact 
tends to centre on two central dichotomies in the realization of change: disruption versus 
moderation and internal versus external explanations (Giugni 1999). This has led to cross­
national and cross-temporal studies of either movement strategy or of internal/external 
constraints that explain success and failure.
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The attempts in these studies to measure and compare the impact of a large number of 
movements necessitates definitions of ‘success’ and ‘failure’ that are truncated and non- 
nuanced. In this regard Gamson (1975) argues that along with ‘new advantages’, success 
can be defined as ‘acceptance’ by the state of a movement as a valid vehicle for the 
communication of a particular group’s demands, but considers ‘incorporation’ of the 
movement into the state as the ultimate achievement. While he acknowledges that 
incorporation is never the goal of a revolutionary movement, he fails to concede that 
incorporation could be interpreted as cooption even for non-revolutionary groups. Indeed, 
in the Brazilian case, the need to defend ‘autonomy’ from government is fiercely defended 
by social movements (Hochstetler 2000). Schumaker (1975) expands on a definition of 
success by setting out degrees of state ‘responsiveness’ to movement demands, but his 
comparative study cannot provide space for analysis of the complex transactions and 
negotiations through which movement demands are translated into government 
responses. Similarly, the abstraction of movement strategy to ‘disruption’ or ‘moderation’ 
fails to acknowledge the way in which groups involved in contentious politics will shift 
between different registers of the ‘repertoire of contention’ (Tilly 2004).
Resource m obilization and po litica l opportun ity
While relatively fewer scholars have looked at social movement impact, many have 
engaged in studies that form part of the resource mobilization tradition. This places an 
emphasis on the examination of movement mobilization and strategy in an attempt to 
explain why collective action occurs and how a more enduring ‘social movement 
organization’ coalesces around campaigning by individual actors (McAdam, McCarthy and 
Zald 1988). Scholars also seek to understand why movements do not emerge, despite the 
presence of grievances amongst potential members. Another related area is social network 
theory that examines the linkages between movement members and how these help to 
mobilize and maintain movement action (Passy 2003; Diani 2003) and how they create 
links with other established organizations (Staggenborg 2002; McCarthy and Zald 2005).
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These approaches to the study of movements could be charged with a failure to take into 
account the broader socio-political environment within which collective action emerges, 
since they largely orientate study to the inner workings of social movements. A response to 
this critique can be found in the political process or political opportunity approach that 
emerged in the late 1980s. This approach privileges study of the constraints on and 
stimulus for collective action by external political circumstances. The most well-known 
proponents of the method are Sidney Tarrow and Charles Tilly, both of whom have 
undertaken large-scale comparative historical studies of movement emergence. Tilly is 
often cited for his work on defining the social movement, which he regards as a relatively 
modern phenomenon (cf. Tilly 2004) while Tarrow is concerned with illustrating broad 
historical trends in collective action, that he has named ‘cycles of contention’. The political 
process approach differs from standard resource mobilization work, since it does engage 
with politics and allows a role for the state. As Tarrow notes:
Although movements usually conceive of themselves as outside of and opposed to 
institutions, acting collectively inserts them into complex policy networks, and thus 
within the reach of the state (Tarrow 1994: 25).
However, he concedes that most theorists, himself included, have tended to focus on the 
emergence of movement activity, rather than the dynamics of movement interaction with 
those in power (Tarrow 1994).
The neglect of the state in social movement analysis may be due to the focus of many 
theorists on the Western European or North American contexts, where democracy is well 
established and rights are, in general, respected (Foweraker 1995). In these contexts, 
contention often arises between different groups within society, rather than between 
society and the authorities, and the state will play only a mediating role (Tilly and Tarrow 
2007). Furthermore, the focus on revolutionary or pro-democracy coalitions and broad 
cycles of protest exemplified by the work of Tilly and Tarrow, appears to preclude 
examination of movements that are oriented towards basic social needs and specific policy 
change. This omission is illustrated in the following statement by Tarrow:
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Few movement activists demand fundamental reform, and many reject reformism 
altogether. Movement activists demand fundamental social change, the recognition 
of new identities, entry into the polity, the destruction of their enemies, or the 
overthrow of a social order -  seldom ‘reform’ (Tarrow 1994:169).
This is clearly contradicted both by earlier research on eighteenth and nineteenth century 
England (cf. Thompson 1980) and by a great deal of collective action in the developing 
world that is centred on achieving basic services through reform of public policy. However, 
Tarrow denies that movements might have clear, concrete demands, stating that these are 
often ‘imprecise and utopian and maybe aimed more at mobilizing internal militants than 
at convincing opponents’ (ibid: 162). For Tarrow, individual political empowerment is more 
of a likely impact of social movement activity than policy change.
One area of study where the interaction between interest groups and the state is given 
consideration is in the classic literature on pressure groups in the pluralist tradition .3 
However, again the focus of this body of scholarship tends to be on the American or 
Western European context. Furthermore, as Melucci (1996) Castells (1983) and Gamson 
(1975) acknowledge, it assumes that the political arena is a level-playing field on which 
social movements can interact freely and make their voices heard as just one of many 
political actors. As Castells points out, pluralist theory tends to ignore the fact that political 
actors are anchored within the ‘generally contradictory structure of social interests’ 
(Castells 1983:294). As such, pluralism does not take into account the biases of the system 
or differential power and established relationships. It also suggests that entry into the 
political arena is open to all would-be competitors (Gamson 1975). In sum, it fails, in the 
main, to consider how membership of a politically and socially marginalized group can act 
as a barrier to political engagement. This is particularly critical in the Brazilian case, where 
the political system is characterized by ‘traditional’ hierarchies and clientelism (Avritzer 
2002; Hagopian 1996).
3 F or  a d is c u ss io n  s e e  D a h l (1 9 6 3 ) .
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N ew  social m ovem ent theory
It should by now be becoming clear that much social movement literature is somewhat 
inadequate for the context of the developing world. Many contemporary social movements 
in Brazil organize around the basic needs of their members, in particular for housing, 
education, food security and health. The focus of their activities is the Brazilian state at 
municipal, state and federal level, and their rhetoric calls for the state to provide these 
basic goods, conceptualized as rights and set out as such in the progressive Constitution of 
1988. It is therefore somewhat curious that it is ‘new social movement theory’ that has 
been applied virtually exclusively to the study of collective action in Latin America 
(Foweraker 1995). This approach places emphasis on the role of identity within social 
movements and their cultural production in society.
Perhaps the most important proponents of new social movement theory are Alberto 
Melucci and Alain Touraine. Although Melucci was working slightly after Touraine, he has 
taken responsibility for introducing the concept (Melucci 1996; 1998), which is based on 
the assumption that a systemic change has occurred within society, and that since class 
conflict is no longer a key mobilizing factor, social movements must be analysed along 
different lines. The central question he poses is,
Whether in contemporary societies there are relations and social structures that can 
no longer be explained within the framework of industrial capitalist society as 
defended by the classical models of sociology (Melucci 1998: 424).
His focus has therefore been ‘to identify the elements of contemporary collective action 
that require a conceptual framework other than that provided by industrial capitalism’ 
(Ibid: 425 italics in the original). To a certain extent, Melucci’s theory of new movements 
can be read as a proposal for an alternative methodological approach to the study of 
collective action. He argues that by focusing on the cultural production of movements, and 
the ‘hidden networks’ of contemporary collective action, research will provide greater
23
understanding of the meaning behind visible protest and claim-making. This 
methodological approach is similar to that of Escobar (1992) who advocates a greater focus 
on the ‘everyday5 cultural politics of movement actors. Melucci (1996) concludes that late 
twentieth-century movements are more oriented towards issues of identity and that their 
goal is to challenge and upset cultural norms. The meaning of collective action and the 
construction of identities are at the centre of his analysis, and Melucci clearly sees a shift 
away from interaction with the state in the activities of movements. Instead, the latter are 
posited as increasingly autonomous from the political system as they become more focused 
on everyday life and individual experience and the political system becomes the means by 
which new projects of ‘cultural freedom* are ‘embodied and stabilized’, rather than the 
locus of demand-making, or indeed of identity creation.
Melucci’s approach develops the work of Alain Touraine (1996), another key figure in the 
new social movement corpus. Reacting to classical sociology with its emphasis on the 
inevitable progression of society towards modernity and the definition of the individual by 
the system, Touraine’s stated aim is to place social actors centre-stage and demonstrate 
their ability to produce their own society. He argues that societies, in the post-industrial 
world at least, no longer have an orientating ‘centre’ such as religion, or the idea of 
progress. Instead, the ‘central principle of orientation’ for social actors has become the 
control of cultural models by which society is defined and regulated. Social movements 
involve the calling into question of the way in which the dominant group manages cultural 
resources, but movements will only emerge if they are able to rise above claim-making, or 
political negotiations and to posit themselves as producers of society, rather than as mere 
reactions to a social situation. Touraine rejects entirely the state as the locus of activity of 
social movements in post-industrial or ‘programmed’ societies, and it is only in these 
societies that social actors have reached sufficient levels of self-reflection and ‘historicity* 
to be able to produce society themselves. In effect, Touraine denies that collective action 
oriented towards urban goods and services can be considered a social movement, since it is 
not aimed at influencing the direction of history.
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A  bridge betw een ‘new ’ and ‘o ld’social m ovem ents
Although the work of Manuel Castells has been associated with the new social movement 
school (Miller 2006) he is perhaps best placed in a category that spans both traditional 
issues of concern for social movement theorists around production and reproduction, and 
those that seek to understand ‘new’ movements’ focus on culture and identity. The 
direction of his work has changed considerably from early, more rigid formulations of 
urban social movements’ role, which was to effect the ‘destruction-transformation of the 
state apparatus’ (Castells 1975: 65). His more recent work has turned to focus on the 
revolutions in communication, and the ‘network 800161/. However, the works most closely 
focused on collective action are The city and the grassroots (1983) and City, class and 
power (1978). Although a pupil of Touraine’s, in these works Castells explicitly counters 
much of the thesis outlined above. Castells posits the state as central to social movement 
action, but he breaks with Marxist theory by underscoring the cross-class nature of urban 
collective action. He also privileges the notion of the cultural production of social 
movements, but grounds their search for cultural shifts and new identities in the concrete 
issues of territory and what he terms ‘collective consumption’, namely housing and urban 
services. He sees urban social movements across the world challenging ‘prevailing cultural * 
values and political institutions, by refusing some spatial forms, by asking for public 
services and by exploring new social meanings for cities’ (Castells 1983: xv). In a series of 
case studies in The city and the grassroots, Castells maps out the importance of the state 
for the activities of social movements. He argues that in the post-war era there has been 
increased state intervention in the provision of urban services and collective consumption, 
and as a result, politics has come to be at the centre of urban processes. This is a result of 
‘urban contradictions’. Capital has become reliant on agglomerations of workers living in 
close proximity in cities. These workers, in turn, must be able to sustain themselves and 
their families and have, furthermore, come to expect a certain level of social protection and 
urban services in what Castells calls the ‘socialization of consumption’. Since it is not 
profitable for business to provide these services, the state must step in to do so, even
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though this is against the interests of the market. As a result, workers have come to direct 
their demands at the state.
For Castells, an urban social movement, to be defined as such, must combine political as 
well as urban and cultural issues:
By urban social movement we understand a conscious collective practice originating 
in urban issues, able to produce qualitative changes in the urban system, local 
culture, and political institutions in contradiction to the dominant social interests 
institutionalized as such at the societal level (Ibid: 278).
Focused on three axes of change at the political, urban and cultural levels, social 
movements must articulate ‘city, community and power’. The findings from his case study 
research emphasize the importance for urban social movements of political self­
management, local government and citizen participation as opposed to centralized, 
bureaucratic and essentially undemocratic governments. These also draw attention, 
repeatedly, to the difficulties faced by social movements once they begin to negotiate the 
terrain of formal politics. Castells’ balanced approach that takes in issues of identity and 
the role of the state, but grounds these in demands for basic urban services, has the 
potential to provide guidance to studies of contemporary social movements in Latin 
America.
The stu dy  o f  collective action in Latin Am erica
It is not Castells’ work, however, that is driving the bulk of enquiry into collective action in 
Latin America, but those more closely associated with the new social movement paradigm. 
Privileging the meaning of collective action for its participants, proponents of this body of 
theory tend to focus on the way in which movements can provide the space for the 
consolidation of new or alternative identities against dominant perspectives or attempts at 
social categorization, and the pursuit of goals outside the traditional political arena. Many 
of those writing with this perspective in Latin America have downplayed the importance of 
the state as a focus of movement demands or placed a fundamental ambiguity over its role,
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as they search to privilege parallel public spaces for political decision-making. This again 
leads to an inward-looking analysis that glosses over social movement interaction with the 
state.
Examples of this approach are given particular emphasis in two key references on social 
movements in Latin America from the last decade: Escobar and Alvarez (1992) and 
Alvarez, Dagnino and Escobar (1998). These volumes display a tendency to present urban 
movements oriented towards basic needs as vehicles for an exploration of identity and 
culture rather than as centred on collective consumption. For example, the discussion of 
squatter movements in Mexico City is used to examine women’s identities and experiences 
as leaders (Diaz-Barriga 1998). In a similar vein, Lind (1992) studies women’s self-help 
groups in Ecuador to probe issues of gender identity and consciousness. These authors 
appear to be following Escobar’s (1992) call for greater analysis of ‘the micro level of 
everyday practices’ within social movements, where the ‘personal is political and cultural’; 
a reading of new social movement theory that implies the adoption of an inwardly-focused 
methodological approach. In both volumes, particularly Escobar and Alvarez (1992), there 
is a marked ambivalence towards the role of the state, with some contributors arguing that 
the state is no longer the ‘object of attraction’ (Calderon, Piscitelli and Reyna 1992: 24). 
Calderon et al. advance the idea that many collective actors in Latin America are engaged 
in a process of distancing from the state as a way of affirming their identity and finding 
their ‘’’small” representativity within their own space’ (Ibid: 25), particularly those with 
ethical or ethnic orientation.
In the specific case of Brazil, much scholarly work on collective action has been devoted to 
how social movements can contribute to the consolidation of democracy through new and 
progressive forms of public policy deliberation and participation. Experiments in 
participatory democracy at municipal level have multiplied across Brazil since the return to 
democracy in the 1980s, and have drawn the attention of international scholars, aid 
agencies and multilateral financial institutions. They have generated a significant body of
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literature on both their direct and indirect impacts, including improvements to 
infrastructure in low-income neighbourhoods, empowerment of the poor, transparency in 
governance and combating of clientelism (Souza 2001). Although the study of these forums 
does bring the state back into view, it tends to put forward an idea of generic ‘civil society 
participation’ that does not disaggregate the types of organization and individuals involved 
(although Rodgers (2007) and Houtzager (2003) have begun to open up this line of 
analysis). Another danger is that the state is placed in opposition to these participatory 
spaces in a way that overlooks the blurring of boundaries between state and society (cf. 
Paoli and Telles 1998). Also, by analysing deliberative councils and participatory forums as 
social movements in themselves, these studies may overlook the fact that organized urban 
movements will likely have existed beforehand and will attempt to win elected seats in 
these participatory spaces (cf. Baierle 1998). By privileging forums and councils, this work 
also implies that there is a single avenue of dialogue and negotiation between state and 
society over urban policy issues. However, as the empirical chapters of this thesis will 
show, well-established social movements will use a number of channels, both formal and 
informal, to influence state power and policy-making.
Whilst studies of collective action in participatory forums have proliferated, analysis of 
social movements’ organization around collective consumption appears to have declined 
with the return to democracy. This may reflect the commonly held belief, examined in 
chapter four, that social movements themselves have been on the wane since the late 
1980s. Foweraker (2001) and Mainwaring (1987) argue that coalitions of movements that 
find common ground in their opposition towards military or authoritarian rule often fall 
apart once democratic government is achieved. They find themselves unable to deal with 
the realization that the state is no longer a clear enemy, since it is likely to respond to some 
of their demands and may try to bring them into the policy-making process (Hochstetler 
2000). For Gohn (1991) and Canel (1992) movements suffer from a brain drain effect, as 
the most able leaders run for local office or become advisors or technical staff for elected 
politicians. These findings resonate with Tarrow’s (1994) argument that it is easier, in a
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democracy, for social movements to orient themselves towards formal political institutions 
and express themselves through electoral politics. He regards movement incorporation 
into political parties as a natural progression for social movements in a newly 
democratized society. Further, he notes the attractiveness for politicians of ready mobilized 
groups of actors whose cause they can trumpet, while proclaiming themselves ‘tribunes of 
the people’ (Ibid: 88). This problem is also noted by Heilman (1992), particularly with 
regard to left-wing parties.
The situation in Brazil is particularly complex, since the ruling Workers’ Party, or PT, 
originated as a social movement closely linked to the trade unions in the peripheries of Sao 
Paulo (Keck 1992).4 It has established a special office within the party structure for 
engagement with social movements, and has set out its intentions to dialogue with 
movements over key policy issues; although this contact with the grassroots appears to 
have been somewhat sidelined in the party’s pursuit of electoral gains. It is also difficult to 
override a long history of clientelist relationships in Brazil, entrenched in the behaviour of 
politicians, but also in that of neighbourhood associations that often form the base of 
urban social movements (Neves 2007). Furthermore, the political science literature on 
Brazil’s transition indicates the resilience of old elites and oligarchs within the political 
system (Hagopian 1996), and the electoral system itself is weighted heavily in favour of the 
politics of personality. It is perhaps partly for this reason -  a disenchantment with Brazil’s 
‘low intensity democracy’ (O’Donnell 1992) -  that many scholars have devoted their 
attention to alternative forms of democratic decision-making or the opportunities for 
cultural expression provided by a more open political system.
The excitement around alternative spaces for social movements and popular participation 
in Brazil through budgeting councils and social policy forums has led a number of 
academics to trumpet the arrival of a new way of doing politics that challenges the 
practices of a hierarchical and extremely unequal society. As Foweraker remarks,
4 D isc u s se d  in  d e ta il in  ch a p ter  fou r.
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In the Latin American context [...] social movements are usually seen as democratic 
actors, both in practice and in purpose; and if there is scant evidence of democratic 
activity within the political system, the theory supposes that they are democratising 
the society at large (Foweraker 1995:3).
In Brazil, where social movements are seen to be redefining what democracy can and ought 
to be, the (ongoing) democratic transition is presented by Dagnino (1998) and Paoli and 
Telles (1998) as a cultural shift. Here, partly through the efforts of social movements, 
society comes to give greater weight to certain values, in particular citizenship and 
equality. Paoli and Telles credit social movements and participatory forums with creating 
new types of political sociability and even a ‘reinvention of the political contract’ stressing 
how the former have established ‘new subjects of rights’. Their principal argument is that 
social movements have extended the political sphere, by unsettling the dominant political 
culture, creating in the process ‘an extended and redefined notion of rights and 
citizenship’ (Paoli and Telles 1998: 66). This analysis clearly draws on new social 
movement theory, despite the fact that much of the collective action they discuss is 
oriented towards collective consumption. In a similar way, Dagnino (1998) focuses on how 
social actors in Brazil democratize society as a whole. They achieve this by putting forward 
new understandings of what it means to be a citizen. She argues they have introduced a 
conception of democracy,
that transcends the limits both of political institutions as traditionally conceived 
and o f‘actually existing democracy’ [...]. The operationalisation of this conception 
of democracy is being carried out through a redefinition of the notion of citizenship 
and of its core referent, the notion of rights (Dagnino 1998: 47).
It is in this way, according to Dagnino, that social movements try to counter the 
exclusionary and authoritarian political and social cultures. Her work does not, however, 
consider how social movement activity might impact upon relations with the Brazilian 
state (cf. Dagnino 2005; 2007).
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These discussions of citizenship, influenced by new social movement theory, appear to 
divorce the concept from its theoretical roots in the relationship between state and society. 
While citizenship should be understood as linked to identity and cultural values, as Castells 
has demonstrated, it must also be anchored in a series of concrete rights and duties 
(discussed in detail in chapter two). Furthermore, whilst new participatory and 
deliberative spaces may be innovative ways of drawing people into the decision-making 
process at the municipal government level, they cannot just be opportunities for personal 
empowerment or education: if they are to be valued by the population at large they must 
produce concrete improvements to urban services. This takes us to the real world of 
political institutions and elected politicians. As Foweraker (1995) notes, writing specifically 
on the Latin American context:
What much of the theory lacks is a properly political analysis of the movements, and 
a realistic assessment of their impact on processes of political change. This requires 
a more intricate inquiry into their demand-making and into their relationships with 
other political actors, and especially with the agencies and apparatuses of the state 
(Foweraker 1995:3-4).
In general, the focus on identity and culture in social movements, on what could be termed 
‘post-material’ issues (Miller 1993) seems somewhat ill-suited to a region where societies 
are marked by such high levels of inequality. It could be argued that such a privileged focus 
on issues of culture and identity runs the risk of ignoring the very tangible basic needs of so 
many Latin Americans, for health, housing and education, around which they are prepared 
to mobilize. As Foweraker (1995) maintains, the new social movement approach, since it 
first emerged in Western Europe, has a tendency to assume that liberal democratic regimes 
are well-established and that civil society is dense, articulate and well-organized. Escobar 
and Alvarez (1992) have challenged the argument against the use of new social movement 
theory in the developing world as cultural imperialism that smacks of snobbery. They warn 
that it is reductionist to look only at the material needs of poor people, and to give less 
attention to other priorities that are ‘important for people whose material needs are less 
pressing’ such as culture (Mainwaring 1997:320). But although identity is important as a
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mobilizing tool, the ‘theoretical obsession’ (Foweraker and Landman 1999) with this aspect 
of collective action could be charged with romanticism, since it betrays an apparent 
inability to separate out movement leaders’ discourse from the daily reality of the 
grassroots membership. No social movement of poor people will last for long if it fails to 
deliver concrete benefits through which it can show potential new recruits that it is worth 
their time and effort to join up. In the context of the developing world, new social 
movement theory should perhaps be seen as a useful methodological approach that has 
helped to improve our understanding of collective action with its emphasis on the 
‘everyday* nature of political activism. But it should not be used to make the claim that 
culture and identity are the primary focus of movements that are clearly oriented towards 
collective consumption.
A disenchantment with Brazil’s formal democracy may, in part, be behind the academic 
focus on the democratization of society and on alternative participatory spaces. But it may 
also be that once movements are no longer linked by the ‘masterff ame’ of democratization, 
they return to their focus on collective consumption and specific services, and this is of less 
interest to political sociologists and scientists. Doubtless new forms of participation in 
budget and policy deliberation forums have had an impact upon the way democracy is 
conceived and partaken of in Brazil and may have helped to democratize society, instilling 
greater levels of ‘citizenship’ in the sense of mutual respect amongst different societal 
groups. However, continued mobilization around goods of collective consumption outside 
formal channels for policy deliberation indicates that basic needs are not being met. It is, 
crucially, a democratized state, not a democratized society that can meet these demands. 
Indicative of this key role for the state is the fact that movements couch their demands in 
the language of citizenship rights. While the inadequacies of the political system and the 
disrespect for civil rights continue to be cause for concern in Brazil, the most visible protest 
by social movements is for social rights: land, housing, health and education, and since 
they are all guaranteed in the 1988 Constitution, these demands are made on the state. 
Studying the response of the state to those who demand the upholding of social rights
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promised by the Constitution has the potential to illuminate the issues of full citizenship 
and state-society relations.
Studying sta te-society  relations in Brazil
Brazil is a highly appropriate site for the empirical study of collective action and state- 
society relations: the country’s recent political and social history has been significantly 
marked by social movement activity. The country was ruled by the military after a coup 
against the left-leaning president Joao Goulart in 1964. Although the military maintained a 
semblance of formal democracy by holding regular, but indirect elections for political 
office, and allowing the presence of an opposition party in the Congress, it was highly 
intolerant of social organizations. The peasant, workers’ and students’ groups that had 
begun to emerge in the early 1960s were quickly crushed at the start of the regime. As will 
be discussed in detail in chapter four, despite this repression neighbourhood level and 
independent trade union organization did not entirely disappear in the peripheries of 
Brazil’s metropolises, in large part due to the support of the Catholic Church. Buoyed by 
strong economic growth which they believed had given them legitimacy, Brazil’s military 
rulers began a process of controlled liberalization in the 1970s, but were surprised by the 
strength of collective protest and mobilization that then emerged. These popular actors 
played an important role in the return to democracy through campaigns for human rights, 
democratic and direct elections and protests against poor standards of living in urban 
areas. Social movements were also closely linked to the emergence of the Workers’ Party 
in 1980, one of the key players in the political arena in the post-dictatorship era. In 
addition, popular participation was harnessed by the ‘constitutive councils’ in the years 
1987-1988, in which aspects of the proposed new Constitution were discussed. Social 
movement representatives were highly active in these discussions and the subsequent 
submission of amendments (Holston 2008).
But social movements were not just important in the process that led up to the 
promulgation of the new Constitution of 1988. The Constitution also provides for
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continued participation of society in matters of government at municipal, state and federal 
level (Goldfrank 2007). This is one reason why Brazil has become fertile territory for the 
proliferation of consultative and deliberative councils on social policy matters. Electoral 
gains made by the PT at municipal level provided further space for organized sectors of 
society to become involved in local government through participatory budgeting systems.
Despite the establishment of democracy, a progressive constitution and the institutional 
steps taken to incorporate societal input into decision-making processes, social movements 
remain active in the country and regularly make their discontent over socio-economic 
issues known. While many social movement representatives take seats on policy councils 
and in budgeting forums, they continue to engage in extra-institutional acts of organization 
and protest, and these are regularly documented in the news media. While left-wing 
academics make negative evaluations of social movement activity in Brazil, protest action 
across the country still makes headlines. Levels of inequality and deprivation are only 
recently beginning to fall, and at base, there are still many millions of people who are not 
benefiting from the country’s economic wealth, nor the promise of democracy to improve 
distribution of income. The presence of so many potential claim-makers with a collective 
memory of successful protest action has led to perseverance in claim-making, and social 
movements remain an important feature of the Brazilian political landscape.
Brazil’s political system in the post-dictatorship era also makes it an interesting and 
potentially illuminating site of study for state-society relations. Since democratization, a 
process of decentralization has been rapidly rolled out across the country. Competencies 
for social services provision have been devolved to state and municipal level elected 
governments. This increase in responsibilities and autonomy has been matched by fiscal 
transfers from the federal government, that are supplemented with local taxation. This 
decentralization brings the state closer to society in geographical terms, as state-level 
assemblies and municipal-level chambers have been put in place. It also increases levels of 
participation in the political process through elections for each sphere of government, and
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in state-level and municipal-level councils that are established to allocate and/or monitor 
government spending. Importantly for this study, decentralization increases the sites of 
protest for social movement action and the number of ways in which organized groups in 
society can develop contacts with elected politicians and bureaucrats.
Social m ovem ents in Sao Paulo
Sao Paulo is particularly apt for the study of urban social movement activity and its 
interaction with the Brazilian state. It is the city most closely linked to the campaigning for 
democratic transition that occurred in the late 1970s and 1980s and has been described as 
the ‘City of Resistance’ (Goldsmith 1994). It is widely argued that organized protest against 
the military regime took root in industrial action on the peripheries of the city, in 
particular the municipalities of the ABC areas, immediately to the Southeast of Sao Paulo 
municipality. Most notable of these was the metalworkers’ strike organized in Sao 
Bernardo by Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva, who eventually took office as Brazilian president in 
2003. Those involved in strike action and in the formation of unofficial unions (outside of 
the corporatist labour structure established by Getulio Vargas in the 1930s) joined forces 
with burgeoning numbers of community organizations and social movements that were 
forming on the peripheries, encouraged and supported by the Catholic Church.
Whilst historically important for the formation of social movements that came together in 
the fight for democracy, Sao Paulo continues to be a site for social movement organizing 
and protest. Although Sao Paulo is the country’s largest and wealthiest city, it exemplifies 
some of Brazil’s worst socioeconomic problems. As will be discussed in detail in Chapter 
three, extreme levels of inequality and the state’s overall negligence of the poor are mapped 
out in the urban fabric. The city centre is degraded and has thousands of empty buildings, 
whilst the poor have traditionally only been able to house themselves in stigmatized, far- 
flung and under-serviced peripheries. As a result, protest tends to be organized around
s T h e  A B C  r e g io n  refers to  th e  c o n tig u o u s  m u n ic ip a lit ie s  o f  S a n to  A n d re , S a o  B ern a rd o  d o  
C a m p o  a n d  S a o  C aetan o  d o  Su l.
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specific social rights -  housing, education and health. These movements are still able to 
mobilize many thousands of individuals for street marches and petitions and there is 
strong networking amongst the different sectors through umbrella bodies such as the CMP 
-  Central de Movimentos Populares or Centre for Popular Movements. The activities of 
these movements are made more visible through the considerable coverage they are given 
in the print media across Sao Paulo city and state.6 Popular mobilization in Sao Paulo is 
generally considered to be much more dynamic than the country’s second city, Rio de 
Janeiro, where the territorial nature of conflict amongst drug-trafficking groups is more 
marked, inhibiting community-level organizing. Movements in Sao Paulo often take the 
lead in national acts of protest.
While Sao Paulo municipality is the wealthiest and most populous in the country, the 
greater metropolitan region is also the capital of Brazil’s most economically important and 
populous state. As a result the city is home to two seats of decentralized government that 
have considerable political cachet: those of Sao Paulo state and Sao Paulo municipality. 
The importance of Sao Paulo state and city for the country as a whole should not be 
underestimated, nor should the political kudos attached to holding the office of mayor or 
state governor. Mobilization and protest in Sao Paulo can, therefore, have national 
significance. The fact that the city has two sites of government leads to what John (2006:5- 
6) refers to as ‘propinquity’, denoting,
The closeness of urban political and social actors to each other and to the social 
process that affect localities which occurs because of the relatively small size of the 
urban space when compared to other decision-making arena. Many key actors know 
each other in local elite networks; and political institutions are not as differentiated 
as at the national level.
This renders Sao Paulo particularly interesting for an examination of the way in which a 
social movement interacts with the elected governments and with the organs of the state 
charged with the provision of social services. In the case of this thesis, this will involve
6 A ll B raz ilian  n e w sp a p e r s  h a v e  a  re g io n a l o r  sp e c if ic  c ity  fo c u s  -  n o n e  is  c o n s id e r e d  to  h a v e  
n a tio n a l sc o p e .
36
study of the municipal and state-level housing secretariats and their respective operational 
bodies: the public companies that finance and organize the building of social housing.
Housing and the Uniao de M ovim entos de M oradia
Of all the social movements active in Sao Paulo, those organized around the provision of 
housing to low-income families are arguably the most active, visible and belligerent. 
Furthermore, the movements’ claims are controversial in a way that those directed towards 
health and education are not. Housing is a constitutional right in Brazil, but was not 
included as such in the original 1988 Constitution. It was only finally guaranteed as a right 
in 2000 through a constitutional amendment, after considerable lobbying by a coalition of 
social actors. Social housing is financially burdensome for the state in any country, and is 
particularly so in Brazil where the concept of subsidized rental housing is almost non­
existent. Those selected to receive social housing, generally in a special lottery, will be 
invited to purchase the property. As a result, provision of social housing involves a 
significant cash transfer to the recipient, in the form of subsidies and/or cheap credit. The 
capital invested in social housing can easily be released through semi-legal sale of the 
property.
Conceiving housing as a right in Brazil is also problematic because of the shortage of 
housing stock. It is not just the poor who have difficulty becoming homeowners; this is also 
a problem for the middle-classes. Furthermore, the housing deficit in the country as a 
whole is considered to be so large as to be insurmountable, even in the long-term. These 
factors, combined with entrenched stigma attached to the poor and their perceived 
inability to take care of their living environments or to cooperate with neighbours in a 
block of flats, further heightens tensions around the provision of housing to low-income 
groups (Souto and Kayano 1996).
The provision of social housing also involves interaction with market forces to an extent 
not shared by the building and staffing of schools and hospitals. Construction of housing
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units both impacts upon and is impacted by the property and land markets. This is of 
critical importance in Sao Paulo, which has some of the highest land values in Brazil. 
Traditionally in Sao Paulo and other large cities, the problem of the elevated cost of urban 
land was avoided by building on marginal land on the peripheries or in the ‘rural zone’ (see 
chapter three). However, the main housing movement in Sao Paulo, the UMM, now 
criticizes this model for creating ‘social apartheid’ and negatively impacting upon the life 
chances of those sent to live in the peripheries. It also queries the economic rationale of 
this policy, since it requires bringing urban services to ever more distant areas. One of the 
UMM’s principal claims now focuses on provision of social housing in well-equipped more 
central areas. This, however, brings their demands into conflict with the interests of 
powerful actors in Sao Paulo linked to real estate and property development. The current 
construction boom in the city and the benefits it brings to the economy have consolidated 
the political clout of the building industry. When it comes to housing in Sao Paulo, the 
municipal and state governments must therefore negotiate this complex terrain of 
interests, which is further complicated by negative stereotypes of the urban poor and a 
tradition of exclusionary housing policy.
Housing in Sao Paulo -  where it is built, by whom and for whom -  is a contentious issue, 
and one that has been deeply politicized by the activities of housing movements. The oldest 
and most important of these is the Uniao de Movimentos de Moradia, an umbrella body 
founded in 1987 to bring together the agendas and protests of the growing number of 
community-based housing associations that were starting to organize regionally within the 
city. Its principal aim is to correct gross inequalities and negligence of the state by lobbying 
for building of residential units and for changes to housing policy so that it privileges the 
poor. The movement has since spread to a number of municipalities in the greater 
metropolitan region, and to other urban municipalities in Sao Paulo state in and around 
the cities of Campinas and Santos. In total, it brings together around fifty separate 
movements, themselves made up of many smaller grupos de origem, neighbourhood 
groups and associations. Since the early 1990s, the UMM model has spread to other states
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in Brazil who are now affiliated to a national organization, the UNMP (Uniao Nacional por 
Moradia Popular -  National Union for Popular Housing) which is run out of the same 
headquarters in Sao Paulo as the UMM and by the same social movement leaders. In Sao 
Paulo city, the UMM regularly interacts with the municipal and state-level governments, 
through negotiations with civil servants, appointed special advisors in the housing 
departments and elected politicians. They use both formal channels for policy deliberation 
and engage in legal and extra-legal forms of protest, drawn from the social movement 
repertoire, to force the state to negotiate. A study of Sao Paulo will therefore provide an 
opportunity for a comparison of the formal and informal strategies engaged in by social 
movements. But more importantly, the fact that housing is enshrined as a constitutional 
right in a city with such entrenched inequalities and where powerful interests contest 
urban space generates a situation where controversial action undertaken by housing 
movements brings the state’s attitude towards the poor into sharp relief. In short, this 
study will analyse social movement organizing around a specific social right (housing) in 
the context of post-democratic transition, as a way of contributing to understandings of 
citizenship and state-society relations in Brazil.
Research Design
This thesis is based on an empirical case study of a social movement, the Uniao de 
Movimentos de Moradia.? The case study framework was employed to support the 
elaboration of an in-depth exploration and analysis of a single organization and of the 
complexity of its relations with the state. As Armato and Caren argue,
Single case-studies are best at explaining the nuances of social phenomena and 
addressing specific mechanisms that produce, reproduce, change or are otherwise 
related to the phenomena (Armato and Caren 2002: 97).
The single case study is often used in the examination of urban politics (John 2006) and is, 
furthermore, ‘compelling’ as ‘the reader can probe it alongside the researcher’ (Ibid: 6).
? T h e  s tu d y  a lso  e x a m in e s  sm a lle r  m o v e m e n ts  a ff ilia ted  w ith  th e  U M M , b u t  th e s e  are  ta k en  a s  
p art o f  th e  o v era ll h o u s in g  m o v e m e n t.
However, the use of a single case study can be problematic: since the research is limited to 
the study of a just one organization, no generalization to populations can be made from the 
research findings (Hamel 1993). However, findings from a case study can be used to make 
theoretical inferences (Gomm, Hammersley and Foster 2000). This process is defined by 
King, Keohane and Verba (1994:8) as ‘using observations from the world to learn about 
other observed facts’. This point is made in a similar way by Yin (2003) who employs the 
term ‘analytical generalization’, to denote the way in which research findings are 
generalized to wider theory. As such, the researcher, through the case study, contributes to 
and expands theoretical debate.
While the object of case studies can be examined through both quantitative and qualitative 
methods of data collection and analysis, this study draws on a qualitative approach, since 
its focus -  perceptions and interpretations of the state, of citizenship and legality -  is not 
concerned with measurement (King et al. 1994; Bryman 2004). The case study framework 
allows for the collection of various types of data (Robson 2002) and in the case of a 
qualitative approach, the use of ‘thick description’ is a way of ensuring there is sufficient 
empirical data from which to make theoretical inferences (Shofield 2000; Bryman 2004; 
Hamel 1993). This study draws principally on interview data and participant observation 
recorded in a field diary, but also makes use of official publications and limited archive 
material. The approach to data collection was, therefore, largely informed by ethnographic 
practice. More specifically, the approach can be described as ‘critical ethnography’ since it 
seeks to link local ethnographic detail to the wider political context (Agar 1996: 27). 
Through long-term and intensive engagement with research participants, the researcher is 
able to gain a detailed understanding of the world which they are navigating and gains a 
degree of access to their interpretations of that world. The combination of interviews and 
participant observation allows the researcher to make a comparison of stated aims and 
opinions and how these play out in practice. Ethnography, as Agar points out, is theory 
generating and is closely related to the grounded theory approach, developed by, among 
others, Strauss and Corbin. Rather than set out to test hypotheses, following the general
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guidelines of Strauss and Corbin (1998), this study began with a broad research theme, 
which was gradually refined into more specific research channels as the fieldwork 
progressed. Analysis of research findings then generates contributions to theoretical 
debate and opens up avenues for future research. The relationship of theory to empirical 
data collection and analysis is, therefore, one of continual reflection and reformulation. 
The compatibility of the case study framework with grounded theory methodology is 
indicated by Hamel (1993) who notes that the case study researcher must combine and 
constantly compare what is picked up from the actors during the research process with 
relevant aspects of sociological theory. This iterative approach chimes with that of 
grounded theory, often referred to as ‘the constant comparative method of analysis’ 
(Robson 2002:193).
Fieldwork
I originally became interested in the Sao Paulo housing movement while working in the 
Rio office of ActionAid, a British NGO in 2000-2001. The movement’s activities, especially 
its occupations of empty buildings and its apparent ability to induce policy change were 
well documented in the Sao Paulo daily newspaper, the Folha de Sao Paulo, that was 
delivered to the NGO office. I returned to Brazil in February 2006 for a five-week pre­
fieldwork visit, during which time I was based at the Sao Paulo research organization, 
Instituto Polis, that specializes in urban social policy. Polis and ActionAid have a long­
standing working relationship with the UMM through their participation in the Forum 
Nacional de Reforma Urbana (FNRU -  National Forum for Urban Reform), an influential 
group of academics, social movements and NGO representatives that lobbies at federal 
government level. When I returned to Sao Paulo in October 2006 to begin a year’s 
fieldwork, I was able to use my contacts in the FNRU to gain introductions to the 
leadership of the UMM.
During the pre-fieldwork visit, I had also made contact with the general coordinator of the 
Frente de Lutas por Moradia (FLM - Housing Struggles Front), an umbrella body for
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housing movements in Sao Paulo that had broken away from the UMM in 2002. Although 
I maintained some contact with the FLM throughout the fieldwork year and was able to 
interview key figures within it, I decided to concentrate my research on the UMM. The 
FLM is a far smaller and much more recent organization than the UMM, and although it 
had organized a very high profile occupation in the centre of Sao Paulo, aside from this one 
building its activities, political acumen and outreach were far less developed than those of 
the UMM. Most important for my decision was the fact that the FLM is heavily funded by 
European NGOs who are rumoured to wield considerable influence over the direction and 
strategies of the movement. Since the aim of this study was to gain an insight into the 
relationship between the Brazilian state and the urban poor through the activities of a 
social movement, it seemed inappropriate to study an organization that weighed up the 
potential impact of foreign funding flows before taking action.
My contact in the Instituto Polis, who had since left the institution to take up a university 
post, put me in email contact with two of the most senior figures in the UMM. He 
introduced me to these two leaders as a colleague of an FNRU member, and someone who 
had undertaken research in the former Soviet Union. The latter was a reference to work I 
had done prior to beginning the PhD, and both comments were designed to reassure the 
movement leaders of my left-wing credentials. During preliminary meetings with these 
leaders, I explained my interest in studying the work of the movement, particularly in its 
negotiations with government over housing in the centre of Sao Paulo. I also stressed my 
willingness to work as a volunteer for the UMM over the course of the year. The decision to 
work as a volunteer arose from a number of concerns: firstly it was an attempt to 
counteract some of the ‘arrogance’ of the ethnographic enterprise (Agar 1996) and to 
contribute something to the organization that, by opening its doors to me, would allow me 
to work towards a PhD. Secondly, introducing myself as a volunteer would explain my 
presence to the rank and file of the movement, and, I hoped, make me less conspicuous. 
Finally, I anticipated that doing voluntary work would speed up the process of building 
trust with movement leaders and members and facilitate access to internal meetings.
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I found the movement leaders extremely willing to help me with my research. They 
declared themselves happy for me to sit in on internal meetings and accompany them to 
seminars and conferences where they would be making presentations. I began to attend 
weekly general meetings of the UMM from November 2006 onwards as well as monthly 
plenaries and other meetings on specific issues called on an ad hoc basis. I also attended 
the monthly meetings of smaller movements and associations based in central districts of 
the city. From January 20071 joined a weekly forum hosted by a local NGO that attempted 
to bring together all the associations and movements working on housing in the centre of 
Sao Paulo, including those from the FLM. Although I considered it unlikely I would be 
permitted to sit in on meetings between the UMM and government representatives, this 
request was also readily accepted, and I was able to attend meetings, convened 
sporadically, at the municipal and state-level housing secretariats.8 This access to 
movement-state negotiations provided me with some important empirical material 
(discussed mainly in chapter six) that could not have been generated through interviews 
alone. I was further permitted to look through files of recent correspondence with 
government officials. Part of this willingness was perhaps due to the presence of two 
volunteers already working with the UMM from the Swiss government volunteer-sending 
agency E-Changer. Members of the UMM were thus used to having foreigners helping out 
in their headquarters. My presence, and the intermittent appearances of a Spanish 
architect, augmented their ‘international department’. Although this term was used in jest, 
movement leaders were keen to introduce their British and Swiss ‘technical advisors’ at 
meetings with government representatives, some of whom appeared genuinely impressed.^
For the first six months of the fieldwork I concentrated solely on participant observation 
and undertook no formal interviews. This corresponds to Agar’s (1996) ‘informal phase’ of 
the fieldwork process during which the researcher builds up knowledge of the local context
8 O n  o n e  o c c a s io n  I w a s  a lso  in v ited  to  a tte n d  a  m e e t in g  a t th e  s ta te - le v e l p u b lic  h o u s in g  
c o m p a n y  w ith  th e  FLM .
9 E u ro p ea n  cu ltu re , a c a d e m ia  an d  g o v e r n m e n t in s t itu t io n s  are  m u c h  a d m ired  b y  th e  B raz ilian  
e lite s , a n d  o u r  p r e se n c e  s e e m e d  to  im p o r t a  d eg ree  o f  k u d o s  to  th e  U M M .
43
that can then be verified and expanded upon during the formal phase of interviewing. I 
attended UMM internal and external meetings at least three times a week, as well as 
seminars, conferences, courses and workshops at which UMM representatives were 
present. I also regularly spent several hours a day at the UMM’s headquarters helping with 
small administrative tasks and cataloguing their library. This meant I was able to chat to 
the UMM members working there or passing through, to catch up on recent events, ask 
specific questions to clear up issues raised at meetings I had not fully understood, and find 
out about planned meetings with municipal and state-level government representatives. 
During the second half of the year I carried out a total of 68 formal interviews. Roughly 
half of these were with movement leaders and members, whilst the other half were with 
politicians, academics and NGO workers associated with the housing movement, as well as 
government representatives in the housing secretariats at municipal, state and federal 
levels.10 The fact that I spent six months as a participant observer before beginning 
interviews meant that I had already spoken informally to almost all of my eventual 
interviewees that were regularly involved with the UMM. In general, I believe I built up 
very high levels of trust amongst representatives of the movement which led to some 
surprisingly frank interviews. Occasionally I was given privileged information as to the 
secret location of planned building occupations. Although encouraged to participate in 
these, I did not accompany night-time building occupations, as these were sometimes met 
with police violence and arrests, were of questionable legality and could have jeopardized 
my leave to remain in the country.
Situating m yse lf  in the research
Although on paper I was in many ways clearly an ‘outsider’ in the research setting, there 
are a number of ways in which I believe I was able to mitigate problems associated with 
‘outsider’ status. I had already lived in Brazil, my fluency in Portuguese is such that I am 
sometimes mistaken for a native speaker, and in terms of physical appearance, I am not
10 A  d is c u ss io n  o f  sa m p lin g , a  l is t  o f  in te r v ie w e e s  a n d  in te r v ie w  g u id e lin e s  are  p r e se n te d  in  th e  
m e th o d o lo g ic a l a p p en d ix .
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obviously a ‘gringa’. Experiences elsewhere in Latin America -  of living in Mexico and 
Chile and undertaking fieldwork in Peru and Cuba had already taught me that British 
‘reserve’ can be mistaken for coldness. The informality of social interaction is perhaps even 
more marked in Brazil, where it is noticeable even at the highest levels of the government 
bureaucracy. Prior exposure to Brazilian ways of doing things allowed me, I believe, to 
strike up friendly relations within members of the UMM from the start. This obviously 
helped me to gain trust within the organization and facilitated the types of relaxed 
conversations about the work of the UMM that were key to gaining a preliminary 
understanding of its functions.
My immersion into the world of the UMM and its many affiliated groups, associations and 
movements, all of which regularly convened meetings, meant that I was exposed to 
hundreds of hours of speeches, declarations and arguments. Once a familiar face, and 
behaving inconspicuously during meetings, (sometimes even unobserved by movement 
leaders who had invited me to attend but had not seen me arrive) I believe that my 
presence had a limited impact on the public discourse of movement leaders and members. 
This permitted me to gain considerable insight into the image of the state presented by the 
UMM’s members and how they perceived the state’s attitude towards the urban poor, 
along with their conceptualizations of housing and of their rights, both to housing and to 
the city in general. I was then able to use these insights to develop the thematic areas of the 
interview guide I later used to probe these issues of concern. Participant observation also 
allowed me to map the ways in which movement members established and maintained 
channels of dialogue with the state. My attendance at meetings held with municipal and 
state representatives was, however, clearly more noticeable when these involved just a 
handful of movement representatives. It is quite possible that the government advisors and 
civil servants were more conciliatory in their attitude towards movement members due to 
my presence, although UMM members never made this assertion. Exposure to the 
responses of those in state bodies to the demands of the movement for provision of 
housing permitted me, similarly, to develop questions to be used in interviews with them.
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R eliability  o f  data, lim itations o f  the research and ethical questions
This ‘dialogic’ approach to interviewing, in which research findings from previous
interviews and participant observation were discussed in subsequent interviews was a way 
of both encouraging critical debate with research participants, and of verifying claims and 
statements that I perceived as particularly salient or unusual. Adapting and adding to the 
interview schedule in this manner is advocated in the grounded theory approach as the 
way to achieve both empirical and theoretical saturation. I was also able to use informal 
conversations with movement leaders and members at its headquarters to verify interview 
responses. Where possible, I have triangulated data gathered through interviews and 
participant observation with work produced in collaboration with the UMM by other 
researchers.
Careful interviewing and attempts to verify and triangulate interview material are the core 
ways in which the researcher can seek to improve the reliability of her data (Bryman 1994). 
There are, however, a number of factors outside the researcher’s control that will inevitably 
impact upon the research process. It is important to acknowledge that all knowledge is 
‘situated’ and produced in specific circumstances that will shape it in some way (Rose 
1997). The researcher’s presence, as well as her cultural and educational background, will 
have an impact on the collection of data. Furthermore, the relationship of interviewer to 
interviewee often suffers from a power imbalance: as Staeheli and Lawson (1995) point 
out, the researcher controls information over the research aims, directs the flow of 
discourse and will be ultimately responsible for the direction that analysis and writing-up 
of findings will take. This power imbalance maybe particularly acute in developing country 
contexts, and might skew the way in which responses to questions are formulated. 
Although I believe I achieved informed consent for all of my interviews, the fact that my 
research was supported by key leadership figures in the movement may have made it 
difficult for those lower down the hierarchy to refuse my requests.
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But while the researcher clearly has an agenda, the research participant’s responses may 
also be guided by the potential benefits of agreeing to be interviewed. As Berry notes,
It is not the obligation of a subject to be objective and to tell us the truth. We have a 
purpose in requesting an interview but ignore the reality that subjects have a 
purpose in the interview too. Consciously or unconsciously, they’ve thought about 
what they want to say in the period between the request and the actual interview. 
They’re talking about their work and, as such, justifying what they do. That’s no 
small matter (Berry 2002: 680).
In the specific case of my own research, movement leaders are keen to speak at 
conferences and NGO workshops outside of Brazil, and may have believed that I could 
help facilitate this. One key movement leader specifically spoke of his interest in travelling 
to the UK. This perception of me and my academic and NGO contacts may have altered 
the way in which movement leaders delivered their responses. There were, however, also 
potential risks in speaking frankly to me during interviews. The leadership of the UMM, as 
one might expect of a body made up of so many smaller movements and associations 
competing for members, resources and media attention, is affected by power struggles and 
‘political differences’ amongst key individuals. Whilst I was relieved to get through a year 
with the UMM without being caught up in any major arguments, I was constantly aware 
that indiscretion on my part could cause problems, and had to frame requests for 
information on sensitive topics in such a way as to underline my own neutrality on the 
issue. Resentment between factions of the UMM and the FLM also prevented me from 
doing in-depth research into the breakaway group. More critically, concerns with the 
overall public image of the UMM may have prevented some movement leaders from being 
completely honest with me. When undertaking research into activist organizations, there 
is a danger that information about the organization can be used in such a way as to be 
harmful to it. As an Universidade de Sao Paulo masters student put it to me, I should be 
very careful not to let my research become an ‘instrument of oppression’. These words 
made an impression upon me, and I have made sure to anonymize references to 
movement members. However, too great a level of caution could prevent me from 
presenting an honest description and critical appraisal of my subject matter. I hope that I
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have managed to strike a balance in this regard.
Finally, the methodological approach taken by this study privileged the relationship 
between state and society and has led to a focus on the movement’s outward annunciation 
of its claims, goals and justifications of its action. This focus on outward projections of 
movement demands on the state means that the issue of gender has not been studied. The 
way in which movement leaders appeared to recite the ‘party line’ when discussing 
questions of citizenship and rights also meant that there was not sufficiently nuanced data 
available from interviews for a disaggregation by gender of understandings of citizenship, 
rights and the way the movement relates to the state. Although approximately half of the 
UMM’s senior leaders were women, there was a marked reluctance amongst many of them 
to use their leadership positions to engage with gender issues either in strategic terms, or 
with regard to the differentiated needs of movement members. Indeed, a number of female 
leaders were hostile towards the establishment of a women’s secretariat within the overall 
structure of the movement, noting that they personally had risen to the top without any 
institutional assistance, and as such, no secretariat was necessary. Although the secretariat 
had been created alongside others for young people, people with disabilities and 
homosexuals, only the last of these appeared to be functioning in any meaningful way. A 
number of women within the movement leadership also put forward a somewhat 
essentialized view of women’s roles as carers and providers, remarking that ‘everyone’s 
first home was in the womb of their mother’. The question of gender would be a profitable 
area for future research within the movement, particularly considering the domestic focus 
of the movement’s campaigning for housing, and the fact that women are often in the 
majority amongst social movement members (Molyneux 2002).
Outline o f  the thesis
Chapter two sets out the broad theoretical framework for the thesis by developing the issue 
of citizenship introduced briefly in this chapter. It traces the roots of the concept in notions 
of civil, political and social rights and argues for the need for a deeper understanding of the
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significance of social rights. In particular, it looks at citizenship within the space of the city 
and the question of housing. The chapter further discusses how citizenship is understood 
and used as a term in Brazil, particularly in the context of ‘disjunctive’ democracy. This 
sets the scene for later discussion on how the fact that housing is a right impacts upon the 
relationship with the state, the ways that demands are made and the type of protest action 
that is employed.
Chapter three provides the context to the empirical content of the thesis through a 
historical overview of the way in which the city of Sao Paulo has grown since the late 
nineteenth century. It shows how and why the poor have generally been housed in 
irregular and illegal settlements on the periphery of the city. It argues that through 
calculated negligence, the state has encouraged the creation of a city that segregates and 
excludes. The illegality of huge swathes of the city further marginalizes its poorer residents 
but is also the background to a conceptual framework employed by the housing 
movements to make their claims against the state. The establishment of a strict dichotomy 
between legal and illegal by many Brazilian authors is questioned here, through reference 
to concepts of legal plurality and ‘local law’ from the work of legal anthropologists.
Chapter four examines the emergence of organized popular movements in the peripheries 
of Sao Paulo in the 1970s towards the end of the military dictatorship, and their 
contribution towards the transition to democracy. It examines Walton’s (1998) typology of 
urban conflict and its relationship with national economic performance, suggesting that 
there can be considerable crossover between different types of collective action focused on 
labour, collective consumption and political rights. The chapter then introduces the UMM 
and details its development over the past twenty years in light of its roots in the transition 
era. It notes the particular importance of the founding of the PT and the drawing up of the 
new Constitution for the movement’s current activities and political positioning.
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Chapter five presents the movement’s discourse and explores how movement leaders and 
members conceptualize the state. It illustrates the significance of housing for low-income 
families, the connection between housing and citizenship, and the way in which adequate 
housing can combat the stigma associated with poverty and socio-spatial marginalization 
within the city. It details the way in which the movement has developed a ‘politics of 
rights’, drawing attention to the gap between the commitments outlined in the 
Constitution and the sub-standard housing of its members. It shows how through the use 
of the discourse of citizenship, formal legal questions around the upholding of the 
Constitution necessarily appear.
Chapter six illustrates how perceptions of housing and citizenship feed into interaction 
between the movement and the state. The chapter draws on participant observation of the 
movement’s internal meetings and external negotiations with public servants. It 
documents the many ways that the movement attempts to influence the state, both in 
terms of formulating pro-poor housing policy and in ensuring that its own members get 
access to housing, and analyses these in light of Gaventa’s (2004) framework of ‘closed’, 
‘invited’ and ‘claimed/created spaces’. The chapter will argue that although the movement 
makes use of participatory forums provided by the state, it does not depend on these for its 
access to policy-makers or members of the legislature. The threat of occupation of empty 
buildings and civil disobedience is always present. This highlights the limitations of 
participatory and institutional channels.
Chapter seven examines building occupations more closely. The chapter analyses how and 
why movements carry out occupations and discusses two different trends in occupations: 
as a means of political protest and as a way of providing shelter. The ramifications of what 
is in essence an illegal act are discussed, both for movement members who spend many 
years living in very vulnerable housing, and for the state, that is forced into a compromised 
bargaining position. The chapter illustrates, through reference to the literature on civil 
disobedience, the way in which the movement is able to take advantage of the illegality
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underpinning the city’s built environment and of the state’s own practice, to give greater 
legitimacy to its demands. The chapter draws on interview material with lawyers and 
public prosecutors in Sao Paulo who have close links to the housing movements and who 
support their claims against the state. This brings into focus particular impacts of the 
housing movement in Sao Paulo, which has achieved both legitimacy for its illegal 
occupations and developed novel interpretations of the right to housing.
Chapter eight puts forward a new way of conceptualizing citizenship amongst the 
organized urban poor in Sao Paulo. Building on the recent work of Holston (2008) on 
‘insurgent citizenship’ in the periphery of the city, the chapter reiterates both the 
importance of social rights for low-income groups, and a discourse based on the 1988 
Constitution for those who claim these rights. It argues that the UMM is able to use the 
law in a creative, rather than a conservative manner, and that through a discourse based 
on constitutional rights, is attempting to dialogue with the state through a channel 
normally reserved for the elite. As such, the chapter develops the work of Chatteijee 
(2004) on the question of political and civil societies. Finally, through a discussion of the 
literature on the anthropology of the state, particularly Mitchell (1991) the chapter 
presents a case for the notion of ‘transgressive’ citizenship, which involves the use of 
formally illegal acts as a way of promoting autonomy, bringing public attention to injustice 
and calling on the state to uphold social rights.
The thesis ends with a brief Conclusion that summarizes the research findings and 
principal contributions of the research, and highlights areas for further academic inquiry.
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Chapter Two
State-society relationships: through the lens o f citizenship
This chapter takes up the question of the interaction between social movements and the 
state raised in the introduction by examining the theoretical literature on state-society 
relations. Whilst relations between organized sectors of society and the state are often 
considered in terms of civil society engagement, this chapter will argue in favour of the use 
of a citizenship lens with which to study this phenomenon. This is due to the problematic 
conceptual ambiguity of the term ‘civil society*. The chapter begins with a discussion of the 
state, drawing in particular on the work of anthropologists of the state who seek to 
understand both how the ‘state idea’ is created, and how the boundary dividing state from 
society is put in place. It then explores how state-society relationships can profitably be 
studied through engagement with the notion of citizenship. The application of citizenship 
theory and its constituent notion of rights is key to an understanding of the housing 
movement in Sao Paulo, since the movement leaders and members themselves employ the 
discourse of citizenship, problematize the notion of‘citizen’ in the context of urban poverty 
and articulate their demands in terms of rights that the state has a duty to uphold. 
However, this chapter will argue that the bulk of recent work on the concept of citizenship 
does not provide an adequate framework for an investigation of the relationships between 
the state and the urban poor in the context of developing countries that display high levels 
of social inequality. In particular it contests both the relative neglect of social rights as a 
core component of citizenship and the unnuanced promotion of the concept of active 
citizenship. It also questions an approach that privileges the politics of difference in a 
context where people are mobilizing for the right to equality. The chapter calls for a re­
reading of the work of T.H. Marshall, with particular regard to his discussion of the 
broader social impacts of the expansion of social rights. It puts forward the idea of‘limited 
citizenship’ as a way of conceptualizing the status of individuals who have the legal status 
of citizen, but lack much of its substantive content. It is argued that limited citizenship
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impacts upon state-society relations and draws social movements into a particular 
relationship with the state. Through a brief discussion of the concept of civil disobedience 
and how it relates to citizenship, the chapter closes by signalling the path that the rest of 
the thesis will take as it develops the idea of ‘transgressive’ citizenship.
Ideas o f  the sta te
Before proceeding with an examination of the relationships between state and society that 
are bound up in the notion of citizenship, it will be necessary to explore the idea of the 
‘state’. Use of the term is itself problematic, since it can imply a homogenous, even 
monolithic, entity. However, as Held (1989) makes clear,
It is important to consider the state as a cluster of agencies, departments, tiers and 
levels, each with their own rules and resources and often with varying purposes and 
objectives. Abstract statements about the state are always a shorthand for this 
‘cluster’ and must be consistent with an exploration of its dynamics (Held 1989:2).
References to the state may also gloss over the distinction between ‘state* and 
‘government’: As Hall points out,
The complex character of the state cannot be reduced to the ways in which the 
institutional machinery of government functions. The state embraces a much wider 
range of functions than the technical and administrative questions of how the 
machinery of government operates (Hall 1984:19).
Highlighting the division between state and government also helps draw focus to the way 
that the state may have certain characteristics that remain in place despite radical changes 
in government. The role of the civil service is critical in this regard. Marxist scholars have 
provided insight into the way in which state bureaucracy can strongly influence or block 
policy formulation. Miliband (1973) argues that by virtue of the need to pass competitive 
exams, members of the civil service, in the example of Western European countries, are 
drawn from the middle and upper classes, and Cockburn (1977) notes, in the case of a 
London borough council, that left-wing politicians’ attempts at reform can be quashed by 
senior permanent officials. These examples bring into question the notion that the state
53
may in some sense be a neutral arbiter between different interest groups in society, as a 
simplistic version of pluralism would have it, or the ‘embodiment of universal interests’ 
(Jessop 2002:456). Indeed, as Miliband argues,
The state bureaucracy, in all its parts, is not an impersonal, un-ideological, a- 
political element in society, above the conflicts in which classes, interests and 
groups engage. By virtue of its ideological dispositions, reinforced by its own 
interests, that bureaucracy, on the contrary, is a crucially important and committed 
element in the maintenance and defence of the structure of power and privilege 
inherent in advanced capitalism (Miliband 1973:116).
Miliband perceives the state as dominated by the economic elite, although other Marxist 
scholars, notably Poulantzas (1972) see the state as ‘relatively autonomous’, in that it must 
be able to arbitrate between different factions among the elite, to preserve the overall 
capitalist framework. Whilst further discussion of this literature is outside the scope of this 
study, reference to these arguments is useful since they make a more general point: that 
the state is constituted by society. Hall’s (1984) more moderate stance modifies the 
original meaning of Poulantzas’ notion, by arguing that the state is relatively autonomous 
in that it is not ‘wholly determined in form and function by society’ (Hall 1984:23) and, set 
above society in order to govern it, the state will also constitute society.
A more nuanced view of the state is given by Offe (1984) and Giddens (1981). Both argue 
that the state is ‘enmeshed in the contradictions of capitalism’ (Giddens 1981:200) but see 
it as susceptible to pressures from the organized working class, and not wholly given over 
to ensuring economic gain for the dominant class. The state has a fundamentally 
ambiguous role, since in order to maintain legitimacy, it takes on the provision of a range 
of social services, but must tax business interests in order to pay for these services. As Held 
(1984: 76) concludes, ‘The multiplicity of economic constraints on state action -  and 
regime survival -  means that the state is not an unambiguous agent of capitalist 
reproduction’.
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Other scholars, particularly anthropologists of the state, have examined more carefully the 
complexities of the relationship between state and society. Much of this literature is 
motivated by a frequent tendency amongst both theorists and society at large to refer to 
‘the state’ in abstract terms and portray it as an autonomous entity. As Migdal (1994:8) 
notes,
Some researchers have gone so far as to reify and anthropomorphize the state, 
treating it as a unitary actor that assesses its situation strategically and then acts 
accordingly to maximize its interests.
For Mitchell (1991) these theorists have mistaken the state’s apparent autonomy for real 
autonomy. But this tendency is, in itself, an important sociological phenomenon and one 
worthy of study. It illustrates the way in which perceptions of the state come to be reified 
and generate their own political reality, becoming ‘social facts’ (Abrams 2006: 122). 
Referring back to Miliband, Abrams notes,
There is a state-system in Miliband’s sense; a palpable nexus of practice and 
institutional structure centred in government and more or less extensive, unified 
and dominant in any given society. And its sources, structure and variations can be 
examined in fairly straightforward and empirical ways. There is, too, a state-idea, 
projected, purveyed and variously believed in different societies and different times 
(Abrams 2006:125 emphasis in the original).
The ‘state idea’ becomes so strong, he continues, that ‘conservatives and radicals alike 
believe that their practice is not directed at each other but at the state; the world of illusion 
prevails’ (Ibid: 126). For Abrams, then, the task of the sociologist is to demystify and study 
this illusion.
The work of Akhil Gupta on India sets out a similar task. He argues that research on the 
state has focused on its highest echelons, structures and policy decisions. This has failed to 
show how the decision-making of civil servants and bureaucrats will impact upon the 
everyday lives of particular populations. This focus cannot illuminate how the idea of the 
state comes to be constructed through multiple mediations of its different rungs and 
institutions at the local level. He concludes, therefore, that investigation into the state must
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involve ‘both the analysis of the everyday practices of local bureaucracies and the 
discursive construction of the state in public culture’ (Gupta 2006:212 emphasis in the 
original), whilst also bearing in mind the ‘translocality’ of the state. Similar approaches are 
advocated by Migdal (1994:15) who calls for an anthropology of the state that includes ‘the 
lowest rungs on the organizational hierarchy where direct engagement with society often 
occurs, and the interaction among the levels’. The local state is, therefore, still to be 
regarded as ‘part of a whole’ (Cockburn 1977: 47).
But the fact that the state is ‘discursively constructed’ means that defining the boundaries 
that separate state and society will always be problematic: ‘There is no position strictly 
outside or inside the state because what is being contested is the terrain of the ideological 
field’ (Gupta 2006:231 emphasis in the original). This question informs the work of 
Migdal, Kohli and Shue and their ‘state-in-society* perspective. They again stress the need 
for disaggregation of the state, but also call for particular attention to be paid to the 
recognition of the ‘blurred and moving boundaries between states and societies; and to 
view states and societies as mutually transforming’ (Migdal, Kohli and Shue 1994:4). But 
perhaps most important for this study is the work of Timothy Mitchell (1991; 2006) who, 
while accepting both the porosity of state-society relations and the existence of a ‘state 
idea’, posits that there is, nevertheless, a line between state and society.
The line between state and society is not the perimeter of an intrinsic entity that can 
be thought of as a freestanding object or actor. It is a line drawn internally, within 
the network of institutional mechanisms through which a certain social and political 
order is maintained. The point that the state’s boundary never marks a real exterior 
suggests why it seems so often elusive and unstable. But this does not mean the line 
is illusory. On the contraiy [...] producing and maintaining the distinction between 
state and society is itself a mechanism that generates resources of power (Mitchell 
2006:175).
Mitchell therefore suggests an ‘alternative approach to the state that begins with this 
uncertain boundary*, one which asks how it is that an effect has been created whereby 
there is a perception that ‘certain aspects of what occurs pertain to society, while others
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stand apart as the state’, and what the significance is of effecting this distinction (Mitchell
1991:89).
Much of the empirical work of this study focuses on the ways that social movements 
interact with the different institutions, groups of people and practices that make up the 
state, including members of the bureaucracy, elected politicians and appointed technical 
advisors in government agencies. As such, this study works towards a disaggregated 
understanding of the state and its multiple relations with societal actors. In the case of 
Brazil, furthermore, the state is divided into municipal, state-level and federal 
administrations, and so analysis must also be broken down along these lines. However, in 
later chapters that draw on the empirical content of this study, analysis of social movement 
interaction with the different levels of the state also seeks to identify how the state-idea is 
created, the significance of this construction and how representatives of both state and 
social movement attempt to manipulate the line drawn between them. The study therefore 
follows Migdal’s (2001:22) guidance for those who pursue a ‘state in society5 approach to 
think of the state in dual terms, as both ‘the powerful image of a clearly bonded, unified 
organization that can be spoken of in singular terms’ and ‘the practices of a heap of loosely 
connected parts or fragments, frequently with ill-defined boundaries between them’.
A b rie f note on the concept o f ‘civil soc ie ty 9
There are a number of reasons why this study takes a citizenship approach to the study of 
state-society relations. Not least among these is the fact that the concept of citizenship is of 
great importance to members of Brazilian social movements. But there are also problems 
with the civil society concept in and of itself. Whilst Chandhoke (1995) argues that ‘the 
state cannot be adequately analysed without reference to civil society5, the distinct 
genealogies of the concept have led, in some cases, to a tendency to analyse civil society 
without adequate reference to the state. Whilst on the one hand the concept can be traced 
to a current in liberal thought as a realm through which the power of the state over society 
is held in check, the recent ‘rediscovery’ of the work of de Tocqueville on associational
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activity has led to a focus on the existence of associations rather than what they actually do. 
The output of Putnam (1993) has been particularly influential in this regard, since his 
assertion that the presence of associational activity is linked to a healthy growth of social 
capital has been taken up by multilateral organizations working in development country 
contexts. This has led to an overwhelming focus on the specific organizational form of the 
NGQ in development literature, amid accusations of depoliticization, and that foreign- 
funded NGOs are not representative of local civil society (Giffen and Earle 2005). Other 
scholars have argued that civil society itself is a Western concept rooted in the colonial 
experience that has been uncritically imposed on non-Western contexts (Santos 1995), 
although Lewis (2001) has made a case for the way in which this imposition has generated 
interesting local responses to the promotion of good governance agendas. But whilst it is a 
descriptive term, the concept of civil society is inherently problematic since it also has a 
normative component, suggesting that associations within society are necessarily 
motivated by the common good (Howell and Pearce 2001). That this is not the case is 
frequently illustrated through reference to criminal gangs with considerable social capital, 
for example the mafia. But there are further underlying problems with the term. As Migdal 
(1994) drawing on Gramsci points out, there is a tendency to assume both a normative 
consensus among social forces and a generally mutually supportive relationship between 
state and civil society. This fails to acknowledge that elements of civil society might be 
pitted against the state, and that the ‘heterogeneous struggles in society’s multiple arenas 
of domination and opposition in which social forces pull in different directions [can] also 
affect the state profoundly’ (Migdal 1994:28). Finally, in a very different vein, Chatteijee 
(2004) in his work on India (discussed in more detail below) rejects the label of civil 
society for groups of the poor who, although far from being criminal gangs, are forced to 
live and work illegally. This critique of the concept finds resonance in this study of a social 
movement that uses illegal acts to highlight the failure of the state to provide adequate 
housing. Although, as will be shown in chapter seven, building occupations can be read as 
acts of civil disobedience, the UMM’s determined breaking of the law jars with the 
normative undercurrents of the term ‘civil society’. In sum, the use of the term civil society
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with its extensive and contradictory conceptual baggage is likely to obfuscate rather than 
clarify the study of state-society relations in this study which will, instead, draw on the 
concept of citizenship.
Core elem ents o f  citizenship
When discussing the notion of citizenship, many studies make reference to its earliest 
incarnation, in ancient Greek cities, where members of thepoZz's took an active role in the 
governing of their society (Isin 2000). However, the exclusive nature of the polis, 
membership of which was denied to women and slaves, renders it a problematic model for 
some critics (Lister 1997). More current understandings of citizenship are grounded in the 
consolidation of the nation state and the elaboration of the notion of rights that began in 
the Enlightenment era in Europe in the eighteenth century. At its most basic level, 
citizenship refers to the status of membership within a nation state, something that is 
bestowed upon the individual by a higher power. The notion of citizenship is therefore 
closely linked to an individual’s national identity. But beyond formal membership 
documented in passports and other official papers that link the individual to a particular 
nation state through (most often) the accident of birth, there are in theory a series of rights 
and entitlements to which the citizen can lay claim.
Stemming from the teachings of the Enlightenment era philosophes, modern 
understandings of citizenship are tightly bound to the idea of universal equality. As 
Holston and Appadurai (1993:1) set out, citizenship, ‘erodes local hierarchies, statuses, and 
privileges in favour of national jurisdictions and contractual relations based in principle on 
an equality of rights’. Similarly, for Scott (1998) writing about post-revolutionary France, 
the establishment of citizenship was a ‘revolutionary political simplification’ that 
homogenized a people by making them equal before the law, and equipping them with 
uniform, inalienable rights. Although he acknowledges that there continued to be a great 
divide between the pays real and the pays legal long after the event, the establishment of 
the ‘facts’ of citizenship in law was clearly a crucial step. For Turner (1992), drawing on the
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work of Talcott Parsons, the development of modern citizenship will require a levelling of 
society to ensure a meritocracy of unmarked, abstract subjects.
The development of citizenship involves a transition from societies based upon 
ascriptive criteria to societies based upon achievement criteria, a transition which 
also involves a shift from particularistic to universalistic values. Thus the emergence 
of the modern citizen requires the constitution of an abstract political subject no 
longer formally confined by the particularities of birth, ethnicity or gender (Turner 
1992:38).
Because of the link between citizenship and equality, universal rights and modernity, it is 
very often equated with the democratic project. For, as Chatteijee has pointed out, being a 
citizen ‘carries the moral connotation of sharing in the sovereignty of the state’ (Chatteijee 
2004:136), whilst O’Donnell has noted that citizenship is dependent upon a government 
that subjects its decisions to the rule of law, and that makes itself accountable to citizens so 
that they may ultimately ratify or reject its actions through the electoral process (O’Donnell 
1992: 38). Once transposed to a democracy, Parsons’ abstract modern citizen will have a 
series of duties to the nation state, and can expect the state, in turn, to uphold a number of 
core rights.
Explorations of citizenship almost invariably make some reference to Marshall’s seminal 
lecture from 1949, Citizenship and social class. Indeed, Held (1989) maintains that any 
exploration of citizenship must address this work. In it Marshall establishes the three core 
elements that make up the notion of citizenship -  the civil, political and social. Within each 
of these elements are a number of basic rights, the fulfilment of which is the key to the 
acquisition of full citizenship.
The civil element is composed of the rights necessary for individual freedom -  
liberty of the person, freedom of speech, thought and faith, the right to own 
property and to conclude valid contracts, and the right to justice. The last is of a 
different order from the others, because it is the right to defend and assert all one’s 
rights on terms of equality with others and by due process of law (Marshall 1964: 
71).
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The political element involves the right to participate in the political process, either as a 
voter or as an elected member of a body invested with political power. Finally, the social 
element encompasses,
The whole range from the right to a modicum of economic welfare and security to 
the right to share to the full in the social heritage and to live the life of a civilized 
being according to the standards prevailing in the society (Ibid: 72).
Each type of right is backed up by a set of institutions, parliament in the case of political 
rights, the courts and judiciary for civil rights and, in the specific context of 1940s Britain, 
social rights are based in the emergent welfare state. Marshall further argues that 
citizenship must be understood as double-sided concept, in that it represents rights that 
are bestowed from above, as well as a series of duties and responsibilities of the citizen 
attached to these rights. An idea of simultaneity, of a continual interplay of something that 
is both bestowed and earned, is implicit in his text. Acknowledging that there is no 
universal principle setting out what the duties of citizenship should be, Marshall makes 
some suggestions, specifying paying taxes and national insurance contributions. More 
generally, he promotes the idea of living the life of a ‘good citizen’ and having an active 
desire to promote the welfare of the ‘community*.
Marshall sets out a chronology for the development of these three sets of rights. Civil rights 
have their origins in eighteenth-century ideas of equality of the individual before the law, 
with the collapse of feudalism in Europe and the rise of capitalism. They are seen to arise 
out of and support market relations and ensure a competitive market economy (Barbalet
1988). Political rights follow on from civil rights in the nineteenth century, with the 
gradual enfranchisement of the population. The development of social rights is finally seen 
coming to fruition in the twentieth century. Marshall makes a specific link between social 
rights and the establishment of legal aid and the welfare state in Great Britain. His 
analysis implies a steady and continual progression towards ever greater and more 
inclusive levels of citizenship:
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The urge forward along the path thus plotted is an urge towards a fuller measure of 
equality, an enrichment of the stuff of which the status [of citizenship] is made and 
an increase in the number of those on whom the status is bestowed (Marshall 1964:
84).
Critiques o f  M arshall
Marshall’s work has been at the centre of critical debate for many decades. His perception 
of steady onwards progress towards ever fuller citizenship has been described as 
‘optimistic’ and a product of his time, writing as he was in the late 1940s (Giddens 1982). 
This idea of progression implies that the expansion of rights is irreversible and overlooks 
the fact that rights once won can be withheld, and substantive citizenship reduced, as well 
as expanded and deepened. As Foweraker and Landman (1997) point out, what the state 
gives, it can also take away. The use of a chronological model for an understanding of the 
development of citizenship rights has also proven problematic for many of Marshall’s 
critics. Giddens (1982) regards the three types of rights as much more ‘entangled’ than is 
maintained in Citizenship and social class, while other commentators have strongly 
criticized Marshall’s chronology for its inapplicability to developing countries and former 
colonies (Chatteijee 2004; Caldeira and Holston 1999). In his defence, Marshall never 
claimed to be writing about anything other than the historical development of rights in the 
English context (Marshall 1964:83).
There has been further debate as to the extent to which Marshall takes into account the 
importance of struggle in the acquisition of citizenship. With his focus on the English 
experience, he stands accused of failing to give adequate attention to the revolutionary 
nature of the push for rights.
Marshall failed to emphasize the idea that historically the growth of social 
citizenship has been typically the outcome of violence or threats of violence, 
bringing the state into the arena as a stabilizer of the social system (Turner 1992: 
3 8 ).
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Held also notes that Marshall’s analysis seems to suggest that through reform based on the 
three types of rights, citizenship can make ‘the modern capitalist system and the liberal 
polity more equal and just without revolutionary activity* (Held 1989: 190). However, 
Turner’s portrait of the state as mediator is also problematic, since it excludes the idea that 
the state might be aligned with class interests that aim to maintain certain sectors in a 
state of incomplete citizenship.
While Marshall’s analysis may not cover issues of violent struggle for citizenship, he does 
acknowledge the tensions that are involved in the expansion of citizenship. He notes that 
while civil citizenship rights emerged simultaneously with the capitalist system in order to 
support it, modern citizenship has evolved into a ‘system of rights which exist in 
antagonistic relationships with the market and class systems’ (Barbalet 1988: 5). The 
expansion of rights, as for example in the increase in ‘industrial citizenship’ achieved 
through trade union activity, brings the workers into a conflictual relationship with the 
elite. At the same time, the growth of social citizenship through the provision of welfare, 
decreases income inequality and will thus ‘mellow the tensions’ that derive from the class 
system (Held 1989:191). As Giddens (1982) points out, Marshall presents citizenship as 
double-edged, in that it can both create social tension, and reduce class divisions. 
However, for Giddens, Marshall’s argument is primarily about mitigating social inequality.
In my view it is more valid to say that class conflict has been a medium o f the 
extension o f citizenship rights than to say that the extension of citizenship rights 
has blunted class divisions. All three forms of citizenship distinguished by Marshall 
are double-edged. They do serve, as levers of struggle, to extend the range of human 
freedoms possible within Western societies; but at the same time they continue to 
be the sparking-points of conflict (Giddens 1982:175 emphasis in the original).
The relationship between citizenship and class is a key element of Marshall’s argument, 
and one to which this chapter later returns. However, the issue of class is often overlooked 
or marginalized in more recent analysis of Marshall’s output. Instead, critics have pointed 
to the rigidity of his model of citizenship and its constituent rights, arguing that it fails to
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take into account alternative identities. For this reason, along with critiques of his ‘linear’ 
and ‘ahistorical’ approach, Marshall also faces charges of being too focused on the 
experiences of the white, European male (Brodie 2000:112). In this vein, Held rejects both 
Giddens’ and Marshall’s focus on class conflict, arguing that if the aim of citizenship 
struggle is for inclusion and participation in the community, then any analysis of 
citizenship must involve, ‘examining the way in which different groups, classes and 
movements struggle to gain degrees of autonomy and control over their lives in the face of 
various forms of stratification, hierarchy and political oppression’ (Held 1989: 199). 
Although discussions of differentiated universalism have made important contributions to 
citizenship theory (discussed below), this chapter maintains, and will demonstrate, that 
Marshall’s focus on class is highly appropriate for the study of lower-income groups 
struggling for access to basic services in the context of high levels of social inequality.
Republican and active citizenship
One further criticism of Marshall involves the charge that social rights are prioritized in his 
outline of citizenship, and as a result, citizenship is depoliticized. For Roche, citizenship 
must be thought of principally as apolitical category. However, he argues that the post-war 
welfare state has turned populations into passive clients of the state,
The theory and practice of social citizenship and of the welfare state has in many 
instances tolerated and even propagated the dependency and depoliticization of 
‘second class citizenship’ (Roche 1987: 381).
This observation is also made by Lister (1997) and finds resonance in the literature on 
republican and active citizenship that has arisen in response to what is perceived to be the 
reductive nature of liberal citizenship. Advocates of liberalism tend to hold a 
conceptualization of minimalist citizenship that is based on legal rights and entitlements. 
Since the liberal democratic project promotes freedom from interference and the 
maximization of individual liberty, there is far less emphasis on the duties of citizens, than 
in the republican tradition As Skinner (1992) has noted, those promoting a republican
concept of citizenship refer less to rights and place greater emphasis on the ideal of the 
common good for which citizens should actively strive. It is precisely contemporary 
democracies’ adoption of liberal and therefore minimal definitions of citizenship that have 
inspired scholars to return to republicanism for a revaluation of the term. As Skinner 
warns,
Contemporary liberalism, especially in its so-called libertarian form, is in danger of 
sweeping the public arena bare of any concepts save those of self-interest and 
individual rights (Skinner 1992: 222).
Similar concerns are voiced by Chantal Mouffe, who sees a failure amongst contemporary 
democratic theorists to tackle the question of citizenship, as they operate with,
A conception of the subject which sees individuals as prior to society, bearers of 
natural rights, and either utility maximising agents or rational subjects. In all cases 
they are abstracted from social and power relations, language, culture and the whole 
set of practices that make agency possible (Mouffe 2000: 95).
Her work on citizenship challenges the depoliticization inherent in models of consensual 
and deliberative politics put forward by proponents of the third way and asserts the 
unavoidably adversarial nature of politics. These critics support the republican vision of an 
active type of citizenship, which entails greater levels of participation in the political 
process, public service and the pursuit of the common good (Skinner 1992). This divide 
between citizenship as a legal status and as active political participation mirrors the way in 
which citizenship can be understood as double-sided concept, in that it represents rights 
that are bestowed from above, as well as a series of duties and responsibilities attached to 
these rights.
The idea of active citizenship is often equated with membership of social movements. At a 
basic level, implicit in much of the literature is the view that the simple act of association in
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a social movement, is a marker of citizenship.11 More explicitly, social movements are 
linked to the acquisition of citizenship since they can act as a ‘both schools for 
understanding rights and vehicles for disseminating ideas and perceptions of rights’ 
(Foweraker and Landman 1997: 33). When joining a movement an individual will gain a 
greater understanding of her rights as a citizen and the duties of the state. In this way, 
citizenship becomes a ‘process’ or social practice (Isin 2000; Turner 1986; Lister 1997; 
Foweraker and Landman 1997). Further, as Barbalet (1988:16) notes, ‘rights are created 
through being exercised, and [...] it is the exercise of rights which generates the capacities 
associated with them’. As such, membership in social movements and engagement in their 
struggles are frequently perceived as a route to the achievement of citizenship. However, as 
I argue in the following sections, much of the literature on social movements and 
citizenship tends to privilege the idea of active citizenship over the content of movements’ 
claims. This is particularly problematic if movements are organizing around citizenship 
rights themselves. Further, as will be shown, criticism of Marshall’s focus on social rights 
fails to contemplate how these can be at the centre of political activity.
N ew  ideas o f  citizenship
The issues of active citizenship, and of conflict and struggle for citizenship are closely 
related to the projects of social movements. Indeed, the latter are credited by a number of 
scholars with having paved the way for the general expansion of citizenship (Foweraker 
and Landman 1997; Turner 1986; Isin and Turner 2002). In the second half of the 
twentieth century they are regarded as having forced the recognition of new types of 
identity by both the state and society at large, and brought previously excluded groups into 
the political arena. The social movements in question here, therefore, are those connected 
with identity and culture, the ‘new’ social movements discussed in the previous chapter. 
For Isin and Turner (2002:4) the rise of new forms of cultural politics ‘has challenged
11 This also seems to be the case in Leach and Scoones’ (2007) discussion of global citizenship, where the 
simple act of engaging in international lobbying seems to qualify the individual for global citizenship; this 
despite the inexistence of any global government that can uphold rights.
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modern understandings of belonging and has contributed to rethinking the meaning of 
citizenship’.
Going beyond definitional aspects of citizenship’s constituent rights, there is much debate 
over the way that citizenship is achieved, what it means to be a citizen and who the status 
is extended to. As Mouffe has pointed out, ‘there are many different visions of citizenship 
and central issues are at stake in their contest’ (Mouffe 1992: 225). At issue here is the fact 
that citizenship is both an exclusive as well as an inclusive category. It defines who is inside 
the polity and to whom privileges and benefits can be extended and through this very act of 
inclusion, it automatically excludes others. As Isin and Turner (2002:3) put it,
While cast in the language of inclusion, belonging and universalism, modern
citizenship has systemically made certain groups strangers and outsiders.
A number of scholars have argued that with globalization and post-modemization, the idea 
of citizenship is subject to fragmentation and change. The status of immigrants, diasporas 
and refugees has become a key concern, and ‘the importance of accommodating some form 
of differentiated citizenship and the inadequacy of modern liberal citizenship are now 
widely accepted’ (Isin and Turner 2002:2). Feminist scholars have been key to the critique 
of traditional theories of citizenship, arguing that these do not provide political 
accommodation for groups who are not culturally equated with white, European males. 
Both Lister (1997) and Young (1990) expose the problem of achieving a balance between 
universality and the specific needs of particular oppressed groups. For Young (1990:167) 
the democratic public should ‘provide mechanisms for the effective recognition and 
representation of the distinct voices and perspectives of those of its constituent groups that 
are oppressed or disadvantaged’. The politics of difference that she outlines would avoid 
further societal fragmentation by recognizing a ‘commonality of interests’. Lister’s 
approach calls for a ‘politics of needs interpretation’ where needs will be translated into 
rights: ‘both needs and rights need to be understood as tiered, embracing both the
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universal and the differentiated, and standing in a dynamic relationship to each other’ 
(Lister 1997: 87).
Accommodation of alternative understandings and practices of citizenship is also a 
concern for those writing on the city, which has traditionally been regarded as the cradle of 
citizenship (Isin 2002). In the late twentieth and early twenty-first century, the 
relationship between the state and the citizen are seen to be changing, particularly with the 
growing informalization of the labour market, and the neo-liberal retraction of the welfare 
state (Roche 2002). Scholars note that loyalty to the nation-state is breaking down, as 
occupations and consumption cross international boundaries. There are greater levels of 
inter-connectedness between international urban centres, and these links are gaining 
ground over the formerly privileged relationship between the city and the nation-state 
(Isin 2000). The size and fragmentation of today’s large cities are further thought to 
constitute an enemy to the idea of citizenship based on engagement in a community 
(Dagger 2000). These factors are changing the way that urban lives are lived and identities 
are created, leading theorists to examine new ways of defining the modern citizen and her 
input into city governance. For a number of these theorists, revised notions of citizenship 
must rely less on the centrality of the state, and more on the social relationships between 
individual citizens and the participation of citizens in the running of their cities and 
societies (Lister 1997). In some of this writing, there is a suggestion of a return to the idea 
of the Greek polis and autonomous city government, and the centrality of the state in 
previous theorizations of citizenship is questioned:
At its most general, in contemporary games of citizenship, citizenship is no longer 
primarily realized in a relation with the state. Indeed, the idea that it was is 
probably a false path opened up by TH Marshall’s famous essay on citizenship. Nor 
does citizenship inhere in participation in a single ‘public sphere’, even if this is 
understood as a ‘diversified civil society’. What we have are a set of dispersed and 
non-totalized practices within which games of citizenship must be played. Games of 
citizenship today entail acts of free but responsible choice in a variety of private, 
corporate and quasi-public practices, from working to shopping (Rose 2000:108).
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For Rose, citizens must become ‘active agents’ operating in a number of different spheres. 
His argument, that citizenship is not necessarily bestowed by the state, and is in fact 
realized through interaction and participation in various public spheres, connects to the 
idea of active citizenship, as discussed above. But his rejection of the state as the focus of 
citizenship in favour of societal interaction in the realms of employment and commerce is a 
world away from the concerns of the urban poor in developing country contexts whose 
focus remains on the state. Furthermore, far from asserting the right to difference, groups 
of the urban poor that mobilize around the absence of social rights are calling for the right 
to ‘sameness’; they demand adequate access to the basic goods and services essential for 
human flourishing that are easily available to wealthier individuals.
L im ited citizenship in the developing w orld
As with much of the literature on new social movements, the focus on identity and cultural 
politics of the differentiated citizenship school appears somewhat out of step with the 
context of the urban poor in the developing world. This is not to deny the importance of 
individuals’ identification with particular sub-groups within society below the catch-all 
category of citizen. However, too close a focus on specific citizen identities may mask 
general priorities of the poor in ensuring that basic social rights, such as healthcare, 
education and housing, are upheld. Furthermore, whilst a number of cities in the global 
South may now be classed as ‘world cities’, not all residents of such cities will be impacted 
to the same extent by changing patterns of international trade, migration and 
communications. Whilst the poor are no doubt affected by the changes in employment 
contracts and the labour market associated with globalization, those living on the margins 
of society, both literally and figuratively, are not necessarily fundamentally affected by 
internationalized patterns of employment and consumption. Nor will these people have 
easy access to the multiple public spheres of citizen interaction outlined by Rose, cited 
above.
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Many low-income residents of the cities of developing countries are not excluded foreign 
migrants or members of minority ethnic groups. In theory and on paper, they are national 
citizens living in a democratic state, but in practice, their exercise of full citizenship is 
limited in a number of ways. It is only through examination of the social elements of 
citizenship, that these ‘disjunctures’ of democracy become evident. These are often masked 
by measures of democracy that focus too narrowly on formal political processes and 
institutions.
Divided from the social, the traditional political definition generally treats 
citizenship in terms of abstract and uniform rights of membership in the nation­
state. This treatment assumes an even distribution of these rights across national 
space and society (Holston and Caldeira 1988: 288).
Somewhat obviously, identity papers and the right to vote do not lead inexorably to 
universal equality, and, as Holston and Appadurai (1993) point out, foreign nationals may 
in practice have the same or even easier access to social, economic and cultural rights as 
the citizens of the country in which they are living. At the same time, in very unequal 
and/or ethnically divided societies co-nationals may receive significantly different 
treatment before the law. Furthermore, where incomes and standards of living vary so 
wildly, the plausibility of shared citizenship based on an ‘imagined community’ (Anderson 
2006) is brought into question. Holston and Appadurai put forward the following 
argument on national citizenship:
Its working assumption is that this national community is committed to 
constituting a common good and to shaping a common life well suited to the 
conditions of modernity. This notion requires a set of self-understandings on the 
part of citizens that lies at the core of the liberal compact of citizenship: it requires 
that people perceive, through a kind of leap of faith, that they are sufficiently similar 
to form common purpose [...]. This liberal compact is now under tremendous strain. 
With the unprecedented growth of economic and social inequalities during the last 
few decades in so many nations, the differences between residents have become too 
gross and the areas of commonality too few to sustain this compact.'As a result, the 
social imaginary of a nation of commensurable citizens disintegrates (Holston and 
Appadurai 1993:11).
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This situation has led these authors to make a distinction between ‘formal’ and 
‘substantive’ citizenship, where the former relates to membership within the nation state 
and the latter to the upholding of an array of social, economic, political and cultural rights.
Holston and Appadaurai’s approach echoes Pinheiro’s (1999) categorization of Latin 
America’s ‘democracies without citizenship’ and O’Donnell’s analysis of emerging 
democracies in the same region in which he develops the idea of ‘low-intensity citizenship’ 
(O’Donnell 1993). He notes that on a colour-coded map of the world, Brazil would be 
predominantly brown in colour, as a country in which state presence, in terms of the 
effectiveness of bureaucracies and of adequately sanctioned legality, is very low. This 
would be in contrast to Norway, which would be largely blue, indicating high levels of state 
presence and effectiveness. In brown areas of the world, private and privatized systems of 
power prevail. Although O’Donnell notes that Brazil would qualify as a ‘polyarchy’, to use 
Dahl’s term12, in that it meets specific criteria for political participation, other liberal rights 
are denied to large numbers of the population.
Peasants, slum dwellers, ihdians, women, etc. often are unable to receive fair 
treatment in the courts, or to obtain from state agencies services to which they are 
entitled, or to be safe from police violence, etc. These are ‘extrapolyarchical’ but still 
politically relevant restrictions; they entail the ineffectiveness of the state-as-law, 
the abating of some rights and guarantees that, as much as voting without coercion, 
are constitutive of citizenship (O’Donnell 1993:1361).
O’Donnell goes on to stress that the denial of these liberal rights is analytically distinct 
from levels of social and economic democratization, although he does concede that 
empirically, low-intensity citizenship is often correlated with poverty and discrimination. 
Caldeira and Holston (1999) reject this qualification, however, and argue that the social, 
political and civil elements of citizenship cannot and should not be separated in this way. 
As they point out, ‘the social conditions of citizenship are constitutive of its political 
possibilities’ (Ibid: 719), and they go on to argue that democracy as a political system
12 Requirements for polyarchy involve unimpaired opportunities for individuals to formulate their 
preferences, to signify their preferences to their fellow citizens and the government by individual and 
collective action, and to have their preferences weighed equally in the conduct of government (Hagopian 
1996: 281).
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cannot flourish in an atmosphere that is culturally and socially hostile to democratic 
citizenship. The concept of democracy is, therefore, as much a qualification of the social as 
it is of the political. Holston (2008: 311) goes further and argues that ‘the realization of 
citizenship is the central and not the collateral issue of democracy’. For both Holston and 
Caldeira it is the disjunctive nature of democracies, in which one constitutive element of 
citizenship might be expanding, while another contracts, that is of interest. They stress the 
importance of an analysis of this ‘disjunctiveness’ to reach an understanding of the 
troubles of contemporary democracies.
The idea of disjuncture is also apparent in the work of Chatteijee (2004) on India in which 
he frames marginalized people as populations rather than citizens and examines their 
relationship to the state. For Chatteijee, subaltern groups, often living and working 
illegally, are not citizens, nor can their associations be described as part of ‘ civil society’. 
This concept, he argues, is inappropriate for highly unequal societies in the developing 
world. In India, where huge numbers of the population are socially and economically 
marginalized, civil society is a category reserved for a small number of the elite.13 
However, these populations of non-citizens are not outside the reach of the state. The rise 
to prominence of an ideal of governmental performance based on welfare and social 
protection has created a drive towards a governance project that aims not to create 
citizens, but to group people into enumerable ‘populations’, so as to provide a more 
smoothly functioning bureaucracy. This relationship does not take into account popular 
sovereignty or require the active participation of citizens. Chatteijee argues for the 
examination of the way in which non-citizens engage with government through the 
channels of ‘political society’, rather than ‘civil society’, and he underlines this assertion by 
describing the two distinct ‘lines’ connecting the government with the governed.
One is the line connecting civil society to the nation-state founded on popular
sovereignty and granting equal rights to citizens. The other is the line connecting
13 Chatteijee does not elaborate on this point, but he is presumably referring to professional societies and 
the like. This finds resonance with Dagnino’s observation (1997) that governments in Brazil prefers to do 
business with NGOs run by middle-class professionals, who have been dubbed ‘five-star civil 800161/.
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populations to governmental agencies pursuing multiple policies of security and 
welfare (Chatteijee 2004: 37).
Although the findings of this study do not correspond exactly to Chatteijee’s scheme, his 
conceptualization of the limited citizenship of marginalized groups is valuable, and will 
guide later theoretical discussions in this thesis. In particular, the concept of limited 
citizenship becomes an intrinsic part of the Sao Paulo housing movement’s political 
discourse. Further, his particular understandings of‘political society* and ‘civil society* and 
the distinctions he makes between them provide a helpful analytical tool for the study of . 
state response to social movement action.
Social righ ts and citizenship in B razil
The discussion so far has mapped out the inadequacy of much of the literature to provide a 
framework for discussions of the citizenship of the urban poor in highly unequal 
developing country contexts. In this regard, Chatteijee’s insights from India and his 
postulation of limited citizenship is an extremely valuable contribution and one that guides 
this study. However, given that the concept of citizenship is composed of a series of rights 
and duties, it will now be important to specify the particular area of citizenship that is most 
crucial to this study.
In the specific case of Sao Paulo, two authors writing on the city over the past decade have 
paid particular attention to the task of disaggregating the different elements that constitute 
the notion of citizenship. These are Caldeira in City o f walls (2000) and Holston in 
Insurgent citizens (2008). Caldeira develops an analysis of disjunctive democracy in her 
study of crime and citizenship in Sao Paulo, and demonstrates how the consolidation of 
political rights in post-dictatorship Brazil coincided with increased violations of civil rights. 
While democratic participation has been deepened, and poorer sectors have become more 
prominent in Brazilian politics, wealthy residents of Sao Paulo and other cities have 
retreated into gated communities and walled condominiums, protected by private security. 
This is a strategy to promote rather than dismiss difference. Massive income inequality and
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a rise in violent crime have further heightened social tensions, with the poor becoming the 
objects of the ‘talk of crime’. The growing criminalization of the poor has led to support for 
police brutality and a rejection of the idea of basic human rights for those who are 
suspected of having committed a crime. The justice system is shown to be inadequate, and 
almost impenetrable for the poorer sectors of the population. Caldeira’s principal 
argument concerns the violation of civil rights and she posits limited civil citizenship as 
the main problem with Brazilian democracy. Her focus on civil rights, however, minimizes 
a discussion of social rights. She refers to social rights specifically only twice, remarking 
that they are ‘relatively well developed’ in Brazil. This seems somewhat surprising, 
considering her lengthy treatment of the way in which the spatial segregation of the city of 
Sao Paulo and the behaviour of the police regularly humiliates and marginalizes those who 
live in its poorer settlements. Returning to Marshall, if social rights involve ‘the right to a 
civilized life’, then the indignity suffered by those living in favelas and slum tenements 
surely involves a violation of social rights.
A discussion of social rights is also notable by its absence in the case of Holston’s recent 
work on organized groups of home-owners living on the city’s peripheries in Insurgent 
Citizens. In this book, Holston rejects the idea of ‘limited citizenship’ to describe those 
socially excluded in Brazil, since he argues that unlike in the US, membership of the 
Brazilian community of citizens has historically been very inclusive. Holston’s main 
argument is that Brazilian citizenship is massively inegalitarian in distribution, and that 
the law has been used to maintain inequalities, particularly in the acquisition of land. He 
puts forward an idea of ‘differentiated citizenship’ which he traces to a ‘centuries- 
persistent politics of legalized differences’ in which the wealthy have been able to use the 
law to maintain their dominance (Holston 2008: 21). The insurgency he sees in the 
peripheries of Sao Paulo relates to the way in which groups of poorer residents have 
challenged their exclusion, particularly from the law. Some of the findings of this thesis, 
particularly the use of the law by social movements and the way that the irregular 
character of much of the city’s low-income housing can promote mobilization, do echo
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those of Holston. However, his empirical focus is on property-owning residents of 
neighbourhoods better described as lower-middle-class than poor, who engage with the 
law to gain legal tenure of the land their homes are built upon in the face of disputes over 
ownership caused by the activities of land swindlers or grileiros.1*. This means that 
Holston examines not the social rights needed for basic human development but property 
rights. He notes his research participants’ use of historical and legal documents to assert 
their individual claims to land, rather than group assertion of entitlement to social rights 
as human beings deserving of a dignified standard of living. Further, the bulk of Holston’s 
fieldwork was undertaken in the late 1980s and early 1990s, and as such, fails to take in the 
ways in which social movements in contemporary Brazil have developed a powerful 
rhetoric linked to the progressive aspects of the 1988 Constitution.
Contrary to both Holston and Caldeira, then, this thesis will place a particular emphasis on 
social rights. These are generally seen to be a different category to civil and political rights 
since they require considerable state expenditure (Barbalet 1988; Foweraker and Landman 
1997).15 They are also notably difficult to analyse in comparative perspective since they are 
culturally specific and will vary greatly from country to country (Jones 2005). Foweraker 
and Landman (1997), for example, omit social rights altogether from their comparison of 
the links between social movements and citizenship in Latin America and Spain. Returning 
to Caldeira, one of the problems with her analysis is her equation of social rights-with 
‘socio-economic rights’. This reduces the idea of social rights to income transfers through 
welfare benefits. Caldeira with Holston defines socio-economic rights in Brazil as ‘insertion 
into the system of government services’ (Caldeira and Holston 1999: 711). They also 
erroneously refer to Marshall’s three elements of citizenship as political, civil and 
socioeconomic rights (Ibid: 718).
*4 Holston (2008) describes grileiros as swindlers involved in scams whereby they pretend to have 
legitimate title to the land they are selling by producing an array of documents, which are either forgeries 
or have been fraudulently acquired.
15 According to Kabeer (2005:2) in classical liberal theory, social rights ‘are seen as entailing excessive state 
intervention, drawing on public resources and hence constituting an infringement of individual liberty’.
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The simplification of the idea of social rights is, however, commonplace. Held (1989) notes 
that throughout his work, Giddens uses the terms ‘social rights’ and ‘economic rights’ 
interchangeably. He also refers to them as ‘welfare rights’ (Giddens 1982:169). But a closer 
reading of Marshall reveals that social rights are much more complex than the receipt of 
benefits, and are of considerable significance in the expansion of citizenship. Indeed, one 
of Marshall’s principal achievements was to accentuate the social side of citizenship and 
show that it was not just a political category. As Barbalet notes, Marshall contributes to 
the study of citizenship by ‘going beyond the conventional idea that membership of a 
community is predominantly a political matter’ (Barbalet 1988:5). The provision of social 
rights such as education, healthcare, housing and legal aid by the state to poorer members 
of society reduces real income inequalities. The incorporation of these rights into the status 
of citizenship, creates a ‘universal right to real income which is not proportionate to the 
market value of the claimant’ (Marshall 1964:96). Those with higher money incomes will 
still have advantages, but in theory, these advantages will only manifest themselves in 
limited areas of consumption, and will be reduced to ‘frills’ and luxuries.
Beyond a certain levelling of incomes, social rights will also have an impact on class 
divisions. Marshall does not argue that equality of citizenship will do away with the 
inequalities of class and acknowledges that tension between citizenship and class hierarchy 
is inevitable. However, he contends that ‘the inequality of the social class system maybe 
acceptable provided the equality of citizenship is recognised’ (Marshall 1964: 70). For 
Marshall, the aim of social rights is ‘class-abatement’, and while this once involved merely 
abating the problems of destitution amongst the poorest members of society, whose 
poverty was considered a nuisance or a threat, it has now ‘assumed the guise of action 
modifying the whole pattern of social inequality’ (Ibid: 96). The common experience of 
receiving the same healthcare provision, for example, should reduce the social distance 
between citizens (Barbalet 1988:51). Roche (1987) has criticized this argument, claiming 
that it overemphasizes the redistributive potential of the welfare state. And Barbalet, 
despite defending much of Marshall’s thesis, does acknowledge that he fails to investigate
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the economic functions of wealth and property. However, for Marshall income is not the 
principal issue at stake,
What matters is that there is a general enrichment of the concrete substance of 
civilized life, a general reduction of risk and insecurity, an equalization between the 
more and the less fortunate at all levels [...]. Equalization is not so much between 
classes as between individuals within a population which is now treated for this 
purpose as though it were one class. Equality of status is more important than 
equality of income (Marshall 1964:102-103).
Barbalet argues that Marshall understands class as a culturally constructed phenomenon, 
rather than one based on income. As a result,
The development of citizenship rights may change the way in which people identify 
themselves and it may alter their feelings about social and class inequalities 
(Barbalet 1988: 57).
The equalization of status will render all members of a society able to recognize themselves 
as ‘first-class’ citizens, regardless of income differentials, and able to share to the full in the 
social heritage of the society, living what is generally perceived, in that society, as a 
civilized existence. The provision of social rights can have, therefore, an important 
psychological component, impacting upon perceptions of status, membership of society 
and, as a consequence, self-worth.
This is particularly important in the case of housing in Brazil, where acquisition of decent 
standard housing is perceived as closely connected to the achievement of citizenship, by 
city residents, policy makers and academics. Here citizenship is tied to notions of dignity, 
self-improvement and social mobility which can be achieved through adequate housing.16 
Having a ‘place’ in the city in this way is contrasted with sub-standard, illegal housing 
outside of the ‘urban zone* of Brazil’s metropolises. To reiterate, this thesis will therefore 
develop a concept of citizenship amongst the urban poor that is based upon a struggle to 
achieve full access to social rights, which in turn bestow non-economic advantages on 
poorer individuals, in particular dignity and a sense of full belonging to society.
16 The link between housing, dignity and citizenship is discussed at length in chapter five.
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Social m ovem ents and citizenship in Brazil
Despite the fact that the most prominent social movements in Brazil are organized around 
inadequate access to basic social rights -  housing, education, land, healthcare -  and focus 
their demands on the state, the majority of sociologists examining the link between urban 
social movements and citizenship in Brazil tend to focus on the relational and societal 
aspects of citizenship. As a result, they privilege the idea that social movements (i) 
contribute to the expansion of mutual respect and egalitarianism (ii) have broadened and 
redefined conceptions of citizenship rights and (iii) have aided an increase in the numbers 
of people who perceive themselves as citizens. Taking the first of these three approaches, 
Dagnino argues that social movements in Brazil from the 1970s onwards created greater 
levels of citizenship by improving social relations within society.
The broader scope of citizenship went far beyond the formal legal acquisition of a 
set of rights within the political-judicial system. Rather, it represented a project for  
a new sociability: a more egalitarian way of organizing all social relations, new 
rules for living together in society, new ways to deal with conflicts, and a new sense 
of public order, of public responsibility, a renewed social contract (Dagnino 2007: 
551 italics in the original).
Elsewhere she elaborates on this point, noting that society must learn ‘to live on different 
terms with these emergent citizens who refuse to remain in the places which were socially 
and culturally defined for them’ (Dagnino 2005: 8). The egalitarian concept of citizenship 
promoted by social movements challenges the intensely hierarchical and authoritarian 
nature of Brazilian society, where the poor are not recognized as bearers of rights (Dagnino 
2007; Telles 1993). This approach, where citizenship is more about relationships within 
society, rather than between citizens and the state finds echoes in the everyday usage of the 
term ‘citizenship’ in Brazil, where it is employed to refer to voluntary work and giving to 
charity, or the respectful treatment of others in public spaces, particularly while on public 
transport or in queues. Sao Paulo residents are invited to exercise their ‘citizenship’ by 
giving up their seats on the bus or metro to those more in need, allowing old people to 
move to the front of the queue in banks and supermarkets and showing lane discipline on
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the city’s main roads. Here the term is being used to set out standards for good practice 
within society, rather than referring to the relationship between state and society.17
The second approach evaluates the impact of these same social movements in such a way 
as to privilege the manner in which they have increased the reach and depth of citizenship, 
and have brought about the redefinition of citizenship (Dagnino 2005).
These movements were unprecedented in their creation of new kinds of rights 
outside the normative and institutional definitions of the state and its legal codes. In 
particular, these rights addressed new collective and personal spaces of daily life in 
the city, especially in the residential neighbourhoods of the peripheries. As these 
‘rights to the city’ expanded citizenship to new social bases, they also created new 
sources of citizenship rights (Caldeira and Holston 1999: 711).
Holston and Appadurai in their discussion of urban social movements in Brazil develop 
this argument further, saying that social movements have changed the ‘very conception of 
rights and citizenship’. They continue,
Rights become more of a claim on than possessions held against the world. They 
become claims on society for the resources necessary to meet the basic needs and 
interests of members [...]. In terms of rights to the city and rights to political 
participation, rights become conceived as aspects of social relatedness rather than 
as inherent and natural properties of individuals (Holston and Appadurai 1999).
The third approach is linked to the idea of active citizenship. It implies that the great 
triumph of social movements in Brazilian urban contexts is the growth in consciousness 
amongst the marginalized of their right to have rights. An example of this is Paoli and 
Telles’ (1998) trumpeting of the growth of citizen participation through social movements 
and participatory forums, in which they privilege the conquest of citizenship. These 
instances of engagement in the political process are perceived as ‘constituent’ of both 
individual and group citizenship. Claims for rights create ‘identities where previously only 
undifferentiated men and women existed in their own deprivation’ (Paoli and Telles 1998:
17 This depoliticised conception of citizenship is also apparent in Wheeler’s (2005) discussion of a Rio 
favela . Although she notes that residents feel that their identity as citizens is challenged by the poor service 
they receive from the public healthcare system, she insists on an inward-looking conceptualisation of 
citizenship grounded in the local community, without regard to its inevitable insertion into the broader 
political arena.
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66). Social movements, they continue, ‘are important as they constitute [...] public arenas 
in which conflicts gain visibility and collective actors become valid spokespersons’ (Ibid). 
Dagnino (2005) notes the risks of an uncritical equation of participation with citizenship. 
Yet it is a common occurrence: Landman and Foweraker (1997) explicitly conflate 
citizenship with involvement in social movements as do Leach and Scoones (2007) and 
Mainwaring (1987).
These three angles on the connection between urban social movements in Brazil and 
citizenship are somewhat problematic for a number of reasons. They are very inward- 
looking, and focus on the impact social organization will have on society itself. This means 
that the state’s role in the acquisition of citizenship is largely ignored. Further, sociologists 
studying the Brazilian context fail to discuss adequately what it is that these social 
movements are organizing for, whether they have achieved their demands, and the 
significance of this. While they credit social movements with creating new citizens, and 
forcing the state to recognize new rights, they gloss over the fact that many serious 
problems of housing and urban services, around which these groups first mobilized, have 
yet to be addressed. There is no discussion of the impacts for citizenship of the state’s 
inability or unwillingness to uphold these new citizenship rights. There is, furthermore, a 
fundamental paradox at the root of the way the activities of social movements that organize 
around social citizenship rights are analysed. If individuals become involved in social 
movements because they are being denied their social rights, then in some respect, their 
citizenship is being violated or is limited. However, the discussion of active citizenship and 
social movements appears somewhat tautological, since it implies that people who have 
joined a movement because their rights are being denied, achieve citizenship through the 
act of joining a social movement. It must be borne in mind that if social movements have 
created new kinds of rights then they have also multiplied the pressure on the state to fulfil 
its commitments to the country’s citizens. Furthermore, the greater the number of rights 
that are included under the umbrella of citizenship, the more ways there are that an 
individual can have this citizenship denied or limited. This will have a clear impact on the
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relationship between society and the state, and in the case of social movements, the way in 
which the movement will mobilize, organize and pressure the state to uphold these new 
rights. It is precisely the question of the failure of the state to uphold rights that is at the 
centre of this research study.
Civil disobedience, the ‘po litics o f  r igh ts9 and ‘transgressive’ citizenship
The above discussion of citizenship and social rights is key to an understanding of the Sao
Paulo housing movement. Their discourse, as will be shown in chapter five, is based on the 
equalizing project of citizenship and grounded in the social rights enshrined in the 
Constitution. The state is condemned by the movement for its failure to uphold the right to 
housing and for maintaining much of the population in a state of limited citizenship. The 
discourse of limited citizenship becomes in this way, both a powerful weapon and a way of 
shaping the ‘state-idea’. This thesis will show how the movement’s discourse on, 
citizenship, the right to housing and the Constitution come together in a ‘politics of rights’ 
(Scheingold 2004) that appeals to society to condemn the gap between constitutional law 
and the reality of life for many of Sao Paulo’s poorer residents.
Although it may seem a digression, it is important at this point to discuss briefly the idea of 
civil disobedience. This is because, in the specific case of the UMM, one of their responses 
to the issue of limited citizenship and the failure of the state to uphold the right to housing 
is to undertake occupations of abandoned buildings. These acts are theoretically illegal and 
are therefore potentially incompatible with the idea of citizenship -  one of the 
responsibilities of citizenship is, after all, to respect the law and behave as a ‘good citizen’. 
However, as will be shown here, acts of civil disobedience can be consonant with the 
concept of citizenship.
The term civil disobedience was first coined by Henry Thoreau in 1848, an American who 
refused to pay his state poll tax in protest at his government’s pursuit of what he 
considered to be an unjust war against Mexico (Brownlee 2007). However, Thoreau’s
81
private act is now considered to be on the margins of what is understood as civil 
disobedience (ibid), which is generally considered to be a collective endeavour by a 
minority group (Cohen and Arato 1994). Although there is some debate on the details of a 
definition of civil disobedience, there are certain core elements that are generally agreed 
upon by scholars. As Jones explains, for an act to be considered one of civil disobedience,
It must be illegal, conscientiously motivated, and performed for a limited end. If it 
were not illegal, it would not be disobedient and, if its aim exceeded certain limits, it 
would cease to be civil disobedience and become revolutionary activity (Jones 2004:
321).
Along with the questions of illegality and conscientiousness, other criteria include 
publicity, (the public nature of the act sets the civil disobedient apart from the ordinary 
criminal) and the exhaustion of other attempts to put forward alternative viewpoints and 
to change the law. A number of authors also stress the communicative nature of an act of 
civil disobedience, another reason that the act must be carried out publicly. As Brownlee 
(2007) notes,
In civilly disobeying the law, a person typically has both forward-looking and 
backward- looking aims. She seeks not only to convey her disavowal and 
condemnation of a certain law or policy, but also to draw public attention to this 
particular issue and thereby instigate a change in law or policy.
The civil disobedient is, therefore, making an ‘appeal to conscience’ to both the authorities 
and the public and engaging in an exercise in ‘public moral education’ (Bedau 1991:6). This 
issue is also taken up by Rawls in his discussion of civil disobedience in A theory o f justice. 
Writing with reference to a society that is ‘reasonably democratic’, it is assumed that,
There is a public conception of justice by reference to which citizens regulate their 
political affairs and interpret the constitution. The persistent and deliberate 
violation of the basic principles of this conception over any extended period of time, 
especially the infringement of the fundamental equal liberties, invites submission or 
resistance. By engaging in civil disobedience a minority forces the majority to 
consider whether it wishes to have its acts construed in this way, or whether, in view 
of the common sense of justice, it wishes to acknowledge the legitimate claims of the 
minority (Rawls 1999: 321).
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One further criteria which an act must meet for it to qualify as civil disobedience is fidelity 
to law. Although the civil disobedient is breaching the law, and protesting a specific aspect 
of it, she still believes in the relevance and importance of law and the legal system (indeed, 
she is trying to improve this system). This means she must accept that she maybe arrested 
and punished by the law. For Turenne, there is a ‘democratic paradox’ at work here, since 
‘civil disobedients disobey the law, but not because they hold the law as such in contempt. 
On the contrary, they are working upon the same basis -  human rights -  as is the legal 
order itself.’ (Turenne 2004: 383-4).
An act of civil disobedience is not an act of random violence, or of unrest designed to bring 
down a government. Since it shows fidelity to law, and aims to contribute to a better 
society, civil disobedience can be contemplated as compatible with citizenship. Further, 
civil disobedience is a way, albeit an unorthodox one, of engaging with the state. It is one of 
a number of ways in which the UMM attempts to negotiate with the state. Other avenues 
include involvement in institutional spaces for participation, as will be documented in 
chapter six. Civil disobedience, however, is a counterweight to institutional participation 
and a way of manoeuvring the line between state and society. And it is the movement’s 
calculated acts of illegality that is key to the concept of ‘transgressive’ citizenship as will be 
outlined in chapter eight.
This thesis is therefore based on the following research questions: (1) what is the
significance of the adoption of a citizenship discourse by a social movement that engages in
formally illegal acts of civil disobedience as well as institutionalized participation? (2) How
does the state respond to movement claims that are made in the language of social rights?*
(3) In what ways can social movement action alter the nature of state-society relations? 
Sum m ary
To quote one final time from Marshall, ‘citizenship is a status bestowed on those who are 
full members of a community’ (1964:84). Membership of this community is grounded in a
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series of rights that must be upheld by the state. Urban citizenship relies, therefore, on the 
fulfilment of certain basic needs and the provision of goods of collective consumption such 
as housing and urban services. But citizenship is also intimately linked to issues of identity, 
especially a perception of belonging to society and being respected as an equal by both 
society and the state. A social movement that organizes around social citizenship rights can 
therefore be seen to transcend the theoretical division between old and new social 
movements discussed in the previous chapter. This chapter has argued that much of the 
existing literature on citizenship is not appropriate for the study of developing country 
contexts with gross social inequality. A focus on active citizenship distracts attention from 
the substance of social movement mobilization, whilst emphasis on the ‘politics of 
difference’ jars with movements that organize around the right to equality of access to 
goods and services necessary for human flourishing. In the main, these studies do not give 
adequate attention to social rights, which are of great importance to social movements of 
the poor in Brazil. As a response, this chapter puts forward the idea of‘limited citizenship’ 
as a way of conceptualizing groups of people without adequate access to the substantive 
content of citizenship. Later chapters in this study consider how limited citizenship 
impacts on relations between state and society and on the behaviour and discourse of 
social movements. The following chapter provides the background to these discussions by 
elaborating on Sao Paulo’s critical housing situation. It examines the negligence of the 
state that has permitted the growth of the ‘illegal’ city on the peripheries and failed to 
eradicate inner-city slum tenements. This discussion provides the contextual background 
for the emergence of housing movements in Sao Paulo, who frame their demands in the 
language of citizenship and the right to the city.
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Chapter Three
Sao Paulo: The illegal city
Introduction
The aim of this chapter is to elaborate on the context of socio-spatial segregation, 
irregular building and lack of urban services in the peripheries of Sao Paulo, briefly 
outlined in chapter one, that eventually provided the catalyst for the emergence of the 
city’s housing movements in the 1980s. The following chapter therefore traces the 
massive growth of the Sao Paulo metropolitan area that began in the late nineteenth 
century with the development of the regional economy, to become the largest urban 
agglomeration in South America by the later decades of the twentieth century. The 
growth of the city can be attributed in large part to the way in which irregular 
settlements expanded on its peripheries in the absence of state housing provision for 
the millions of migrants who came to work in the city.18 The bulk of self-constructed 
housing is characterized by its illegality -  contravening land-use regulations, building 
codes and planning laws. It is principally for this reason that Sao Paulo has been 
dubbed the ‘illegal city*. However, as this chapter shows, the label of illegality attached 
to low-income settlements generates considerable stigma and has implications for the 
citizenship of its residents. But the stark dichotomy between the legal and the illegal 
cities is perhaps somewhat over-determined in the Brazilian scholarly studies discussed 
here, given the fundamental ambiguity surrounding land ownership in Sao Paulo 
(Holston 2008) and the way in which alternative forms of law can emerge in situations 
of irregularity (Santos 1995). Despite this, perceptions of illegality can provide a 
catalyst for social movement mobilization, and a justification for acts of civil 
disobedience, strengthening claims made by urban social movements against the state. 
The context of widespread irregularity and illegality in the city is a component part of
l8This process is not unique to Sao Paulo or Brazil, as Davis (200 6 :3 8 ) notes, ‘“No-cost” peripheral land 
has often been discussed as the magic secret of Third World urbanism: a huge unplanned subsidy to the 
very poor’.
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the Uniao de Movimentos de Moradia’s ‘politics of rights’, as will be shown in later 
chapters.
Although the empirical chapters of this thesis (five, six and seven) look primarily at the 
activities of social movements in the centre of Sao Paulo, it is precisely the huge divide 
between the peripheries and the centre that drives the movement. A thorough 
appreciation of the significance of the centre of Sao Paulo for the urban poor can only 
be achieved through an understanding of the state’s expulsion of the poor to the 
peripheries, its neglect of these areas, and the fundamental irregularity of so much of 
the city. This follows Katznelson’s reading of Harvey’s relational approach to the study 
of cities: ‘the urban centre [...] is regarded as ‘containing a periphery, for there can be 
no centre without a periphery and each helps to define the other’ (Katznelson 1998:16).
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H o m e  to  a n  e s t im a t e d  19 m i l l io n  p e o p le ,  t h e  g r e a te r  S a o  P a u lo  a r e a  is  m a d e  u p  o f  3 9  
m u n ic ip a l i t i e s ,  t h e  la r g e s t  o f  w h ic h ,  t h e  M u n ic ip io  d e  S a o  P a u lo , h a s  a p o p u la t io n  o f  
n e a r ly  11 m i l l io n .1? T h e  c i t y  is  a ls o  B r a z il’s  r ic h e s t ,  c o n t r ib u t in g  a p p r o x im a te ly  18%  o f  
n a t io n a l  G D P . B u t  S a o  P a u lo ’s  s i z e  a n d  s ig n i f i c a n c e  fo r  B r a z il is  a  r e la t iv e ly  r e c e n t  
p h e n o m e n o n .  A t  t h e  e n d  o f  t h e  n in e t e e n t h  c e n t u r y  i t  w a s  l i t t l e  m o r e  th a n  a  p r o v in c ia l  
b a c k w a te r :  a  s t o p  o n  t h e  r a i lw a y  l in e  b e t w e e n  t h e  c o f f e e  p la n t a t io n s  o f  th e  in t e r io r  o f  
t h e  s t a t e  o f  S a o  P a u lo  a n d  t h e  p o r t  o f  S a n t o s .  I t s  p h e n o m e n a l  d e m o g r a p h ic  g r o w th  
b e g a n  w it h  o v e r s e a s  im m ig r a t io n  a t  t h e  tu r n  o f  t h e  t w e n t i e t h  c e n tu r y  a t  t h e  t im e  o f  th e  
c o f f e e  b o o m .20 T h is  w a s  la t e r  r e p la c e d  b y  in t e r n a l  m ig r a t io n  fr o m  t h e  N o r th  a n d  
N o r t h e a s t  o f  t h e  c o u n t r y  a s  B r a z il b e g a n  a  p r o g r a m m e  o f  in t e n s iv e  in d u s tr ia l iz a t io n  
f r o m  t h e  1 9 3 0 s  o n w a r d s .  T h e  c i t y ’s  p o p u la t io n  h a d  s t e a d y  g r o w th  r a te s  o f  b e t w e e n  5 -
Source: SEADE 2006 Sistema Estadual de Analise de Dados.
20 The population of 239 820 recorded in the census of 1900 was 7.5 times that of 1872. The population of 
the municipality of Sao Paulo grew at 14% per year in the final decade of the nineteenth century.
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6% per year from 1940 until 197021. Average rates for the city currently stand at about 
1.5% annually, but this figure belies significant differences between regions. While 
central districts have negative growth rates, new peri-urban settlements in 
environmentally sensitive zones in the furthest reaches of the municipality have 
recorded growth rates of 8.1% (Torres, Alves and Oliveira 2007).
Despite its wealth and, as a state capital at the centre of a huge regional economy, its 
status as the economic powerhouse of the country, Sao Paulo does not escape the 
problems of massive income inequality for which Brazil is notorious. Recent data show 
22.4% of the Brazilian population living on less than $2 a day, while the Gini coefficient 
measure of inequality stands at 0.564,22 amongst the highest in the world. Frequently 
cited statistics point to the massive concentration of wealth amongst a very small 
segment of the population: the poorest 10% of the population account for 0.1% of 
national income, while the richest 10% account for 47% (UNDP 2005). Levels of 
inequality in Sao Paulo have remained almost constant over the past decade despite 
reductions in the national average; the Gini coefficient for the Metropolitan Region was 
0.543 in 2 0 o6.23 The spatial segregation of residential neighbourhoods in Sao Paulo 
mirrors the social segregation caused by massively skewed distribution of wealth in the 
country.
Sao Paulo is today a bewildering large and sprawling city. It is architecturally diverse, if 
not muddled and seemingly unplanned. Its growth during the twentieth century has 
been described by architects, planners and social scientists as anarchic and chaotic. It 
has been dubbed the ‘wild city’ (Rolnik 1995) and much of the literature on the 
Brazilian urban experience posits the city as the ‘new configuration of disorder’ (Rizek 
2003). Sao Paulo, along with other Brazilian metropolises, is also characterized as a 
divided city. It has enormous and extremely visible disparities between residential
21 Source: Prefeitura Municipal de Sao Paulo.
22 Where 1= perfect inequality.
23 Source: Instituto de Estudos do Trabalho e Sociedade
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areas of the rich and poor. Much of the impression of the chaos of the city must derive 
from the huge expanse of rambling low-rise, low-income, self-built peripheries. These 
are in marked contrast to the planned garden-city neighbourhoods, glitzy high-rises 
and gated condominiums of the wealthier areas, giving rise to Milton Santos’s 
evaluation that, ‘The housing situation is a visual reflection of what is happening in the 
rest of Sao Paulo 800161/ (Santos 1996:231). Although low-income housing is 
concentrated on the periphery, there are also pockets of extreme poverty and 
deprivation in the centre of the city. The central districts are where the majority of the 
city’s slum tenements are located. Known as cortigos, these are generally large, 
formerly single-family residences given over to multiple occupancy. They are far less 
visible than Sao Paulo’s favelas or shanty-towns and self-built peripheries2^ , but 
conditions are considered as bad, if not worse: families live in one room and share the 
use of bathrooms and laundry facilities. The housing deficit for the municipality of Sao 
Paulo is estimated at 850 000 units.25
But it is not just the huge disparity in incomes, lifestyles and residential areas that fuels 
the depiction of Sao Paulo as a divided city. Alongside these highly visible markers of 
inequality academics have established another division: between the legal city and the 
illegal, clandestine or ‘non-city*26 (Santos 2002; Grostein 1987; Maricato 2000). This 
dichotomy is also set out in terms of the ‘official’ city as opposed to the ‘real’ city 
(Rolnik 1995). Social scientists, planners and architects differ in their interpretations of 
how and why these divisions arose, but they are driven by the reality that characterizes 
Sao Paulo today where between 50 and 65 percent of land is illegally or irregularly 
occupied, or in some other way infringes on laws of planning, building or zoning 
(Rolnik, Kowarick and Somekh 1991; Maricato 2000; Caldeira 2000). State absence is 
often posited as the cause of Sao Paulo’s anarchic sprawl, particularly in the area of
24 A fave la  is generally defined as an illegally occupied area without paved roads and characterised by poor 
quality housing construction. In practice, fave la s  are often visually indistinguishable from other peripheral 
areas where families have built their own homes on land they have purchased, which are equally lacking in 
urban services and adherence to building codes.
2s Source:www.prefeitura.sp.gov.br
26 The term ‘non-city’ or ‘nao-cidade’ was used repeatedly by Rolnik in an interview 17.07.07
89
regulation for low-income settlements. For example, Sposati comments in Kowarick 
(ed.) (2004: 88):
Sao Paulo is a highly privatized city, historically overlooked by the state [...] It is a 
city with very low state regulation [and] with very low state capacity for 
redistribution that has left the population having to fight to get basic standards of 
urban living like housing, health, education and security, amongst other things. 27
However, research would suggest that this was a wilful absence that suited the state’s 
interests in industrial expansion, and the elite’s desire to maintain social segregation in 
the city. Far from lacking regulations and legislation, as Grostein (1987) points out, the 
state’s planners and legislators were busy throughout the twentieth century. Yet, as will 
now be demonstrated, legislation did not keep up with the growth of the city in real 
terms and was systematically ignored or used in such a way as to encourage land 
speculation and keep low-income workers outside the urban perimeter, where zoning 
and planning laws did not apply.
The grow th  o f  the c ity
Much of the following section draws upon secondary data coming out of the Faculty of 
Architecture and Urbanism at the University of Sao Paulo, in particular Rolnik (1995) 
Grostein (1987) Bonduki (1998) and Maricato (1996). These Brazilian academics have 
been heavily influenced by the reappraisal of the role of planning that has occurred in 
recently decades, particularly the work of David Harvey (1985; 1988). This involves a 
rejection of the idea put forward by the modernist school of architecture in the early 
twentieth century (which had a profound effect on Brazilian planning practice (Holston
1989)) that city planning is an apolitical endeavour. Le Corbusier, who was particularly 
influential in Brazil, argued that far from being political, plans were rational and ‘a 
necessary and objective ordering of society’ (Fishman 1996: 59). Modernist plans were 
comprehensive, and based on a belief that ‘reforming the physical environment can 
revolutionize the total life of the city* (Ibid: 20). Critiques of comprehensive planning
2? Translations of works published in Portuguese are my own.
90
have exposed how firstly it requires an impossibly complex level of knowledge to 
address the problems of an entire city, and secondly, that in its assumption of a 
common interest, it in fact gives voice to only one sector of society, ignoring the needs 
of poorer and weaker residents (Campbell and Fainstein 1996). It is this last point that 
underpins much of the work of Brazilian scholars of Sao Paulo’s geographical spread, 
who contest the idea that planners are necessarily inspired by progressive social goals, 
and that they take on ‘the role o f‘righter of wrongs’, ‘corrector of imbalances’, and 
‘defender of the public interest” (Harvey 1985:177). As an illustration of the way in 
which planning can be subject to class interests, Brazilian academics note the over­
regulated nature of upper-income residential areas of Sao Paulo in contrast to the 
peripheries that have developed in the almost entire absence of planning (Villaga 
2005). The influence of David Harvey’s work on the relationship between planning and 
economic development is also apparent in the discussions of Kowarick and Oliveira 
below, who examine the link between self-building on the peripheries and massive 
industrial growth during the Brazilian ‘miracle’. Whilst planning has been 
conceptualized as both a support for and a hindrance to economic growth (Harrison, 
Todes and Watson 2008) the Brazilian scholars cited here see planning as serving the 
interests of big business and real estate development. Finally, a number of Brazilian 
architects and scholars cited in this chapter have been involved in recent attempts to 
promote planning based on collaboration (Healey 1997) or advocacy (Campbell and 
Fainstein 1996) for the city, through new instruments such as participatory budgeting, 
policy councils and city-wide engagement in the drawing up of the Master Plan.
That planning does not necessarily always serve the public good is amply illustrated by 
the case of apartheid South Africa. Indeed, the cities of South Africa make an 
interesting comparison to those of Brazil, not least because members of the Movimento 
Sem Teto speak of ‘social apartheid’ when they contrast the sprawling, irregularly built 
peripheries of low-income housing in Sao Paulo, with the centrally-located and 
carefully regulated elite residential neighbourhoods. This comparison with the racist
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planning policies of the South African regime may seem extreme and is clearly designed 
to shock Brazilian society, parts of which still comfort themselves with the myth of 
Gilberto Freyre’s ‘racial democracy’.28 But similarities can be drawn in the geography of 
Sao Paulo, and for example, Cape Town, in that marginalized, low-income residents 
have come to live in areas distant from their places of work, causing the cities to spread 
out over a large area (Harrison et al. 2008). However, whilst planning played a key role 
in separating people of different ethnic origin in South African cities, in the case of Sao 
Paulo, social segregation has been achieved through calculated neglect of workers’ 
interests and a distinct absence of effective planning. Fernandes makes this point for 
Latin American cities generally, noting that in many cases, state inaction has,
Determined the exclusionary nature of urban development in Latin America, 
combining property speculation, widespread vacant urban land, environmental 
degradation, widespread gated communities, and above all the proliferation of 
precarious informal settlements (Fernandes 2007:210).
The rest of this section explores how the growth of Sao Paulo has exacerbated 
inequalities by giving spatial form to extant unequal distribution of income, and 
assesses the role of the state in promoting the illegality and urban socio-spatial 
segregation that arose during the twentieth centuiy.
Irregularity of land occupation in Sao Paulo did not start with twentieth century 
industrialization and migration; it can be traced back to the city’s first colonial 
inhabitants. The city was founded by Jesuit missionaries in 1554, and as a possession of 
the Portuguese crown, land occupation in Brazil followed the system in use in Portugal 
at the time. Rolnik (1995) has shown how parallel to the system known as the sesmaria 
(where land was ceded by the crown for free as long as a tithe was paid to the religious 
order Ordem de Cristo) ran a separate informal system of occupation that was not 
officially registered. Informal land occupations were tolerated because of the difficult 
bureaucracy of the sesmaria system. Rolnik therefore argues that land ownership in
28 This is a (now much contested) belief that Brazil has escaped the racial prejudice of other countries, 
particularly the US, and that Brazilians do not view each other through the lens of race.
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Sao Paulo has always been based on a dual system where issues of legal ownership and 
use-rights are unclear.
The coexistence of a legality inscribed in the law (law-in-books) and a legitimacy 
inscribed in social practice (law-in-action), established since the colonial period in 
the complementary nature of free occupations and the sesmaria system, would 
constitute one of the fundamental aspects of urban property law in Brazil (Rolnik: 
1995: 37).
After independence from Portugal in 1822 the sesmaria system was abandoned and 
extensive occupation of land was authorized. Although this ended in 1850 with the Lei 
da Terra, designed to prevent freed slaves from occupying land, she continues,
What must be recognized -  because it defines the terms of urban development in 
Brazil -  is the existence of the binomial pattern of two legal orders coexisting in 
permanent tension. The history of urban land use is in part a history of 
appropriation of space through both real occupation and legal ownership (Ibid: 38).
It was not until the final decades of the nineteenth century, however, as Sao Paulo 
began to grow significantly, that questions of urban planning and the problem of low- 
income housing came to the fore. Separation of neighbourhoods by social status and 
function became a priority.29 This was motivated in part by epidemics of cholera and 
yellow fever that swept through the centre of the city where there were large black 
populations of former slaves as well as high-income residences (Bonduki 1998).
Seeing a threat from close proximity to the poor, and making clear connections between 
poverty, disease, promiscuity and crime in what is referred to as a higienista, or 
‘hygienicist’ discourse, the municipal authorities introduced draconian hygiene 
measures and laws to improve the standards of cortiqos as well as to prevent further 
growth of this type of accommodation in the central districts.
Disease, immorality and poverty were spun together so that the precarious housing 
conditions were immediately related to immorality and disease, demarcating a 
territory rejected in the urbanistic culture of the city. (Rolnik 1995: 76-77).
29 During the period of slavery, slaves and masters had lived in close proximity, albeit in very different 
conditions.
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Meanwhile, the elites began to move out of the centre in a south-westerly direction 
towards new, planned, garden-city neighbourhoods in an exodus that still continues 
today.30 By contrast, the rural zone of the municipality, that was beyond the urban 
perimeter and far from high-income neighbourhoods, became the principal zone 
reserved for the poor. Here land could be illegally occupied, or bought at low prices 
from a ‘clandestine’ sub-divider, who may, or may not, have had legal title to the land. 
The strategy of reserving the most distant of lands for the poor, ‘survived the century 
without significant change’ (Ibid: 89).
The model of self-building on the periphery, outside the urban zone, accelerated with 
the advent of the diesel bus in the second half of the 1920s (Holston 2008). Once mass 
transport was easily and cheaply available, the expansion of low-income settlements on 
clandestine or irregular subdivisions in the peripheral rural zone exploded.31 Favelas 
were not a feature of the Sao Paulo landscape until the 1970s, since, up until that time, 
land on the peripheries was cheap enough for poor urban workers to purchase and then 
slowly build their homes (Kowarick 1979; Bonduki 1998).32 This has led to a situation in 
the city in which today 80% of residents of the peripheries are home owners, with 69% 
in other areas (Holston 20o8:i83).33 During the period known as the Republica Velha 
or the Old Republic, that lasted from 1889 up until the Revolution of 1930 when the 
populist president, Getulio Vargas, first came to power, the state’s presence in the city, 
and in private life in general, was limited (Bonduki 1998). Oliveira has noted how the 
state should, in theory, be more visible in urban areas than rural ones, through the
3° The Folha de Sao Paulo 19 /06 /05 , reports that between 1981 and 2000  the thirteen central districts of 
the city showed negative growth rates. According to the paper it is principally the middle and upper classes 
who are leaving the centre.
31 Although the term ‘clandestine’ is used generically, according to Grostein (1987) a clandestine 
subdivision is one that the authorities have no record of, whilst a subdivision deemed as irregular is known 
to the authorities but does not fulfil all the legal requirements. Before being included into the official city, 
residents would be unable to register ownership of either type of property and would not receive public 
services.
32 The difference between houses built on clandestine/irregular subdivisions and fa ve la s  is that with 
subdivisions, there is some notion of property and purchase of title, whereas fave las  are characterised by 
occupation not purchase. However, the quality of construction and extent of the urbanization of public 
areas may be very similar in both types of settlement (Grostein 1987:19; Kowarick 1979).
33 The norm of property ownership, even amongst very low-income families, has significant implications 
for the work of the housing movements leaders today, who struggle to promote the concept of social rental 
to their members.
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installation of public works and services (Oliveira 1982). However, in the first decades 
of the twentieth century the state gave almost free rein to private, often foreign-owned 
transport and utility companies, to decide where and when to install services in Sao 
Paulo. These companies were also often involved in land speculation and property 
development, and would put infrastructure in place in areas as yet sparsely populated 
in order both to raise land values and encourage further development, rather than in 
poorer areas where large numbers of people had already been living for years without 
adequate transport or access to basic services.
Grostein (1987) illustrates how and why the unserviced rural zone was reserved for the 
poor. While building within the urban perimeter was, in theory, subject to regulation, 
homes in the rural zone, or in ‘private roads’ within the urban perimeter were not 
covered by urban legislation. The rural zone was reserved by the municipal authorities 
as the space where planning norms did not apply, the space where ‘everything is 
allowed’ (Grostein 1987: 243). The municipality similarly renounced responsibility for 
conditions in private roads. Thus the state would not have to involve itself in approving 
plans, ensuring the quality of the built environment or making sure public services 
were provided. As Rolnik notes, during the 1920s the pattern of building in low-income 
peripheral settlements was established that would become characteristic of Sao Paulo’s 
metropolis, with ‘a near total irregularity before the laws and codes that set the rules for 
land use and occupation in the city* (Rolnik 1995: 275). Furthermore, since roads were 
opened up in unregulated areas without legal approval, this meant that as far as the 
bureaucracy were concerned, they did not exist despite being ‘laid out and occupied’ 
(Ibid: 243). This had considerable implications for their resident’s existence in political 
terms, as will be discussed later.
However, the official non-existence of large parts of the city did not result from 
incompetence or casual negligence on the part of the authorities. Instead, perversely, 
Sao Paulo was consolidated as a city through irregular and clandestine occupation and
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construction, in which the state played a key facilitating role. In 1931, the mayor of Sao 
Paulo, Anahaia Mello, declared that the ‘clandestine city* was larger than the official 
city. Existing legislation was consolidated in a single Codigo de Obras (Works Code) in 
1934, in an attempt to subject the city to the law. By this time, however, popular 
pressure was also mounting on the municipality to regularize illegal areas in the city. 
The few attempts by the municipalities to enforce planning legislation, by, for example, 
knocking down homes on an illegally opened road, were met with resistance. The city 
continued to grow, and by 1930 this type of monitoring and regulation of the built 
environment became unworkable (Bonduki 1998). As a result, the authorities tended 
instead to resort to generalized amnesties, where areas of the rural zone with urban 
uses were incorporated into the official city. This policy was repeated at intervals from 
the 1930s onwards.
Sao Paulo has not evolved in a seemingly disorderly way simply for lack of urban 
planning. A culture of disobedience to the law, and, indeed, encouragement on the part 
of the state for the population to break the law, has led to the anarchy of Sao Paulo’s 
built environment (Grostein 1987).34 From the 1950s onwards, the municipal 
authorities began to produce urban legislation that in theory would plan for and limit 
city growth. However, the rationalist ideology behind the planning showed a lack of fit 
with the way in which the city was actually growing, based on illegal or irregular 
occupations. And crucially, this legislation ran concurrently with a policy of periodic 
amnesties, which, as Rolnik (1995) points out, systematically omitted large swathes of 
settled land from inclusion in the ‘official’ city, each time the urban perimeter was 
redrawn. Even so, the state was establishing a pattern of behaviour that could be 
predicted by those opening up new areas irregularly in the rural zone for low-income 
housing, or illegally sub-dividing plots of land. Eventually, they would be regularized 
and become part of the legal city. Grostein regards the state’s actions as ambiguous, for
34 This type of consistent but low-profile law-breaking that eventually leads to amnesties or modifications 
to the law is best understood as ‘rule evasion’ (Leitzel 2002). It is significantly different to the overt and 
politicised illegal activity characterised as ‘civil disobedience’ discussed in chapter two.
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by bringing irregularly or illegally built areas into the official city, it was attempting to 
exercise some control over the occupation of urban space in the municipality. However, 
it simultaneously created the institutional conditions whereby clandestine occupation 
and building would continue (Grostein 1987: 49).
The law and its transgression were intimately linked. Within the law itself lay the
possibility of breaking it (Ibid: 541).
By encouraging the growth of the clandestine city in this way the state revealed how 
little importance it gave to housing conditions for those with the lowest incomes (Ibid: 
242). The rural zone became a ‘dumping ground’ (vertedouro) for those who could not 
afford to buy a plot of land in the official city. Furthermore, when these areas were 
eventually incorporated into the legal city, as this was most often achieved through a 
general amnesty, nothing was done to address the inadequate structural conditions of 
the housing stock. An amnesty would bring a street or neighbourhood into the tax base, 
and facilitate the installation of services, but the illegality of building, and irregularity 
of tenure would generally remain.
Urban segregation
The city grew illegally in part because the state failed to control, and effectively 
encouraged, irregular occupation. There was a clear benefit in allowing the unchecked 
expansion of the rural zone since it eased pressure on housing and obviated the 
provision of public services. But there were also more insidious processes at work. As 
the elites moved out of the central districts in the early twentieth century, the 
authorities gradually began to establish zoning laws to protect the status of the new 
upper class residential districts. This was achieved by fixing a limit on the height of new 
buildings, the ratio of the built area to the plot of land, width of streets and setback 
from the road. As Rolnik notes, these laws initiated a process of urban segregation.
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The law, by defining that within a territory only a certain standard could occur, 
performed the miracle of designing an invisible wall, and at the same time, created 
an exclusive product in the land and building market, and thus permitted a high 
return on investment, even considering [...] the very low productivity of the lot 
(Rolnik 1995: 88).
These high income areas became, and remain, the most regulated of the city (Maricato 
1996), clearly in marked contrast to the areas outside the perimeter of the ‘urban zone’.
The use of the law to establish invisible walls was a step towards institutionalizing 
segregation between the rich and the poor of Sao Paulo. Although, unlike in the United 
States, there was never legal, racial segregation in Brazilian cities, Rolnik regards urban 
segregation as ‘determinative in the appreciation of value in the real estate market’ 
(Rolnik 1995: 50). Her work shows how the regulation of upper-income settlements has 
always been closely linked to intentional socio-spatial segregation in the city. The 
higienista discourse of the municipal authorities used to justify the clearance of 
insalubrious housing at the end of the nineteenth century, was internalized by the elite 
during the twentieth century. It was linked first to Afro-Brazilian populations living in 
cortiqos in the central districts of the city and later, with the nationalist drive of the 
1930s, applied to foreign immigrants living in similar conditions in workers’ housing in 
the new industrial neighbourhoods (Bonduki 1998). The perceived promiscuity of these 
populations concerned the elites who turned to the law to protect their assets.
Urbanistic legality was built in the city of Sao Paulo at the same time as a zone of 
illegality [...] Extralegal urban development was found on sites where the plans were 
not approved by municipal engineers, or in the sharing of lots or houses by various 
families, creating spaces of high demographic density. Entire neighbourhoods thus 
existed without being recognized as part of the official city. The resulting high 
density of such popular territories disgusted and worried the elite, who used legal 
means to defend themselves: they built exclusive neighbourhoods for the wealthy 
and offered fiscal favours and relaxed construction requirements for developers who 
wanted to build low-cost popular housing in regions specifically marked for this 
purpose, outside the perimeter of the central city (Rolnik 1995: 235).
Encouraging the building of low-income homes not only outside the law, but also 
outside the city, was therefore a way in which the elites would avoid the social 
contagion of the poor.
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Even after Vargas’s populist revolution, Rolnik shows how relationships within the city 
changed little. Although initiatives were put in place to incorporate the poor and 
working class into the urban administration, the 1930s also saw the consolidation of 
zoning policy.
The two developments were related: when the popular city was granted amnesty the 
bourgeois city needed to defend itself (Rolnik 1995: 291-2).
These amnesties, however, brought about another perverse consequence. The continual 
redesign of the ‘urban fence’ increased land values within the urban zone and 
continually pushed poorer settlements further out into rural areas (Holston 2008). As 
Santos concludes, Sao Paulo’s growth was dependent on the complex relationship 
between segregation and speculation:
The city’s land-use pattern has been strongly influenced by land speculation, which 
since the end of the [nineteenth] century, has ensured that the built-up area has 
expanded, leaving large areas of undeveloped space. This process has increased the 
price of serviced land and has helped accentuate social segregation (Santos 
1996:224).
L egality  and illega lity  in Sao Paulo
For Grostein, the illegal city came about because of a culture of disobedience towards 
the law, on the part of both state and society. For Rolnik, the divisions between legality 
and illegality helped to fuel enormous profits from property and land speculation on 
the right side of the line and kept the poor away from elite neighbourhoods. However, 
the dichotomy drawn by these two authors, and also by Maricato, between the ‘official’ 
or ‘legal’ city and the ‘real’, ‘illegal’, ‘clandestine’ or ‘non-city’ is perhaps somewhat 
over-determined, not least because all the works cited show the interplay between the 
legal and the illegal in the city, and how these can serve to reinforce each other.
Further, while building and zoning laws have been contravened in these areas, this does 
not mean the their inhabitants are entirely outside the law or beyond the reach of the
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state. Residents of illegal settlements often engage in the formal economy, whilst the 
state will attempt to police these areas and will eventually supply them with services. A 
categorization of them as part of some type of ‘non-city* may inadvertently fall prey to 
the ‘myth of marginalization* (Perlman 1976) in which residents offavelas and other 
illegal or irregular occupations of land are perceived as wholly outside of mainstream 
society.
Other work on informal settlements in Brazil provides a more nuanced approach to the 
question of urban illegality. Holston (1991:702) notes that the process of amnesties for 
illegally or irregularly occupied land in Sao Paulo show that the distinctions between 
legal and illegal are ‘conceptually slim, non-categorical, and temporary*. Further, while 
much of the periphery is illegally built upon or occupied, the possibility of establishing 
who the legal owner of this land really is has become an impossibility in Sao Paulo. 
Holston undertook fieldwork in the late 1980s with residents of low-income 
neighbourhoods in Sao Paulo who were threatened with eviction after having bought 
subdivisions and houses from developers who claimed fraudulent ownership of the 
land. His historical research into property titles in the Jardim das Camelias revealed 
that,
After 400 years of settlement, one thing is certain: No one has an unambiguous title 
to land in Jardim das Camelias -  or indeed to enormous areas of Brazil. As a result, 
and in spite of many claims to the contrary, there is simply no clear owner from 
whom residents can receive an incontestable deed to any of the 207 lots whose 
disputed history we have traced. Each litigant in the conflict has used law to create a 
version of this history that gives an origin for its claims. These origins are inventions 
of law, literally legal fictions [...] A definitive or even a positive answer seems 
impossible, not only because of the importance of illegality in each claim but also 
because of the unstable relationship between the legal and the illegal. Indeed, our 
historical study has shown not only that usurpation is a prime mover of Brazilian 
territorial occupation but also that land law itself developed in great measure out of 
the need to legalize encroachments (Holston 1991: 721).
Holston uncovers a palimpsest of fraudulent claims and documents stretching back to 
the first inhabitants of the area. Thus whilst much of the occupation of land in the city 
is illegal, it appears that it can almost never be categorically legal either. There is a
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fundamental ambiguity over the question of land ownership that therefore qualifies the 
category of illegal.
Finally, the work of Boaventura de Sousa Santos in a Rio favela contests the distinction 
between legality and illegality in a different way. His anthropological study of the 
workings of a Residents’ Association in ‘Pasargada’ in 1970 raises the issue of legal 
pluralism. Since the favela is based on illegal occupation, land cannot be legally bought 
or sold. Yet the study reveals how residents of the settlement have generated their own 
version of standard law or law from the ‘asphalt’ (the law that pertains to the parts of 
the city which are fully urbanized and part of the ‘official’ city). The ‘law of Pasargada’ 
allows for land and homes to change hands or to be rented, and the workings of the 
Residents’ Association are unofficially sanctioned by the local state.
Pasargada law does not claim to regulate social life outside Pasargada, nor does it 
question the criteria of legality prevailing in the larger society. Both legal systems 
are based on the respect for the principle of private property. Pasargada law 
achieves its informality and flexibility through selective borrowing from the official 
legal system (Santos 1995: 236).
Thus while informal settlements and irregular occupations may be ‘illegal’, this does not 
necessarily mean that they are not governed by laws of some sort. In a similar way, in other 
areas, the laws of organized crime can provide an alternative form of urban governance 
(Harvey 1996:404).
Urban p lun der and the Sonho da Casa P ropria
It would seem clear that the municipal state’s toleration of irregular self-building on the 
peripheries acted as a safety valve by providing a housing solution for the rapidly 
growing urban population at a time of industrial expansion. It also brought down the 
costs of the reproduction of labour since workers who had built their own homes in the 
rural zone would pay no rent. But other students of Sao Paulo’s growth in the twentieth
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century make a clearer link between the state’s studied negligence of the illegal city and 
plans for economic growth and industrial expansion.
After coming to power in 1930 Vargas’s regime began to push for industrialization. As a 
result the role of cities in Brazil, and particularly of Sao Paulo, began to change. The 
country’s economy had previously been based on agro-exports, but Vargas began to 
penalize this sector so as to promote industrialization for manufacturing. The urban 
economy was thus privileged at the expense of the rural. Brazilian cities that were 
already home to the state apparatus and commercial capital took on a third role as the 
site of industry (Oliveira 1982). Cities themselves also came to be viewed as 
merchandise, as property and land markets became increasingly important (Maricato 
1996). As Holanda has pointed out, Brazil’s cities were meant to lead the nation’s 
progress towards modernity. The backwardness of the country’s rural heritage, where 
social relations were based on patrimony and on the overlap of the private and public 
domains, would be wiped clean in its cities, where anonymity would create equality and 
the professionalization of those in public office (Holanda 1969). The state began to play 
a much more active role in society: part of the drive towards the country’s modernist 
motto of ‘order and progress’ would be achieved by regulating relationships between 
labour and capital. It was at this point that a corporatist trade union model was put into 
effect (Oliveira 1982).
Bonduki’s (1998) examination of the city’s peripheral expansion highlights the Vargas 
era as a turning point in social housing policy. Vargas was responsible for a massive 
restructuring of labour organization from 1930 onwards, that laid the foundations for 
his economic policy based on urban industry. His populist style was aimed at the urban 
working classes who would provide the political legitimacy for his rule (Holston 2008). 
As such, Vargas orchestrated enormous changes in state-society relations, and the issue 
of worker housing inevitably came to the fore during his time in office. Up until the 
1930s, housing was considered a private good, and the expansion of residential areas,
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by extension, were a matter for individuals and the market. Vargas, however, with his 
nation-building project based on the rapid expansion of industry, saw the link between 
worker productivity and industrial growth and hence the importance of housing for the 
reproduction of the workforce.
In a setting in which all economic matters had become a concern of the public 
authorities and of the business entities involved in the national development 
strategy, the problem of housing emerged as one of the most important aspects of a 
workers’ living conditions, since it absorbed a significant percentage of their salaries 
and impacted on lifestyle and ideological development (Bonduki 1998: 73).
This last point is important. Although the higienista discourse had not evaporated, 
priority was now given to the formation of the model worker and ‘new man’ who would 
form the basis of political support for the regime. The thinkers behind the regime, 
influenced by modernist planners, believed this type of social engineering could, in 
part, be achieved through housing.
Despite legislation that should have prevented further construction of cortiqo housing 
and had existing tenements demolished, this form of housing had not been eradicated 
from the city and was the principal accommodation solution for low-income workers.
As noted above, this type of collective dwelling worried the elites, and it was thought 
that they were a breeding ground for socialism, along with other social ills. The middle 
classes were also highly critical of landlords who did not work for a living. In sum, the 
model of rental accommodation for workers was seen to be in crisis. According to 
Bonduki the regime needed to convince the workers that having their own homes was 
just a matter of having the will, and that even a precariously built house, without 
infrastructure or basic services, far from the workplace and poorly served by public 
transport was preferable to the corrupting influence of a cortiqo in the centre of Sao 
Paulo. Business would also support this model of home ownership, since it would bring 
down the cost of the reproduction of the workforce.
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Housing, as well as creating the illusion of economic progress, also contributed to 
the stability of the macropolitical order, and so was considered the basis for the 
creation of a moral society and the good worker, who would be adverse to deviant 
desires and practices. As such, if the family home and the dissemination of 
ownership guaranteed political order, at the micropolitical level the reproduction 
and docile acceptance of bourgeois morality by the workers would only be possible 
through individual housing and the eradication of cortigos. In this way, the role of 
the family, with its function of reproducing the established morality and order, was 
considered essential (Bonduki 1998: 84).
It was not just non-collective housing, but home ownership, that would encourage 
conservative family values, and keep the workers in check. Home ownership became 
synonymous with improvements in living conditions and would be proof that the 
workers were also benefiting from Brazil’s development (Ibid: 88). As such, the state 
marketed the sonho da casa propria ‘the dream of having one’s own home’, which is 
still a cultural referent in Brazil today.
One initiative of Vargas’s involved a rent freeze of 1942 which remained in place for 
twenty years. At first it had popular support since as well as bringing down the price of 
rental accommodation it also did away with the class of unpopular, parasitic landlords. 
However, Bonduki (1998) shows how what seems at face value to have been a populist 
move in favour of the urban poor living in cortigos in the centre of the city, in fact led to 
a series of other outcomes in line with broader state objectives, both ideological and 
developmentalist. Firstly, by freezing rents at 1940s levels, and maintaining these 
values until rents had become almost minimal due to inflation, Vargas put an end to 
what had been a highly lucrative industry. While those who managed to remain in 
rented accommodation benefited greatly, they were few and far between, as many 
property owners found ways to evict sitting tenants to raise rents or alter the use of 
their buildings, so as to find a new way to make profits. It is estimated that in the 
immediate post-war years, 15% of the population of the city was evicted (Simoes Jr. 
1991). Since new construction for residential accommodation was now almost 
profitless, investors turned their attention to industry, in line with the state’s planned 
push towards manufacturing. At the same time, the onus for provision of low-income 
housing was placed upon the state, since the private sector was not thought capable of
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providing a solution to the crisis. Although there were attempts to provide subsidized 
rental housing with resources from social security funds, these never came close to 
meeting demand, and were not aimed at the poorest of workers. This meant that almost 
the only alternative for low-income families was to buy a plot on the outskirts of the city 
and begin the slow process of building their own homes. It would seem fairly clear, 
Bonduki argues, that the rent freeze was never principally intended to benefit the urban 
poor.
It appears that a fundamental contradiction was at work. For the first time, the state 
was expected to provide housing for the poor, and, in this way, intervene in the private 
lives of the working classes to ensure the development of the country. However, 
although the state was controlling rents and was producing some subsidized rental 
housing, most of the urban poor were left to fend for themselves in the furthest 
peripheries.
Self-building on irregular and distant subdivisions, without infrastructure or 
transport, would not have been the choice of the masses if there were another 
option. But there wasn’t, and so the model of self-building of private homes 
proliferated. With epic sacrifices, the workers became property owners, and the city 
extended without end, reproducing discontinuous lots that were detached from the 
urban fabric. A cheap housing solution came into being, but the consequences for 
the city were definitive (Bonduki 1998: 276).
As discussed above, much of this building was undertaken outside of the law on 
clandestine sub-divisions. For Bonduki, it would be naive to believe that the state was 
not able to contain the process of illegal subdivision of land on the peripheries. As he 
points out, in practice, the state’s laissez-faire attitude provided a solution to the 
housing problem that was cheap, segregated, compatible with workers’ low incomes 
and even gave them the sensation, false or otherwise, of realizing the ‘dream’ of 
becoming home owners. With the expansion of the periphery, the elite also got what it 
wanted: segregation and a reduction in density. Public investments could be 
concentrated in areas where the middle and upper classes were living, and the workers 
got their own homes at very low cost, without creating a financial burden for the
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authorities or for the private sector (Ibid: 288). The downside for the workers was that 
they were, in effect, ‘punished’ for having built illegally or on irregular plots, by having 
to live without services.
The expansion of this model- ownership of self-built homes on the periphery -  
happened precisely at a time when the state was putting its entire weight behind 
capitalist development and encouraging home ownership amongst the workers as a way 
of maintaining the capitalist order. However, the massive production of housing by the 
urban poor using their own resources and un-paid labour was ‘clearly non-capitalist 
[and] outside the normal processes of the production of merchandise’ (Bonduki 1998: 
96). Bonduki goes on to describe the solution of self-built housing as ‘archaic’. This 
term is used in a similar context by Maricato (1996). She notes a dual system in Sao 
Paulo where formal means of land development through investment of financial capital 
exist alongside archaic ones such as building on clandestine subdivisions or in illegally 
occupied areas.
This seemingly paradoxical situation is given a more nuanced analysis by a number of 
Brazilian social scientists (Maricato and Bonduki are both architects). Rejecting the 
duality of ‘archaic’ and ‘modern’, Oliveira (2003) argues that capitalist expansion in 
Brazil depended on, and indeed was subsidized by, an army of underpaid workers who 
constructed their own homes at the margins of the city. Rather than a survival strategy, 
or ‘Darwinist’ adaptation to the process of capitalist expansion in Brazil, the self- 
building of workers’ homes was a way of,
Subordinating the new urban class, the proletariat, to the state and Brazilian 
‘transformism’. This was a form of conservative modernization, of a production 
revolution without a bourgeois revolution (Oliveira 2003:130).
Drawing from Schmidt, he regards those who have built their own homes on the 
periphery as in a ‘state of exception’ within the city. Meanwhile, the state’s principal,
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but invisible presence in the city, was to manage the workings of the economy (Oliveira 
1982: 52).
These arguments are similar to Kowarick’s development of the idea of ‘urban plunder’. 
Whilst some refer to the thousands of migrants who swelled the peripheries of Sao 
Paulo as ‘underemployed’ or a reserve army of industrial labour, Kowarick and Oliveira 
argue that this mass was crucial for the state to be able to keep down wages to almost 
bare subsistence, and thus increase profit margins. For Kowarick, capital absorbs and 
then ‘dilapidates’ young, unskilled workers, rejecting them by the time they reach their 
thirties, and moving on to devour the next cohort. The state’s investment in the city is 
entirely focused on ‘oiling the economic gears’ of the country, and the problems of the 
workers will only become a concern if they spill over into the affairs of the dominant 
classes. Self-building, as the only housing solution for the workers, along with general 
pauperization combine to create ‘urban plunder’ -  the sum of a number of ways that 
the workforce is exploited through the almost complete absence of collective services, 
which aggravates the exploitation experienced in the workplace (Kowarick 1979: 59). 
For Kowarick, then, Sao Paulo grew into the chaotic, illegal city so that the business 
elites could drive a further wedge between profits and production costs. Kowarick was 
writing and researching at a time when the country was under the rule of the military 
(1964-1985). The successful management of the economy, and Brazil’s massive 
economic growth during the years of the ‘miracle’ were crucial to maintaining the 
legitimacy of the regime in the eyes of many of the population.
More recent attempts on the part of the state to address the housing deficit and illegal 
subdivision of lots has only served to entrench further social segregation in the city. 
Legislation in the 1970s enforced to subdue the market for illegal or irregular 
subdivisions brought in harsher penalties for those selling land on the peripheries in 
this way. This legislation, general pauperization and the decreasing availability of land 
did have the required effect in reducing the number of irregular subdivisions for sale,
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but also appears to have stimulated the growth oifavelas on illegally occupied land and 
increased density of occupation in settled areas (Simoes Jr. 1991; Caldeira 2000).35 
Despite this legislation, the number of illegal lots offered for sale in the period 1985- 
2000 exceeded the total number of housing units offered by the private, legal market 
(Maricato 2000). Further, the rapid peri-urban growth recorded by Torres et al. (2007) 
is fuelled by illegal occupation.
To date, the establishment of the Banco National de Habitagao (BNH) by the military 
regime in 1964 has been the only systematic attempt by the state to produce large 
numbers of low-income housing units in Brazil. The thinking behind the bank was the 
need to maintain support for the regime by facilitating home ownership amongst the 
lower income groups. This further entrenched the Brazilian obsession with a casa 
propria. But the activities of the BNH have been labelled one of the most shameful 
events of recent Brazilian history (Maricato 1996) with the workers ending up 
subsidizing middle-class homes. Whilst nearly five million units were built across the 
country, the majority was captured by those with higher incomes, often through 
clientelist networks (Maricato 1996). Caldeira (2000) records that in the twenty years 
that the BNH was operational, only 6.4% of apartments went to families with an 
income of less than 3.5 minimum wages. The Bank was closed down in 1985 amidst a 
huge corruption scandal. All records were subsequently lost in a fire (Rolnik 1995). 
With redemocratization and decentralization, public housing companies were 
established at municipal and state-level. The output of these companies cannot keep 
pace with demand, however, and is often of very low quality and located in marginal 
areas.
35 The percentage of the city’s population living in favelas has increased from 1% in 1970 to close to 17% in 
2.007. Source: O Estado de Sao Paulo 14 /07 /07
Sao Paulo Centro
The very use of the term ‘periphery’ suggests a comparison with the centre of the city, 
and implies a space of marginality as compared to one of inclusion. However, the 
centre of the city is also a space that is regarded as marginal by many of Sao Paulo’s 
upper-income residents. Out of favour with the elites for many years and neglected by 
the authorities, it has recently become an important site of conflict between the state 
and the organized urban poor, as projects aimed at regeneration are implemented.
The fear of poverty and of contagion from the poor in the early twentieth century 
provoked the exodus of upper-income residents from the city centre, towards new 
exclusive residential areas such as Higienopolis and Jardins in the southwest (Simoes 
Jr. 1991). At the same time, the consequences of the rent freeze and rising land prices in 
the Centre meant that, with the exception of a room in a cortiqo, the area was no longer 
an affordable option for the working-classes. Sao Paulo Centro thus began its long 
decline. Today the area comprising the sub-prefectures of Se and Republica is 
described as ‘degraded’. Middle and upper income Paulistanos36 consider it dangerous, 
dirty and overcrowded. In other words, it has been taken over by the classes populares 
or ‘popular classes’ who swell the streets during the day but leave it almost empty by 
night, apart from the population of homeless rough-sleepers.
It is not just higher income residents who have moved out of the centre. Business began 
to follow suit in the 1960s, as the first skyscrapers were put up along Avenida Paulista, 
the new ‘chic’ residential and corporate neighbourhood of Sao Paulo. Paulista, however, 
appears to have had its day, and elite business has followed the wealthy 
neighbourhoods further into the southwest of the city. There are now new ‘centralities’ 
along the Marginal Pinheiros and Avenida Berrini (Frugoli 2000). Commerce does still 
exist in the centre - the huge numbers of people who still come into the centre to work 
(it is the area with the highest concentration of jobs in the city) means that it is still
36 Residents of Sao Paulo city.
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profitable to run a shop or restaurant in these areas, thus maintaining high property 
and land values (Teixeira, Comaru, Cymbalista and Sutti 2005).
The centre is also characterized by its empty buildings -  illustrating its unpopularity 
both as a residential area and a centre for business. It is estimated that there are 400 
000 empty residential units in Sao Paulo, of which 45,464 are to be found in the central 
districts. In these areas 17% of homes are empty (Prefeitura Municipal de Sao Paulo 
2004). There are also numerous abandoned hotels, factories and office buildings. While 
many buildings are left empty for speculative purposes, they are also abandoned 
because of legal wrangles over ownership (often amongst heirs), because of problems of 
irregular documentation with the land registry (the registry offices have a notoriously 
corrupt past) or unpaid property taxes.
Over.the past decade, Sao Paulo’s municipal authorities have made attempts to 
regenerate the centre, citing Boston’s CBD, Barcelona’s port area and London’s 
docklands as successful models of urban renewal. However, this regeneration has been 
described as elitist (Teixeira et al. 2005) since much of it aims to attract the middle and 
upper-classes back to the Centre for high culture leisure pursuits in museums and art 
galleries. One such initiative involved a multi-million dollar refurbishment of a train 
station as a concert hall. Set in the heart of the drug-dealing/red-light district known as 
cracolandia or ‘crackland’, concert-goers reach their seats in the auditorium through 
an underground car park without setting foot on the streets of the neighbourhood 
(Wisnik, Fix, Leite, Andrade and Arantes 2000). A number of people associated with 
the project were reported as saying that the concert hall brought ‘civilization’ to the 
area (Andrade 2001). These localized investments are also marketed by the authorities 
in such a way as to suggest that the city as a whole has been improved. Here, the image 
of the ‘formal’ or ‘official’ city is used as a front for the entire metropolis, despite the 
fact that it is just a tiny fraction of the whole (Souto and Kayano 1996; Maricato 2000).
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It is argued, also, that the revitalization of the centre is leading to the expulsion of 
poorer residents to the peripheries (Teixeira et al. 2005).
Meanwhile, residents of cortigos continue living in very low standard accommodation, 
as they have done throughout the twentieth century. Legislation designed to eradicate 
the tenements failed to do so, and subsequent regulations introduced to improve living 
conditions continue to be routinely flouted. Unlikefavelas and the jumble of self-built 
peripheries that are inserted into and interfere with the urban landscape, cortigos are 
hidden from view behind a discreet front door (Caricari and Kohara 2006). It is, 
furthermore, extremely difficult to obtain accurate figures as to the numbers living in 
this type of accommodation. Some estimates put the number of cortigo residents in the 
city at 600 0 0 0 .3 7  Rooms are small and poorly ventilated: a survey in the early 1990s 
recorded an average of 2.6 people living in one room varying from 8 to 15 square 
metres (Santos 1996) and washing conditions are shared and often unsanitary. 
Nevertheless, rents for cortigo rooms are some of the highest per square metre in the 
city (Kohara 1999). Residents are routinely intimidated by the ‘intermediary’ who 
collects rents, and evictions are frequent. However, when weighing up the prospect of 
living on the periphery and travelling up to four hours a day to work in the centre, some 
families take the cortigo option. This type of accommodation has been tolerated, in 
breach of the law, since immigrants first started arriving in Sao Paulo in the last 
decades of the nineteenth century. They constitute yet another space of illegality in the 
city. Described by some as worse than living in a favela (Andrade 2001) they represent 
a type of peripheral marginality in the heart of the centre.
Despite its problems, the city centre is well-equipped with urban infrastructure. The 
streets are paved and lit, there is full connection to mains water and the sanitation 
system, and it is the public transport hub for the entire city. Although the falling middle 
and upper-income population means that there has been less investment in health and
37 Source: O Estado de Sao Paulo 12/12/06. This is probably based on an estimate of the cortigo population 
in Sao Paulo by FIPE in 1993 of 595 110.
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education in recent years, the once noble districts of Se and Republica still have 
symbolic resonance for the elite.
The abandonment of the central areas by the elites, however, was never complete. 
Principally because the symbolic and historic value of the central districts could not 
be reproduced in other areas (Teixeira et al. 2005: 4).
The gulf between the centre and the periphery, in terms of urban services and 
proximity to the workplace, and the fact that the only low-income housing option in the 
centre is the cortigo, further highlights the marginality of life on the outskirts of the 
city. The cortigo and the periphery are linked by their status as marginal, stigmatized 
and illegal spaces, where, in the discourse of the housing movements residents are 
deprived of dignity and as a result, of full c i t i z e n s h i p .88
Segregation and stigm a in the c ity
Returning to the periphery, there seems little doubt that Sao Paulo’s growth was built 
on all-pervasive illegality and with the complicity of the state. Whilst there is an 
apparent absence of the state within the city, the research discussed here would suggest 
that this is, in truth, a calculated negligence. Despite popular wisdom that Sao Paulo 
has grown into today’s chaotic city as a result of a lack of plans, both Villa<ja (2005) and 
Grostein (1987) show that the problem is not a lack of plans for the city, but a lack of 
political will to enforce existing legislation on the part of the state. The result of a 
century of unregulated, illegal building on the peripheries is a city fundamentally at 
odds with the dream of the Brazilian modernists (cf. Arantes 1998). The city was meant 
to provide a new democratic social space in which relations between state and society 
would be reinvented. The process of urbanization would break the patrimonial power of 
the rural elites and provide a counterweight to a centralizing, authoritarian state (Rizek 
2003: 80). Instead, urbanization has produced ‘a socio-ecological disaster’ and a 
‘gigantic concentration of poverty, that is the result of a historical process of occupying
38 Discussed in detail in chapter five.
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land in a way that segregates and excludes’ (Maricato 1996:16). Sao Paulo has become 
a highly segregated city where people’s life chances and opportunities are significantly 
influenced by their place of residence and where the stigma associated with low-income 
neighbourhoods is deeply entrenched in social attitudes.
The huge disparities between the wealthy neighbourhoods of Sao Paulo and the low- 
income peripheries are detailed by Villaga (2005). Although there is debate over the use 
of the term ‘segregation’ in Brazil, for Villaga it is closely linked to homogeneity of 
populations -  a segregated city is one in which residential areas have very high 
concentrations of households with similar incomes and/or ethnicity. Villaga’s work 
focuses on areas of the city with concentrations of very wealthy households. Overlaying 
maps of the city that show average income by neighbourhood with maps showing the 
human development index, social vulnerability and even average temperature, he 
illustrates the stark differences between life for the wealthy minority in the southwest 
‘quadrant’ with the rest of the city. His thorough research into segregation in Sao Paulo 
highlights the skewed manner in which public investments are made in the city. The 
upper income districts are the best provided with rail services and will benefit from the 
latest addition to the underground system, despite the fact that those on higher 
incomes are much less likely to use public transport. An analysis of investments in 
large-scale road transport infrastructure during the administration of the corrupt 
1990’s mayor Maluf also shows that resources were concentrated in the wealthy 
southwest quadrant (Maricato 1996). Thus the management of the city deepens 
inequalities (Maricato 2000). These empirical findings would seem to confirm 
Oliveira’s assertion that city in Brazil involves ‘the creation and reproduction of middle 
class space’ (Oliveira 1982: 52).
Marques and Torres (2005) illustrate the social consequences of living in a low-income 
neighbourhood in Sao Paulo. Controlling for parental income, ethnicity and 
employment, they have shown that an individual’s residential neighbourhood will
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influence his/her chance of finishing secondary school and finding a job39 (Marques 
and Torres eds. 2005). The child of a low-income family living on the periphery is much 
less likely to complete its education than one living in a more central area. There are 
also negative consequences for health in poorly serviced peripheral neighbourhoods, 
with higher risk of infectious diseases.
Unfortunately for the city’s low-income residents, the fact that their neighbourhood can 
impact upon their life chances finds a distorted echo in a type of environmental 
determinism rife in Brazilian social attitudes. Caldeira has examined the stigma 
attached to poverty and low-income neighbourhoods in Sao Paulo. She interviewed 
Paulistanos from several different social groups, and found that they shared certain 
perceptions on crime, poverty and evil.
They seem to think that the spaces of crime are marginal ones, such as favelas and 
cortigos, and that their inhabitants, potential criminals, are people from the fringes 
of society, humanity, and the polity (Caldeira 2000: 53).
The idea of contamination of ‘evil’ and criminality from these sites is also often 
mentioned in her interviews, and there is a suggested link between low-income 
neighbourhoods and drugs and prostitution. The statements of her interviewees share 
much of their essence with the higienista movement of the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries: class-based stereotypes clearly continue to be closely linked to the 
built environment in Sao Paulo. Caricari and Kohara (2006) note perceptions amongst 
the middle classes that residents of cortigos do not deserve to live in upgraded housing. 
Similarly, interview-based research by Souto and Kayano (1996) found lower-middle 
class respondents critical of the fact that families from a favela had been moved into 
brand new public housing, that looked, from the outside at least, like middle-class 
apartment buildings.
39 Marques and Torres explain this relationship by the fact that in Brazil employment is often secured 
through personal contacts. If an individual is living in a low-income neighbourhood where there are a large 
number of unemployed or ‘precariously’ employed people, he or she is less likely to find a job through these 
means. Substantial anecdotal evidence would suggest that employers discriminate against candidates who 
live in ‘bad areas’.
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Taking into account that the perception of thefavelado is often conflated with that 
of a violent criminal, the fact that [Xhefavelados] had been given the opportunity to 
own their own homes in an area considered well to do and close to the centre led 
[the respondents] to feel as though they had been unfairly treated (Souto and 
Kayano 1996: 40).
These respondents further remarked that the new residents should be penalized, if they 
‘insisted on behaving like marginals’ (Ibid: 40).
Caldeira sees segregation increasing with the democratization of Brazil. As the ‘popular’ 
classes began occupying public and political space so the higher-income groups 
retreated into private gated condominiums and put up security walls, employing the 
‘talk of crime’ as a justification for these measures. Caldeira sees them not only as 
fearful of crime, but also of social change -  that the poor can no longer be kept in their 
place (Caldeira 2000: 322). This leads her to the conclusion that Brazilian democracy is 
fundamentally disjunctive, since while formal political rights are expanding, civil rights 
in the form of protection from violence and equality before the law are decreasing in a 
city that has rising levels of violence against the poor.
Citizenship in the illegal, segregated c ity
There are a number of links between illegality, segregation and limited citizenship in 
Sao Paulo. At the most basic level, living on the clandestine, illegal peripheries deprives 
individuals of citizenship, since their existence within the city is unknown to the 
authorities. Without an address, they are ineligible to vote. This definition of 
citizenship -  as having an address on a government register -  is simplistic, but one 
much disseminated by architects and urban planners writing on Sao Paulo. For 
example, Rolnik’s brief discussion of citizenship sets it out in these terms:
Urban legality defines territories within and outside the law. This demarcation has 
important political consequences, since to be located in a territory outside the law 
can determine a position of limited citizenship. To not exist from the bureaucratic
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or official point of view of city government is to be outside the scope of its 
responsibilities to its citizens (Rolnik 1995: 2).
She continues by pointing out that it is in urban sociology and sociology of law that ‘we 
find a framework for the relation of urban legality to citizenship, revealing the political 
consequences of the clandestine occupation of space by the poor in the city’ (Ibid: 6). 
Whilst there is no doubt that illegality will limit citizenship, there is a troubling 
implication here that citizenship will be achieved once a neighbourhood is incorporated 
into the official city. Grostein (1985) also implies that physical improvements to the 
peripheries will generate citizenship:
The demand for better living conditions on the urban periphery continues to be an 
issue that is overlooked. There remains, therefore, the task of reconstructing the 
urban periphery and building real citizenship (Grostein 1985:14).
Maricato (1996) makes a similar link between urban regulation and the building of 
citizenship. But beyond this somewhat simplistic connection between urban 
legality/improvement and citizenship, Maricato (1996) and Rolnik (1995) discuss the 
arbitrary way in which the law is applied to regularize illegal areas as another way in 
which equality of citizenship is jeopardized. Rolnik takes particular issue with the 
granting of amnesties to parts of the illegal city that began in earnest during the Vargas 
era. Drawing on the work of Teresa Sales, she views the policy as heralding an era of 
‘conceded citizenship’ in which inclusion into the city was granted as a type of favour.4° 
Furthermore, there was no fundamental change in hierarchical relations within the 
city:
The old order was not transformed to incorporate different forms of occupation of 
space. It only selectively tolerated exceptions to the rule. By being recognized, the 
exceptions were ‘awarded’ the right to receive public investments in infrastructure 
and urban services. The clandestine majority thus entered urban policy owing a 
favour to those who judged them admissible (Rolnik 1995: 283).
4° The paternalistic attitude of the state towards the poor was a core theme of the Vargas era. Later on in 
the century, populism would make way for a more clientelist relationship between the state and the urban 
poor, as regulation, infrastructure and improvements for low-income neighbourhoods would be offered by 
political candidates in exchange for votes.
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Conditions on the peripheries also limit citizenship because of the amount of time a 
worker will have to spend travelling to his or her place of employment, low quality of 
education and healthcare, lack of leisure facilities and fundamentally, insecurity of 
tenure (Kowarick 1979).
The link between lack of access to the city and lack of citizenship, in the sense of 
receiving urban services and being able to enjoy the benefits of urban life, was also 
grasped and used to great effect by urban social movements in the 1980s. As the 
democratic transition unfurled, urban social movements began to gain prominence in 
Sao Paulo. Based in the peripheries and supported by the Catholic Church, their 
demands for urban services and the fulfilment of basic needs were closely linked to the 
struggle for democracy and citizenship rights. Amongst these campaigners were groups 
that would eventually form part of the city’s housing movement. They began by 
demanding land, and then state funding for community house building. Their location 
on the periphery with its poor quality housing, limited access to schools, healthcare, 
leisure activities and public transport allowed them to make comparisons to those in 
better located areas who were able to take advantage of all that the city had to offer. 
Caldeira (2000) records the widespread use of this centre-periphery model by social 
movements in their early negotiations with government officials, although she argues 
that with the growth of gated condominiums in more distant areas of the city, this once 
sharp divide is no longer so clear cut.
However, as this thesis will illustrate, the centre-periphery comparison is still of great 
significance for the political struggles of housing movements in Sao Paulo. It is 
particularly important today because of the municipal authorities attempts to 
‘revitalize’ the centre of Sao Paulo. In response to regeneration that commenced in the 
late 1990s the housing movements began to mobilize around the ‘right to live in the 
centre’ with a number of high profile building occupations. Whilst the idea of a right to 
live in the centre is questionable, there is a strong political argument for the poor to be
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housed there, as a way of making amends for a century of expulsion to the peripheries. 
The centre has become important for the movement as the symbolic opposite of the 
periphery and the space from which the poor are either excluded -  evicted to the 
periphery or hidden away in the cortigo.
The following chapter shows how illegality and the spatial segregation, lack of services, 
stigma and inequality of opportunity that it produces have been key mobilizing factors 
in the growth of social movements in the city. It thus supports much of the argument of 
Holston (2008) in this regard. However, beyond this, as will be shown in chapter five, 
the city's housing movements have developed a sophisticated discourse based on the 
idea of ‘limited citizenship* that contrasts living conditions on the peripheries with the 
social rights of citizens set out in the 1988 Constitution. The historic negligence of the 
state vis-a-vis worker housing, and the conditions of illegality that arose as a response 
in both the cortigos and the peripheries have become a key weapon for the movement 
as it puts forward its members’ demands and seeks legitimacy from society at large 
through a ‘politics of rights’. Further, the illegality of much of the city, the way that the 
state has purposefully failed to enforce the law, and the fundamental ambiguity that 
surrounds ownership of land, can be used by the movement to justify its acts of civil 
disobedience. In the midst of an ‘illegal’ city, occupations of empty buildings can be 
read as a new manifestation of a centuries-old practice of land acquisition in the city.
Sum m ary
To conclude, the history of Sao Paulo’s growth during the twentieth century illustrates 
the way in which the city segregates and excludes its poorer populations. The 
complicity of the state in the expulsion of the poor beyond the boundaries of the legal 
city in order to benefit economic growth and land speculation, also gives an indication 
of the relationship of the Brazilian state to the urban poor. Maintaining a huge swathe 
of the population beyond the reach of adequate urban services and in a state of illegality 
creates multiple deprivations and negatively impacts upon citizenship and the
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relationship between state and society. Much of Brazil’s massive economic growth 
during the 1960s and 70s was based on the large numbers of low-paid, semi-skilled 
workers living in Sao Paulo’s peripheries. Although the success of the military’s 
economic policies up until the mid 1970s brought legitimacy to the regime in the eyes of 
many Brazilians, the concentration of so many poorly paid workers in Sao Paulo’s 
industrial belt would ultimately play an important role in the struggle for transition to 
civilian rule. The following chapters will explore how the movement emerged out of the 
illegal city to challenge the nature and behaviour of the state and how its use of both 
legal and illegal activities forces the state into a reappraisal of its own relationship to 
the urban poor.
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Chapter Four
Social movements in recent Brazilian history and the emergence of the 
Uniao de Movimentos de Moradia
Introduction
This chapter traces the evolution of collective action in Sao Paulo in the context of the 
gradual transition from military to civilian rule that occurred over the course of the 1970s 
and 1980s. This provides the context for a presentation of a brief history of the Uniao de 
Movimentos de Moradia. The chapter describes political organization during the 
dictatorship, before detailing the development of trade union activism and its influence on 
neighbourhood mobilization. The chapter shows how social movement and trade union 
activity emerged into the public sphere in the late 1970s, after a decade of less visible 
organization and mobilization, and gradually gained strength and legitimacy during the 
1980s. These actors took advantage of changing political circumstances to denounce the 
chronically low standard of living of the poor in the city, particularly on the periphery (as 
explained in the previous chapter) which had been exacerbated by the end of the Brazilian 
‘miracle’ of economic growth. The chapter highlights a number of key moments for social 
movement organizing in recent Brazilian history: the metalworkers’ strikes in Sao Paulo, 
the formation of the PT, participation in the drawing up of the new Constitution and the 
return to electoral democracy. The second part of the chapter explores the significance of 
these moments for the Uniao de Movimentos de Moradia, or UMM, the housing movement 
that is the focus of this study. It shows how levels of participation in the movement were 
sustained after the formal return to civilian rule in 1985; a finding that runs contrary to the 
bulk of analysis of the period. Of particular import were contributions amongst urban 
popular sectors into the drawing up of the new Constitution in the late 1980s. This marked 
the culmination of a gradual process whereby demands for basic needs were 
reconceptualized as social rights and as core elements of full citizenship. This 
reconceptualization, and the way it has been enshrined in the text of the Constitution, is of 
real significance for the way in which Sao Paulo’s housing movement currently makes its
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demands on the state and justifies its actions, as is shown in the following chapters. 
Building on the work of Walton (1998) that argues that particular types of urban collective 
action are motivated by shifts in the economic climate, this chapter suggests a greater 
overlap between his categories of urban conflict: labour action, collective consumption 
action and political and human rights action.
Social m ovem ents and transition
Much has been written about the transition to democracy in Brazil, which was the most 
protracted in the region (Alvarez 1990). But there is limited consensus as to precisely when 
it began and at what point it can be understood to have ended. The term ‘transition’ is in 
itself problematic, in that it implies a steady progression towards democracy, and does not 
contemplate the idea that countries may remain in the ‘grey zone’ between democratic and 
authoritarian political systems (Carothers 2002). Although Brazil is now considered a 
formal democracy, as pointed out in previous chapters, other measures of democracy have 
not been adequately consolidated, leaving commentators to describe the country as having 
suffered an incomplete transition. As Kingstone and Power summarize,
The New Republic has not lived up to the normative promises inherent in the 
concept of democracy, to the expectations its defenders held at the time of the 
transition, or to the standards provided by advanced industrial democracies. 
Brazilian democratic institutions remain controversial and problematic, as do many 
of the public policies emerging from them. Brazilian society remains highly unequal 
and elitist, and the rule of law has not been effectively extended to the lower-income 
segments of the population (Kingstone and Power 2000:6).
Further to this, important parliamentary reforms are still to take place: the electoral system 
massively over-represents the poorer and more conservative states of the Northeast in 
Congress. This is a leftover from the pre-1964 era, benefiting the coroneis or bosses of the 
region. Indeed, Hagopian (1996) shows how traditional elites were able to maintain their 
hold on power during and after the military regime. It could therefore be argued that the 
transition to democracy is still ongoing.*1 As Keck (1992) points out, the ambiguity over
41 Interview with Renato Simao, PT official and former Sao Paulo state deputy 2 9 /06 /07 .
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when the transition ended reflects uncertainty over the progress towards democratization. 
The problematic nature of Brazilian democracy is key to an understanding of the actions of 
social movements, as will be discussed below.
The role of social movements in the transition to democracy that took place during the 
1980s divides scholars working on this period of Brazilian history. The transition has been 
described as top-down, elite dominated and a ‘conversation between gentlemen and 
generals’ (Alvarez 1990:14). It was a process inaugurated by the regime itself, and tightly 
controlled by a series of military rulers. Mainwaring (1989) emphasizes the dominance of 
the elite during the transition, and in Brazilian politics generally. Although he acknowledges 
that social movements have had some impact on political processes he believes that 
conservative political actors maintained their dominant position after the return to civilian 
rule. Alvarez is also cautious about the input of social movements into the transition 
process:
Minimally, popular pressure and mass-based political protests indirectly 
legitimated the more moderate goals of the elite-based opposition sectors in the 
eyes of the military incumbents. And the existence of social movements among the 
popular classes and other social groups [...] who were quintessentially excluded 
from the pact of domination under authoritarian rule, provided the elite opposition 
with an organizational base that could be mobilized in favour of democracy (Alvarez 
1990:15).
Social movements cannot be credited with the initial decision to return to democracy as 
Arantes (2004) would suggest. The movements became more visible, vocal and influential 
once the military had signalled its intention to set out on the path towards democratization. 
But the ensuing outburst of popular mobilization no doubt contributed to the speeding up 
of this process. Other more sympathetic analysts of the period argue that movements made 
a clear contribution to the transition process inaugurated by the regime, emphasizing their 
contributions to ‘democratization from below’. This position gives them a different role to 
that set out for them by Alvarez above. In this view, social movements both contributed to 
the democratization process by maintaining their opposition to the continuation of the 
authoritarian regime, and introduced their members to democratic practices through
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participation in the internal workings of social organizations (Hochstetler 2000). However, 
beyond being a school for democracy, social movement organizing during this time did have 
an impact on broader political processes. For example, their demands brought about some 
change in policy towards the poor, with the implementation in the late 1970s of more 
targeted social programmes (Jacobi 1987; Mainwaring 1987). But more generally, as Keck 
notes, (1992:1), ‘the emergence of a wide range of social movements raising socioeconomic 
demands and questioning elitist notions of politics’ was a key outcome of the transition 
process. Collective actors of the 1970s and 1980s challenged the elitist nature of Brazilian 
politics, and were highly successful in bringing popular voices into the public sphere. This 
was achieved through campaigns for direct elections and popular involvement in the 
drafting of the new Constitution by the Constituent Assembly from 1987-1988, as will be 
explained below. These growing demands for popular participation were then 
institutionalized through provisions for participatory policy councils in the new 
Constitution.
Whilst the activities of social movements during the transition period should not be 
disregarded, it is also important to note the critical impacts of both the authoritarian and 
the liberalization periods on the organization of popular sectors and the mobilization of 
collective action. Firstly, as opposition to the regime grew, movement members and leaders 
developed an antagonistic and anti-state stance which is still in evidence in their discourse 
today (see chapter five). But of particular note was a growth in awareness of the concept of 
citizenship and its constituent rights that led to a discourse that posited needs as social 
rights. This culminated in movements’ involvement in the drawing up of the new 
Constitution of 1988 which grounded the discourse of rights and citizenship in text-based 
guarantees. The social rights set out in the Constitution are now central to the Sao Paulo 
housing movements’ public discourse and justification of both its demands and its actions. 
Furthermore, whilst there is indeed continuity amongst the political elite in today’s Brazil, 
as will be argued more thoroughly in later chapters of this thesis, social movements play a 
role in Brazilian politics through their continued questioning of the status quo in Brazil,
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particularly with regards to inequality and the role of the state in providing for the country's 
most vulnerable populations.
Transition fro m  authoritarian to civilian rule
Brazil’s most recent experience of military dictatorship began in 1964, when the military 
seized power from the left-leaning government of Joao Goulart.42 Once installed, the 
military initiated a crack-down on organized groups that had grown in militancy during the 
Goulart presidency of 1962-64 (Hagopian 1996). The military regime also crushed the most 
radical elements of the Sao Paulo unions in 1964, bringing about the dismissal of around 
1800 workers, and the imprisonment and torture of many (Sader 1988; Oliveira 1987). 
Attempting to wipe out the populist legacy, peasant and student groups were quashed, and 
their protests in 1967 and 1968 were harshly dealt with (Skidmore 1989). In 1968, Medici’s 
hard-line ‘coup within a coup’ took the regime further to the right (Alvarez 1990), and the 
climate of fear pushed most dissent underground. During this time habeas corpus was 
suspended, and the military fought against an armed left-wing opposition (Skidmore 
19893.43
Despite the repressive climate and the intolerance of many opposition groups, the 
presidency changed hands regularly throughout the authoritarian period as the military 
maintained a semblance of formal democracy through regular, but indirect elections. It also 
made numerous institutional changes as a response to sustained criticism (Alvarez 1990). 
However, the regime ensured that it maintained control of the electoral college that would 
elect each president. Although there was a ‘profound ambivalence within the regime about 
liberal democratic principles’ the military never openly rejected democracy (Stepan 1989: 
x). The generals argued instead that Brazilian society ‘had not yet reached the stage of 
economic and social development where it could afford the practice of a ‘true democracy”
42 In the 120 years since independence from Portugal, Brazilian society has had two experiences with 
military rule. The first was under Getulio Vargas, who took power in a bloodless coup, also referred to as a 
Revolution, in 1930 and ruled until 1945.
43 Although it dealt with these groups ruthlessly, and used repressive tactics against the unions and other 
organized groups, levels of human rights violations were not as high as in Chile and Argentina during their 
dictatorships (Keck 1992).
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(Martins 1986: 77). The military put forward its project to. create the economic 
preconditions for ‘the establishment of social structures out of which ‘stable’ and 
‘democratic’ institutions would evolve in the future.’ (Ibid). The semblance of democracy 
through the maintenance of an electoral system was one of the key differences between the 
military regime of Brazil and those of other Southern Cone countries. It was further fostered 
by a two-party system that allowed for a ‘formal’ opposition party, the MDB (Movimento 
Democratico Brasilieiro -  Brazilian Democratic Movement) and the continued, although 
severely limited, functioning of the legislature (Keck 1992). Regular elections were also held 
for municipal mayors, although residents of capital cities of states (including Sao Paulo) 
and those considered key to national security did not elect their mayors; these were 
appointed by state governors (Samuels 2000). However, the military attempted to maintain 
control over these institutions and processes by manipulating electoral rules to favour the 
party that supported them, ARENA (Alianga de Renovagao National -  Alliance for National 
Renovation) later known as the PDS (Partido Democratico Social -  Social Democratic 
party) (Hagopian 1996). Whilst the MDB existed as an opposition party, its potential to 
develop a more radically oppositional stance was stymied by ‘the efficiency of selective 
repression of its leaders, the government’s firm control over the electoral rules and 
patronage, and the weakness of potentially countervailing forces in society’ (Keck 1992:30).
Buoyed by the defeat of armed resistance to the military, and with the belief that the 
massive economic growth experienced during the Brazilian ‘miracle’ had given the regime 
legitimacy, Medici’s successor General Geisel took office in 1974 and introduced the concept 
of distensao, or ‘decompression’. Geisel was much less of a hard-liner than his predecessor 
and considered it appropriate to loosen control over the electoral process, particularly as 
the economy was still strong at this point (Keck 1992). Further, as Mainwaring notes 
(1989:198) the apparent weakness of organized sectors of Brazilian society convinced the 
country’s military rulers that they would be able to liberalize without ‘adverse effects’. As a 
first step towards this gradual liberalization, elections for state governors were held in 1974, 
which although indirect, were still the freest since 1966 (Martins 1986). It is for this reason
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that some commentators see these elections as the starting point for the transition. 
However, the ‘transition’ cannot be seen as a linear process from this time, as the military 
regime, shocked by the gains of the opposition in the governorship elections, continually 
manipulated and postponed further elections over the following decade.
The ensuing crisis in authoritarian rule that eventually led to redemocratization largely 
came about because of the end of the Brazilian miracle of 1968-1973 and the exhaustion of 
the regime’s economic policies. This had involved a programme of ‘accelerated 
industrialization [...] fuelled by multinational and transnationalized domestic capital 
investment and debt-financed state investment and supported by regressive wage policies 
and tight controls on labour’ (Alvarez 1990:37). By the time of the debt crises of the 1980s, 
this programme had run its course, and the militaiy lost control of the economy as inflation 
spiralled. The regime also lost the support of the entrepreneurial groups and elites who had 
benefited from Brazil’s record economic growth during the miracle (Martins 1986). The 
slowdown of the economy coincided with the first oil shock and with reports of corruption 
and fiscal irresponsibility. The business elites and affluent middle-classes who had given 
their passive support to the regime began to question the generals’ grip on financial 
matters, eventually leading to calls for greater civilian involvement and participation 
(Cardoso 1986).
Most scholars of Brazilian democracy put the start date of the transition at General 
Figueiredo’s inauguration in 1979, when he announced his aim to make the country a 
democracy, thus kick-starting the abertura or ‘opening’ process. Although Figueiredo was 
succeeded by a civilian president, Jose Sarney in 1985, the population at large was still not 
able to cast its vote despite a huge popular campaign for direct elections, known as the 
Diretas Ja , meaning ‘direct elections now’. Sarney would have been vice-president had it 
not been for the death of Tancredo Neves, the choice of the electoral college, shortly before 
his inauguration. Barney’s democratic credentials were somewhat marred by the fact that he 
had been the civilian head of the military’s party, ARENA/PDS, from 1979, and as Alvarez
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(1990: 226) records, ‘The military retained six cabinet posts in the Sarney administration 
and de facto veto power over a number of key policy areas.’ Whilst some would place the 
end of the transition from military rule with Samey’s inauguration in 1985 as the first 
civilian president for 21 years, it was not until 1990, when Fernando Collor de Mello took 
office, that the Brazilian population finally elected its president directly.
The m eta lw orkers9 strike
In 1978, a strike was organized by the metalworkers’ union of Sao Bernardo, an industrial 
municipality within the Greater Sao Paulo area (Kowarick 1994). The unfavourable 
conditions for industrial action, including tight control over the unions, meant that the 
country was surprised by the strike. This industrial action was undertaken by the ‘new 
unionists’, and led by Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva, who went on to found the Workers’ Party 
and was eventually elected president of the Republic in 2002. New unionism opposed the 
existing forms of union organization and sought change from within. It was further 
characterized by the quest for autonomy from the state and was led by the autenticos, 
authentic popular leaders, as opposed to the pelegos, the latter being union leaders 
believed to be in the pockets of the regime (Galdino 2005). The strike has since come to be 
regarded as the key moment that kick-started popular mobilization for democracy. 
Furthermore, it acted as a catalyst for neighbourhood level organization that burst onto the 
public sphere in the 1980s.
Although centred on demands for pay to keep pace with inflation, the metalworkers 
employed a discourse that went beyond pay demands to touch on issues of dignity and 
honour. The leaders demanded that they be credited and respected for Brazil’s massive 
economic growth over the past decade. Abramo gives some insight into the issue of dignity 
in the metalworkers’ strikes, noting that the workers felt that,
Their dignity was routinely violated. Their rights as workers, as citizens and even as 
human beings were totally and systematically disregarded at every moment of their 
waking day [...] The idea of dignity seems to have emerged out of a profound
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sentiment of injustice and humiliation experienced individually by workers in their 
daily lives (Abramo 1994:150).
The strike in 1978 was successful, in that pay was brought back up to 1972 wage levels: a 
63% increase (Skidmore 1989). But Abramo reads a deeper significance into the 
metalworkers’ industrial action.
The workers recovered their dignity and their ability as subjects to organize, act 
collectively in defence of their interests, and win victories against a political and 
economic system, a body of repressive laws, a set of employers, and a state which 
had long believed (and made society believe) in their own impotence and impunity 
(Abramo 1994:170).
The reference to dignity and its relation to rights is important. It is linked to the idea of 
being respected by government, and is key to some of the ideas around housing held by the 
UMM, as will be discussed in the following chapter. It echoes Marshall’s (1964: 72) 
conceptualization of social citizenship, in which citizens have the right ‘to live the life of a 
civilized being according to the standards prevailing in the society*. And the theme of 
dignity is also drawn out by other scholars of Sao Paulo’s labour force who, as noted in the 
previous chapter, refer to the way in which industry was able to drive down the pay and 
living conditions of a huge mass of semi-skilled and underemployed urban workers, 
resulting in massive exploitation and human degradation (Kowarick 1979; Oliveira 1982). 
Similarly, for Holston (2008:198) residents of Sao Paulo’s peripheries began to organize in 
the late 1970s partly as a response to their ‘incorporation into the labour market as 
practically servile workers [that] denied them dignity*.
The metalworkers’ strike was also significant for those outside of the industry. It was the 
first major protest against the regime since 1968, and the strikers garnered immense 
support throughout the country. In the greater Sao Paulo region in particular, the strike 
transcended the boundaries of the factory to find solidarity in the neighbourhoods of the 
peripheries, where committees were set up to provide food and money for the families of 
those on strike (Skidmore 1989). The strike was seen as,
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Sowing the seeds of popular organizations in the neighbourhoods, which flourished 
after 1980 into a people’s movement that began questioning the municipal 
government and the authorities in general (Bava 1994: 203).
The strike in 1978, and those that followed are, in this way, credited with the politicization 
of everyday life, serving as the catalyst for other collective action in Sao Paulo and beyond 
around both production and reproduction. Further, particularly after the arrest of Lula in 
1980 and the repression of a second metalworkers’ strike widely perceived by society as 
legitimate, these struggles came to be conceived as protests against a repressive state (Bava 
1994).
That these strikes in Sao Paulo should come at a time of national economic contraction is 
interesting, since the traditional link between industrial action and the business cycle sees 
unions’ bargaining power as greatest at times of economic expansion and declines during 
recession (Wood 2000:137). That these protests should manifest themselves through labour 
strikes also runs counter to Walton’s supposition that collective action of the urban poor in 
times of recession ‘is more likely to occur in the form of collective consumption and less 
often in the form of labour (e.g. strikes)’ (Walton i999:47i).44 The politicization of union 
activity, as demands spread from the narrow focus of the workplace to more general 
protests about standards of living, was not unique to Brazil at this point, however. The late 
1970s in South Africa also saw trade unions with close ties to community organizations, 
pressing ‘for political reforms that far exceeded the usual union mandate’ (Wood 2000: 
137).
The founding o f  the PT
A second key moment in the transition period was the establishment of the Partido dos 
Trabalhadores, the Workers’ Party, or PT. Its creation reflects the broadening of focus 
within labour organizing as trade union leaders sought to establish a political party that 
would reach out beyond unionized workers to Brazilians employed in the informal economy
44 Walton (1999) does concede that contrary to his expectations labour action can increase concurrently 
with collective consumption action, as was the case in Sao Paulo in the 1980s.
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and residents of poor communities, thereby representing ‘workers’ generally/5 In the late 
1970s, union leaders and sympathisers had come to the conclusion that,
Union representation of members’ demands for better working conditions, wages, 
and other benefits was not enough to ensure a better life for Brazil’s working 
classes. Workers were also citizens, with needs and interests outside the workplace, 
and they needed to be represented as such in the national political arena. Even for 
workplace issues, unions were seen as highly vulnerable to state repression whereas 
a party might operate in multiple locations within and outside the state apparatus 
(Nylen 2000:129).
The PT was formed in 1980 after the military relaxed its rules on the formation of 
political parties, and although its impetus came from the trade union movement, other 
social actors were also involved in its formation, notably the Catholic Church, the 
neighbourhood movements and exiled left-wing academics. The PT is based on a 
pyramid system with groups organized around neighbourhoods, schools and 
workplaces who meet to make decisions and then elect delegates to party conferences at 
the ‘zonal’, municipal and regional levels. Key to the ideology of the party at its 
founding was to be the continued support for social movement mobilization and 
ongoing input into programmatic issues from the grassroots.
The idea behind this pyramidal system is to insure bottom-up decision making in 
which a large party base rooted in popular movements has direct contact with the 
top leadership (Abers 1988:42).
The party’s philosophy is based on ‘three pillars’: (i) popular participation, (ii) social 
policies for redistribution of income and (iii) ‘reversal of priorities’ inversao de 
prioridades- i.e. prioritizing the needs of the more vulnerable sectors of Brazilian 
society who have historically been marginalized.
The PT’s roots in the trade unions, neighbourhood movements and general struggle for 
democracy led some observers to refer to the party, in its earlier years, as a social movement
45 The term trabalhador, or ‘worker’ is a synonym for the hardworking, honest poor in Brazil.
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in itself (Keck 1992).46 It was perceived as fulfilling a dual function as both mobilizing and 
representing the poor. As Keck (1992: 3) notes,
The PT was unlike other parties created in the 1980s, as it had a base in labour and 
social movements and it took representation, both internally and externally very 
seriously.
The mobilizational capabilities of the party were clearly demonstrated in the early 1980s 
when it brought thousands of protestors onto the streets of Sao Paulo at the time of 
elections in 1982, and then again in the campaign for direct presidential elections in the run 
up to 1985, the Diretas Ja. However, much has changed in Brazilian politics since the 
1980s, and in its current state of advanced formal institutionalization and integration into 
the Brazilian political system, the PT would not be referred to as a social movement. 
However, achieving a balance between a close relationship to social movements with the 
need to make electoral gains remains an underlying tension within the party. Some 
commentators argue that relationships with social movements have been sidelined in the 
quest for institutionalization (cf Petras and Veltmeyer 2003), but there are still currents 
within the party who seek broader engagement with grassroots movements (Duquette 
2005). Although there is now considerable disquiet amongst many popular movements, the 
UMM included, as to the direction taken by the PT, there are still substantial links between 
social movements and the party as will be discussed below.
Emergence o f  a  righ ts discourse
Scholars of political science in Brazil during the 1980s saw the metalworkers’ strike and the 
establishment of the PT as opening the doors for an ‘explosion of civil society’ (Keck 1992). 
Autonomous popular organizations had traditionally been considered weak in Brazil, partly 
as a result of the dominance of elite groups that had fostered a history of clientelism and 
vote-buying, but also due to Vargas’s legacy of the state-controlled corporatist organization 
of the trade unions (Hagopian 1994; Nylen 2000) (discussed in chapter three). Rights for
46 The formation of the PT was also supported by left-wing intellectuals and members of former 
revolutionary and resistance groups (Duquette 2005).
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registered workers had been privileged, but at the price of the closing down of spaces for 
dissent, and excluding those not in the formal sector. As Mainwaring (1989) points out, 
with the partial exception of the 1961-64 period, popular sectors had been excluded from 
decision-making processes throughout Brazilian history. The repressive tactics of the 
military regime from 1964 onwards against worker, student and peasant groups quickly put 
down popular organizations that had emerged in the early 1960s. The situation of the 
military regime was therefore one in which spaces for expressing dissent or articulating 
needs appeared to have been reduced to almost nothing, and this perception accounted for 
the general surprise that greeted the emergence of organized sectors in the late 1970s. This 
was Xhefechamento, or ‘closing off of the state (Sader 1988). In response to it, organized 
groups within society recoiled from the state and retreated to the sphere of the family and 
the neighbourhood. But this is not to say that popular organization disappeared. As 
Duquette notes,
Civil society had not sat on its hands waiting for the demise of the dictatorship.
Associations multiplied in the late 1970s and early 1980s, extending civil networks
and attempting to take up the slack from a struggling regime short on money,
prestige and internal organizational strength (Duquette 2005: 45).
The closing down of the state is credited with the gradual strengthening of civil society 
during the military regime, as ‘people began to consider the potential of social movements, 
that could only be developed outside of the institutions of the state’ (Sader 1988: 34).
The type of problem-solving and mobilization that ensued in the sphere of the home, 
neighbourhood, and to an extent the workplace, created a new perception of the state and 
its relationship to society (Sader 1988; Telles 1994; Brandt 1983). Since the 1930s, the state 
had ‘penetrated the very pores of social life, ordering and regulating society while 
constructing an image of itself as the only subject able to realize a project for the national 
future’ (Telles 1994: 200). By contrast, ‘the history of the 1970s can be seen as the 
constitution o f the social as apolitical space’ in which people began to imagine alternative 
futures and to perceive these in opposition to the state’s project for them (ibid: 198
emphasis in the original). Social movement militants therefore began to speak of‘everyday 
life* as the new space of resistance (Sader 1988).
The key actor in bringing about this change in perception amongst poor communities is 
generally considered to be the Catholic church, and the role of the Church in stimulating the 
first neighbourhood level associations should be emphasized:
It is impossible to overstate the importance of the Catholic church’s role in 
providing space for interaction and organization, a communications network and 
human rights advocacy during the most difficult years of the authoritarian period 
[...] The adoption of the defence of human rights and the preferential option for the 
poor as the principles for the whole Brazilian Church [...] meant that the Church qua 
institution could confront the State [...] it took an institutional position against 
torture, repression and social and economic oppression that were often stronger 
than those of its counterparts elsewhere in Latin America (Keck 1992: 37).
It was through the Comunidades Eclesiais de Base, the Christian Base Committees, that 
were set up in neighbourhoods across Brazil following the conscientization teachings of 
Paulo Freire, that a gradual politicization of everyday problems was built up.47 The CEBs 
were an umbrella body for organizing local initiatives, such as mothers’ groups, literacy 
circles and youth clubs, through which campaigns for improvements to local services were 
also developed.
The CEBs [could not] accept the persistence and the aggravation of social 
inequalities. Nor [could] they accept the idea that inequalities are the result of 
individual differences, which implies that the poor -  because of their ignorance, 
their low productivity, their inability to limit the size of their families [...] are the 
principal, if not the only ones responsible for their own poverty (Singer 1982:290).
The work of the CEBs in the poorer neighbourhoods of Sao Paulo began to manifest itself in 
a series of well-publicized campaigns and protests in the late 1970s and 1980s, including 
the Cost of Living campaign. Although they may not have started out with a political 
agenda, many campaigns acquired a politicized edge, as Keck notes,
47 Arantes (2004:189) explains Freire’s pedagogy thus: ‘According to Freire’s teachings, literacy moves 
from being a process of domesticating and mechanizing students towards a means of awareness and 
liberation. Learning to read and write becomes, m ost importantly, an act of learning how to read the world 
and to write one’s own history. What was required was an emphasis on the reality of each community and 
its problem situations with a view to the formulation of generative-themes with transformative educational 
properties’.
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Through an examination of Christian teachings, many communities, particularly in 
poor areas, developed a social critique based on immediate experience (Keck 1992: 
47).
Similarly, as Alvarez (1990: 39) argues, it was through the process of making demands on 
the state that its repressive and exclusionary character was revealed, leading some 
movements to develop ‘an oppositional consciousness and a combative political practice’. 
The conscientization and politicization of these groups led them to point the finger of blame 
at the authorities for the difficulties suffered by the urban poor. Crucially, basic needs 
began to conceptualized as rights: chronic hunger and malnutrition, combined with 
inadequate shelter (experienced even by families where adults were in work) were perceived 
as violations of the right to life and to human dignity. The state was posited as the culprit 
for the negation of these rights. In this way, an anti-state stance and a discourse of 
citizenship developed within neighbourhood organizations and urban movements.
The emergence of a citizenship rights discourse amongst the urban poor is one of the key 
impacts of social movement organizing during the 1970s and 1980s (Jacobi 1987; Sader 
1988; Levy 2005). Poorer sectors of society began to challenge the elite dominated political 
system and to denounce the engrained inequalities of Brazilian society by both voicing their 
demands in the public sphere and framing these demands as rights. The impact of this was 
to raise ‘their demands to a more encompassing, universal and systematic level, which 
strengthened their notion of citizenship as well as their collective identity* (Levy 2005:106). 
Employing the discourse of rights over questions of poor urban infrastructure and basic 
needs was also a way of combating clientelistic relationships with politicians. The idea that 
the poor had the right, as citizens, to receive adequate urban services without the need to do 
deals with corrupt politicians was supported by the development within social movements 
of a strong rhetoric around the question of organizational autonomy (Jacobi 1987; Sader 
1988).48 Finally, for Sader (1988), the conscientization of movement members and
48 The question of the autonomy of social movements is a highly charged and complex one, and will be 
discussed in greater detail below and in the following chapters.
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politicization of demands is proof of a sea-change within the popular classes, as they 
became aware of their own agency and ability to alter the status quo.
That popular groups began to mobilize around basic needs at a time of economic recession 
would seem to lend weight to Walton’s (1998) thesis that collective action of the urban poor 
around goods of collective consumption is most likely to arise at a time of economic 
decline.^ This is particularly likely to be the case when welfare spending is cut back, thus 
damaging the ‘moral economy’ whereby populations have built up expectations of some 
kind of state provided social protection^0 He observes that these groups express their 
discontent with a decline in living standards through non-institutional channels, 
particularly since many do not have access to unionized employment. However, it would be 
inaccurate to describe the collective action on the peripheries of Sao Paulo during the 1980s 
as purely based on a search for the fulfilment of needs. As has been demonstrated in 
discussions above, needs were conceptualized as rights, and, at a time of political 
liberalization, gross inequality, social segregation and even hunger became key rallying 
points in the struggle for democratization. This finding has resonance in the discussion of 
social movement theory in the first chapter of this thesis that, drawing on Castells (1983), 
identified a link between questions of identity and collective consumption. It is also echoed 
in the behaviour of other urban movements across the world that politicize their demands 
for housing and other services (cf. Appadurai 2001, D’Cruz and Mitlin 2007).51 Finally, it 
gives weight to Walton’s suggestion (which he does not develop further) that political and 
human rights action can involve popular mobilization around material as well as non­
material issues (Walton 1998:463). There is thus a clear cross-over in the case of Sao Paulo 
between all three types of urban conflict in Walton’s typology. Collective action in trade
49 Goldfrank (2007) observes a pattern of neighbourhood-based mobilization across Latin America in the 
early 1980s in response to the deterioration of urban services brought on by economic crisis.
5° As Baierle 1998 notes, somewhat ironically, it was during the military dictatorship that the Brazilian 
state established universal access to healthcare, education and some forms of welfare support,
s* Many housing movements in cities around the world start life as savings and rotating credit 
organizations and, as such, could be classified as purely consumption based. These may be facilitated by 
the local authorities, as in the case of Thailand (cf. Boonyabancha 2001). However, as these organizations 
federate, they can develop a politicised discourse and strategy, particularly when they engage with 
democratisation processes, as is shown by the case of the South African Homeless People’s Federation 
(Millstein et al. 2003) -  recently renamed FEDUP.
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unions catalysed and provided support for action based around collective consumption, 
which in turn acquired a political component as basic needs were conceptualized as rights.
The Constituent A ssem bly
The late 1970s and early 1980s were clearly a time of significant mobilization amongst 
poorer sectors of Sao Paulo society, and these groups were joined by more middle-class 
elements from the human rights and women’s movements in the Diretas Ja. The majority 
of scholars of the period consider the 1984 Diretas Ja campaign as the high point of social 
movement organizing in the city’s recent history. The campaign brought thousands onto the 
streets in 1984 to demand direct elections (to be held the following year) for the first civilian 
president in twenty years. The failure of this campaign (the transition to civilian rule went 
ahead in 1985 after indirect elections) is perceived by many observers as leading to the 
fragmentation of the pro-democracy coalition (Hochstetler 2000; Mainwaring 1987; 
Alvarez 1990). And popular collective action is posited as having gone into a general decline 
from this point onwards (Mainwaring 1989; Hellmann 1995; Hagopian 1996). These 
commentators display a belief that the movements that had shown so much promise and 
vitality during the authoritarian era and transition were not able to live up to their potential 
with the restoration of civilian rule after 1985.
Hochstetler (2000) notes the generally negative evaluation of social movements after 1984- 
5. She regards the period as the end of what Tarrow would label a ‘cycle’ of contention, and 
argues that the ‘masterframe’ of democratization that had held disparate movements 
together had been exhausted. There are two distinct critiques of the social movement field 
at this time, reflected in the following comment from Kingstone and Power:
Groups and movements that were intriguing in the early 1980s now seem less vital 
or more ambiguously prodemocratic (Kingstone and Power 2000: 6).
On the one hand, social movements are seen to have lost their vibrancy, either because they 
have become institutionalized (Foweraker 2001; Houtzager 2005) or because they have
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experienced difficulty in mobilizing members in the post-dictatorship era. The lack of a 
clear enemy is posited by Mainwaring as the explanation for social movements’ decline:
When the government was openly anti-popular, it was easier for the movement to 
project an image which combated this view (Mainwaring 1989:184).
On other hand, a number of scholars voice their disappointment that the anti-regime 
coalition of social movements has not been able to adapt to changing political 
circumstances to become a force for the consolidation and deepening of democracy. 
Movements are perceived as unable to make the shift from the ‘confrontational tactics of 
the transition period to strategies of negotiation and compromise necessitated by 
democratic political rules of the game’ (Alvarez 1990: 227). A similar critique is made by 
Jacobi (1987) who criticizes the anti-state positioning of social movements. Hellmann 
(1995) concurs that with the return to democratization, social movements have not found a 
‘positive role’ for themselves in the new political arena.
The pessimism over the direction and general health of collective action in Brazil after the 
end of the military regime is reflected in evaluations of the process that accompanied the 
promulgation of the new Constitution. For over nineteen months in 1987-88 the members 
of the Assembleia Constituinte, or Constituent Assembly, mainly congressmen, debated the 
form and content of Brazil’s new Constitution. For Duquette (2005) social movements 
hovered between being h it players’ and ‘docile participants’ in the process. Keck quotes 
from an article in a the newspaper Folha de Sao Paulo which evaluated the work of the 
Constituent Assembly as,
Nothing so much as a group of politicians sitting in a room surrounded with 
mirrors, so that everywhere they looked they saw only their own images (Martins 
cited in Keck 1992: 253).
Political scientists have also been somewhat scathing of both the constituent assembly 
process and its final outcome. Kingstone and Power (2000:19) criticize the ‘non-stop 
tinkering with the institutional arrangements of Brazilian democracy’, damning the process
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of the Constituent Assembly as ‘a free-for-all of parochial and sectoral demands [that] 
produced a document reflecting its chaotic politics and ad hoc procedures’.
Beyond tinkering in a room of mirrors, however, there was a strong participatory element to 
the process: citizens’ groups that amassed at least 30 000 signatures supporting changes to 
the draft of the Constitution were permitted to submit amendments to the Assembly. In 
total, 168 amendments were submitted in this way, meaning that movements collected 
millions of signatures. They then lobbied the Assembly in favour of the proposed changes 
and debated the language used in the drafts of the Constitution (Hochstetler 2000). Alvarez 
(1990) records the presence of effective women’s lobbies during the drafting of the new 
Constitution that ensured the incorporation of key demands from the women’s movement. 
The process also created a huge amount of popular interest in the Constitution and brought 
about a high degree of awareness of the content and tone of the final document amongst 
social movements. As will be shown in following chapters, the way that the Sao Paulo 
housing movement now uses the Constitution to make claims on the state and to justify its 
actions is a key element of its ‘politics of rights’.
The activity of popular sectors in the Constituent Assembly clearly contradicts arguments 
that the failure of the Diretas Ja marked the beginning of a serious downturn in social 
movement organizing in the city. In general the accounts of the withering away of social 
movement activity post-transition do not find resonance with the specific history of Sao 
Paulo’s Uniao de Movimentos de Moradia. The UMM was founded in 1987, and although it 
has undergone fluctuations in internal organization, success and mobilizational ability, its 
general trend, as with the national level movement that emerged out of it, is one of growth 
in strength and visibility over the past twenty years. Similarly, Brazil’s most well-known 
movement of Rural Landless Workers, the Movimento de Trabalhadores Rurais Sem Terra 
or MST, has also made gains over the period since the transition. Indeed, the MST is 
considered to have ‘exploded’ in the mid 1990s (Power and Roberts 2000). Levy (2005) 
makes parallel claims for the housing movements of Sao Paulo, which she sees as having
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had a renaissance in the late 1990s. The vibrancy of these collective actors is acknowledged 
by Keck (1992:24) who points out that these are the two social movements that have not 
faltered post-transition.
Social movements did not disappear, indeed, during the 1980s some of them, 
particularly urban squatter movements and the rural landless movement, were 
much larger and more militant than their counterparts during the early phases of 
the transition. The difference lies in the fact that during the late 1970s such 
movements were interpreted as part of the broader fabric of a democratic 
opposition, while in the 1980s it was their contestatory role and their capacity for 
disruption that appeared paramount.
Keck does not, however, elaborate on these issues of contestation and disruption, and 
appears to refrain from making a value judgement on social movements’ ‘contestatory role’. 
Her somewhat oblique comments suggest that during the dictatorship, contestation was 
part of the way in which opposition was mounted, but that this appears somewhat out of 
place in a democracy. Comments above on the lack of a ‘positive role’ for social movements 
post-transition suggest a similarly negative critique of disruptive or transgressive action on 
the part of social movements. At the other end of the spectrum, movements that have 
become less visible through absorption into the institutional political system, particularly 
through participatory policy councils, risk accusations of cooption and a loss of vibrancy 
This appears to have been the fate of the once highly dynamic youth and health movements 
in Sao Paulo.52 These evaluations will now be examined in light of the specific history of the 
Uniao de Movimentos de Moradia in the post-transition period.
52 Interview with Luiz Kohara, representative of a legal assistance NGO 27.03.07.
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Figure 4: M em bers o f th e  UMM gather in  cen tra l Sao Paulo to  a ttem pt the  
occupation  o f an  em pty federal build ing
raw
A  B r ie f  H is to ry  o f  the Uniao de M ovim en tos de M orad ia
T h e  d e v e lo p m e n t s  in  r e c e n t  B r a z il ia n  h i s t o r y  o u t l in e d  h e r e  -  t h e  t r a n s it io n  p e r io d ,  t h e
f o r m a t io n  o f  t h e  P T , m o b i l i z a t io n  a r o u n d  t h e  C o n s t i t u t io n  a n d  t h e  r e s t i t u t io n  o f  fo r m a l  
d e m o c r a c y  -  h a v e  h a d  im p o r t a n t  a n d  la s t in g  e f f e c t s  o n  t h e  S a o  P a u lo  h o u s in g  m o v e m e n t ,  
a s  w il l  n o w  b e  s h o w n .  T h e  U M M  w a s  f o u n d e d  tw o  y e a r s  a f t e r  t h e  r e tu r n  to  c iv i l ia n  r u le , b u t  
a s  a  f e d e r a t io n  o f  m o v e m e n t s ,  o r g a n iz e d  in t o  r e g io n a l  g r o u p s , it  b r o u g h t  to g e t h e r  a  n u m b e r  
o f  a lr e a d y  w e l l - e s t a b l i s h e d  a s s o c ia t io n s  c a m p a ig n in g  fo r  h o u s in g  a n d  u r b a n  s e r v ic e s  a c r o s s  
t h e  c i t y .53 I t  t h u s  r e f le c t s  t h e  o r g a n iz a t io n a l  s t r u c tu r e  o f  o t h e r  la r g e  h o u s in g  m o v e m e n t s  o f  
t h e  u r b a n  p o o r  a r o u n d  t h e  w o r ld , n o t a b ly  in  I n d ia , S o u t h  A fr ic a  a n d  t h e  P h i l ip p in e s  
( A p p a d u r a i  2 0 0 1 ;  B a u m a n n  a n d  B o ln ic k  2 0 0 1 ;  M il ls t e in ,  O ld f ie ld  a n d  S to k k e  2 0 0 3 ;
53 A t t h e  t im e  o f  t h e  f ie ld w o rk  f o r  t h i s  s tu d y ,  t h e  U M M ’s in te r n a l  s t r u c t u r e  in c o r p o r a te d  s ix  ‘m a c r o - r e g io n s ’ 
w i th in  t h e  m u n ic ip a l i ty  o f  S a o  P a u lo :  N o r th ,  E a s t ,  S o u th e a s t ,  S o u th ,  W e s t /N o r th w e s t  a n d  C e n tr e  a n d  a 
f u r t h e r  t h r e e  in  S a o  P a u lo  s ta te .
53 E a c h  r e g io n a l  m o v e m e n t  is  a ls o  a  f e d e r a t io n  o f  s m a lle r  a s s o c ia t io n s  a n d  m o v e m e n ts  lo c a te d  in  i ts  
g e o g ra p h ic a l  a r e a .  T h ro u g h  th e s e  m a n y  g r a s s ro o ts  g r o u p s ,  k n o w n  a s  grupos de o r ig e m , t h e  U M M  
c u r r e n t ly  c la im s  to  r e p r e s e n t  5 0  0 0 0  p e o p le  a c ro s s  S a o  P a u lo  s ta te .
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Shatkin 2007). Many of the members and leaders of Sao Paulo’s urban movements had 
been involved in activism since the 1970s, working in local neighbourhood associations, 
involved with the work of the Catholic Church through the Christian Base Communities and 
the Pastoral de Moradias* or participating in industrial action. Key leaders, particularly 
from the eastern areas of the city, had also been affiliated to the MST that, as part of a broad 
programme for land reform, had begun to transpose its tactic of land occupations from 
rural areas to urban o n e s .5 5  The UMM’s roots in the movement against the dictatorship and 
involvement in the transition period are clearly reflected in its discourse -  leaders and 
members continue to refer to their campaigning as a luta, ‘the struggle’, their rhetoric has a 
strong anti-state stance and they continue to carry out occupations of both land and 
buildings. Leaders and members also demonstrate extreme concern with the autonomy of 
the movement, again an echo of the new unionism of the late 1970s. These are not an 
anachronisms, however. The UMM adapts swiftly to changes in political circumstance, and 
engages when it can with the local and national states through collaborative housing 
ventures and involvement in new participatory policy councils. This suggests that along 
with analysis of economic climate, analysis of social movement action must also take 
political process into account. The movement’s dual strategy of collaboration and 
contestation is at the heart of its response to a situation of formal democracy where many 
Brazilians still suffer from ‘limited citizenship’.
In the early years of mobilization around housing, the 1980s, groups of low-income 
residents affiliated to the MST and supported by the Church undertook mass occupations of 
land, particularly on the eastern peripheries of the city. This action can be read as a survival 
strategy amongst the urban poor; a response to growth in inflation and unemployment, and 
rising rents. Occupations, sometimes involving up to 100 000 people, were also a reaction 
to the growing density of Xhefavelas and legislation that restricted the opening up of new 
plots for house building. Squatting, land invasions and rent strikes are classic ‘non-
54 This is the Church’s housing support programme. There are also pastoral units organized around health, 
education, children and young people.
55Although the UMM and its constituent members borrow from the strategies and discourse of the MST, as 
will be discussed in chapter five, the two organizations no longer have formal associations.
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institutional’ responses to economic downturn amongst the urban poor (Walton 1998). But 
the 1980s saw both the intensification of occupations and protests in Sao Paulo as well as 
the gradual development of a political component to this type of action at a time of 
democratization. The UMM was formed precisely to give a deeper political dimension to 
demands for housing. Its original raison d’etre, according to UMM leaders, was to bring 
groups with similar aims into a federation so that they could present their demands in a 
unified manner to the municipal and regional state, giving ‘greater weight to the struggle for 
housing’ (Cavalcanti 2006).s6
The development of the housing movements’ demands also shows an increasing emphasis 
on collaboration with a newly democratic state. In its early years, demands on the local 
state by housing movements revolved around the provision of land in the city of Sao Paulo, 
calling for thousands of plots from the municipal government on which their members 
would build their own homes (Cavalcanti 2006). However, over the course of the 1980s, 
elements of the housing movement began to develop the idea of mutirao con autogestao, a 
type of self-help in which land and financing of building materials are provided by the 
municipality. The future residents, known as mutirantes, are organized into groups and 
take on building work in their spare time. The group of mutirantes receive technical 
assistance from architects and are intimately involved in all aspects of the project, from 
planning to administrative management of resources. For Cavalcanti (2006) mutirao was a 
significant development for the housing movement because it engendered a change in 
relationship between the state and the social entity organizing the project. Rather than 
simply receiving plots of lands on which to build poor quality housing, mutirao aimed to 
break with the traditional cycle of precarious self-construction in poorly serviced areas 
(detailed in the previous chapter) by producing higher quality housing and establishing a 
relationship between the state and organized groups of the urban poor. Further, while the 
state approves the project, provides the funding and makes checks on the building work,
s6 Levy (2005) also claims the Union was formed as a response to the emergence o f other umbrella 
organizations linked to the PT and the unions, particularly the forerunner to today’s Central de 
Movimentos Populares (CMP) or Centre for Popular Movements.
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control over all other management issues is passed to the social movement (Bonduki 2000). 
As such, it comes to be recognized as an ‘autonomous political subject’ (Cavalcanti 
2006:66).
A couple of attempts to carry out pilots of mutirao projects were made during the 1980s, 
but these were marred by lack of funding (Bonduki 2000). However, the situation in Sao 
Paulo municipality changed dramatically in favour of the housing movements when the city 
elected a PT mayor, Luiza Erundina, to office in 1988. A woman from a humble 
background, who had migrated from the poor Northeast of the country, she had been 
actively involved in neighbourhood organizing on the peripheries of Sao Paulo and made 
housing one of the priorities of her mandate (Cavalcanti 2006). Her election opened the 
doors of the housing department to representatives of the housing movements, amongst 
which the UMM was and remains the most prominent. Erundina’s government began a 
large-scale programme of mutirao com autogestao which proved enormously popular with 
low-income groups. Approximately 11000 homes were built in this way during her 
administration. Mutirao has recently been criticized for its extensive reliance on the free 
labour of the poorest members of society (Rizek, Barros and Bergamim 2003). However, 
proponents maintain that the process is socially ‘transformative’ in that it promotes 
community solidarity, individual empowerment and skills development, whilst also 
reducing the cost of individual units. The mutirao programme as a whole drew new 
members into the housing movements and was taken up by the Sao Paulo state government 
and, briefly, the federal government, although these programmes granted varying levels of 
responsibility to the social movements and associations involved (Rizek et al. 2003). The 
Erundina administration was positively evaluated for its contribution to housing amongst 
poorer sectors living on the peripheries (Souto and Kayano 1996) and the era is considered 
the ‘golden age’ of the mutirao by current UMM leaders. Furthermore, the ‘self­
management’ aspect of the process, autogestao, remains at the core of the UMM’s 
organizational philosophy.
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The late 1980s also saw the UMM begin to engage with the federal government with yearly 
caravanas to Brasilia, in which bus loads of movement members would travel to the federal 
capital to make demands for social housing (Caricari 2006). The year 1990 saw the start of 
a lengthy campaign to establish the FNMP (Fundo National de Moradia Popular -  
National Fund for Popular Housing) and an associated national management council that 
would distribute federal resources exclusively for social housing. This would ensure the 
development of housing policies for the poorest members of society. The UMM took 
advantage of a provision in the Constitution that permits the population at large to submit a 
‘popular initiative’ to introduce a law. As Hochstetler (2000) notes, the UMM was the first 
coalition to do so, collecting over 800 000 signatures through collaboration with other 
social and non-governmental organizations across the country. The final petition was 
submitted in 1991 and the eventual acceptance of the FNMP, by now the FNHIS (Fundo 
Nacional de Habitagao de Interesse Social -  National Fund for Social Interest Housing) by 
the Lula government in 2003 after 14 years of campaigning, is regarded by UMM leaders as 
one of the key successes of the movement’s twenty-year history. For Cavalcanti (2006) this 
campaign was also significant for the UMM since it achieved national level prestige and 
recognition within the unions and political parties. But it also shows a commitment to 
democratic principles, as the movement demonstrates a concern not just with the material 
needs of its own members, but attempts to bring about a redistribution of income at the 
national level, for the benefit of all poorer members of society.
This engagement with the Constitution is also significant as it reinforces the discussion of 
the importance of the document for social movements outlined above. The findings of this 
study show a widespread sense of pride in and ownership of the 1988 Constitution. 
Representatives of the UMM interviewed often referred to the document as the Constituinte 
(from Assembleia Constituinte or Constituent Assembly) rather than using the correct 
Portuguese term, which would be Constituiqao. In this way they were speaking of the final 
document by referring to the process through which it was drawn up. This phenomenon 
was also recorded by Holston (2008) in his interviews in a lower-middle class
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neighbourhood of Sao Paulo in the 1990s. Although at first he believed this to be a mistake 
or slip of the tongue of his interviewees, he later came to understand that the process of 
involvement in the drawing up of the Constitution was intimately linked in their minds with 
the document itself, and that they were underscoring the importance of their agency in 
creating it. Whilst criticism of the document and the process by which it was drawn up 
remain, these findings point to the importance of informal institutionalization of the 
Constitution amongst representatives of popular movements, who both take advantage of 
the opportunities for participation and legislation that it offers, and draw on it as a symbolic 
resource. More recently the UMM has engaged with federal legislation known as the City 
Statute, that sets out the ‘right to the city* and provides implementing legislation for articles 
of the Convention that deal with housing and urban services. The Statute is of considerable 
significance for the housing movement and its supporters, in that it establishes in law 
progressive ideas on the equal right of all to benefit from the use value of the urban 
environment, and to engage in participatory planning. The extent to which the discourse of 
the UMM is intimately bound up with Constitutional rights and legislation such as the City 
Statute will be discussed in the following chapter and in chapter seven.
Returning to the UMM’s engagement at the municipal level, from discussions so far it 
should be clear that the fortunes of the UMM are closely linked to those of the PT. And 
indeed, after the failure of the PT to re-elect a mayor for Sao Paulo in 1992 the doors to the 
municipal housing secretariat were closed to the UMM, with two terms in office for 
candidates from the centre-right party, PP (Partido Progressista -  Progressive Party). The 
first of these was Paulo Maluf, who presided over an administration of such high levels of 
corruption that the term malufismo has been coined to refer to misappropriation of public 
funds. He was succeeded by Celso Pitta, widely perceived to be Maluf s puppet, at a time 
when mayors could not stand for re-election. For Amaral (2002)
Maluf s administration destroyed municipal housing policy [...] Approximately 124 
building projects were frozen and left to deteriorate, bringing about a criminal 
waste of public money [...] Favelas multiplied and channels for dialogue with social
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movements were cut.[...]The lack of housing policy in the period contributed to a 
decline in living conditions for a significant number of people (Amaral 2002: 27).
While the UMM made some progress in negotiating mutirao projects with the state 
government from 1993, the movement remained frustrated with frozen mutirao projects at 
the municipal level. Levy (2005:119) paints the 1990s as a time of ‘disarray and loss of 
influence’ for urban popular movements. However, during this time the UMM was 
beginning to develop arguments associated with the difficulties of living on the periphery of 
the city, where there are poor transport links and few basic services (as detailed in chapter 
three). This led to a change in tactic in the second half of the 1990s. In 1997, the UMM 
carried out its first large-scale occupation of an abandoned building in the centre of Sao 
Paulo. There followed a wave of building occupations of both public and private properties 
until 1999. Along with the lack of housing policy for the city, movement leaders also cite the 
growing number of evictions of poor residents from cortiqos in the centre of the city as a 
motivating factor behind the occupations, as well as the lack of adequate, low-income 
housing for poorer workers in central districts of the city, that would allow them to live 
close to their places of employment. Building occupations therefore served a number of 
functions: providing temporary accommodation for families facing life on the street, 
highlighting the contradiction between the city’s housing deficit and the large number of 
empty buildings in central districts and condemning the absence of housing policy for the 
city. This ‘new moment’ (Amaral 2002:33) for the movement was characterized by the 
assertion of the ‘right to live in the centre’. This notion, and the issue of occupations will be 
examined in more detail in chapter seven.
When the PT candidate Marta Suplicy was elected mayor of Sao Paulo in 2001, the UMM 
seized its chance to push forward on the central housing agenda, as well as calling for the 
renewal of mutirao projects. During the Suplicy administration a number of UMM leaders 
took up positions in the municipal housing secretariat, and had seats on the newly 
established Municipal Housing Council. Although there was massively increased dialogue 
with the city authorities during this time, movement members and leaders have expressed
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dissatisfaction at the slow-pace with which housing projects progressed (Cavalcanti 2006). 
It is important to note that the UMM scaled back building occupations at this time. Suplicy 
failed to get re-elected, losing the mayoral race to Jose Serra who took office in 2005; as a 
result the majority of the plans for social housing in central areas were never implemented. 
Since this point the UMM has had difficulty in influencing the social housing agenda at both 
the state and municipal government levels. It also lost all representation on the municipal 
housing council in 2005. However, the assumption of the presidency by the former union 
leader Lula in 2003 created an alternative space for the UMM’s campaigning activities. 
UMM members took up positions on federal level housing councils and within the newly 
created Cities’ M in is tr y .5 7  Since the establishment of the FNHIS, they have been lobbying 
for social movements and popular housing associations to have direct access to the fund. 
However, at the time of the fieldwork for this study, which coincided with Lula’s election to 
a second term in office, the UMM leadership began to speak of taking a more antagonistic 
stance towards the federal government, including undertaking waves of occupations of 
federally owned abandoned buildings in the city.
As they continue to campaign for adequate housing supported by urban services, today 
the UMM’s member organizations organize mutiroes, call for the building of new units 
and the renovation of abandoned buildings, counter threats of eviction and lobby for 
the ‘urbanization’ offavelas. In almost all cases, the UMM’s affiliated organizations 
link these lutas or ‘struggles’ with demands for increased levels of movement 
participation in policy-making and ‘social control’ of government spending on housing. 
The UMM itself, as the umbrella body, coordinates activities that aim to influence 
housing policy at municipal, state and federal level. It directs its activities at the 
municipal and state level housing departments, SEHAB (Secretaria Municipal de 
Habitagao -  Municipal Housing Secretariat) and the Secretaria Estadual de Habitagao 
do Estado (State Housing Secretariat). These departments work in close collaboration
57 The Cities’ Ministry was established at the start of Lula’s first term in office and brings together all 
government departments that work on urban issues, including housing, that had previously been scattered 
across a number of different ministries.
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with their respective public housing companies, COHAB (Companhia Metropolitana de 
Habitagao -  Metropolitan Housing Corporation) and CDHU (Companhia de 
Desenvolvimento Habitacional e Urbano do Estado de Sao Paulo -  Sao Paulo State 
Housing and Urban Development Corporation), that operationalize housing policy. 
There is very little to distinguish between housing built by the two companies which 
has, in the main, been of very low quality (Bonduki 2000) often in marginal areas of the 
city. Completed homes are distributed through a lottery system to which those in need 
of housing sign up. Not all of these are necessarily from very low-income groups, as 
CDHU currently builds homes for families with up to ten minimum wages. (To give 
some perspective, the UMM works principally with families with up to three minimum 
wages.) They are then invited to purchase the unit with a subsidy, thus, yet again, 
reinforcing the norm of property ownership, even amongst very poor individuals. 
Historically, CDHU has been better funded than COHAB and has built greater numbers 
of units. In recent years it has begun to work more closely with COHAB, as the political 
visions of the two Sao Paulo governments have become more aligned. As will be shown 
in chapter six, the UMM’s leaders meet for frequent negotiations with representatives 
from CDHU (into which the State Housing Department has been virtually subsumed), 
COHAB and SEHAB. Although according to the Constitution all three levels of the 
Brazilian state share competency for housing, the Cities’ Ministry at federal level is not 
involved in operational aspects of housing provision. It does, however, work with the 
federal level savings bank, the CEF, (Caixa Economica Federal) to provide subsidized 
mortgage loans for low-income groups, as well as directing federal funds to both 
COHAB and CDHU and developing housing policy. The Cities’ Ministry is therefore 
also a target of UMM mobilization.
Although most movement leaders are careful to state that they are campaigning for 
housing for their members, rather than home ownership, in reality social rental 
housing or locaqao social, is almost non-existent in the city. Experiments in locaqao 
social are limited to three sites, all established during the Suplicy administration. Two
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of these have quickly become no-go areas with the majority of flats bought from tenants 
illegally by drug dealers. The third, built especially for older people, was only finally 
inaugurated in 2007, and there are concerns over how it will fare. The problems faced 
in these social rental housing pilot schemes lead some in both the movements and the 
housing secretariat to question the viability of the model in Sao Paulo. Certainly, there 
was considerable resistance to the idea of social rental amongst the housing movements 
when it was first mooted by Suplic/s housing department. As noted in chapter three, 
the ‘dream of owning one’s own home’ is deeply embedded in Brazilian social 
aspirations, and the idea of the ‘dream’ is a cultural referent played upon by property 
development companies and mortgage lenders. However, movement leaders, 
particularly those who work on the centre of the city, are coming to the realization that 
subsidized social rental is the only option for the vast majority of their members who 
have family incomes of up to three minimum wages. These very low incomes render 
them ineligible for other types of subsidized mortgages provided by the federal public 
bank, the CEF.
The UMM and the FT
That a political process approach is important for an examination of the UMM should be 
clear from the above brief discussion of the movement’s twenty-year history. Clearly its 
fortunes are closely linked to those of the PT. Almost all the core leaders of the UMM are PT 
members, and a number credit themselves as being ‘founders’ of the party. The link 
between the housing movements and the party are not unusual, given that they both 
emerged out of union and neighbourhood organization at the end of the 1970s, that the PT 
always aimed to maintain a strong grassroots based, and they share a fundamental ideology 
of inversao de prioridades. Whilst the two Workers’ Party administrations in Sao Paulo 
have provided openings for a greater degree of collaboration in policy design at the 
municipal level, the election of the first of these, Luiza Erundina, had had other long-lasting 
impacts on the UMM. It was from this point that links between the movement and the party 
began to become institutionalized, as UMM leaders took up positions in politicians’ offices.
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This practice was initiated by Henrique Pacheco, a vereador (city councillor) and former 
student activist with the movement, who decided to employ a number of UMM’s leaders as 
his ‘cabinet’ assistants and advisors -  assessores de gabinete. He justified this decision as 
follows:
Before being a vereador, I was a law student, really committed to the student 
movements8, and I ended up as a vereador thanks to the housing movement. My 
struggle was the same as the housing movement’s. So when Luiza Erundina won 
and I got elected, the people who came to work with me were Gaetano, Ivana, 
Adana, Leide.59 They were just starting out [...] now they all have important roles 
within the UMM. [...] I’m not some politician who went looking for the housing 
movement to incorporate them into my term of office. I was part of the movement, 
and I brought them into the cabinet that we had won together.
This practice has now spread, and almost all regional UMM leaders and those on the 
executive have at some point served as an assessor to a municipal councillor or state and 
even federal deputy. Movement leaders who are described as ‘liberated’ liberadoy receive a 
salary but devote themselves full-time to the work of the movement. For those politicians 
who are committed to similar goals, and who dedicate themselves to housing and urban 
issues, this may produce a positive synergy.60 At the time of the fieldwork there were two 
state deputies who were intimately involved with urban issues. They claimed to consult 
their UMM assessores regularly on the situation ‘at the grassroots’ and ask for their input 
into the drafting of proposed legislation.61 This type of contact with parliamentarians means 
that movement leaders are kept abreast of important debates within the various levels of 
government, and can request PT politicians to form coalitions to vote on particular 
measures. This occurred in 2007 when the mayor attempted to make significant changes to 
the city’s Master Plan that would impact on requirements for social interest housing in the 
centre of the city, without the required input of the population. On a more mundane level, 
UMM leaders can call on parliamentarians to help with pressing membership issues such as
s8 Members of the student movement, particularly during the dictatorship, affiliated themselves with a 
variety of popular movements. Middle-class students were less likely to suffer persecution for publicly 
defending movement demands.
59 Key UMM leaders who will be introduced in the next chapter.
60 It is normal for politicians in Brazil to dedicate themselves to legislative production on specific sectoral
areas. This is in part because there is little idea of a geographic constituency. With an open list system  
every voter in Sao Paulo state will be presented with the same (extremely long) list of candidates for state 
deputy.
61 Interviews with Simao Pedro 23.07.07 and Mario Reali 18.07.07.
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evictions or support for occupations. In this way, the movement is able to open a window 
onto the ‘closed spaces’ (Gaventa 2004) of the parliament, and, when its allies are in power, 
of the government.
Nevertheless, much social movement literature criticizes close links between movements 
and political parties. Asserting a somewhat romantic view of collective action, it sees this 
type of association as sullying the aims of progressive social movements with the dirt of 
partisan politics. Undeniably, the close links to the PT problematize the movement’s 
assertions of autonomy. However, as Heilman (1992) points out, it is important not to 
dismiss all connections between social movements and political parties as clientelism and 
cooptation. Challenging analysts of movements who have focused on the social element of 
collective action at the expense of the political, she argues that alliances with progressive 
political candidates can stimulate the creation of a ‘new political culture’ and the ‘conquest 
of political space’ in support of movement goals. As Luiz Kohara, a long-term collaborator 
with the city’s housing movements notes, it is important to consider the gains the social 
movement can make from its involvement with politicians:
When the movement started out, it had no strength, it didn’t have a single member 
of parliament -  it didn’t have anyone. I think it gained strength when the 
occupations started. A lot of people became parliamentary assistants. That 
relationship brings sustainability. You have to consider the ways [the relationship] 
can be positive and the misfortunes it can bring.62
Finally, Cardoso (1992) dismisses the use of the word ‘clientelism’ in this context as old- 
fashioned and unable to accommodate the need for social movements to channel their 
demands into the political arena.
These authors do acknowledge, however, that the ‘clientelistic game’ (Cardoso 1992) is a 
dangerous one. A number of UMM leaders are currently working with city councillors who 
are not particularly committed to the goals of the movement. Some cabinet assistants are 
not ‘liberated’ and are required to undertake long hours of administrative work. Assistants
62 Interview with Luiz Kohara 27.03.07.
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to federal deputies rarely see their bosses, who are often in Brasilia. Most problematic of all 
is the electoral campaigning work that these assistants are expected to undertake. Clearly, if 
a parliamentarian fails to get re-elected, his staff will lose their jobs. There is a therefore 
intense pressure on assessores to secure as many votes for their boss as possible. Although 
all movement leaders who are parliamentary assistants claim to separate out their party 
work from their movement work, it is inevitable that a blurring of boundaries will occur 
during election campaigns. Further, although parliamentary terms are for four years, the 
staggered electoral system means that there are elections every two years. Networks of 
alliances within the PT between the three levels of the state mean that parliamentary offices 
of a city councillor, for example, will be expected to campaign for allied state deputies, who 
will have, in turn, supported their candidacy. The issue was an extremely sensitive one, 
leading to occasional obfuscation in interviews with movement representatives. When I 
asked one core leader of the UMM how he earned his living he replied that he was ‘by 
profession, a cutter of cloth in the textile industry\ 63 But he had not worked with cloth for 
some time: he was a parliamentary advisor to Berzoini, a federal deputy, the head of the 
parliamentary PT and one of the most powerful politicians in the land.
Given the close working relations between the movement and the party, it is perhaps not 
surprising that until recently, the UMM has been loathe to undertake transgressive 
collective action against a government that it perceives as ‘friendly* (i.e. run by the PT). 
However with the growth of electoral success of the party at national level, and its shift to 
the centre ground of politics, the movement has been confronted with the fact that not even 
sympathetic governments necessarily give priority to their demands. At the same time, 
there has been a growing burden upon movement members to increase party membership 
and contribute to electoral campaigning. In an article on left-wing governments and 
participatory democracy around the world, Heller (2001:150) argues that ‘the unlikelihood 
of coming to power at the national level* means that the PT has maintained close and 
productive links to the grassroots, focusing its energies on promoting local democratic
63 Interview with Benjamin 05.06.07.
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governance. He cites the success of the Porto Alegre participatory budgeting experience as 
an example. Written in 2001, this evaluation is obviously outdated, but it provides an 
insight into the way in which the PT has changed dramatically in the intervening years. 
These changes have had an impact on the way in which the movement relates to the party 
and on its strategic decisions vis-a-vis the current PT federal government. That the UMM 
has decided to increase pressure on Lula’s government is perhaps illustrative of the extent 
to which it has matured politically over its twenty-year history.
As this brief history has shown, the UMM did not disappear from the political scene with 
the transition to formal democracy, unlike many other key movement players involved in 
the anti-dictatorship struggle. Further, the transition to democracy had an important 
impact on the movement as it took steps to engage with local government through the 
production of mutirao housing. As will be shown in more detail in chapter six, the UMM 
does attempt to negotiate through institutional channels with different levels of 
government, even those perceived as ‘unfriendly’. However, the movement has not lost its 
anti-state discourse nor its use of transgressive collective action, as will be shown in 
chapters five and seven respectively. It is this characteristic that renders it somewhat 
different to other Sao Paulo movements, notably the youth and health movements, that are 
regarded to have invested heavily in institutional engagement at the expense of direct 
action.6* Although the UMM has been less prone to use the tactic of building occupations 
against PT governments, this attitude is changing, as is the nature of occupations, which are 
now rarely used to house movement members and are instead presented as ‘political’ or 
‘symbolic’. These occupations are no doubt an example of what some critics would call 
social movements’ ambiguous relationship to democracy. However, this observation fails to 
contemplate the idea that disruptive or transgressive activity might be both an attempt to 
assert autonomy (a preoccupation that remains from the early years of union organization) 
and a critique of the country’s ‘shallow democracy’ (Goldff ank 2007). What is lacking from 
these criticisms is a more thorough questioning of why some movements continue to place
64 Interview with Anderson 06.08.08
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themselves in stark opposition to the state. Rather than lament that social movements in 
Brazil have yet to create for themselves a ‘more positive role’ in the workings of democratic 
institutions, the following chapters will examine the significance and impact of the UMM’s 
combative discourse and activities. In particular, the movement’s skilful use of the 
Constitution to justify occupations is a key element of its ‘politics of rights’ and further 
ammunition against accusations of an ambiguously pro-democratic stance in the post­
transition era.
Sum m ary
Despite authoritarian repression urban collective action grew during Brazil’s military 
regime, as popular sectors were forced to reappraise their relationship with a state that had 
cut off channels for representation and demand-making. Aided by the strong current of 
liberation theology within the Catholic Church and inspired by trade union action, urban 
social movements in Brazil began to challenge the inequalities inherent in society and to 
make demands on the state to improve living conditions for the urban poor. In this way, 
movements developed a strong discourse of autonomy in terms of their relationship to the 
state, and began to frame their demands for basic needs and urban services in terms of 
rights. This would suggest a crossover between the different types of urban conflict in 
Walton’s (1998) typology, as mobilization around collective consumption acquires a 
politicized aspect. These factors, and the building up of alliances with pro-democracy 
movements and the PT, created a strong anti-state stance amongst urban collective actors. 
The return to democracy created some space for the housing movement to engage in policy­
making forums in cooperation with institutions of the state at all levels, and lobbying work 
linked to the 1988 Constitution has been critical to the UMM’s organizational consolidation. 
However, the rhetoric of struggle and of resistance still permeates the way in which leaders 
and members talk about the activities and goals of the movement. Further, the movement 
continues to use transgressive collective action to voice its demands. Far from being 
anachronistic, this positioning is key to movement identity, strategy and mobilization. As 
will be shown in the following chapters, the UMM draws on its institutional knowledge of
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and engagement with the Constitution to construct a powerful ‘politics of rights’ 
(Scheingold 2004) and legitimate its acts of civil disobedience.
Chapter Five
Housing, citizenship and conflict with the state 
Introduction
This chapter introduces the leaders and members of the UMM and seeks to understand 
how they ‘see the state* (Corbridge, Williams, Srivastava and Veron 2005) and mobilize 
their members. This will involve an examination of how they conceptualize their 
collective relationship with the organs of the government and bureaucracy, and how 
they adopt and operationalize concepts of citizenship, discussed in chapter two, to 
frame their demands on the state for housing. More senior leaders of the UMM are 
careful to specify which level or organ of the state they are referring to. However, many 
movement members refer simply to ‘the state’, particularly when they are being critical 
of it. They are therefore referring to the ‘state idea’, defined by Corbridge et al. 
(2005:108) as a powerful myth that supposes a unity and purpose amongst the 
‘dispersed collection of institutions of government’. This chapter therefore outlines the 
movement’s philosophy in terms of its stated rationale for the way it behaves, setting 
the scene for an examination of its behaviour in practice, in chapters six and seven. 
These chapters show how the movement uses both formal channels for engagement 
with the state (chapter six) and extra-institutional ones through the practice of building 
occupations (chapter seven). The current chapter will seek to explain how and why it 
takes up these seemingly contradictory attitudes towards the state. It shows how the 
movement’s stance towards the state is tied up with its own perceived status as a 
‘democratic’ organization, and a legalistic view of how government should work within 
a democracy that is continually challenged by the reality of the failure of the 
government to abide by its own laws. The relationship is farther problematized by the
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fact that the movement is dependent on the state for the funding and implementation 
of housing policy. This chapter will argue that the movement approaches these 
impasses by drawing on the ‘politics of rights’ (Scheingold 2004). This rests upon the 
careful construction of a discourse that posits housing as a core citizenship right and 
the evocation of the 1988 Constitution. The movement is able to use a rhetoric of rights 
to critique the Brazilian state for failing to ensure the full citizenship of its poorer 
populations. However, this leads to highly combative positioning on the part of the 
movement, which influences the ways in which it engages with the state in practice.
M ovem ent Leaders and M em bers
In an echo of the rural landless workers’ movement, the MST, or Sem Terra, the 
UMM’s affiliates are open to anyone who considers themselves Sem Teto. Meaning, 
literally, ‘without a roof, it is perhaps best translated as ‘without a roof of one’s own’. 
The UMM does not work with homeless rough sleepers (there are a number of 
movements in Sao Paulo organized for and by this group), but with individuals and 
families who live in cortigos and favelas, in overcrowded conditions with family or 
friends (morando de favor, ‘living as a favour’) and other types of substandard housing 
on illegally or irregularly occupied land. Individuals joining the movement generally 
come from very low-income households, and there is therefore considerable class 
homogeneity amongst the rank and file. People join in order to improve their own, or 
more frequently, their family’s living conditions, or as a response to impending 
eviction. Movement leaders acknowledge that members are motivated by the need for a 
house, but they are keen to stress the consciousness raising, political awareness and 
other types of training programmes that members are then involved in. These activities 
take place at lower levels of the housing movement structure, within the grupo de 
origem, or neighbourhood groups, and the smaller movements that are made up of 
these groups. The extent of conscientization work varies greatly in intensity and 
depends on the attitude and experience of the group’s leader. In some cases, attempts 
to discuss the city’s housing problem and its links to poverty were dynamic and highly
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politicized and were a core aspect of regular local meetings. In other group meetings, 
this type of discussion was often absent. As a consequence, the level of political 
awareness on the part of the rank and file of the movement was also extremely varied. 
Whilst some members that I interviewed were able to articulate their need for housing 
in terms of a social right that was being violated by the government, others were barely 
able to repeat to me the arguments used by their particular group leader in the regular 
meetings they were attending. The question of how many members remain within the 
movement once they have solved their own housing problems was a sensitive one. 
Estimates varied between two and ten percent, although a number of those interviewed 
posited that these people had fundamentally changed their outlook on life, and were 
able to use mobilizational and organizational skills to lobby for other types of 
improvement to their lives and communities, even if they were no longer involved in 
the housing movement.
The UMM leadership is formed by an executive committee of nine members each 
representing an area of Sao Paulo. The UMM holds weekly general coordinators’ 
meetings in its headquarters, which are attended by up to 100 local movement and 
association leaders. The UMM also holds monthly plenaries for movement leaders from 
across Sao Paulo state. Some of the older leaders who described themselves as 
‘founders of the UMM’, had become involved in the movement through experiences 
with the Catholic Church’s pastoral de moradia and the unions in the peripheries of 
the city in the late 1970s. But at the time of my fieldwork, the majority of executive and 
general coordinators had joined the movement in the 1980s and 1990s out of a need for 
housing and had become committed to the cause of the movement, choosing to take up 
coordinating positions after, in most cases, satisfying their personal need for housing. 
Of the most prominent 25 or so movement leaders in the UMM, just two could be 
described as ‘middle-class’. Adana had joined the movement not out of need for 
housing, but out of her connection to the Church and personal commitment to social
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justice. Cristiano joined the movement when he became homeless after the loss of his 
job and the breakdown of his marriage and family relationships.
The life trajectories of other leaders within the UMM reflect those of the majority of Sao 
Paulo’s urban poor. Many arrived in the city as children or young adults in the 1970s at 
the peak of the ‘economic miracle’, accompanying their parents from rural areas of the 
north-eastern and southern states. They remember helping to work the land at a young 
age before leaving for the city. The majority did not finish secondary education as 
children, and worked in semi-skilled and unskilled employment before joining the 
movement. For example, of the UMM’s key coordinating group who will be cited in this 
and following chapters, Benjamin arrived in Sao Paulo at the age of eight from Rio 
Grande do Norte, leaving school three years later to work as an office boy before 
eventually training as a cloth-cutter in the textile industry. Gaetano arrived in the city 
aged eleven from the interior of Sao Paulo state, and later worked in the postal service. 
Ivana’s mother was a migrant from the south of the country, she herself worked as a 
domestic servant. Diogo was born in a cortiqo in Sao Paulo and worked in a bakery, 
whilst Kelly who arrived from the north-eastern state of Bahia aged eight, went on to 
work in a factory. Pedro trained as a metal worker and also worked as a bank clerk. 
Anderson’s trajectory was somewhat different: the son of a domestic worker and a 
joiner from a small town in the interior of Sao Paulo state, he joined a seminary in his 
late teens and received an education within the Catholic Church. But becoming leaders 
in the movement has had a significant impact on their working lives and earning 
potential. Most have since been able to complete their secondary education, and a 
significant number have gone on to study at tertiary level. Anderson, Kelly, Gaetano 
and Pedro have all studied law, (two other leaders not interviewed for this study are 
currently studying law) although to date, only Anderson has passed the bar exam.
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Movement leaders have had the opportunity to study because since the early 1990s, 
there have been opportunities for paid employment in the offices of PT politicians.^
In the course of this chapter, it will become apparent that there are significant 
similarities in the way in which different movement members and leaders speak about 
the state and their understandings of citizenship. This should be read as the promotion 
of the movement’s official ‘line’, in that it reflects the way in which new leaders are 
formed within the movement through exposure to more experienced individuals within 
the UMM. Those who are considered to have leadership potential are encouraged to 
stand up in meetings and speak to the assembled members. This inevitably entails 
some repetition of the themes and rhetorical style which the new leader has witnessed 
in meetings. Further, the UMM was created, as noted in the previous chapter, so as to 
speak to government ‘with one voice’. There is therefore pressure internally to present a 
coherent message in public, so as to prevent an attempt on the part of the municipal 
and state governments to privilege one regional movement over another, or to discredit 
the UMM on account of internal inconsistencies.
The UMM and dem ocracy
As detailed in the preceding chapter, the UMM grew up out of the resistance to the 
military dictatorship in the late 1970s and 1980s, emerging from a broad coalition of 
pro-democracy actors. Since the return to democracy, as Houtzager (2005) notes, the 
‘social movement field’ has undergone significant changes.
At its foundational moment the field’s protagonists shared an oppositional stance 
toward the state, an emphasis on transgressive collective action, and a symbolic 
order structured by a prophetic utopian project. Since the early 1990s there has 
been a shift towards increased contact with the state, a focus on citizen 
participation, and a discourse built around the construction of citizenship and 
influencing public policy (Houtzager 2005:13-14).
65 These links to the PT also serve as channels of communication for the movement to learn of and 
contribute to political and legislative developments within the institutions of the state at municipal, state 
and federal level, as discussed below.
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He continues,
The field lost its original utopian and prophetic content as the emphasis shifted to 
constructing citizenship and “citizenship in action”, which included participation in 
constitutionally mandated policy councils, and influencing public policy and public 
debate (Ibid: 15).
Given that the UMM is reliant upon the state to achieve its goals of housing its 
members and improving low-income housing policy, one might expect it to take a 
conciliatory attitude towards the state, as outlined by Houtzager. Pressure to adapt 
behaviour according to changing political circumstances is noted in the case of women’s 
movements across Latin America, who faced the challenge of shifting from ‘la protesta 
a la propuesta (from protest to proposal)’ (Molyneux and Craske 2002:13). Further, 
having been involved in the pro-democracy campaign, it seems likely that the UMM 
would be characterized by a commitment to democracy, both in terms of its internal 
organization and its external relations. These assumptions will now be examined.
Returning to the discussion of democratic citizenship outlined in chapter two, 
definitions of substantive democracy that involve the democratization of social as well 
as political relationships draw on the core elements of participation, accountability, 
equality and respect for the rule of law (Caldeira 2000; Holston and Caldeira 1998; 
Mouffe 2000; O’Donnell 1992; Harriss, Stokke and Tornquist 2004). These have been 
described as the ‘satellite concepts of democracy’ (Santos 1995:120). Observing the 
internal functioning of the UMM, the movement does indeed appear to value these 
democratic tenets. Firstly, leaders are elected to their positions within the UMM 
biennially in a vote where all regions of the city must be represented. But beyond this 
formal element, the way that the movement is organized is highly inclusive: anyone can 
join simply by attending local level meetings, and weekly coordinating meetings are 
open to all movement affiliates, including the rank and file. Anyone can stand up and 
speak at these, and new contributors are always welcomed. A commitment to 
transparency was also shown by the executive committee, who never met behind closed
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doors. Weekly meetings begin with lengthy informes as representatives of affiliated 
movements share news and provide notice of upcoming events. These meetings are 
often extremely long, generally lasting at least three hours, and are characterized by a 
focus on open debate and the building of consensus around important decisions. 
Regional leaders then take these debates and their outcomes for ratification with their 
‘bases’ in meetings at the grassroots, with whom they have regular contact. The 
behaviour of the executive committee is characterized by attempts to generate 
negotiated settlements, shying away from being seen to have made ‘executive 
decisions’. Indeed, the biggest conflicts generally arose from accusations that 
individuals had acted unilaterally, without adequate consultation. But while the 
movement both declares itself, and can be seen to be, participatory, inclusive and 
transparent in its internal relationships, its commitment to the ‘satellite concept’ of the 
rule of law is problematic. Whilst the UMM has been involved in both the creation of 
pro-poor housing legislation and litigation against the state (suggesting a belief in the 
role that law can play in regulating society) it is also frequently involved in 
transgressive collective action of questionable legality. This issue is discussed below 
and in greater detail in chapter seven.
The UMM draws on its internal democratic structure and practice to validate its role as 
a representative actor in external relationships, particularly with the state. The UMM 
makes claims to represent around 50 000 families across the state of Sao Paulo and, in 
meetings with the municipal and state-level housing secretariats, its senior leaders 
emphasize their continued, close contact with the poor families they represent, and 
their detailed knowledge of Xhefavelas and cortigos where they live. Movement leaders 
strongly assert the idea that they should always be consulted on housing issues by 
representatives of the local and state governments. An illustration of this was a 
reprimand by Pedro towards a senior figure in the municipal department for social 
housing who had visited a favela  in the east of the city that was going to be demolished,
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saying ‘You came to our neighbourhood, but you didn’t meet with us there’.66 This type 
of indignation was also voiced by Anderson, after the UMM failed to receive an 
invitation to tripartite governmental talks on housing in the city.67
When asked specifically about the role of social movements in today’s Brazil, leaders 
often indicated some continuity between the role of social movements in the struggle 
against the dictatorship and the function they fulfil in contemporary society, in that 
they continue to promote participation and democratic practice. This is now achieved, 
in theory, though a type of self-appointed watchdog role which is often labelled as the 
‘social control’ of government action. Ivana, for example, states that ‘social movements 
have a fundamental role, which is to demand that laws and housing programmes are 
actually implemented’.68 Movement members also assert their role as a ‘pace setters’ for 
the state to try and speed up the processes of social change.
My evaluation is that housing movements play a big role in society, very big, and it’s 
not that their role is to do the work of the state. It’s their role to impose a different 
rhythm on the government in power, whatever party it represents, because without 
the movements, what type of rhythm would there be? If with movements around it 
is already really slow, and with a bureaucracy that just wears you down, how would 
it be without the movements?69
Other leaders agree, remarking that social movements have an important role to play to 
‘push the government forward’.70 Without the movements, the governments ‘would do 
whatever they wanted’.71 Further, the UMM attempts to bring the voice of the ‘people’ 
to the decision-making forums of the state, through its involvement in participatory 
councils and general negotiations with state bodies (see chapter six).
66 Meeting between UMM representatives and municipal housing secretariat staff 18.09.07
67 Interview with Anderson 06 .08 .08 , member of the UNMP (national union for popular housing) 
executive, principal founder and effectively the director o f the UMM but not named as such.
68 Interview with Ivana, high profile leader of a historically important centre-based movement 01.06.07
69 Interview with Leon, UMM spokesperson and politically active leader of centre-based movement that 
undertook a high-profile building occupation from 1997-2005. 07.06.07
7° Interview Gaetano, leader of a regional movement, member of UNMP executive 08.06.07
71 Interview with Ivana 01.06.07
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The movement therefore asserts itself as a democratic actor, stressing its internal 
representation, involvement in external participatory forums and commitment to 
keeping the government in check. Crucially, in doing so, it creates a situation whereby it 
is able to call on the state to keep its side of the democratic bargain. The call for 
reciprocity is made by Pedro in the following terms:
The movement has to do its job, which is to pressure the government and hold it to 
its word. And the government has to fulfil its own role, which, if it’s a serious 
government, is to sit down and dialogue, listen to proposals and try and find some 
kind of solution.?2
Movement members continually stress that it is the democratic state that is responsible 
for ensuring that housing solutions are found for its population, particularly 
considering that housing is a right according to the 1988 Constitution. For example, 
Adana describes the work of the movement as trying to keep the government to its 
responsibilities: ‘We hold them to their duties -  it’s them that are supposed to be 
building housing.’^  As does Ana, ‘We put pressure on the authorities so that they 
recognize our right to housing, and so that they give it to us.’74 Movement members and 
the rank and file stress their desire for a reciprocal arrangement -  they are willing to 
pay for housing, but wish to be given the opportunity to do so through the provision of 
affordable housing and/or credit. As occupying movement member Wanda put it, We 
want a place to live in, we don’t want anything for free. We want a solution to this 
situation. The government has to give us a solution.’^
Analysis of the rhetoric of the movement soon reveals that it does not believe the state 
is keeping its side of the bargain. In particular, the governments of Brazil in the 
democratic era are not perceived as showing a commitment to equality. Nearly half the 
movement representatives interviewed made an allegation that the government 
(particularly at the state and municipal levels, but also occasionally the federal) was
72 Interview with Pedro, leader of a regional movement, member of UNMP executive 18.09.07
?3 Interview with Adana, adviser to UMM and UNMP 06.07.07
74 Interview with Ana, provides support to regional movement leaders, 19.06.07
75 Interview with Wanda 24.07.07
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only concerned to protect the interests of the more affluent sectors in society, and that 
they have exclusionary policies towards the urban poor. Benjamin and Cristiano’s 
comments provide an example:
The government today just thinks about policies for one sector of society [...] for the 
bourgeoisie, for the elite. [...] The state government is exclusionary, and so is the 
municipal one. They are right-wing governments, and the needy population and the 
social movements suffer at their hands.76
A while back Kassab [the current mayor] didn’t want to approve any plans for social 
housing in the centre of the city. It just shows that the government isn’t worried 
about the situation here. Well, only in that he wants to clean up the area and send 
poor people off to the peripheries.77
This situation, in which all levels of government are perceived as favouring the 
moneyed classes, as opposed to those who are poor and in need, leads to negative 
evaluations of the state’s commitment to democracy in terms of equality. Questions of 
transparency in the way that the low-income housing built by COHAB and CDHIJ is 
distributed are also frequently raised by the movement, and by some of its high profile 
supporters.78 The perceived failure to respond adequately to the needs of the poor from 
the various levels of government is often conceptualized as a lack of respect, and, 
crucially, as a wilful violation of citizenship rights. This perception has an impact on the 
way the movement frames the state and its relationship to it, in public discourse.
The rhetoric o f  the UMM
The dissatisfaction that movement members feel with regard to Brazil’s democracy is 
manifest in their rhetoric, which is perhaps best described as ‘fighting talk’. The 
language used has clear echoes of the anti-dictatorship era, in that the movement 
places itself in opposition to the state, suggesting that they believe elements of the 
Brazilian state have yet to become fully democratized. The language used by movement 
leaders in interviews, internal meetings and public forums is peppered with the
?6Interview with Benjamin, leader of regional movement, UMM treasurer and member of executive 
05.06.07
77 Interview with Cristiano, leader of small local association in the centre 09 .08 .07
t8 Interview with Jose Eduardo Cardozo 30.07.07, PT federal deputy.
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terminology of resistance and antagonism. The UMM’s motto that it displays on 
banners and posters is Ocupar, Resistir, Construir: Occupy, Resist, B uilds The UMM 
is engaged in a ‘fight’ for housing, and the movement’s overall goals can simply be 
referred to as a luta, the struggle. When a family or individual receives the keys to a 
new home, this is described as a ‘conquest’. When the movement ‘takes to the streets’ it 
shows its ‘force’. Occupations and street protests are ‘weapons’ of the struggle, and the 
movement must show daring and strength as the only way to achieve its aims. Men and 
women in the movement describe themselves as ‘fighters’ who are ‘battling for their 
rights’. These references to violence and the importance of militancy are underscored 
by allusions to life and death in the rallying cry of the more radical FLM: ‘the person 
that doesn’t fight is already dead’.
This discourse of resistance is directed towards the institutions of the Brazilian state, 
which is sometimes explicitly referred to as ‘the enemy*. Movement leaders talk of 
‘taking on’ the authorities, and when they organize protests or occupations this is 
described as batendo no govemo, literally battering, or hitting the government. It is 
common parlance amongst members of the movement to denounce any government 
not explicitly ‘popular’ (which in practice means a PT government), as ‘non- 
democratic’. Governments ‘betray’ the movement even when it appears to be 
cooperating and must be made to ‘bend to the movement’s will’, while the role of social 
movements in Brazil is to provide a space for the workers to ‘seize’ or ‘wrench’ their 
rights from the grasp of government. It is the failure of the state that drives the 
movement, which, members claim, would not exist if there were adequate and 
transparent housing policy and provision. In general, the movement claims that rights 
are not willingly bestowed by the state on its people, even that it actively seeks to deny 
many rights. As such, these rights must be fought for.
79 This clearly borrows from the rural MSTs slogan o f ‘Occupy, Resist, Produce’.
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The discourse might seem out of place given the democratic political system in place in 
Brazil today, and especially considering the country's influential experiments with 
forms of participatory planning. Democratization should, in theory, remove the need 
for such militancy, since it provides institutional outlets through which social actors 
can put forward demands and voice criticisms. But the UMM, as well as taking 
advantage of the institutional channels provided by a return to democracy, also takes a 
militant approach. Its actions thus contradict much of the literature on social 
movements in Brazil discussed in the previous chapter. It also contradicts Houtzager’s 
evaluation cited above, that posits that the social movement field has lost the militancy 
of the authoritarian era and has become institutionalized. It further challenges the 
dualism established by Houtzager (2005) who regards the rural MST as being unique in 
its ongoing antagonistic stance towards the Brazilian state, in contrast to the rest of the 
social movement field that has taken on a ‘citizenship in action’ approach in 
collaboration with the state. The UMM maintains its antagonistic stance, expressed 
through the militant language of the transition era and put into practice through 
building occupations (see chapter seven). Simultaneously, however it adopts the 
discourse and practice of participatory citizenship, engaging in popular councils and 
holding regular meetings with representatives of the state (see chapter six). It 
maintains this dual position by using the idea of democracy and its trappings -  
participation, the rule of law and the Constitution -  to frame its own practice whilst 
measuring the state’s performance against these ideals. In this way, the rhetoric of 
citizenship comes to be used in a combative manner through the ‘politics of rights’, as 
will now be explained.
The m yth  o f  righ ts
As was noted above, in the introduction to the background of some of the movement’s 
members, a number of key leaders have chosen to study law at university level. This is a 
significant phenomenon and reflects a general conviction in the importance and power 
of the law apparent amongst many interview respondents from the UMM. The
166
movement’s overall commitment to both legislation and litigation in its relationship 
with the state is also evident. In 1991, the movement became the first organization to 
take advantage of a new constitutional right to submit a proposal for a law of ‘popular 
initiative’ for consideration by the federal legislature.80 Leaders also follow and provide 
input into the processes by which laws are proposed and debated by politicians at all 
three levels of the state, in particular through their contacts with elected members of 
the PT. Benjamin, a member of the UMM executive who plays a key role as interlocutor 
between the movement and the municipal and state housing secretariats, sums up the 
movement’s institutional agenda:
In our specific struggle for urban reform [...] we have the things that are guaranteed 
us in the [city’s] Master Plan, in the City Statute, in the ZEIS [zones of special social 
interest]. We have to make these things happen, and make these laws happen in 
practice (that to a certain extent we contributed to through the law of popular 
initiative) so that these laws aren’t just on paper. If things are happening, there’s no 
reason for us to be mobilizing people outside the doors of the municipal, state or 
federal governments. But if things aren’t happening, we have laws that we have to 
make work. Like the law on the purchase of land, like a whole load of things that we 
have. And then if that doesn’t work, the UMM has its other main type of struggle -  
occupation.81
The laws that Benjamin refers to are municipal (the Master Plan of which the ZEIS are 
a part), state-level (the law on the purchase of land which obliges the state-housing 
company CDHU to buy land yearly for social housing) and federal (the City Statute 
which regulates the constitutional right to housing). This extract therefore shows the 
significant extent to which movement leaders are conversant in current legislation at all 
levels of the state.
Beyond legislation, the movement has also become involved in litigation against the 
state through its close working relationships with the recently created city ombudsman 
and with specific public prosecutors sympathetic to the movement within the 
Ministerio Publico, equivalent to the prosecution service. Most recently, the housing 
movements, represented by a public prosecutor, successfully prosecuted the municipal
80 Described in chapter 4.
81 Interview with Benjamin 05.06.07
government for ceasing to pay housing benefits for families that had been evicted from 
properties declared unsafe. Since the municipal government had failed to provide 
permanent housing solutions for these families as it had originally committed to, a 
judge ruled that the municipality must continue to pay for their rented accommodation. 
This ruling led a senior advisor (and former public prosecutor) within the state 
secretariat to declare that the question of housing had become ‘judicialized’, that is to 
say, it had ‘left the sphere of negotiation between the authorities and social movements 
and entered the sphere of the judiciary’.82 The UMM’s long-term involvement with 
other actors to ensure that the law is upheld is noted by Anderson:
We have joint activities with other public actors like the ombudsman or the 
Ministerio Publico. We have always sought their help. [...]A government might 
commit what we believe to be a diversion from a particular policy direction that we 
support. We feel both obliged and at liberty to seek representation with the 
Ministerio Publico, or to seek the help of the ombudsman to make a judicial 
challenge to those public bodies, whether federal, state or municipal.83
This contradicts Holston and Caldeira’s claim that Brazilian social movements 
emerging in the 1970s and 1980s ‘ignored the courts as an arena of redress’ and 
‘bypassed the judiciary’ (Holston and Caldeira 1998:276). It further stands in sharp 
contrast to Houtzager’s (2005) appraisal of the MST, who notes that the rural 
movement has been reluctant to engage in the juridical field, perceiving the courts as 
the traditional enforcer of bourgeois property rights.
It is perhaps surprising, however, that the UMM chooses to use legal channels to press 
for its aims, firstly since the law and its institutions are often perceived as deeply 
conservative (Shklar 1986), but also because of the specific characteristics of the legal 
system in Brazil. It is a country where the expression, ‘some laws stick and some don’t’ 
is in common usage (Maricato 2000), and where pervasive ‘rule evasion’ (Leitzel 2002) 
leads to official tolerance of law-breakers (see chapter three). Indeed, the significant
82 Interview with Sergio Mendon^a 01.08.07. The significance of this remark will be discussed in more 
detail in the final chapter of this thesis.
83 Interview with Anderson 26.06.07
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gap between legislation and its implementation is widely acknowledged by scholars, 
leading to references to the law as a ‘dead letter* (Paoli and Telles 1998; Macaulay 
2002; Villaga 2005; Pereira 2000). Further, both Macaulay (2002) and Sadek (2001) 
note the problems of access of the poor to legal process in Brazil and the extremely slow 
progression of cases through the courts, which suffer from a shortage of judges. Court 
cases at the federal level, for example, can frequently drag on for a decade (Taylor and 
Buranelli 2007). Hold-ups in the legal system can also be purposefully created:
Meszaros (2000:525) quotes a senior judge in the state of Sao Paulo as saying ‘with the 
Brazilian judiciary, if you have an able lawyer you can almost eternalize the discussion: 
it never ends’. The legal system is further complicated by a profusion of laws at the 
three levels of the state that can contradict each other (Passos 2002). A perceived 
contradiction between municipal and state law can delay a court case for years as the 
problem is considered through the appeals process at a higher-level tribunal.8* For 
both Caldeira (2000), Taylor and Buranelli (2007) and Fry (1999) these problems have 
generated a distinct lack of faith in the judiciary held by the population, particularly 
amongst poorer groups who declare that ‘justice is a privilege of the rich’ (Caldeira 
2000:345). Despite these issues, however, lawyers have considerable status in Brazil, 
and are allowed to use the title of ‘doctor’. Historic deference for members of the 
profession is noted by Holanda (1969) [1936] who labels Brazil, ‘a land of lawyers, 
where, as a general rule, only those citizens who are trained in the law will rise to top 
public positions and offices’ (Holanda 1969:115). He further notes Brazilian’s general 
faith in the power of law, and their belief that,
The letter of the law can in itself, and in a dynamic way, influence the future of the 
population. The rigidity, impermeability and perfect homogeneity of legislation 
appears to us to constitute the only obligatory requisite for the good functioning of 
society (Holanda 1969:133).
More recent analysts make similar evaluations, Maricato (2000:143) rebukes the FNRU 
for behaving as though ‘the principal causes of urban social exclusion were the absence
84 Conversation with Dra. J. Setzer. 25.07.08
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of new laws or new urban instruments’. This faith in the law, and the idea that ‘a new 
law will fix things’, is represented by the overabundance of legislation on the statutes: 
‘Brazilians have an exaggerated hope that law can produce social change -  if one day 
the laws are obeyed’ (Pereira 2000:221). But the ‘ambiguity of law* in Brazil, where it is 
never clear how or if the country’s ‘inconsistent and voluminous’ legislation will be 
enforced, leads Pereira to declare that Brazilian legality ‘contains strong elements of 
fantasy and desire’ (ibid). Whilst this situation is clearly problematic for social 
movements who frame their demands in terms of rights and are involved in legislation 
and litigation, it also provides a significant resource for movement actors, as will be 
discussed in light of the ‘politics of rights’ approach.
Scholars from the law and society tradition have noted how successful litigation can 
provide momentum to a social movement, helping to increase membership numbers, 
and drawing attention to its aims from society at large (Handler 1978). However, they 
caution against an uncritical faith in the power of litigation to achieve social change. 
Benjamin’s words cited above, where he appeals to the law as something that can be 
imposed upon the government from without, find resonance to an extent, in Judith 
Shklar’s (1986 [1964]) exposition on ‘legalism’. In it she sets out to challenge those who 
believe ‘that law is not only separate from political life but that it is a mode of social 
action superior to mere politics’ (Shklar 1986:8). She counters a pervasive positivist 
approach to law, in which the law is treated as ‘just there’, describing legalism as an 
ideology whereby law is divorced from its political and social context and can be 
neutrally ‘applied’. Skhlar’s ideas provided a stimulus for Scheingold’s (2004 [1974]) 
work on the ‘myth of rights’, which critiques the generalized opinion that laws and legal 
decisions have a direct impact on society and social policy.
Legal frames of reference tunnel the vision of both activists and analysts leading to 
an oversimplified approach to complex social process -  an approach that grossly 
exaggerates the role that lawyers and litigation can play in a strategy for change. The 
assumption is that litigation can evoke a declaration of rights from courts; that it 
can, further, be used to assure the realization of these rights; and, finally, that 
realization is tantamount to meaningful change. The myth o f rights is, in other
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words, premised on a direct linking of litigation, rights and remedies with social 
change (Scheingold 2004:5 his emphasis).
Rather than see rights and litigation as promoting social change in themselves through 
the legal system, Scheingold argues that a general belief in the myth of rights (within 
American society) constitutes a resource that can be used by social movements to 
achieve indirectly through ‘political process what was unavailable through legal 
channels’ (Ibid: xix). American society is, he argues, sensitive to the violation of rights, 
and can be mobilized in defence of rights. Rights as a resource can therefore be used as 
a weapon against the elites, in what Scheingold has labelled the ‘politics of rights’.
There is very little reason to believe that legal and constitutional values are directly 
persuasive to the elites who are most immediately responsible for making decisions 
for the polity. These elites are, however, likely to respond effectively to organized 
interests, and legal symbols can be usefully employed in behalf of political 
mobilization. The politics of rights, therefore, involves the manipulation of rights 
rather than their realization. Rights are treated as contingent resource which impact 
on public policy indirectly -  in the measure, that is, that they can aid in altering the 
balance of political forces (Ibid: 148).
Since it cannot be taken for granted that constitutional rights will have an influence on 
the political system, the rhetoric of rights, ‘introduces constitutional values into politics 
in an imperfect but salient and engaging fashion’ (Ibid:39-4o). Essentially, the politics 
of rights approach is based on a disconnect between rights on paper and rights in 
practice. This disconnect is used both to mobilize members to the movement, 
producing a change in legal consciousness (Macaulay 2002; Scheingold 2004) and to 
generate general support from society in favour of the movement’s rights claims, thus 
potentially bringing about adequately implemented public policy and real social 
change. Interestingly, Scheingold’s idea that an awareness of the violation of rights 
works as a mobilizing tool is asserted by movement leaders:
When people identify with the struggle, when someone begins to realize that 
housing is their right, and that that right is being denied, this really unites people at 
the grassroots of the movement. From the moment that you get that kind of 
consciousness, you’ll never stop participating in some kind of way.8s
Interview with Pedro 18.09.07
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Returning to the extract from the interview with Benjamin above, although his words 
seem to suggest that he is a believer in the myth of rights, his final comment, that if the 
laws don’t work the movement can undertake transgressive collective action, are an 
acknowledgement of the limited power of the law to advance the goals of the 
movement.86 The following section will detail how the UMM’s discourse can be seen to 
reflect a politics of rights approach.
The po litics o f  righ ts in B razil
Scheingold based his research on the context of the United States, citing what he saw as 
a particularly North American belief that, ‘politics is and should be conducted in 
accordance with patterns of rights and obligations established under law’ (Scheingold 
2004:13 his emphasis), but his theoretical insights have relevance for Brazil also. The 
discussion above of Brazilians’ faith in the potential power of the law would suggest the 
concept is equally applicable to Brazil. Certainly, the considerable if badly coordinated 
institutional infrastructure in place in the capital to investigate and prosecute 
individuals involved in political fraud and corruption (Taylor and Buranelli 2007), and 
the numerous parliamentary and senate investigations ongoing at any time in Brasilia, 
point to a belief that politics, in theory, should be conducted in accordance with the 
law, even if it manifestly is not in practice. The UMM is able to take advantage of a 
Brazilian belief in the myth of rights to garner support for its aims by presenting the 
city’s housing problems as a violation of rights, as will now be shown. Being able to 
present movement demands as rights is in itself a useful strategy, as (Nielsen 2004: 66) 
points out
Rights serve as a significant source of power for members of traditionally 
disadvantaged groups precisely because of the characteristics inherent in the social 
construction of a legal right. ‘Rights’ are said to apply equally to everyone, they are 
‘neutral’, and are backed by the legitimate authority of law and the state. While this
86 Although Scheingold’s work does not consider the question of illegal action, the discussion of 
occupations as civil disobedience in chapter seven explains how these can be understood as an extension of 
the movement’s politics of rights.
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may not be true in practice, this idea may serve as a source of power for the 
disadvantaged (emphasis in the original).
Scheingold (2004:58) makes a similar point on the universalizing power of rights, 
noting that,
In asserting your right you imply a reciprocal relationship with others in the society. 
Your right is no longer personal but part of a more general set of societal rights and 
obligations, independent of and predating your particular need. To claim a right is 
thus to invoke symbols of legitimacy that transcend your personal problems.
This is particularly useful for the UMM since it is campaigning collectively for what is 
ultimately a private good. Also, by framing its demands as rights, the role of the state is 
instantly asserted, for it is the state’s acknowledged duty to ensure that rights are 
upheld.
The UMM is also able to pursue its politics of rights through the framing of its demands 
with reference to the Constitution. The Constitution of 1988 has particular resonance 
for Brazilian society, marking the end of the military regime, and, through its highly 
progressive content, setting out a legal framework for an egalitarian society. As 
Macaulay (2002:88) notes, regime transition is often accompanied by the drafting of a 
new constitution, thus ‘signalling a symbolic discursive and normative break with the 
preceding regime and its values’. The normative value of national constitutions is 
outlined by Scheingold (2004) for whom the theory of constitutional government 
implies a legal approach to political change: the judiciary’s proper interpretation of 
constitutional standards that reflect national political ideals renders the constitution a 
‘timeless document’.
Rather than tying us irrevocably to the past, constitutional standards are presented 
as indispensable guides to the future (Scheingold 2004:16).
In the Brazilian case, the process by which the Constitution was written, with many 
thousands of people involved in the submission of popular amendments, has led to a
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engrained feeling of ownership over and pride in the document amongst popular 
sectors of society, as discussed in the previous chapter. Kingstone and Power (2000:17) 
also note high levels of public awareness of the document,
There are few countries in the world where an academic debate on constitutional 
design has so decisively influenced the journalistic and partisan arenas as the 
debate in Brazil has since 1985, and fewer still where public debate is so sensitive to 
perceived deficiencies of the existing institutional arrangements.
It could perhaps be suggested, using James Ferguson’s (1999) terms, that reference to 
the Brazilian Constitution of 1988 has become part of a ‘metanarrative’ of progress and 
modernity, and one that has been absorbed by much of the movement and the society it 
addresses. Certainly, the power of the Constitution as a normative framework is not lost 
on the UMM, both as a backdrop for its demands, and as a weapon with which to 
denounce the state. This engagement with the Constitution is also indicative of the fact 
that legislative victories achieved at national level have resonance and salience for local 
level struggles.
Dubbed by jurists as the ‘Social Constitution’, the text promulgated in 1988 is generally 
considered highly progressive. The importance of social rights is flagged even in the 
preamble,
We, representatives of the Brazilian people, brought together in the National 
Constituent Assembly in order to establish a Democratic State, for the purpose of 
ensuring the exercise of social and individual rights, freedom, security, well-being, 
development, equality and justice as supreme values of a fraternal, pluralist and 
non-prejudiced society, based on social harmony and committed, on both national 
and international levels, to the peaceful solution of conflicts, promulgate, under the 
protection of God, the following Constitution of the Federative Republic of Brazil 
(Presidencia da Republica 1988).
The first article of the Constitution sets out the five foundational elements upon which 
the Republic is based namely, sovereignty, citizenship, dignity of the human person, 
social values of work and free enterprise, and political pluralism. The right to housing is 
set out in Article 6 along with other social rights including education, health, work,
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leisure, security, social security, protection of motherhood and childhood and 
assistance to the destitute. But it was not included in this list in the original draft of the 
Constitution promulgated in 1988.87 Housing was only added in 2000, through a 
Constitutional Amendment, and after years of campaigning by the Forum National de 
Reforma Urbana, a coalition of academics, NGO representatives and social movements. 
According to Anderson88, prior to 2000 the movement had still claimed housing as a 
right, but had done so with reference to the 1995 Habitat Agenda that came out of the 
UN conference in Istanbul, to which Brazil is signatory.8? The assertion of housing as a 
citizenship right is given further weight by movement members and leaders who 
discuss the social significance of housing with reference to notions of dignity and 
equality. This would suggest that these foundational elements of the Constitution were 
used to support demands for housing before it was specifically made a right.?0 The 
formulation of housing in terms of rights will now be examined through the rhetoric of 
the movement.
H ousing and the discourse o f  righ ts
Motivated by the need for housing, and by the desire to help others achieve solutions to 
their housing needs, movement members and leaders take the importance of housing 
as a given. They make continual reference to the inclusion of housing as a right in the 
Constitution and the evidence of the violation of this right in the city and across the 
country. ?x Ernesto’s words are typical here:
8? Competency for promoting the provision of housing is shared across all three levels of the state (Article
23).
88 Email communication with Anderson, 06 .08 .08 .
89 The right to housing was a key area of debate at Habitat II (Urquiza 1996) but it was not incorporated 
specifically into the conference’s final document, the Habitat Agenda. Instead, references are made to the 
‘right to adequate housing’ as set out in other UN treaties, in particular the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. Further, the 
Habitat Agenda states that this right ‘shall be realized progressively’ (UN Habitat 1996).
9° Turenne (2004) notes the use of constitutional commitments to the dignity and equality of all citizens by 
housing activists in France. Dignity is also a core element to the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights. Articles 22 and 23 of the Declaration present the realization of social, economic and cultural rights 
as indispensable for the dignity and free development of the person (Dicke 2002).
91 Although movement leaders acknowledge that members join because their incomes are not high enough 
to access mortgage credit available on the open market, they do not generally speak about housing in 
economic terms. Leaders admit that housing improves family finances, since subsidised loan repayments 
are often lower than the costs of renting, but these economic issues were not stressed by movement
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Housing is in the Constitution. It’s in the law that every citizen has the right to 
housing. It’s in the law. If it’s in the law, we shouldn’t have to occupy buildings and 
have the crap kicked out of us by the police.92
This awareness of a gap between the law on paper and the law in practice is 
fundamental to a politics of rights approach. But beyond this, over the course of my 
interviews, individuals associated with the movement elaborated a series of ideas 
around the significance of housing, grounding it in other rights and emphasizing its 
contribution to general well-being and human development. At the most basic level 
housing provides shelter, but it also gives those inside it a type of metaphorical shelter, 
by providing them with a framework around which they can organize their lives. These 
ideas are developed by Kelly who is a key figure in the UMM, which she represents in a 
number of international forums.
I think housing is fundamental to the life of any citizen. Because through housing, 
you have a reference. If you don’t have a house then you don’t have a reference: 
you’re a nobody. When you have a house you can say ‘I left my house at this time in 
the morning, and I’ll go back home at this time’. You can get home and lie down, 
and it doesn’t matter if it’s on a mattress on the floor or in a bed [...] but you know 
you have somewhere to go, and you have a moment to lie down, think, and plan how 
the next day will be [...]. Housing is fundamental to the life of any human being, 
because once you’ve got a house, your horizon expands, and you can see a whole 
load of other tilings.93
Having a house gives you a reference, as Kelly puts it, in the sense of providing you with 
an address and a geographical location, but the phrase also implies a less tangible idea 
of having a reference in the sense of a recognized place in society. Here the home is not 
only a safe haven, but a type of social anchor, through which you become a ‘somebody’. 
Kelly’s words also highlight another key issue: the idea that with a house, a person’s 
horizon will expand, and they can address other areas of their lives. Later on in the 
interview she elaborates on this point, explaining that the aim of the UMM is for 
members to reach a point where they have housing and their lives have stabilized to the
leaders. This is not surprising: a movement whose discourse revolves around housing as a right, and its 
importance in promoting citizenship is unlikely to stress that it will also be making its members richer.
92 Interview with Ernesto, leader of a centrally-based movement affiliated to the FLM 14.03.07
93 Interview with Kelly, member of UMM executive, represents the movement in international forums, 
particularly on women’s issues, 29.05.07.
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extent that they are able to reflect and to make plans for improvements in other areas, 
such as the health and education of the family.
Improvements in living conditions are seen to have a positive impact on an individual 
or family’s practical life chances, in terms of health and education. Housing is, in itself, 
a social right, but it provides the key to achieving a number of other social rights that 
are also set out in the Constitution. This idea of adequate housing impacting upon the 
social development possibilities of its residents finds resonance in the work on 
capabilities advanced by Amartya Sen (1999). This is most clear in the words of Adana, 
the middle-class leader referred to in the previous chapter, who has a university 
education and close links to the Church.
For me, for the poorest of people, those whose rights are most violated -  rough 
sleepers, people who live in favelas where there is no clinic -  what’s most important 
is not just that they have needs that aren’t met. For example, they need a doctor and 
there’s no doctor, they need food and they haven’t got any, they need a house but 
they haven’t got one. It’s not just this. It’s that this person’s capacity to realize 
themselves is hindered.9*
At the root of these perceptions of the importance of housing is an intertwining of the 
more tangible benefits of housing with commentary on the impacts that having or not 
having a house will have on people’s psychological well-being and sense of belonging to 
society. These two sides to the housing question are closely connected, in the rhetoric of 
movement representatives, to the notion of dignity:
I generally say that the dignity of each citizen comes from them having a house in 
which to live, because once the/ve got decent housing, they can achieve anything. 
They have a reference, they can get a job and achieve a better standard of health, as 
they’re not going to be living surrounded by rats anymore. That person will have a 
reference and a dignified address, and will be able to study without anyone being 
prejudiced against them, since here in Brazil, there is still a lot of prejudice against 
someone who lives in a favela.^
94 Interview with Adana 06.07.07
95 Interview with Tristana, leader of a regional movement, member of UMM executive 26.03.07
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R e fe r e n c e  t o  d ig n i t y  is  a  t h r e a d  th a t  r u n s  t h r o u g h o u t  t h e  in t e r v ie w s  w ith  in d iv id u a ls  
a s s o c ia t e d  w ith  t h e  h o u s in g  m o v e m e n t .  I n d e e d ,  t h e  e x p r e s s io n  ‘m o r a d ia  d ig n a ’ is  in  
s t a n d a r d  u s a g e  b y  m o v e m e n t  le a d e r s  w h e n  ta lk in g  o f  t h e  o r g a n iz a t io n a l  a im s  o f  t h e  
U M M . A lth o u g h  i t  is  b e s t  p a r a p h r a s e d  a s  ‘d e c e n t ’ o r  ‘a d e q u a t e ’ h o u s in g ,  a  l i t e r a l  
t r a n s la t io n  o f  moradia digna  w o u ld  b e  ‘d ig n i f i e d  h o u s i n g ’. In  t h i s  w a y , r e s p o n d e n t s  
m a k e  a  d i s t in c t io n  b e t w e e n  t h e  ty p e  o f  h o u s in g  t h e y  a r e  c a m p a ig n in g  fo r , a n d  th a t  
p r o v id e d  b y  t h efavela  o r  cortigo in  w h ic h  m a n y  o f  t h e ir  m e m b e r s  a r e  h o u s e d .  T h e  g o a l  
o f  moradia digna  p r o m o t e d  b y  th e  U M M  a ls o  r e s o n a t e s  w it h  t h e  c o r e  t h e m e  o f  h u m a n  
d ig n i t y  s e t  o u t  in  t h e  f ir s t  a r t ic le  o f  t h e  C o n s t i tu t io n ,  w h i l s t  t h e  r e d u c t io n  o f  s t ig m a  
th r o u g h  d e c e n t  h o u s in g  c o n tr ib u te s  t o w a r d s  t h e  p r o m o t io n  o f  e q u a li ty . T h u s  th e  
m o v e m e n t  s t r e n g t h e n s  it s  p o l i t i c s  o f  r ig h t s  a p p r o a c h  b y  e m p h a s iz in g  t h e  m u l t ip le  l in k s  
b e t w e e n  h o u s in g  a n d  r ig h ts :  n o t  o n ly  d o  t h e y  s t r e s s  th a t  h o u s in g  is  a  c o n s t i t u t io n a l  
r ig h t , t h e y  a ls o  s h o w  th a t  h o u s in g  is  c lo s e ly  l in k e d  t o  c o r e  e le m e n t s  o f  t h e  C o n s t i tu t io n  
a n d  th a t  it  e n a b le s  t h e  f u l f i lm e n t  o f  o t h e r  s o c ia l  r ig h t s .
Figure 5: Shacks built over a ditch in the H eliopolis favela
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Figure 6: L u x iu ^ ^ p a rtm en t build ing  in  th e  H igienopolis
H ousing and citizenship
A lo n g  w ith  p o s i t in g  h o u s in g  a s  a  c o n s t i t u t io n a l  r ig h t  in  i t s e l f  a n d  t h e  k e y  t o  t h e  
r e a liz a t io n  o f  o t h e r  s o c ia l  r ig h t s ,  t h e  m o v e m e n t  h a s  d e v e lo p e d  a p a r t ic u la r  d is c o u r s e  
t h a t  l in k s  a d e q u a te  h o u s in g  d ir e c t ly  to  th e  a c q u is i t io n  o f  c i t iz e n s h ip .  T h is  i s  a  
p a r t ic u la r ly  p o w e r fu l  w e a p o n  fo r  th e  m o v e m e n t ’s  p o l i t i c s  o f  r ig h t s ,  s in c e  t h e  c o n c e p t  o f
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citizenship is an emotive one in Brazilian society, building, as it does, on the 1988 
Constitution. For both Caldeira (2000) and Dagnino (2007) citizenship in the 
democratic era has come to represent an Arendtian idea of the ‘right to have rights’. As 
Holston (2Qo8:xiii) notes, since the return to democracy, the word has become 
ubiquitous in Brazilian everyday life where its use is ‘evocative of alternative futures’. 
For Dagnino (2007:550-551), an innovative definition of citizenship as a ‘project for a 
new sociability’, has ‘penetrated deep into Brazil’s political and cultural fabric’. The 
movement’s establishment of a link between housing and citizenship further buoys the 
power of its rhetoric, and perceived violations of the government’s own charter can be 
used by the UMM as a weapon against the state.
Responses to the question ‘what do you understand by the term citizenship?’ generally 
involved the research participant listing the social rights enshrined in Article 6 of the 
Constitution, and referring to the notion of dignity. Perceptions of citizenship were 
therefore closely associated with social rights, with civil and political elements of 
citizenship infrequently mentioned. Further, citizenship was generally described in a 
one-sided way: respondents placed responsibility for the acquisition of citizenship onto 
the state. A minority of movement representatives interviewed referred unprompted to 
the duties associated with being a citizen, but they then had difficulty giving clear 
examples of these. However, this limited appreciation of the complexities of citizenship 
amongst some movement members does not necessarily diminish the power of their 
rhetoric in appealing to a generalized myth of rights. As Scheingold (2004:60-61) 
notes, the piecemeal use of slogans and symbols may impede ‘systematic reflection on 
the total social vision implied by the myth of rights’ but, ‘in the final analysis it is not 
the accuracy of the image, but its attractiveness, that determines the success of the 
myth of rights’.
Particularly salient from responses to the question of citizenship was the clear 
connection made between having adequate housing and being a citizen. For example,
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I think that having citizenship means, first of all, having basic things. It means 
having a house to live in, being respected as a citizen and having the same rights as 
everybody else.96
The direct link between citizenship and housing can be explained through the 
connection made by the movement between citizenship and dignity. Dignity will be 
achieved through the fulfilment of social rights, particularly housing. This is because 
having decent housing will enable an individual or family to live in a dignified manner, 
gain access to other social rights and thus become a citizen. These ideas are expressed 
by a member of a local movement affiliated to the UMM, whose family had moved to a 
centrally located building that had been converted into social housing after it had been 
occupied.
Today I feel much more of a citizen that I did before. When I came to live here, I 
‘rescued’ a bit more of my citizenship. We feel like decent people here [a gente se 
sente gente], and where we lived before, we didn’t.9?
The phrase ‘sentir-se gente’, literally ‘feeling like a person’, implies feeling like someone 
who is worthy of respect, and who lives in a civilized manner. This idea finds resonance 
in TH Marshall’s (1964) definition of social citizenship discussed in chapter two. For 
Marshall, social citizenship involves being able to participate in civilized life, according 
to the standards prevailing in a given society. This concept is similar to that proposed 
by Sen in his work on the concept of freedom in which he develops the ideas of Adam 
Smith (Sen 1999). One core freedom is the ability to hold up one’s head in public, 
without feelings of shame. For leaders of the UMM, having decent housing will allow 
movement members to achieve this type of freedom, since it will lift them up to the 
standard of ‘dignified living’ in Brazil and by making movement members ‘more like 
everybody else’ it should also reduce inequalities.
96 Interview with Benjamin 05.06.07
97 Interview with Nina 09.10.07
181
The link between housing and citizenship was further strengthened by research 
participants when they spoke about those without adequate housing. The underlying 
suggestion is that these people are not treated like human beings. For example,
Lourdes, when describing a cortigo eviction, remarked that the furniture was better 
treated than the residents: ‘At least the furniture has somewhere to go’.98 Ivana spoke of 
police action to evict people from the ‘Cracolandia’ drug-dealing area of central Sao 
Paulo, in the following terms, ‘They are throwing people onto the streets, as thought 
they were rubbish.’99 Similarly, for Nina, residents of far-flung peripheral 
neighbourhoods are ‘treated like trash’.100 Ernesto complains that buildings are torn 
down in the city centre to make way for car parks, when they could be converted into 
social housing. This leads him to conclude that cars have ‘more prestige today than 
humans’.101 Another fairly common way of articulating similar beliefs was to suggest 
that poor Brazilians were treated worse than animals:
We have a right to housing. We are human beings not animals. You can do what you 
like to an animal, but us, although we are poor, we still deserve respect. And we 
deserve somewhere to live.102
A couple of more radical leaders would contrast the living conditions of the sem teto, 
with that of vermin. This idea was most often employed with reference to buildings that 
have been left empty in the centre of Sao Paulo. Here, cockroaches, rats, fleas and 
pigeons all have a sturdy roof over their heads, whilst those who are sem teto do not.
Placida’s and other movement representatives’ remarks suggest a dehumanization of 
the urban poor, and the phrase cortdigoes desumanas, ‘inhuman [living] conditions’, is 
also current. In the discourse of the movement, its members are being stripped of the 
basic dignity that should underlie all human existence. This is perhaps why some 
movement leaders talk o f‘rescuing’ their citizenship. The term suggests that all are
98 Interview with Lourdes, leader of a small centrally based association.
99 Speaking at a centre-movements’ meeting, 02.07.07.
100 Interview with Nina, member of a UMM affiliated movement, housed after an occupation, 09.10.07
101 Interview with Ernesto 14.03.07
102 Interview with Placida, member of a FLM affiliated movement, living in an occupied building 24.07.07
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born as citizens and decent human beings, but that some have lost this status, as their 
basic needs (including housing) are not being met. This appeal to a kind of essential 
status as a mobilizing tool is discussed in passing by Nettl (1967:247) who notes that,
One of the most successful elementary forms of mobilization of otherwise 
unacculturated sections of the periphery of society is the claim for the return of 
rights believed to have been illegally removed or denied.
Intriguingly, he illustrates this idea with reference to northeast Brazil, where ‘preaching 
the inequity of land distribution, and the resultant glaring discrepancies in social status 
and economic return to peasants [...] are far less remunerative (in terms of resentment, 
generalized belief and therefore mobilized commitment) than the much ‘narrower’ 
presentation of ancient legal rights with regard to land and water unjustly or illegally 
taken away5 (Ibid).1Q3 In a similar way, rather than a reference to citizenship as part of 
the path to modernity, the idea of rescuing citizenship used by some members of the 
UMM appears as an appeal to some ideal past. Nevertheless, this evocation of (mythic) 
rights may have symbolic weight amongst certain sectors of society, including the 
membership.
Establishing a connection between housing and citizenship is, furthermore, a critical 
element of the movement’s politics of rights, since it allows for an extremely powerful 
discourse on limited citizenship. This is the principal argument through which the 
movement attempts to hold the state to account: it posits the state’s failure to resolve 
the housing problems of the poor as a violation of their citizenship rights. This can be 
understood by borrowing from Khan’s typology of state failure, where rather them 
affected by structural faults, the state apparatus suffers process failures, in that 
measures are not taken to improve redistribution of resources, as certain powerful 
sectors are committed to ‘holding the existing structure of institutions constant’ (Khan 
1995:84). In the eyes of movement members, these process failures, where the 
government does not make a concerted, transparent effort to improve the living
103 No sources are provided by Nettl for these findings.
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standards of the poor, impact upon levels of citizenship, because it denies them dignity. 
Many interviewees expressed quite similar ideas on the paradox that they were 
Brazilian citizens, but that there were limits to the extent that they were enjoying full 
citizenship rights. A basic explanation of this idea is made by Ernesto.
Look, I’m a citizen. But there’s something missing for me to be able to really call 
myself a citizen. What’s missing is the house that I haven’t got.104
Joanadarc makes the link between formal and substantive citizenship more distinct:
I haven’t yet recovered my citizenship. Citizenship doesn’t mean that I was born in 
some country or another. That has nothing to do with it....I mean, I do have 
citizenship, Brazilian citizenship, but not in the way that I want it, that I ought to 
have it, that I deserve.105
These comments on the limited nature of citizenship articulated by those without 
adequate housing are extremely common among movement members and leaders and 
bring to the fore the clear emphasis placed on the fulfilment of social rights for the 
acquisition of citizenship amongst Sao Paulo’s poor. This runs counter to Holston’s 
(2008) and Caldeira’s (2000) preoccupation with civil rights, in their examination of 
citizenship amongst the property-owning urban lower-middle-classes of the city. The 
research participants in these studies show a greater concern for personal security and 
property rights, suggesting that income levels have a bearing on how citizenship is 
understood. Further, conceptualizing citizenship as ‘limited’ allows the movement to 
‘denounce’ the state as behaving illegally for failing to uphold social rights, leading to 
accusations such as, ‘The state steals our rights’.106 The perceived illegality of the state 
is a cornerstone of the way in which the movement justifies its building occupations, as 
will be shown in chapter seven.
104 Interview with Ernesto 14.03.03
1Qs Interview with Joanadarc, leader of a small association representing families living in an occupied 
building in the centre, 23.04.07
106 Interview with Nora, leader o f a small association based in the centre 08.10.07
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The im plication o f  a  po litics o f  righ ts approach
The failure of the state to develop and implement adequate housing policy for the poor 
and the resultant perception of a violation of citizenship rights drives the movement to 
take a radical and antagonistic position. This position is most clearly expressed through 
the use of building and land occupations, a tactic that can cause significant 
embarrassment and logistical difficulties for the government targeted. Many movement 
members and leaders express the belief that occupations are the only way to make a 
‘non-democratic’ government listen to the movement’s demands, or to force it to keep 
to its word on previous policy commitments. However, these criticisms are generally 
directed at municipal and state-level governments. There is a marked reluctance to 
make aggressive statements about the federal level government, which movement 
representatives refer to as our government, with our president Lula, at the helm. But 
for Anderson and Diogo, two of the more self-reflexive members of the UMM executive, 
the very fact that the Lula regime has not lived up to their high expectations points to 
the limits of the state’s ability to respond to their demands and leads to the conclusion 
that the movement must always be on the offensive. Anderson goes some way to unpick 
the problems facing the relationship between the movement and the PT government in 
power in Brasilia. He gives as an example a recent presidential visit to Sao Paulo to sign 
off federal funds (known as the PAC) for urbanization of two favelas, in one of which 
Anderson has been working for over twenty years.
Lula himself has said that he won the [presidential] elections thanks to the intensive 
collaboration that he built up with social movements before the second round -  
with urban movements and those from the countryside. And where’s the dialogue 
and interaction now? That launch for the PAC here in Sao Paulo, where was the 
engagement with social movements? There wasn’t any. That’s why I didn’t go to the 
ceremony. I don’t accept that type of relationship with a political party that says it’s 
left-wing and working class, and then creates a programme that it says will have 
huge social impact, (the resources that have been earmarked for the favelas, for 
social housing, are really significant amounts of money, thanks to our struggle, 
thanks to social movements) and then it doesn’t invite us to help work out the 
prioritization of the projects or have even the tiniest bit of engagement with us, or 
discussion about the impact of these projects. We get indignant about these things 
because during the electoral process we were very welcome at the discussion forums 
in the presidential palace. When it’s time to discuss policy, to make decisions, and 
when they really have the power to make those decisions, social movements aren’t 
invited. That’s why I think that there is no option for social movements other than
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social struggle, taking to the streets, mobilizing members -  the whole battle plan 
that the movement has.10?
What is interesting about this statement is that it shows that not even Lula, the 
movement’s president, behaves in the way they expect of him. Diogo makes a similar 
point, noting that the movement tends to refer to Lula’s administration as ‘our 
government’, and yet he has come to realize that the ‘democratic’ PT federal 
government must govern everyone in the country, even those who did not vote for it. As 
such the ‘struggle’ must continue, since the movement cannot assume that the 
government will automatically respond to the needs of its members.108
The seeming impossibility of an end to the housing struggle, with the failure of even 
friendly governments to place priority on the needs of the poor lead, not only to an 
adversarial stance, but also to a rhetoric of compulsion and duty to act as the 
government’s antagonist. This idea of ‘constant opposition’ is discussed in greater 
detail in chapter eight. But despite movement leaders’ strident statements of opposition 
towards municipal, state and federal governments, they cannot surmount the 
fundamental paradox of their overall reliance on the state. The state maybe perceived 
as the enemy that denies dignity and limits citizenship, but firstly, the country is now 
formally a democracy thus limiting the actions of a movement that labels itself 
democratic, and secondly, the state and municipal housing companies are the only 
providers of housing with sufficient subsidies to be accessible for the UMM’s members. 
Movement leaders may declare themselves to be in perpetual opposition to 
government, but if they are to house their members successfully, they must eventually 
negotiate with the representatives of the state. The labelling of state and municipal 
governments as ‘non-democratic’ and as responsible for maintaining urban populations 
in a state of limited citizenship is a useful tool for mobilization. It harks back to the 
movement’s roots in the campaigns against the dictatorship, and helps to provide a 
clear target against which the movement is organized. But this positioning generates
10? Interview with Anderson 26.06.07
108 Interview with Diogo, leader of a large centrally based movement 12.06.07
186
difficulties for the UMM once a ‘democratic government’, (meaning the PT) takes 
office. Recent experiences with a PT mayor in Sao Paulo tested the ability of the 
movement to remain autonomous and maintain pressure on the government in the 
absence of a commitment to pro-poor housing and social movement participation 
(alluded to by Anderson in the final citation above). And the UMM is experiencing 
similar difficulties with Lula’s current presidential administration. These issues are 
discussed in the following chapter.
Sum m ary
Members and leaders of the UMM have adapted to political circumstances in the post­
dictatorship era in Brazil by making skilful use of the fundamental elements of 
democracy. Stressing their own democratic practice, they call on the state to live up to 
similar standards. The movement’s involvement in both legislation and litigation give it 
a legal take on the government’s policy failure, and this has helped it to develop a 
‘politics of rights’ approach that aids both internal mobilization and external support.
In their rhetoric of rights they link housing to citizenship in multiple ways: (i) it is 
enshrined as a right in the Constitution (ii) it is the key to achieving.other core social 
rights and (iii) it is bound up with notions of dignity, respect and having a place in 
society. Since responsibilities for housing lie with the state, the lack of housing 
provision for low-income groups is articulated by movement leaders as a state failure 
and a wilful violation of citizenship rights by governments more committed to 
protecting the interests of the wealthy sectors of society. The UMM uses these 
arguments to develop a powerful discourse on limited citizenship. However, the 
movement’s strident politics of rights has led to a situation where it places itself in a 
type of perpetual opposition to the state. This is problematic given that it must also 
engage with the state to achieve its ends. The movement therefore walks a tightrope 
between institutionalized negotiations and theoretically illegal acts of civil 
disobedience. The following chapters explore how the UMM’s rhetoric plays out in its 
actual interaction with the state.
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Chapter Six
Non-confrontational institutional engagement 
Introduction
The following chapter examines the ways in which the UMM attempts to influence 
decision-making processes on housing policy in Sao Paulo state and city and at federal 
level without recourse to confrontational tactics such as protest marches or 
occupations. As such, it focuses on its engagement with the institutions of the Brazilian 
state through formal channels as well as examining examples of the UMM’s use of 
informal relationships and interaction to influence key decision-makers. Examining 
engagement with each level of the state in turn, the chapter documents the different 
strategies that the movement employs. These strategies (not all of which are used at 
each level of the state) can include involvement in deliberative and consultative 
councils on housing and urban issues; regular meetings with representatives of housing 
departments and public housing companies; input into wider initiatives for the 
establishment or amendment of local and national legislation; and movement leader 
employment in government housing departments.109 These opportunities for 
participation will be discussed in light of Cornwall’s (2002) and Gaventa’s (2004) call 
for closer examination of the ‘spaces’ within which members of society interact with the 
state. Arguing that how these spaces are created will impact upon how people act 
within them, Gaventa draws up a typography of ‘invited’, ‘created/claimed’ and ‘closed’ 
spaces for state-society interaction. This chapter builds on this typology, showing how 
movement activity around one type of space can influence its leverage in others. 
Through an examination of the generation and use of these spaces, the chapter shows 
how the movement has come to be a recognized interlocutor at all three levels of the 
Brazilian state, that it is constantly seeking ever greater entry into policy-making 
institutions, but that total institutionalization is not its overarching goal.
109 Although this may appear to be an individual decision, taking up employment in a state housing 
department is perceived by movement members and leaders as a way of promoting the goals of the 
collective. This issue will be discussed in detail later in the chapter.
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Experim ents in partic ipa to ry  governance
The chapter also questions some of the literature on participatory governance that has 
been a key focus of much recent academic study of state-society relations. Brazilian 
experiments with participatory budgeting forums and policy councils have generated 
considerable literature, reflecting their proliferation across the country which has 
become a ‘laboratory* for participation (Fernandes 2007). Health councils, which along 
with councils for the protection of children and youth were made obligatory at 
municipal level by the 1988 Constitution (Houtzager, Lavalle and Acharya 2003), have 
drawn considerable interest (Cornwall 2007; Schonleitner 2004; Coelho 2007) as has 
the successful implementation of participatory budgeting schemes in Porto Alegre and 
Belo Horizonte (Abers 1988; Koonings 2004; Souza 2001; Baierle 1998; Baiocchi 2004; 
Heller 2000). However, some analysis of these spaces for participation is somewhat 
na’ive in the assumed potential for the democratization of both society and the state 
(Avritzer 2002, Paoli and Telles 1998). Emphasis on the institutionalization of 
participation and Habermassian forms of rational dialogue (Fung and Wright 2003; 
Avritzer 2002) is, furthermore, at odds with the agendas and behaviour of the many 
social movements and community associations who are key players in these forums. 
And yet a number of texts speak simply of the participation of individual citizens or of 
newly formed social movements, without adequately exploring their links to pre­
existing networks of organizations (Abers 1988; Baierle 1998). Schonleitner’s (2004) 
careful examination of the impact of varying levels of social capital and political will on 
the workings of health councils across the country is a useful corrective to these less 
nuanced texts. And some scholars are now analysing the limitations of these forums, 
and the key question of who participates in them more critically (Houtzager et al. 2003; 
Cornwall 2007; Rodgers 2007). These authors examine the institutional affiliations of 
those who participate, and flag up, in particular, their engagement in party activism. 
However, the methodological approach of these texts tends to place a specific council or 
forum at the centre of the analysis (Cornwall 2007; Rodgers 2007) or involves
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statistical analysis of participation (Houtzager 2003). This cannot allow for a detailed 
qualitative appraisal of how participatory spaces are used by social movement actors in 
conjunction with other opportunities for state-society interaction, nor how their 
participation in policy councils can impact or be impacted by involvement in other 
channels for engagement with the state. This chapter seeks to show that participatory 
forums are not the main site of state-society interaction for the UMM, placing them in 
the context of an array of different channels that the movement employs to engage with 
the state. Building on the introduction to the movement’s history in chapter four, it also 
shows the extent to which the functioning of these spaces is intimately linked to 
configurations of political power.110
This chapter begins by assessing the forms of institutional engagement that were in 
evidence during the year’s fieldwork with the movement. It will draw on observational 
data at meetings with government representatives and interview material in which 
UMM members evaluate the movement’s position vis-a-vis the institutions of the state 
at the time. It will then analyse the movement’s engagement with the state during the 
mayoral administration of Marta Suplicy of the PT in Sao Paulo (2000-2004) with 
greater scrutiny. This was the period of most heightened institutionalization of the 
movement at any level of the state to date, as movement leaders took up office within 
the municipal housing secretariat. Although for the purposes of analysis this chapter 
will study the more formal side of institutional engagement in isolation, this involves a 
degree of artificiality. Ultimately, the flipside of the UMM’s institutional engagement is 
radical protest, and the potential outcomes of both are continually evaluated and
110 It should be noted here that participatory budgeting has not been a success in Sao Paulo, nor has it been 
implemented by Lula at the federal level and that the participatory spaces that the UMM has been involved 
in are polity sector councils in the area of housing. Unlike participatory budgeting forums the creation of 
which is a policy choice made by an incumbent government (most often from the left of the political 
spectrum (Koonings 2004)), policy councils in many sectors are now a legal requirement at the various 
levels of the state. Goldfrank’s (2007) insightful conclusions on the way in which well-institutionalised 
opposition parties can derail the efforts of incumbent PT governments to implement participatory 
budgeting are not therefore directly applicable to a discussion of the housing councils. However, a general 
recognition of the way that party politics can influence the workings of participatory governance spaces 
informs the analysis of this chapter.
190
compared by movement representatives in accordance with changing political 
circumstances.
The im portance o f  the ‘institu tional stru ggle9
Before analysing the movement’s engagement with each level of the state, it is
important to stress the importance the UMM gives to involvement in policy-making 
processes within the state. This may seem surprising, given the considerable animosity 
expressed by members of the UMM towards the institutions of the state detailed in the 
previous chapter, and the movement’s notoriety for its extra-institutional building 
occupations. However, the movement’s members spend the majority of their time 
attempting to influence decision-making processes through formal channels or setting 
up opportunities to discuss housing issues with state employees in the housing 
departments at all three governmental levels. A number of senior UMM leaders showed 
immense pride in the movement’s history of institutional achievement. When asked to 
name what they believed to be the UMM’s greatest ‘conquest’ of its twenty-year 
existence, as many leaders cited the approval of the FNHIS, the national fund for social 
interest housing, and its related housing councils as they did the construction of tens of 
thousands of homes through the mutirao. As Gaetano remarks,
The biggest conquest was the FNHIS. Why? Because it was a national campaign, 
driven by the housing movements, and today it’s become law. It was the first 
‘popular initiative’ law in Brazil. Other people will say that the biggest conquest was 
the building of housing units through self-management. That was very important, 
but the most important thing has been us having this institutional struggle. As well 
as conquering housing through self-management, we have managed to construct a 
national law.111
For Gaetano and others, the movement’s involvement in the creation of a legal 
instrument that has institutionalized funding for pro-poor housing provision is a 
crowning achievement, proving that the movement is able to impact upon policy at the 
highest level. It should be remembered that Gaetano ran for political office in 2006,
111 Interview with Gaetano 08.06.07
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and is perhaps more likely to value achievements in this sphere. But the movement has 
also shown considerable support for the creation of other relevant legislation, becoming 
closely involved in campaigns connected to the. municipality’s master plan, the creation 
of the Cities’ Ministry and the City Statute in collaboration with the FNRU. This 
involvement reflects another of the movement’s key characteristics, as perceived by its 
more senior leaders, that it is propositivo -  able to develop proposals for housing 
policies that are then brought to the negotiating table with state representatives. The 
ability to propose is contrasted with movements that are only able to demand.
However, the ‘institutional struggle’ also involves more mundane dialogue with 
government housing departments over specific plots of unoccupied land and buildings 
that could house low-income families. Here the movement is not attempting to leave its 
mark on broad policy development, but is trying to respond to the demands of its 
members. If more immediate solutions are to.be found for these individuals and their 
families, negotiations must remain open. It is Benjamin, the key mediator, who 
articulates this issue most clearly.
If you don’t know what you’re doing in politics, you can create a crisis between the 
movement and the authorities. Governments are in power for four years, and 
suddenly those guys will stop doing anything, and won’t receive any of us from any 
region of the city. I believe that my responsibility has to come before my personal 
feelings, and I’ve got to grin and bear it [engolir sapo, literally ‘swallow a toad’]. I’d 
like to go into a meeting and tell them all to go and get stuffed. Do you understand? 
But I can’t do that, even though I don’t feel great about it, and that’s why I’m 
sometimes seen as a bit of a pelego.112 They say, ‘the right-wingu3 speaks to 
Benjamin, every government will talk to Benjamin, and Benjamin has to go and 
open the doors there, and talk to this person and that person’. But it’s not because I 
want to, it’s because we all should be doing this. Only unfortunately, within the 
UMM, the person who has this role is me.11*
112 A person or popular organization that does deals with right-wing governments.
1X3 This is a reference to the municipal government of Gilberto Kassab, of the recently renamed Democratas 
party, generally perceived to be on the centre right of the political spectrum. Given the country’s recent 
history of military dictatorship, Brazilian politicians rarely refer to themselves or their parties as ‘right- 
wing’, which can be taken as a pejorative term. Walter Abrahao, a personal friend of Kassab, appointed by 
him as commercial director of the municipal housing council, COHAB, reacted angrily when I referred to 
the Democratas as right-wing in an interview, 15.06.07.
114 Interview with Benjamin 05.06.07
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Benjamin sees the danger inherent in resorting to more ‘radical’ solutions without any 
attempt at negotiation first. In Portuguese the term has more negative connotations 
than in English, suggesting an outright refusal to compromise or to accept the existence 
of opposing viewpoints. Asked to reflect on whether he thought this policy of 
moderation was having any results at the municipal level, he replied that although 
times were difficult, ‘the tap was still dripping’.
You see people who go to the meetings and they want much more. It’s just that it’s 
very difficult to wrench much more out [of the municipal government]. [...] In 
politics, you have to discuss things with everyone. You have to sit at a negotiating 
table. He [the director of COHAB] acts as though he were my friend. I know that 
he’s not my friend, but I have to pretend that he is. [...] Some people in the 
movement have this idea of getting radical, but I’m not going to get radical with 
anyone. I want the Uniao to get its projects realized -  the ones that are suspended 
as well as the ones that have yet to get started. And that’s why we have to have 
everyone swallowing toads together.1^
While the discourse of the UMM discussed in the previous chapter generally presents 
the movement as a resilient opponent of a malevolent state, the reality of their 
dependence on government funding means they must keep as many channels of 
dialogue open as possible. The need to ‘keep the tap dripping’ is the foundation for 
much of the movement’s engagement with the state.
Strategic planning
Although as was noted in the previous chapter some movement members refer to ‘the 
government’ as the entity that should be responsible for providing low-income housing, 
more senior movement leaders are careful to disaggregate the different levels of the 
Brazilian state when assessing the status quo and making plans for movement 
activities. This planning often took place during the weekly general coordinator 
meetings, but was also discussed in greater detail during the monthly plenaries. In both 
cases, the words ‘municipal’, ‘state’ and ‘federal’ would be chalked up on a large 
blackboard, under which dates of important events and ideas for relevant movement
115 Ibid.
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action would be added as the meetings progressed and different members contributed 
news of meetings, seminars, official visits, building inaugurations, public hearings or 
parliamentary votes. Much of this information comes from movement contacts with PT 
parliamentarians.116 This type of strategic planning is, according to Adana, a hallmark 
of the UMM. She had been struck by the movement’s ability to undertake andlise de 
conjuntura, or ‘situational analysis’ since its earliest days:
I remember this right from the start of the Uniao, which has stuck till today -  our 
meeting agendas: municipal, state and federal government. All our agendas were 
like that. That means that we aren’t focused on one government in one place. Even if 
we’re fighting with the mayor’s office, we’re in discussions with the state 
government, fighting in Brasilia and doing various different things. It’s so we don’t 
become an organization that is dependent on one type of situation, on one 
particular institutional set-up, that could change at any moment, just like it’s 
changed a lot in the last few years.117
This characteristic of the UMM is underlined by another very experienced leader, 
Anderson, responding to a question on the activities of the movement during the most 
recent PT administration of Sao Paulo municipality.
Our actions always have three separate accusations.118 If you look at our documents 
from the Marta [Suplicy] era, for example, they always make demands on the three 
levels of government. [...] If you take the mobilizations and actions of the housing 
movement, they always make a diagnosis of the municipal, state and federal 
environment. The movement will never bring up just one specific local issue, 
because the way we engage has always been to defend the integration of policies and 
government actions. It has always made these demands of the three levels of 
government. Obviously the movement sometimes holds meetings with a specific 
municipal, state or federal agenda... but our belief is that the government has to 
follow the line that we are defending, which is the integration of policies. And we 
also know that the housing problem in the country will never be dealt with by one 
government alone. It can only be taken on by integrated action from the state, 
municipal and federal governments. You’ll see that this is a very particular 
characteristic of the UMM.11’
116 As was detailed in chapter four, a number of movement leaders work in the parliamentary offices of 
elected PT politicians.
117 Interview with Adana 06.07.07
118 The word Anderson uses is denuncia, a term equivalent to ‘accusation’ or ‘charge’ used in legal 
proceedings. References to the law and the criminalisation of the state will be examined in detail in chapter 
seven.
119 Interview with Anderson 26.06.07
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Although Anderson calls for the integration of government policy, and claims that the 
UMM spreads its focus over all three levels of government, it became clear from 
observation and interviews that the movement, in practice, will vary the intensity of its 
activities according to the prevailing political situation within each level of government. 
This is based on on-going analise de conjuntura of how receptive each level of 
government is likely to be to the movement’s demands. Recalling the discussion of 
chapter four, it should be reiterated here that the election of PT governments at both 
municipal and federal levels has had an important impact both on movement access to 
policy-making arenas and the way in which the movement strategizes.
In interviews, movement leaders were asked to articulate their personal views on which 
level of government they believed should be targeted by future movement demand- 
making or campaigning. These respondents almost all presented a very similar analysis 
of the difficulties and opportunities the movement was facing at the time, although 
their reasoning led them to different conclusions as to how to overcome these 
problems. In general, the majority of movement leaders saw the federal government as 
the most likely source of funding for housing projects. As the wealthiest level of 
government, and one that was headed by a PT president and a close ally of social 
movements, it would make sense to focus demand-making at this level. Other members 
agreed with this, but pointed out that Lula’s government had already earmarked a 
considerable amount of money for building of new homes and ‘urbanization’ offavelas. 
In early 2007, the federal government had announced a huge infrastructure 
programme called the PAC (Programa de Aceleragao do Crescimento -  Programme for 
Acceleration of Growth) which had set aside billions of reais for the urbanization of the 
two largest/aue/as in Sao Paulo, Heliopolis and Paraisopolis, along with other large- 
scale investment across the country. The problem perceived by a number of movement 
leaders was that the federal government can only finance these projects, and must leave 
their execution to the municipal and state-level governments. This issue is discussed by 
Ivana:
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This is the story: the federal government sends money to the municipality, and the 
municipality does nothing. It sends money to the state, and the state does nothing. 
This is why we need to step up the pressure. We used to say that the federal 
government didn’t help, only the municipal and state governments did. Today 
there’s money from the federal government and now the state and municipality 
aren’t doing anything.120
The municipal and state governments of Sao Paulo were also widely perceived to be in a 
close alliance unfavourable to social movements. The governorship of the state has 
been run by the centrist Brazilian Social Democracy Party (PSDB) for nearly 14 years, 
and when Jose Serra of the PSDB won the mayoral election against the incumbent 
Marta Suplicy of the PT, taking office in January 2005, the two governments were in 
the hands of the same party for the first time since the return to democracy.121 Serra 
stood down from the mayoralty in mid-2006 to run for the office of Sao Paulo state 
governor and his success meant that the vice-mayor, Gilberto Kassab of the Democratas 
was elevated to the position of mayor. Despite the change of mayor, movement 
members widely regard the alliance between the state and municipal government to 
have continued, particularly in the area of housing where few changes were made to 
executive posts that are appointed by the mayor (known as cargos de confianga, or 
‘trust posts’). Movement members were largely pessimistic about their ability to impact 
upon policy and decision-making forums within the housing departments and public 
housing companies at the state and municipal level. The following section will address 
each level of government in turn, describing the ways in which the movement was 
observed to be engaging with institutions of the Brazilian state during the fieldwork 
year of this study.
120 Interview with Ivana 01.06.07
121 The UMM has had a varied history with PSDB state governors. Despite friction, it made considerable 
headway with state-funded m utirao  projects during the two administrations of the more populist governor 
Mario Covas in the 1990s.
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Federal governm ent122
With the election of Lula to the presidency in 2003, the ability of the UMM to engage 
with the federal government increased considerably. Prior to this, the movement had 
been met with ‘dogs and water cannons’ on its campaigning trips to Brasilia, according 
to a number of movement leaders. Key to an increase in institutional engagement was 
the establishment of the Cities’ Ministry in 2003 to coordinate urban policy and 
management that had previously been dispersed across a number of government 
departments. Also important was the ratification of the FNHIS, that had been at the 
heart of housing movement campaigning for fourteen years. During the first of Lula’s 
terms in office, when the Cities’ Minister was a PT politician and movement 
sympathizer, social movements were encouraged to play a strenuous role in policy 
discussions, as Raquel Rolnik, former national secretary for urban programmes and 
erstwhile member of the FNRU recounts,
The first Minister we had here, Olivio Dutra, was a minister who was really 
committed to the idea of social movements being protagonists, to the idea of 
constructing a non-state public space, to the idea of creating policy based on 
dialogue with the movements, involving a lot of space for the movements in that 
formulation process.123
Engagement with the country’s housing movements had been particularly intense in 
the first years of the Ministry as Rolnik had employed the UMM leader, Adana, to work 
as her chief of staff and to coordinate the participation of popular sectors in the work of 
the ministry. However, shifts in the PT’s network of alliances led to changes at the head 
of the Cities’ Ministry in 2005. The new Minister was a politician from the right-wing 
Partido Progressista (an incarnation of the dictatorship party ARENA), and his 
appointment led to the resignation of a number of PT sympathizers working within the 
bureaucracy, including, eventually, Rolnik and Adana. Despite these changes, the UMM 
continues to have considerable levels of engagement in urban policy deliberations in
122 Although I spent five days in Brasilia carrying out interviews in the Cities Ministry, I was not able to 
participate in any UMM meetings with federal state employees or to attend sessions of the councils linked 
to the Cities Ministry.
123 Interview with Raquel Rolnik, 17.07.07
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Brasilia through two participatory councils that were established alongside the Cities’ 
Ministry. These are the Cities Council and the Management Council for the FNHIS 
fund. At the time of the fieldwork the UMM was represented on both councils by two of 
its most senior members, Anderson and Adana, with Ivana as a substitute councillor. 
Involvement in these councils meant that senior UMM figures were making frequent 
visits to Brasilia. Alongside these councils, as Gaetano explains, the UMM has received 
a number of invitations to participate in other discussion forums in Brasilia.
As nowadays the Uniao is a movement that is very strong on urban issues, it is 
invited to take part in different events in various secretariats in Brasilia. So, we’re 
taking part in a special commission on hunger in the national secretariat for human 
rights. We’re also invited to take part in the judicial reform process, in Brasilia. 
Another important group we were invited to join works on relations with social 
movements [in other countries] through the foreign office.124
Movement members involved in federal level councils are fairly cautious about the 
extent to which they can influence policy through these channels. Ivana, for example, 
notes that as the Cities Council is consultative, the government does not have to act on 
its recommendations. Other councils, such as the municipal housing council in Sao 
Paulo are ‘deliberative’ in that their decisions are taken to a vote and are legally binding 
on the municipal housing secretariat. Despite their limitations, there are other indirect 
benefits to membership of the federal level councils, particularly visibility for the 
movement and an increase in status. For example, high-level officials in housing 
departments at the federal and municipal levels showed awareness of the UMM’s 
representation at federal level. And, as Cid Blanco Jr. chief of staff to the national 
housing secretary noted in an interview, movement members’ presence on these 
councils brings them into regular and close contact with senior members of staff from 
the Ministry.125
Although there was criticism within the movement of the slow pace at which the 
Ministry functions, pressure from UMM representatives through the Councils appeared
124 Interview with Gaetano 08 .06 .07
125 Interview with Cid Blanco Jr. 14.07.07
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to be leading towards a couple of policy successes for the UMM. The first of these was 
the creation of a programme called Credito Solidario, which provides federal funding 
for mutirao building (although this has yet to be implemented in Sao Paulo because of 
high land values in the city). The second was an increase in resources flowing into the 
FNHIS. Building on this, during 2007 the principal demand on the federal government 
coming from the UMM was for social movements and community associations to have 
direct access to the Fund, so as to reduce the role of the municipal or state governments 
in the planning and building of new housing. The importance of this is set out by 
Benjamin:
We have to focus on the federal government, so that there is a proper mechanism in 
place that will allow associations to get their hands on the money, without having to 
go through the state or municipality. Because otherwise things just won’t go 
forward. The federal government can keep sending the money, but things won’t 
improve. These guys [in the municipal and state governments] are doing nothing at 
the moment and they won’t start in the future either.126
Progress was made on this issue over the course of 2007. According to Blanco Jr. the 
national housing secretary, Ines Magalhaes, was coming round to approving this move, 
and in August 2007 she met with UMM members in their headquarters in Sao Paulo to 
discuss the matter.
This type of personal contact with a high-level public servant is, however, of a different 
order to the debates that the movement will have with these types of actor within the 
space of the federal councils. Despite being represented on these councils, the 
movement bypasses formal channels for negotiation between the federal government 
and social movements, to make personal demands on the national housing secretary. 
Whilst the councils can be perceived as an ‘invited space’(Gaventa 2004; Cornwall 
2002) in the sense that they have been opened up by the state expressly for the 
participation of its citizens, the negotiations in Sao Paulo on the issue of the 
distribution of federal resources were on the movement’s terms and, quite literally,
126 Interview with Benjamin 05.06.07
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within its own space. As such, this type of engagement, to follow Gaventa’s typology, 
could be described as a ‘created space’, one that is ‘claimed by less powerful actors from 
or against the power-holders’ (Gaventa 2004: 35). On this same visit to Sao Paulo, 
Magalhaes had taken on the role of mediator between the city’s housing movements 
and the municipal and state housing secretaries in an attempt to resolve the stalemate 
between them. Although a number of UMM leaders remarked to me afterwards that 
they had gained very little from the visit, it was as a result of this meeting that a 
solution was finally found to a long-standing building occupation by the FLM affiliated 
MSTC (Movimento Sem Teto do Centro -  Roofless Movement of the Centre). Her visit 
is evidence of the considerable leverage that Sao Paulo’s housing movements wield over 
the national housing department.
This kind of interaction between the housing movements and a high-level civil servant 
can be described as ‘informal’, since Magalhaes was under no obligation to meet with 
UMM representatives or to discuss policy issues with them outside the official forums 
for participation in Brasilia. It is not, however, uncommon.12? The informality of social 
interaction in Brazil pervades even the highest levels of politics. Anderson remarked 
that on their visits to Brasilia for council meetings, movement representatives take the 
opportunity to arrange other meetings within the Cities’ Ministry. This was denied by 
Grazia de Grazia, a former member of the FNRU and now a senior manager in Rolnik’s 
former department at the Ministry, who stressed that this interaction took place within 
the Councils. However, on further questioning she admitted that the movement 
members did arrange meetings outside of the forums, but only if they had a specific 
problem with, for example, a federal building they were campaigning to have 
renovated. Testimony from Rolnik would suggest that interaction between movement 
representatives and those from the Ministry had, in the past, often occurred outside the 
formal channels for discussion.
127 This type o f personal relationship was taken to an extreme by Ivana, who was in regular telephone 
contact with the president of the CEF, which is the main provider of housing credit to low-income families 
in Brazil
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In the secretariat for urban programmes that was a phenomenon that was quite, 
well [...] there was a lot of dialogue, the whole time, and that’s to do with personal 
relations as well. It was a space where when the movements came to Brasilia, to do 
whatever, they would come to the secretariat and settle in. They would sit at the 
desks, use the computers. The secretariat was their home, because they knew they 
were welcome and that they had space there. This was partly because Adana was my 
chief of staff, and she was always a social movement leader. I asked her to be my 
chief of staff because I wanted the secretariat to be closely identified as a space for 
the movements.128
In this way, the movement was able to take advantage of a different type o f‘invited 
space’, one that was considerably less formal than that provided by the federal councils. 
This type of engagement is still institutional in the sense that it is taking place within an 
institution of government, but is marked by a considerable degree of informality. The 
movement was therefore able to discuss and influence the formal processes of 
government in an informal way. This ‘open door’ policy for the movement, with one of 
their key leaders playing a dual role as a representative of both state and movement can 
perhaps be read as an attempt to infiltrate and thus reduce the number o f‘closed 
spaces’ within government, where ‘decisions are made by a set of actors behind closed 
doors’ (Gaventa 2004: 35). Adana’s decision to take up a post in the ministry that took 
her away from the UMM’s headquarters in Sao Paulo was positively evaluated by other 
movement leaders. Her presence there was seen to facilitate their engagement with the 
state at the federal level, and to have helped the movement gain greater understanding 
of the workings of the government in Brasilia.
Once Dutra lost the position of Minister, the level of informal engagement within the 
Cities’ Ministry dropped dramatically, particularly after the resignation of staff, such as 
Rolnik and Adana, who were most in favour of social movement input into decision­
making. However, the UMM remains on the formal councils and is still able to exert 
pressure on the national housing secretary, as shown above. Even with this reduced 
interaction, this level of dialogue over federal housing policy is still considered far 
higher than under any previous administration. The changing levels of engagement are
128 Interview with Raquel Rolnik 17.07.07
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indicative of the way in which the movement’s relationship with the state fluctuates 
according to the electoral fortunes of the PT. This issue will be discussed in greater 
detail in relation to Marta Suplicy’s administration of Sao Paulo municipality. However, 
at the time of the fieldwork, as noted above, the political environment in Sao Paulo city 
and state was not so conducive to positive working relations between the movement 
and the institutions of the state government, as will now be shown.
S ta te  governm ent
Since at the time of the fieldwork for this study the state secretariat had yet to establish 
a participatory council for the management of resources destined for social housing, the 
movements had no formal institutional channel to engage with the state government’s 
housing department, or its operational wing, CDHU, the public housing company.12? 
The UMM had been making repeated demands for the establishment of the state-level 
fund and its oversight council for many years, through official letters submitted to the 
secretariat and by raising the issue at meetings. The council is a legal requirement if the 
state is to receive funding from the FNHIS. The planned creation of the council was 
finally announced by the Sao Paulo state secretary for housing, Lair Krahenbiihl, in 
August 2007. However, the detail on its functioning was swiftly challenged by the 
UMM, who were opposed to the council being consultative rather than deliberative, 
meaning that it cannot make binding decisions on how resources should be spent. 
Movement leaders attributed the slow progress on the establishment of the council as 
evidence of lack of political will on the part of the state government to open up state 
housing policy to external scrutiny and debate.
Despite the absence of a state-level council, UMM representatives were in regular 
negotiations with high-level officials within the secretariat during 2007. Krahenbiihl 
had been appointed at the start of 2007 by the newly elected state governor, Jose Serra.
12? Although in theory the state housing secretariat and CDHU are separate entities, in practice they have 
the same director and are housed in the same building. In recent years the secretariat had been reduced to 
a handful of staff, with almost all functions transferred to CDHU.
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One of his first actions as secretary was to call a meeting for February 5th with housing 
movements from across Sao Paulo state, including those affiliated to the UMM, to set 
out his vision for the CDHU. Although much of the two hour meeting was taken up by 
speeches made by the secretary and his technical team, Adana was also able to give a 
prepared speech from the floor in which she listed the UMM’s demands. These 
included joint work towards the development of proposals to be funded by the FNHIS, 
so that these were ready to be submitted by the time that the state-level housing council 
and fund had been established. She also presented the secretary with a fifty-point 
agenda for future discussion and expressed the need for ‘shared goals’, saying that she 
and her movement colleagues expected progress to be made ‘before April’. During this 
speech Krahenbiihl turned to his director of planning and told him to arrange meetings 
with Adana and the UMM to work on FNHIS funded proposals.
During the course of 2007, the UMM’s representatives requested and were granted an 
average of one meeting a month with high-level representatives of the state housing 
secretariat. Although they demanded to meet with the secretary himself, they were 
generally met by his chief of staff, Sergio Mendonga. The UMM took steps to formalize 
these meetings: each time a date was fixed, an agenda would be submitted by the UMM 
the week before the meeting to beprotocolado -  stamped by the CDHU to acknowledge 
that the document had been received. Although these meetings would appear to 
correspond to Gaventa’s (2004) ‘invited spaces’, in that the state secretary had made it 
clear from the start of his mandate that he was willing to work with movements, these 
spaces for negotiation had been gradually carved out by the UMM through its history of 
being propositivo. The CDHU has, in the past, responded positively to proposals put 
forward by the UMM, notably during the governorship of Mario Covas when mutirao 
projects were adopted on a large-scale, modelled on the housing movement’s 
experiences with the municipal government. It should be emphasized that the CDHU 
was under no legal obligation to hold regular meetings with housing movements over 
the course of 2007. As such, building on Gaventa’s (2004) framework, this is perhaps
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an example of the ‘creation of an invited space’. Notably, FLM members told me they 
had significant difficulty in arranging meetings with the company. During the week of 
9th April 2007, 1 was able to attend two meetings held by Sergio Mendonga, one with 
representatives of the FLM and one with the UMM. His reactions to them were 
significantly different. The FLM had to explain, in detail, who they were, and were 
eventually told to take their concerns to a lower-level official. By contrast, Mendon<ja 
asserted his willingness to set aside a whole day in which to discuss the UMM’s agenda 
(presented at the meeting convened by Krahenbiihl in February) point by point, with 
each region in turn. This points to the UMM’s status as a recognized interlocutor on 
housing issues, that it has achieved through its long history, proven ability to provide 
workable proposals for housing, but also its ability to mobilize many thousands of 
members and undertake transgressive collective action.
Despite the relative regularity of meetings in 2007, granted more freely than by 
counterparts in the municipal government, movement leaders complained that these 
involved nothing but ‘chat, coffee and iced water’. Although Adana noted in a meeting 
on June 22nd that some progress had been made on ‘heritage issues’ (agreements made 
during previous administrations but yet to be implemented), they were not ‘managing 
to go forward’. No meetings had been held to discuss proposals for the FNHIS, for 
example. Although meetings were congenial, movement leaders generally considered 
that they were ‘getting fobbed off, and that the state was agreeing to meet them just to 
‘keep them quiet’. Although Adana had called for ‘shared goals’, implying that the UMM 
was willing to work in partnership with the CDHU, in general, movement leaders 
appeared suspicious of any attempts by the state government to absorb them into 
programmes that they had not had a hand in designing. In October 2007, they were 
invited to attend a second meeting convened by Krahenbiihl, in which he announced 
his plans for ‘shared management’ of mutirao projects with the movements, essentially 
an attempt to regularize the institutional contact between the CDHU and Sao Paulo 
state’s many housing movements. This ‘new model of mutirao’ would involve a
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tendering process for housing movements and community associations, who, if 
successful, would be involved in aspects of project management of future mutirao 
projects. Afterwards, movement members expressed their anger at the limitations that 
would be placed on their role when compared with their own model of mutirao com 
autogestao, declaring that it would reduce them to mere ‘minions’ of the state 
government apparatus, rather than key figures in designing and implementing housing 
policy.
Since the announcement, however, a number of movements and associations affiliated 
to the UMM have submitted their applications to the tendering process, illustrating 
that there are differences of opinion amongst regional and local movements on the best 
way to engage the state. Whilst cautious of institutionalization, in order to keep the ‘tap 
dripping’ and produce real results in terms of housing its members, the movement 
must take up the state’s invitations to be involved in housing production. The 
movement cannot refuse to cooperate out of hand, or it will be accused of behaving 
‘radically* and ‘undemocratically’, potentially closing down sources of state funding.
This situation is somewhat at odds with the participation literature that discusses the 
involvement of social movements in collaborative ventures with the state. For Sagoff 
(1999:161), there are considerable dangers involved in collaboration:
Deliberating with others undermines the group’s mission, which is to press its 
purpose or concerns as far as it can in a zero-sum game with its political adversaries 
[...]. When an interest group joins with its enemies to solve a problem, it loses the 
purity of its position; it ceases to be a cause and becomes a committee.
A similar point is also made by Fung and Wright (2003:282), who note that the use of 
‘injustice frames’ on the part of social movements can lead to a unyielding attitude 
towards the state, since they ‘unambiguously assign culpability’. They further argue 
that many social movements refuse to become involved in collaborative governance 
since this would ‘erode bases of solidarity and support [...] and call into question the 
deep purposes of leaders and the very reasons that those organizations exist.’ (Ibid)
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The discourse of the UMM detailed in the previous chapter falls within the ‘injustice 
frame’, as they put forward the idea of the ‘limited citizenship’ of the movement’s 
members. UMM representatives are also acutely conscious of the importance of 
maintaining autonomy, as discussed in chapter four. However, their reliance on state 
investment in housing renders them a different type of collective actor from the 
environmental movements that provide the examples for both Fung and Wright and 
Sagoff. This reliance prevents the UMM from entering into a zero-sum game with the 
state. Indeed, it must enter a considerably more complex game, to extract as much as 
possible from the state, whilst avoiding allegations of cooptation, or of behaving like a 
pelego. It tries to achieve just this by making continued attempts to influence the 
direction of housing policy.
M unicipal governm ent
The UMM’s desire for intense participation in the formation of low-income housing 
policy was given shortest shrift by employees of the municipal housing department 
SEHAB, and its public housing company COHAB. Bette Franga, superintendent of 
social interest housing in SEHAB regarded it as ‘absurd’ and spoke at length in an 
interview of her personal technical expertise on housing issues.130 This is in marked 
contrast to the attitude amongst her counterparts in the federal housing department, 
displayed by Rolnik above, encouraging a ‘protagonistic’ role for movement leaders. 
Rolnik’s attitude reflects the left-wing of the PT who still prioritize the party’s original 
commitment to close partnerships with the grassroots (discussed in chapter four). 
Meetings between the movement and SEHAB/COHAB employees, especially when the 
Superintendent was present were considerably less congenial than those held at state- 
level. On one occasion Franga repeatedly made inflammatory remarks about the federal 
government’s decision to send far greater levels of resources from the PAC for the 
urbanization of favelas to the city of Rio than to Sao Paulo. The general lack of progress 
of these meetings was highlighted by the fact that an almost identical agenda for the
x3° Interview with Bette Franca, 26.07.07
206
meeting was submitted by the UMM each time. In these meetings most discussions 
revolved around the regularization of completed mutirao complexes. This issue was 
effectively a stalemate since movement members living in the mutirao were refusing to 
make their monthly repayments to COHAB until the regularization of the land and 
buildings was complete, whilst the financial director of COHAB was refusing to initiate 
the regularization process until the residents began paying. There was also continued 
discussion on the ‘unfreezing’ of payments to uncompleted mutiroes and the approval 
of projects that had ‘got stuck in the drawer of the municipal housing secretary’. The 
latter was a euphemism for the housing secretary’s decision to stall all projects 
associated with the housing movements after a protest in January 2007 that disrupted 
the mayor’s participation in public commemoration of St Paul’s day outside the city’s 
cathedral.^1
Unlike the state-level government, the municipal government has a deliberative 
housing council in place, the Conselho Municipal de Habitagao, CMH. Although the 
creation of a council had been the subject of debate in the municipal chamber since the 
administration of Luiza Erundina in the early 1990s, it was only finally established in 
the second half of Marta Suplicy’s term as mayor, in early 2003. The council, the 
establishment of which had been a key demand of the housing movement since the 
Erundina era, is composed of forty-eight members elected by the population of the 
municipality, who stand as representatives of one of three ‘sectors’. There are thus 
sixteen representatives of relevant municipal and state bodies, sixteen from popular 
associations and sixteen from ‘civil society’ all of whom stand for two years. The term 
‘civil society’ is used in this case to refer to organizations that are not social movements 
or community associations. Within it, there are quotas for NGO employees, 
representatives from relevant unions (for example property development, civil 
construction, architects), and university lecturers. In the first elections in 2003, the
131A group of student activists along with some key members of the UMM had attempted to present the 
mayor with a toilet bowl, to symbolise his attempts at the higienizagao or ‘social cleansing’ of the city 
centre.
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UMM swept the board, winning fifteen of the sixteen available seats. The sixteenth seat 
went to a representative of a housing movement linked to the PCdoB, the Communist 
party of Brazil, broadly considered an ally by the UMM. However, the second time 
elections were held in 2005, once Jose Serra had taken over as mayor, the UMM failed 
to gain a single seat. All sixteen were taken by community groups more favourable to 
the PSDB, Serra’s party. When questioned on how this had occurred, UMM members 
and leaders unanimously stated that it was because the mayor had arranged for the 
CMH election day to coincide with the PT’s internal elections. When pressed, a couple 
of interviewees admitted that they had not anticipated the efforts that the governing 
party would make to change the composition of the council.
Although regulations state that meetings should be held every two months, during the 
fieldwork year only one meeting was held, on March 19th 2007 (the previous meeting 
had been held on September 29th 2006, before my arrival). As implied by Tatagiba and 
Teixeira (2007) in their study of the council, under the Serra/Kassab administration 
the CMH had degenerated into a ‘rubber stamp’ for approving proposals submitted to it 
by the executive. Although one of the key items on the agenda for the 2007 meeting was 
the approval of the budget for the municipal social interest housing fund, no figures 
were circulated beforehand to councillors. A brief presentation by a representative of 
the housing department was made, during which he flashed up figures on a powerpoint 
presentation that were too small for the majority of the room to read. Despite this, the 
budget was passed almost without comment. The only interjections were from the two 
university architecture professors who queried variations in COHAB’s pricing of 
housing units and voted against the budget on principle because of the way it had been 
presented to them. One member of the construction industry union abstained. Notably, 
a representative of a popular association stood up to ask the university professors to 
stop making comments so that the meeting could proceed. This was the only 
contribution from any of the sixteen representatives of the popular sector for the 
duration of the four and a half hour meeting.
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The almost complete absence of debate within the council during the administrations of 
Serra/Kassab at the municipal level and its reduction to a mere formality is noted by 
Tatagiba and Teixeira (2007). They compare this to the dynamism of the CMH during 
the Suplicy administration when extraordinary meetings were frequently called to be 
able to accommodate intense debate on housing policy, and meetings could last for up 
to six hours (as opposed to a mean of around two from 2005 onwards). Although UMM 
members were not able to participate in the CMH during the fieldwork year, and given 
the frostiness of relations between the housing secretary and the movement were likely 
to be refused entry to the meeting room to observe, they still kept abreast of 
developments through their contacts and close allies in the ‘civil society’ sector. A 
meeting was held with these representatives on 6th March to discuss how these 
councillors could support movement objectives in the forthcoming meeting. This 
meeting was also called to discuss formalities for the upcoming council election, that 
was held in September 2007. Wary that the UMM would again miss out on 
representation, the discussion revolved around how the municipal housing secretary 
could be forced to begin the election process, since the timeframe for him to do this, 
according to the regulations, had nearly expired by this point. Once the electoral 
procedures were in place, the UMM began intense mobilization, fielding fourteen 
candidates on a single voting list with the two other places on the same list granted to 
the FLM affiliated MSTC and a PCdoB affiliate. The UMM presented this election as a 
pitched battle against the ruling party and accusations spread that the director of 
COHAB would be using municipal resources to bus voters to the polls to vote against 
the UMM’s candidates. Ultimately, the UMM’s exhaustive campaigning was successful, 
and all but one of the candidates on the voting list were returned (the sixteenth had 
failed to complete the complex paperwork required of his candidacy).
The significant resources of both time and money expended by the UMM to get its 
representatives elected to the CMH point to the importance placed on these
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institutional spaces by the UMM’s leadership. This despite the fact that the council’s 
workings can be emptied of almost all political content by the executive, and that it is 
outside the space of the council that deals are brokered between the movements and 
the municipal government. Franga claimed in July 2007 that she was agreeing to meet 
regularly with the UMM and its affiliated movements because they were not 
represented on the council, but these regular meetings have continued throughout 
2008, after the UMM’s success in the elections.132 Further, Tatagiba and Teixeira 
(2007) note that the movements represented on the council during the 2005-2007 
term were negotiating with the housing secretariat outside the boundaries of the 
council. Nor when the council was fully functioning during the Suplicy era did the 
UMM limit its engagement with the municipal housing bodies to the space of the CMH, 
as will be discussed below.
These issues colour Sao Paulo’s municipal housing council somewhat differently to 
other evaluations of Brazil’s experiments with participatory governance in much of the 
literature. Rather than being a way for ‘the people’ to set priorities in policy-making 
and contribute to the democratization of the state, the CMH has been reduced to a 
pawn in a game of party politics. The UMM’s drive to win the election appeared to be 
less of a wish to make a significant contribution to debates on housing policy, which 
they regarded as unlikely given the political situation, than to make life difficult for the 
mayor and his housing secretary. Nabil Bonduki, a councillor who represents the 
architect’s union and long-term ally of the movement remarked that election of UMM 
candidates would allow them to ‘make a noise’ on the council. Bonduki credits himself 
as one of the founders of the CMH but conceded that its workings are open to 
manipulation by a recalcitrant executive.133 This evaluation is far removed from 
Avritzer’s (2002) idea of a space for rational discussion and consensus building, where 
there is ‘genuine deliberation’ for ‘problem-solving’ (Fung and Wright 2003).
132 Email communication with Rosemary, UMM volunteer, 17 /07 /08 .
133 Cornwall (2007) notes a similar reluctance on the part of the mayor and health secretary in Cabo to 
ensure the proper functioning of the municipal health councils.
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Institu tionalization  during the Suplicy m ayora l adm in istration
The election of Marta Suplicy to the position of mayor of Sao Paulo in 2000 was
described by Diogo as one of the movement’s key ‘victories’ of recent years in the c it y .  ^ 4  
At the most basic level this PT election success can be equated with movement success 
since the vast majority of IJMM leaders are card-carrying PT members who had 
campaigned hard for her candidacy. But beyond this, between 1992 and 2000 the 
movement’s overall goals had been seriously thwarted by eight years of conservative 
and corrupt city government. After Suplicy assumed the mayoralty, the relationship 
between the movement and the local state changed profoundly, only to change once 
more after she failed to get re-elected four years later. The welcome made to the UMM 
within the space of the municipal housing secretariat and COHAB during the Suplicy 
era mirrors that described by Rolnik in the Cities’ Ministry. But the election of an ally to 
political office also generated significant changes in strategy within the movement that 
lasted throughout the four year PT administration.
The three years prior to Suplicy’s election had witnessed one of the most belligerent 
phases in the UMM’s history with waves of high profile building occupations in the 
centre of the city -  an entirely new tactic that had taken the authorities by surprise and 
generated significant media coverage. Once Suplicy took office the UMM’s occupations 
appear to have ceased. Interestingly, when asked if the movement had undertaken any 
occupations during the Suplicy administration, a number of movement members were 
unable to give clear responses. Those who replied in the affirmative were then unable to 
supply dates or names of buildings. Diogo was one leader who was clearer on the issue: 
there were a couple o f‘political’ occupations, during which movement leaders entered 
and then left a building within minutes, so as to then meet with the press and put 
forward their demands and accusations, but nothing more substantial than this. 
Furthermore, none of these occupations had been focused on the municipal
134 The election of Lula to the presidency is described in similar terms.
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government, instead they were specifically aimed at the state government. This is in 
marked contrast to the UMM’s behaviour during the PT’s first administration of Sao 
Paulo municipality during the Erundina era, when it occupied SEHAB’s offices to 
demand progress on mutirao building (an event now enshrined in UMM folklore) to 
the fury of the then superintendent for popular housing, Erminia Maricato.
This change in strategy amongst the movement was perhaps partly a result of a rethink 
by Ivana and her movement, one of the most active and visible groups in the centre at 
the time, after a child died in an occupied building in 1999. Other movement leaders 
attributed the greater focus on negotiation, in part, to the fact that the municipal 
government was ‘democratic’ and was ‘listening to and receiving’ them. The 
movement’s engagement with the state took place within a variety of different forums 
for the discussion of housing policies, including in the CMH, but also through other 
spaces set up within the framework of specific housing projects. This institutional 
involvement was taken to its extreme by an invitation to Anderson and Cristiano to 
work in the ‘cabinet’ of the municipal housing secretary, Paulo Teixeira. They were also 
joined there by Xavier, a key figure in the Centre for Popular Movements (CMP), to 
which the UMM is affiliated. According to Anderson, this opportunity was discussed 
within the UMM, and his acceptance supported by movement colleagues. However, it 
has since become a highly contentious matter, drawing criticism both within the 
movement and by observers and allies outside of it.
Out of seventeen interviews with key UMM figures, only three spoke positively of 
Anderson and Cristiano’s move to the municipal government, remarking that this had 
given them a hotline to the housing secretary, and naming the creation of an emergency 
rent support programme as a key success. Nine of the movement respondents 
condemned it outright, whilst five others gave ambiguous responses, skirting the issue 
by employing the mantra they use to deflect criticism of the movement’s close 
involvement with the PT: ‘party is party and movement is movement’ with the phrase
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‘government is government’ added. In this way they attempted to gloss over any 
conflicts of interest or potential issues of cooptation, saying that experienced leaders 
knew how to separate out the different areas of their working lives. However, Cristiano 
himself admitted to me that he found the situation confusing. This conversation took 
place on a car journey through Sao Paulo, when Xavier (who I did not formally 
interview) was also present. The conversation between the three of us unfolded as 
follows:
Lucy: The decision that the two of you made to go and work in the government, did 
it help the movement?
Cristiano: I don’t know if it helped, for me, at least, it created a bit of difficulty. 
There were times when I didn’t know if I was from the government or the 
movement. I would go with the movement to negotiations with the secretaiy himself 
[...] and he would ask me if I was from the government or the movement at that 
particular time. But he did always respect the situation.
Xavier: [inaudible]
Lucy: What was that, Xavier?
Xavier: I didn’t have those doubts. I was from the government.
Cristiano: Well, I did. I would be there, making demands on the side of the 
movement, and would forget that I was in the government and shouldn’t be doing it. 
So, I got stuck in a type of difficult relationship. Your heart’s with the movement, 
wanting to speak about how the people are feeling.^5
Ricardo, an architect working in COHAB at the time, also expressed his difficulty in 
perceiving Anderson as a government colleague, rather than a key leader of the 
UMM.^6
Anderson himself said that after much thought, he had concluded that he had not done 
any harm by taking up the position. But many of his senior colleagues were decidedly 
more critical, remarking that Anderson and Cristiano had ended up acting as a ‘buffer’ 
between the movement and the municipal housing secretary, in detriment to the 
movement’s ability to put forward its demands and pressurize the secretary to speed up 
the pace of policy implementation. How could they rise up against Teixeira, they asked, 
if this would mean ‘beating up’ their own colleagues? Ricardo and another architect, 
Raquel, who was contracted by SEHAB at the time, also commented on the skilled
*35 Interview with Cristiano 09.08.07
*36 Interview with Ricardo 04.10.07
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political manoeuvring of Teixeira that prevented ‘attrition’ between him and the 
movements. Both labelled the situation one of outright cooptation. A number of 
movement leaders and observers also implied that it was the UMM’s move away from 
the strategy of occupation that had brought about the rise to prominence of the MSTC, 
affiliated to the FLM. Rebeca, an MSTC leader at the time, named eight buildings in the 
centre of the city that were occupied during the Suplicy a d m i n i s t r a t i o n .^
As mentioned in the previous section, there was a great deal of activity within the space 
of the CMH once it was established during the latter half of the Suplicy administration, 
but it is not clear that the lengthy discussions had a great impact on policy. Both Raquel 
and Ricardo were cautious in their evaluations of the council, as were some of the UMM 
leaders. Despite having undertaken extensive campaigning in support of participatory 
housing councils at all three levels of the state, Anderson acknowledges that these 
spaces have very limited scope for influence on housing policy.
Any housing council is always going to be extremely limited in its ability to put 
forward proposals, because the wider agenda is much more loaded and there are 
many, many more demands than the council can cope with meeting monthly, or 
every two months.188
Whilst those who had sat as councillors during the Suplicy administration tended to 
give a more positive evaluation of the potential influence of the CMH, other observers 
were modest in their appraisals, noting the limited amount of money in the municipal 
fund controlled by the CMH, which is not the housing budget for the whole of the city, 
and more critically, that high levels of debate did not necessarily lead to related policy 
decisions. It would seem fair to conclude that the CMH has functioned as a space for 
debate (if not necessarily a great deal of action) around housing policy only when under 
the auspices of a government that holds popular participation as a central election 
promise. This finding echoes reappraisals of much of the somewhat uncritical literature
w  Interview with Rebeca 05.06.07
188 Interview with Anderson 26.06.07
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on the participatory budgeting process in Porto Alegre, that faltered once the PT lost 
control of the municipality (Harriss et al. 2004).
Despite high levels of participation in the invited spaces within the municipality, few 
new housing projects got further than the design phase before Suplicy was voted out of 
office, leading Raquel to question the degree of ‘permeability* that this participation 
had into real arenas of power and d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g .^  Out of twelve social rental 
projects designed for the centre of the city trumpeted by Paulo Teixeira (Budds and 
Teixeira 2005) only two had been completed by the time Serra won the election. A 
further two were under construction and were completed in 2007. Although a number 
of unfinished mutirao projects from the Erundina era were completed, no new projects 
were initiated. Explanations for this within the movement ranged from the apologetic: 
Suplicy did not have a majority in the municipal chamber, the administration ran out of 
time and needed another term to complete its goals, the municipality had been sucked 
dry by a succession of highly corrupt mayors, to the more fiercely accusatory: that 
neither Suplicy nor Teixeira were concerned with the housing problem, and were not 
brave enough to confront powerful business interests to implement the city’s 
progressive Master Plan. All but one movement leader interviewed voiced frustration 
that more had not been achieved during this time. The most common phrase employed 
was that Suplicy, ‘left much to be desired*. Most also apportioned a significant degree of 
blame for this on their own failure to exert greater pressure on the municipality at a 
time when it was most likely to support their demands. As Cristiano noted:
It was a mistake on the part of the movement not to havei organized any direct
action, particularly when the budget for housing was reduced.1*0
Leon concluded that the movements had believed themselves to be on honeymoon, 
treating the election of a PT mayor as an end in itself, rather than an opportunity for 
‘revolution*. For Cavalcanti (2006) the relationships established between Suplicy*s
139 Interview with Raquel 03.10.07
*4° Interview with Cristiano 09,08.07
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government and social movements caused serious damage to the latter. A government 
employee at the time, he believed movement leaders were coopted by individuals 
within and around the executive who had underlying authoritarian tendencies, and 
were more focused on retaining power than delivering on election commitments.
Raquel also questioned the PT government’s overall understanding of ‘participation’ 
and noted, similarly, that powerful elements within the government took key decisions 
in an autocratic manner. Although none of my movement respondents made such 
profound criticism, there was general consensus that after Suplicy left office, the UMM 
found itself in much the same situation as it had been four years previously. In sum, 
most UMM members appear to regret having placed all their faith in the invited spaces 
of the local state during the PT’s mayoral administration. They have, however applied 
this lesson to their relationship with the PT’s administration at federal level, as will be 
illustrated in the next chapter.
The lim its to institu tional engagem ent
This chapter has shown that the movement’s discourse of continual opposition to the 
state discussed in chapter five does not appear to be entirely congruent with its choice 
of strategy vis-a-vis the institutions of government. Even though the municipal and 
state governments in power during the fieldwork year were labelled ‘anti-popular’ in 
that they were not committed to the interests of poorer sectors of society, and ‘non- 
democratic’ as they were not regarded as espousing genuine participation, the 
movement still sought to occupy invited spaces within the institutions of government, 
and beyond this, continually sought to open up other channels of negotiation with civil 
servants, technical staff and members of the executive. This would suggest that 
movement leaders discern value in these channels, since they can create opportunities 
for dialogue with representatives of the state, and catalyse the flow of resources towards 
low-income housing projects. However, the movement’s non-confrontational 
involvement with the institutions of the state is always coloured by the future 
possibility of extra-institutional and potentially illegal direct action. Adana’s speech to
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the CDHU in February 2007 is an example of this: she had demanded a response to the 
UMM’s demands ‘before April’, knowing that Krahenbiihl and his colleagues were fully 
aware that April is a month of intensified campaigning on the part of the movement.1*1 
The subtext of her comments was that the movement would carry out occupations of 
state-owned buildings and land if it was felt progress was not being made. More overt 
threats were also made in a meeting by leaders of regional movements affiliated to the 
UMM when they met with the head of planning on 22nd June 2007. These leaders made 
specific reference to uncompleted CDHU-funded mutiroes where movement members 
and future residents ‘were at the end of their tether’ and ‘things were getting 
complicated at the grassroots’. But the threat of direct action is present even when it is 
not articulated. Kelly notes that once an agenda is protocolado, ‘they know what will 
happen if they don’t turn up to a meeting.’ Here, rather than sitting down at the 
negotiation table to achieve consensus, the movement is attempting to leverage greater 
control over negotiation spaces before dialogue has begun. As Ana remarks,
This insertion [into the political arena], and the mobilization that we’re capable of, 
the demands we make, they all influence politics. Not a lot, but they do something. 
Because they [the governments] are a bit afraid of what we might do.1*2
These meetings are a clear example of the analytical difficulties involved in 
distinguishing ‘moderation’ from ‘disruption’ in movement strategy, and, by 
consequence, in making a clear divide between an ‘invited’ and a ‘claimed’ space in 
which to negotiate with government. It is difficult to make a distinction between an 
invited and a created space when a government is obliquely threatened with adverse 
consequences if it fails to invite the movement to negotiate.
Although, as noted above, the movement is reliant on state investment in housing and 
must at some point reach a deal, engaging with the state through formal channels is 
also a way to be seen to be behaving ‘democratically’. By making visible attempts to
*** This is an echo of the rural MST’s ‘Red April’ in which it carries out mass occupations and protest 
marches.
Interview with Ana 19.06.07
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work in an institutionalized way with the authorities, the movement is then able to 
assert its moral superiority over the state, and to declare its behaviour illegal or 
undemocratic when progress on housing policy, or solutions to particular housing 
problems are not forthcoming. As Benjamin remarked, after an occupation the 
movement must always be able to say to the press that it has never stopped trying to 
negotiate through formal, ‘civilized’ channels. By announcing the failure of these 
channels, the movement will justify direct action in the form of occupations and protest 
marches. Taking direct action without first having attempted negotiations will draw 
unwelcome criticism o f‘radicalism’ upon the movement, a term that is almost 
synonymous with ‘undemocratic’. Also, by virtue of being elected councillors, authors of 
federal laws and interlocutors with all three levels of the state, movement leaders are 
able to counter the accusations of criminality that often follow occupations.
While the movement must engage with the state through formal channels, if it is seen 
to accept invited spaces in an unquestioning way, it will be accused of cooption and to 
have contradicted its own rhetoric on the authoritarianism and conservatism of the 
Brazilian state and its elites. The (dis)functioning of the CMH in Sao Paulo, while 
challenging some of the hyperbole around participatory governance experiments, also 
serves as an exemplar of the limits to institutionalization. For Avritzer these types of 
participatory spaces should constitute an institutionalized version of the democratic 
values brought into the public sphere by social movements during the transition from 
authoritarian rule, making the ‘innovations at the societal level operative at the political 
level in a democratized setting’ (Avritzer 2002: 98). Both he and Fung and Wright 
(2003) place considerable faith in the ability of these forums to democratize the state,
‘to transform the mechanisms of state power into permanently mobilized deliberative- 
democratic, grassroots forums’ (Fung and Wright 2003:22). This emphasis on 
institutionalization is clearly at odds with social movements concern for their 
‘autonomy’ and fear of cooptation. Further, the fact that these spaces can be almost 
completely emptied of political influence by a ruling party that does not support
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popular participation (and even one that publicly defends participation) places serious 
queries over their democratizing potential. Essentially, Avritzer sows the seeds of 
destruction of his own argument, by emphasizing the extent to which the Brazilian state 
machinery is tainted by its authoritarian past and the considerable ‘elite continuity’ 
from the dictatorship era to the present.145 Were the UMM to limit its engagement with 
an essentially undemocratic state to an invited space established by that state, it would 
be seen to be sanctioning the behaviour of its stated enemy.
Far from being a zero-sum game, the movement’s interaction with the state requires a 
delicate balancing act to maximize returns from collaboration whilst avoiding 
accusations of cooption. Anderson articulates explicitly this interplay of institutional 
activity and direct action:
We have been struggling, since the beginning, for local and state councils, for spaces 
of participation. That’s what the Uniao defends, but without giving up direct action. 
We have an institutional struggle, pressure for policies that we apply in councils and 
in our dialogue with governments, and the legislature, but the Uniao, at root, is an 
organization that grew out of fighting, mobilizing, occupying. So we will never let go 
of that principle, of uniting direct action and mobilization with interventions in the 
institutional field.144
And Luiz Kohara also noted the limits to institutional engagement, asking whether, if 
the state is essentially capitalist, the movement with its socialist roots really can be 
intimately involved in state management.145 This delicate balancing act, in which the 
movement swallows a certain number of toads before taking up direct action was, 
however, disrupted by the election of the PT to the mayoralty in 2000. The change in 
political context had problematic outcomes for the movement’s internal continuity and 
overall goals, as well as external reputation. Anderson’s recognition that the movement 
was ‘scalded’ by its experiences with the Suplicy government renders his assertions
^3 The traces of lingering authoritarian and clientelistic culture are also noted by Cornwall (2007) and 
Coelho (2007). This situation leads Schonleitner (2006: 62) to suggest that Brazil should work first to 
ensure the proper functioning of traditional political mechanisms, before further experimentation with 
alternative forms of participatory governance, since, ‘deliberation presupposes conditions most likely to be 
found in already more democratic polities’.
144 Interview with Anderson 26.06.07  
Interview with Luiz Kohara 27.03.07
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above more of a mission statement than an accurate evaluation of movement actions.
But the realization that institutional alliances with a left-wing government, and one 
that supposedly espouses participation, do not necessarily further movement goals has 
led to a reappraisal of internal strategy, particularly in regard to the relationship with 
the current federal government. The beginning of my fieldwork coincided with Lula’s 
election to a second term in office when intense discussion in UMM meetings on the 
need for a year of campaigning focused at the federal level. Movement leaders are 
coming to the painful conclusion that in the past they have achieved greater levels of 
mobilization and internal coherence during the mandates of governments to which they 
are politically opposed. As Diogo noted,
One thing the movement knows really well how to do, is to be in opposition. Man, 
when there’s a government that’s not democratic we are so good at beating it up, 
because we’ve tried to negotiate and nothing gets done. We have such a hard time 
when there’s a democratic government, thinking that everything will be easy, and 
we end up getting fobbed off and given crumbs, and sometimes not even those 
things come out r ig h t .
A similar evaluation was implied by UMM leaders’ frequent references to the late 1990s 
as the glory days of the movement, when it was aggressively mobilized against the state 
and municipal governments. Its strategy of daring building occupations at this time 
ultimately generated some key successes, as will be shown in the following chapter. 
Cavalcanti (2006) also remarks that the UMM emerged from this period strengthened 
as a movement precisely because of its ability to maintain an oppositional stance. The 
following chapter will explore the use of occupations as a counterweight to institutional 
engagement.
Sum m ary
In what appears to be a display of faith in the importance of formal arenas for 
participation and negotiation, the UMM has campaigned assiduously for housing 
councils at municipal, state and federal level. Furthermore, where the movement
n6 Interview with Diogo 12.06,07
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cannot participate on such a council, it attempts to formalize its engagement with the 
state by institutionalizing regular meetings. The fact that the UMM is regularly received 
at all levels of the state, even where authorities are under no legal obligation to 
negotiate with them, would suggest that the movement is a recognized interlocutor. 
However, this chapter has shown that ‘invited’ spaces are just one of many entry points 
to the state for the UMM, and furthermore, its status as interlocutor in these spaces 
cannot be credited purely to its ability to present proposals for housing policy or the 
legitimacy it has accrued through close connections to the grassroots. The movement 
has also built up a reputation on its ability to organize direct action in the form of 
protests and occupations and has come to recognize that, perhaps paradoxically, it is at 
its strongest when in opposition to government and relying most on direct action. This 
leads to a situation where the boundaries between invited and created spaces for 
negotiation with the state are blurred, since it places the state in a position where it 
fears the consequences of not inviting the UMM to participate. Furthermore, the fact 
that the movement does not rely on spaces such as participatory policy councils for 
access to policy makers and politicians calls their prominent status in the literature into 
question. That they can be subverted and circumvented by both the movement and the 
state is a fact that challenges their role in widening societal input into decision-making 
processes. Broadly, attempts to open up dialogue with recalcitrant governments are 
often made by the movement so as to assert its own credentials as a democratic entity 
in the event of the almost inevitable failure of the state to respond to the movement’s 
demands. As will be shown in the following chapter, the use of informal strategies such 
as illegal building occupations highlights the failure of legally instituted and formal 
channels for state-society interaction.
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Chapter Seven 
Occupying the city
Introduction
At midnight on the 8th March 1997, the ULC (Unificagao de Lutas dos Cortigos -  
Unification of the Struggles of the Cortigos) undertook the first organized building 
occupation the city had ever seen.1*? Although families and individuals had squatted in 
empty buildings on a small-scale before, the occupation of the Casarao Santos Dumont 
(a listed building once home to the pioneer of Brazilian aviation) was different. Several 
hundred movement members, most of them women, set out for the central district of 
Campos Eliseus, once an elite residential district, but now one in which many large 
family mansions had become cortigos and squats. On the way to the Casarao, some of 
the women came across a police patrol who asked where they were going. The women 
replied that they were off to occupy an empty building. The police laughed, believing 
them to be joking, and the occupation went ahead unimpeded. The ULC was 
accompanied by a priest, who helped to make a hole in the door of the building, and to 
push people through. The movement members remained inside the building for three 
months, while negotiations were held with the state government (that owned the 
property) on how the site could be developed to provide housing for movement 
members and preserve the historic building. The perceived success of the building 
occupation led to a wave of ‘organized occupations’ in Sao Paulo city, and beyond, 
particularly over the years 1997 to 1999.
This chapter examines the use of building occupations by the movements affiliated to 
the UMM and FLM since 1997. It details the way the tactic has been modified and 
adapted in the intervening years and how it is justified and understood by movement 
representatives. This involves a discussion of how concepts of citizenship are used by
* 7At the time the ULC was the largest and most visible o f the housing movements acting in the centre of 
the city. Since then, it has suffered a number of splits and former leaders have gone on to form the Forum 
dos Corticos, Movimento de Moradia do Centro (MMC) and Movimento Sem Teto do Centro (MSTC).
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different movement factions in ambiguous and contradictory ways in the context of an 
act that is in formal contravention of both the civil and penal codes, but potentially 
supported by the Brazilian Constitution. Occupations are then examined in light of the 
theory of civil disobedience. Although this body of literature is not often paid great 
attention by social movement scholars, the way that civil disobedience theory focuses 
on the issue of legality helps to shed light on the significance of building occupations. 
The final section of the chapter examines the attitude of government authorities to 
building occupations, both in terms of views aired during interviews, and eventual 
policy and specific case responses resulting from this particular movement tactic. This 
includes an examination of how these actors respond to the movement’s discourse 
around the ‘right to the centre’. The discussion reveals a profound ambiguity on the 
part of the state towards the legality of building occupations. This ‘grey zone’, of 
movement action and state response, is the subject of further analysis in the final 
chapter of this thesis.
The ‘golden age’ o f  occupations
As can be gathered from the nonchalant response of the police in this chapter’s opening 
vignette, organized building occupations in the centre of Sao Paulo took the city and its 
law enforcement agencies by surprise. Occupations of urban land have been occurring 
in Brazil for centuries. Indeed, as was noted in chapter three, property ownership in 
colonial Brazil was originally established through occupation, and Sao Paulo’s 
phenomenal growth (both geographical and economical) was based upon occupations 
of land. Urban land occupations in Sao Paulo have generally been carried out on the 
peripheries1*8, and occupations of marginal areas are very often tolerated in the city, 
particularly if the land is public (Maricato 1996; Bonduki 1998). As Anderson points 
out,
148 Rio de Janeiro’s centrally located/aue/as show that that this has not always been the case in Brazilian 
cities.
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The authorities will react when occupations take place in areas where the real estate 
markets have an interest. If the market’s not interested then the authorities aren’t 
interested [...] On the periphery occupations happen everyday. Everyday in the city 
a new favela is born, and there’s no attempt to regain possession, no reaction, no 
indignation shown by either society or the a u t h o r i t i e s . 1^
There is, however, something fundamentally different and shocking, for Sao Paulo 
society, about the occupation of a building in a central location in the city. Anderson 
makes the contrast between centre and periphery plain:
Go and try and occupy a building in the centre -  then you’ll get a reaction from 
government.^0
Movement leaders speak of overcoming their own inhibitions and breaking a taboo 
when the first building occupations were carried out. As Macareno, a trained lawyer 
and founder of the FLM put it, they had challenged the right to private property, and 
shown that this right, a clausula petrea or untouchable clause in the Constitution, was 
no longer inviolable. For Macareno, this was an ‘ideological advance’. As Luiz Kohara, 
(an activist within a Sao Paulo NGO that supports the housing movements) explains it, 
occupying a building is different from occupying land, since you are clearly interfering 
with an individual’s (or the state’s) heritage: an asset and investment that adds value to 
the land it is built upon. Furthermore, although the centre of Sao Paulo is degraded, it 
is still the historic heart of the city. Middle and upper class Paulistarios may not wish to 
live or work there, but nor would they be happy seeing it ‘handed over’ to the poor.
The case of the Casarao Santos Dumont generated much media coverage, through 
which the ULC was able to broadcast its message to the city and country. The ULC 
called for low-income housing to be provided in the centre of Sao Paulo, and criticized 
the general practice of municipal and state governments that build affordable housing 
only in the under-serviced peripheries, despite the presence of many thousands of 
empty and abandoned buildings in consolidated areas of the city. As Pedro put it,
149 Interview with Anderson 26.06.07
*»> Ibid.
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The decision to occupy [...] in the centre, was a decision that was about putting the 
question of living in die centre of Sao Paulo on the agenda. Because before that, 
there had always been a huge prejudice that people who were poor couldn’t live [in 
adequate accommodation] in the centre.^1
The occupation therefore contrasted the centre with the poor quality of life in the far- 
flung ‘ghettos’ from where workers had great difficulty in reaching their place of 
employment, and where social housing units were often left for years without paving, 
schools, recreation facilities, transport or street lighting (as discussed in chapter three). 
The centre is already equipped with infrastructure and services, that are, furthermore, 
seriously underutilized outside of office hours. The occupation was also a way of 
denouncing the existence of many thousands of empty buildings in the central areas of 
the city. This contrast between the centre and the periphery is ever-present in the 
rhetoric of the movement, and the transposition of a movement tactic used first on 
rural land (from the MST), to urban peripheral land and finally to centrally located 
buildings is also significant. The organized occupation of buildings shows that scarcity 
of land and inequality of tenure are not just rural phenomena, draws attention to the 
city’s housing problem as a whole, and indicates that the city cannot rely on its 
peripheral areas to absorb the city’s poorest populations forever.
Occupations were therefore backed up with pragmatic arguments that called for the 
renovation, as low-income housing, of empty privately and state-owned buildings in 
central areas as a more cost-efficient way of housing the poor than expanding the 
periphery to areas without infrastructure. But the first building occupations were also 
used to make a political argument over the treatment of the urban poor. The movement 
began to express a right to the centre, and called on the state and municipal 
governments to prove their commitment to social equality and to make amends for 
years of ‘expulsion’ to the peripheries, by providing low-income housing in the centre of 
the city. The idea of a right to live in the centre is highly problematic in theoretical
151 Interview with Pedro 18.09.07
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terms, but is an aspiration that has been widely adopted, without a great deal of 
questioning, by left-wing academics, politicians and policy-makers, as will be discussed 
below.
As well as these publicly pronounced aims of the occupations, there were other internal 
issues that prompted the transposition of occupations from urban peripheral lands to 
centrally located buildings. The ULC had been working with the population of cortiqos 
for a decade, helping them to reduce utility bills and countering the threatening tactics 
of the intermediaries who would collect the rent for the landlord. However, the ULC 
was faced with the dilemma that any physical improvements to the cortiqo would 
ultimately benefit the landlord, who could then increase rents, potentially leading to the 
eviction of the movement’s members. Key movement leaders also noted, in interviews, 
that the mid-1990s had seen a huge rise in the number of evictions. Occupation of 
empty buildings was, therefore, a way of providing housing for movement members 
who were facing life on the streets. These evictions may also have been linked to plans 
on the part of the municipality to begin the regeneration of central districts, attempting 
to bring in investment and prevent businesses from leaving the area.152 Returning again 
to the issue of the peripheries (which are key for an understanding of the dynamics of 
the centre) land for occupations was becoming increasingly scarce from the 1980s 
onwards, as property speculators bought up large tracts, and the city limits reached 
forest and water protection areas. After the Santos Dumont occupation, other UMM- 
affiliated regional movements that had traditionally been involved in mutiroes on the 
peripheries, began participating in building occupations in the centre, perhaps aware 
that the model of mutirao building had come to reproduce the state’s own social 
housing builds in un-serviced and distant areas. Finally, the coup of the Santos Dumont 
occupation was a way of expressing utter dissatisfaction with the years of corrupt and 
negligent municipal governments of Maluf and Pitta, as well as forcing negotiations 
with the state governor, Mario Covas, who was considered potentially more open to the
ls2 Conversation with Edson Miagusko, PhD student, department of social sciences, Universidade de Sao 
Paulo, 10.12.06.
226
demands of the UMM, having already adopted some mutirao-style building within the 
CDHU.
The years of 1997 to 1999 are often referred to as the ‘golden age’ by the UMM’s centre- 
based movements. The visibility and perceived success of occupations drew many 
hundreds more families in to the movements, who then went on to undertake 
numerous further, and more daring occupations in the following years. One student of 
the city, Diederichsen (2003) noted that in October 2001 the UMM had reported that 
there were 1340 families living in sixteen occupied buildings in the city. Some of these 
buildings had been occupied simultaneously, in what are referred to by the movement 
as ‘mega-occupations’. The chief concern of movement leaders during a night of 
occupations is to get as many members into the building as possible before the police 
arrive (between five and ten minutes), since it is then very difficult for them to be 
physically ejected without casualties. The movement leaders then work with lawyers to 
stay eviction orders until a housing solution for the movement members has been 
reached. In the experience of the UMM, in a number of cases where an occupation has 
lasted for longer than a few months a definitive housing solution has eventually been 
found for the occupiers. Either the occupied building is renovated as social housing; 
movement members receive social housing units elsewhere; they are signed up for a 
special housing credit scheme with the CDHU or federal government, or are eventually 
moved into another, formerly abandoned building, indicated by the movement as 
appropriate for renovation. A string of successes derived from occupations brought 
political strength to the movement as its numbers grew. It is also generally agreed, by 
both movement leaders and government officials, that the tactic of occupations brought 
the question of low-income housing in the centre of the city onto the public agenda. As 
Adana notes,
Since then [the occupation of the Casarao Santos Dumont] not only have we 
managed to conquer some building projects, but we have managed to make a mark 
on the authorities’ agenda. It didn’t exist before. Housing in the centre was 
something that half a dozen weirdos used to talk about -  a few techie types and zany
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architects. Noone discussed it. Today, housing in central areas is on the city’s 
agenda, and everyone has to discuss it whether they agree with it or not. Orlando 
[de Almeida Filho, municipal housing secretary] has to state that he’s against it. He 
can’t ignore the issue as though it didn’t e x is ts
However, the initial success of the use of occupations as a movement tactic has also had 
significant drawbacks. Some occupations have lasted nearly eight years. During this 
time, movement members live in often dangerous and difficult circumstances, with 
clandestine electricity connections, non-functioning lifts in buildings as high as twenty- 
two storeys, little privacy, risk of fire, serious damp and ramshackle plumbing. In 
several cases, buildings have been infiltrated by organized drug gangs, and a number of 
murders have occurred. After the death of a child who fell into the water tank of an 
occupied hotel in 2000, Ivana, the head of the movement responsible for the 
occupation, declared that she would not occupy a building again. Other movements 
affiliated to the UMM have since turned their back on the strategy of ocuparpara 
morar or ‘occupying to live’, where the aim is to resist eviction for as long as possible so 
as to provide housing for members. Instead, the UMM’s occupations are now declared 
to be ‘political’ or ‘symbolic’ and rarely last longer than a few days, sometimes only a 
few hours. In contrast, the FLM, that broke away from the UMM in 2001 in part 
because of differences over the process of occupations, has characterized itself by being 
staunchly in favour of ocuparpara morar.*54 In May 2007, the FLM affiliated MSTC 
finally negotiated housing for 468 families who had been living in the occupied Prestes 
Maia building for nearly five years. Before giving up the building, it secured the 
occupation of an abandoned hotel nearby, where it housed several hundred members. 
The different ways in which the FLM and UMM carry out occupations today are also 
reflected in their varying conceptions of citizenship, and as a consequence, their 
relationship with the state.
153 Interview with Adana 06.07.07
134 Movement members put the split down to ‘political differences’ between different leaders, but this was 
probably a euphemism for personality clashes and rivalries. Since the matter was a sensitive one, I did not 
pursue this line o f inquiry.
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Figure 7: A bandoned ho tel in  the  cen tre  o f Sao Paulo successfully occupied 
by housing  m ovem ents affiliated to  th e  FLM
O ccupations and citizenship
A w a r e  th a t  m a n y  in  s o c i e t y  w i l l  p e r c e iv e  t h e ir  a c t io n s  a s  i l le g a l ,  m e m b e r s  o f  t h e  S e m  
T e to  ta k e  g r e a t  e f f o r t s ,  b o t h  in t e r n a l ly  a n d  e x te r n a l ly ,  t o  p r e s e n t  j u s t i f ic a t io n s  fo r  th e ir  
a c t io n s .  T h is  o f t e n  in v o lv e s  le g a l  a r g u m e n t s  ( d i s c u s s e d  b e lo w )  b u t  t h e  q u e s t io n  o f
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citizenship is also important. With its roots in liberation theology, the movement’s 
original ethos is closely connected to the idea of active or republican citizenship, that 
emphasizes civic engagement and active political deliberation (d’Entreves 1992). The 
mutirdo epitomized this process, as movement members gave up their time to work 
together to build their own homes, and where community participation and 
consciousness-raising were perceived as of equal importance to the final housing 
product. The UMM has made attempts to introduce the mutirdo to the centre of the 
city, but this has only been viable in cases where building work has begun from scratch. 
It is generally acknowledged that renovation work requires skills not easily acquired by 
untrained mutirantes. Anxious that people who simply receive housing without any 
‘struggle’ will not have properly understood the question of rights, the sacrifice and 
long-term commitment involved in the mutirdo is sometimes equated with the 
difficulty of living in an occupied building for lengthy periods. As Tristana puts it, 
people living in an occupied building learn to value themselves and their rights through 
suffering. And Adana agrees, (acknowledging that her Christian beliefs play a part in 
her perception): they come to realize that by taking the difficult decision to live in an 
occupation they will eventually be rewarded.1^  Other leaders stress the sense of 
community fostered by those living in occupied buildings and the political education 
they receive. On this issue, they note the regular compulsory meetings and strict 
regulations on alcohol, drugs and domestic violence. Further, a large room is often set 
aside in these buildings to serve as a community centre, for literacy classes, homework 
clubs and cultural events.
Faced with the accusation, along with criminality, of being bademeiros (trouble­
makers or hooligans) and vagabundos (wasters), terms that echo the early twentieth- 
century higienistas, who linked poverty with filth, promiscuity and crime, the leaders of 
occupied buildings take considerable pains to keep the communal areas of the building 
scrupulously clean. In the MSTC’s most recent occupation, that of the abandoned hotel,
Interviews with Tristana 26.03.07 and Adana 06.07.07
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the occupation leader Daiana proudly told me of plans to paint the fagade. Hoping that 
the building would be expropriated by the municipal government to be renovated as 
social housing, she noted,
We have to take care of it, really take care of it, more here than ever before, because 
the owner hasn’t requested a restoration of possession. He hasn’t done anything. So 
we have to be as organized as possible, so that when they come here [the owner and 
the. authorities] they’ll say ‘No, wait a second, they’re really looking after it’.156
Daiana’s sentiments here are echoed by a number of other movement leaders who 
justify occupations by citing the beneficial impacts of an occupation. The idea that they 
are giving ‘life’ to an abandoned property and improving the local area is a frequent 
claim. As well as noting levels of rubbish and vermin in empty buildings, which are 
cleaned up as soon as the occupation has begun, movement leaders are also indignant 
about the official records and private documents they find rotting in state-owned 
buildings. Adana describes the state in which they found a building belonging to the 
national social security institute.
The building had been closed for fifteen years and was being used as a warehouse. 
There were cracks in the walls, and people’s claims documents had got wet. People 
who had had accidents at work, who were being compensated by the government -  
all their claims were wet and scattered about.157
Her words mirror Leon’s indignation that the state culture secretariat had left ‘a good 
part of the history of Brazilian television and of Brazilian culture, documents and other 
things’ in an abandoned building his movement occupied for nearly eight years.158 
Adana recalled that they had piled up the rubbish they had found outside the building, 
so as to show ‘the world out there’ the state that the building had been left in. The 
implication of these denunciations is that the movement representatives are decent 
citizens who take care of state-owned and private buildings, whilst their owners leave 
them abandoned, their contents rotting.
*s6 Interview with Diana 28.06.07  
x57 Interview with Adana 06.07.07  
Interview with Leon 07.06.07
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However, equating life in the occupation with a type of active and responsible 
citizenship is highly problematic considering the terrible living conditions endured by 
movement members, and, when drug gangs take over, the levels of violence and 
intimidation suffered. Whilst some movement members and leaders spoke in an 
unambiguously positive way of how much they had benefited from life in occupations, 
of positive learning experiences and the sense of community fostered, others recounted 
their experiences in a subtly different manner. Leaders are generally cautious about 
criticizing occupations, since these have come to be a defining characteristic of the 
UMM. However, Cristiano, now a local movement leader who lived in a number of 
occupations, recounted his experiences in a way that invites a reading between the 
lines.
It wasn’t easy no. I suffered a lot. It was a real learning experience...I wasn’t 
prepared for it. I’d never seen so much confusion all in one place like that. It’s not 
easy no. It’s a real laboratory. You have to be very well prepared for it, or you might 
lose your mind.
A number of other leaders admit that long-term building occupations can easily turn 
into a ‘vertical cortiqo’ or Vertical/aue/a’, reproducing the problems of precisely the 
type of housing they wish to see eradicated. This has led the UMM to reject ocupar 
para morar in favour of ‘political occupations’. The FLM, however, continues to pursue 
this type of tactic. Although the breakaway movement also uses the language of active 
citizenship, giving themselves a more radical edge with the slogan, ‘whoever doesn’t 
join the fight is already dead’, its general methods jar somewhat with the ideals of 
citizenship in terms of dignity and the integrity of the person. MSTC representatives 
(the FLM’s largest movement in the centre) admit that the greater the number of 
people living in a building, the more likely that the occupation will be successful in 
terms of securing housing for its members:
We make a point of filling the building up to the maximum, because that way [the 
government] will have to respond. [...] It’s a lot of families. Think about it -  can you
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imagine an eviction with 500 families? About 2300 people? It’s complicated. It’s 
something else. So we also use this strategy of putting in a lot of people so that we 
get a solution.^
The MSTC plays on the fact that any attempt at forced eviction in an extremely densely 
populated building is likely to end in casualties, or even fatalities. Where an eviction of 
a large-scale building is ordered by a judge, it is generally accompanied by the military 
police. In the case of the MSTC’s Prestes Maia occupation, the military police chief 
implied that he would not be able to control his own troops once they were in the 
building (Midia Independente 2007). The MSTC is also known for its willingness to 
confront the police, in contrast to the UMM that avoids confrontation. This threat, of a 
violent and chaotic eviction, where many thousands of people would end up on the 
street at once, is used by the MSTC as a weapon against the state in its negotiations for 
housing. But this overpopulation also significantly reduces the quality of living for the 
movement’s members, particularly for those living at the top of Prestes Maia’s twenty- 
two storeys with no lift, and often without running water.
Further, the FLM has more recently adopted the tactic of creating a favela  on the 
central streets of the city, when its members are threatened with or have already 
experienced an eviction. The FLM’s general coordinator expressed his wish that all 
housing movements followed this example.
The only tool that the movement has to stop the government from stalling is 
pressure. [...] It would be interesting if all the movements took up this idea: the 
eviction happens, you set up a favela  in the centre. Because who is it that gets 
uncomfortable with a favela? On the periphery no-one minds, they already live in 
favelas. But in the centre, a favela upsets tourists, upsets businesspeople, upsets 
society in general. So, for the government, it would be a lot of political stress to have 
a favela  in the centre.160
In interview, Daiana joked about the favela she had helped to set up outside the 
mayor’s office, where children ran riot and their sambas interrupted the municipal 
office workers. But she did not refer to the human cost for the members of living in this
9^ Interview with Daiana 28.06.07.
160 Interview with Arturo 05.07.07.
way. Wanda, a member of an FLM affiliated movement, who lived in a make-shift 
favela for a number of weeks, referred repeatedly to the humiliation she suffered, and 
the physical privations of hunger and exposure to torrential rain and tropical sun.161 
This tactic is, further, a way of accentuating difference between movement members 
who are on the streets, and the public officials who have to step over them to get to 
work. As such, this FLM tactic can be interpreted as demeaning and essentially 
disempowering, as the movement throws its members on the mercy of the authorities.
It suggests that movement members are not active citizens, but marginal, dependent 
non-citizens. This evaluation finds resonance in a photocopy of a federal judgement 
handed out to visitors at the FLM’s headquarters, which, it was argued, should be 
applied to the Prestes Maia building. In it a judge refuses to evict three hundred 
families associated with the MST from a hard shoulder in a rural area of the state of 
Minas Gerais, arguing that, through the fault of the state, the families were indigent, 
and that until the state ‘elevated these marginalized people to the condition of common 
citizens, normal people, able to exercise their citizenship, the state has no authority to 
demand [...] the strict enforcement of the law’ (Melo i996). It is telling that the 
municipality qualified its eventual decision to provide permanent housing for the 
occupiers of Prestes Maia as a response to the building’s high risk status (that had been 
exacerbated by the MSTC). Rather than be given homes as empowered citizens who had 
fought for their rights, it was the threat to their physical integrity in a dilapidated 
building that eventually secured decent housing for movement members.
The connection between occupations and citizenship is therefore an ambiguous one -  
movement members are either non-citizens reliant on the state to lift them out of their 
quasi-destitution, or active citizens consciously acting on the state to claim their rights. 
It could be argued that by moving from the former to the latter position, the UMM has 
taken up a more sophisticated approach towards its relationship with the state. But 
while the UMM continues to employ the tactic of occupations, it must also try to
161 Interview with Wanda 24.07.07
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legitimate these actions in the face of accusations of criminality and uncivil behaviour, 
both of which render problematic the movement’s rhetoric of citizenship. The question 
of legality is therefore central. This will now be discussed through the lens of civil 
disobedience.
Occupations and civil disobedience
If occupations are to be understood through the frameworks set out by social 
movement theorists, the UMM, in its choice of tactics, can be seen to be borrowing 
from the ‘repertoire of contention’ (Tilly 1995), drawing from its roots in the MST -  an 
organization famous for its occupations of unproductive rural lands as a way of bring 
about agrarian reform. The forerunners of the UMM who were once affiliated to the 
MST brought occupations to the outskirts of cities to support their call for urban 
reform, before transferring the tactic to centrally located buildings. This use of 
techniques of contention first employed in different geographical settings, and for 
somewhat different ends is widely noted in the literature (Taylor and Van Dyke 2004; 
Tilly 1995; Tarrow 1995). Indeed, the transposition of specific types of contentious 
action from one setting to another can be highly effective, since it can create new 
meanings and connections both inside the movement and in society at large.
Action repertoires do not spring fully-formed from nowhere; they are bounded by 
the cultural and historical contexts in which they develop, and reproduced and 
adapted as both a conscious process of critical learning and as an expression of 
symbolic proximity to past political movements (Hayes 2007: 309).
The MST has broad support within progressive circles in Brazil (Houtzager 2005; 
Brandford and Rocha 2002), and the UMM’s use of a similar tactic, as well as the 
appropriation of the label Sem Teto, reminiscent of the Sem Terra, is a way of tapping 
into the legitimacy of the long-standing rural movement.
However, in general, frameworks and theories developed by leading collective action 
scholars around the repertoire of contention are not particularly helpful in shedding
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light on the activities of the UMM. For example, the fact that there is almost always 
some violence involved in an occupation -  the occupiers generally have to force entry 
into an occupation -  means that the tactic falls within Tilly’s (2003) definition of 
collective violence, which is,
Episodic social interaction that, immediately inflicts physical damage on persons 
and/or objects (‘damage’ includes forcible seizure of persons or objects over 
restraint or resistance); involves at least two perpetrators of damage; and results at 
least in part from coordination among persons who perform the damaging acts 
(Tilly 2003).
And yet scholars of collective violence like Tilly and Tarrow tend to look at large-scale 
acts of violence: the Rwandan genocide, revolutions and riots. Even where they turn to 
smaller scale ‘everyday resistance’ (Scott 1985), these groups are distinguished by the 
fact that they generally set out with the express purpose of committing violent acts 
against people and property. A number of leaders of the UMM describe their own 
activities as ‘resistance’, and occupations do, up to a point, fit with Tilly*s (2003:172) 
definition of resistance where ‘one party enjoys the preponderance of force but [...] the 
other side responds to its demands or interventions with intermittent, dispersed 
damage’. But for the housing movement, the violent act of breaking into a building is 
more of a side-effect, a means to an entirely different end: that of protesting the non­
application of a number of laws as an act of civil disobedience.
Cohen and Arato (1994: 563) note that civil disobedience is ‘one of the most important 
means through which social movements can hope to influence modern society*. They 
discuss the ways in which civil disobedience undertaken by social movements can help 
to maintain a dynamic and responsive democracy. Lowi (1971) also examines the way 
that the disruption caused by civil disobedience can help to animate a pluralist 
democracy in danger of stagnation. However, the theory of civil disobedience does not 
appear to have been taken into consideration by many social movement scholars, 
perhaps again reflecting a lack of focus on the interaction between state and society that 
is generated as a result of social movement activity. Nor do scholars in the law and
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society tradition who study collective action seem to have explored this area (cf.
McCann 2006). Civil disobedience is, nevertheless, a useful lens through which to 
discuss the actions of social movements and their relationship with the state, precisely 
because it focuses on issues of legality and state response to collective action.
Recalling discussions from chapter two, for an act to qualify as civil disobedience it 
must break the law, whilst showing fidelity to law in order to expose an injustice, and 
be public in nature. There is some debate over the detail of the definition, however. 
Rawls (1999), for example, asserts that civil disobedience must be non-violent, and a 
number of scholars support this approach (cf. Bedau 1991; Suber 1999) And indeed, 
perhaps the world’s most famous civil disobedients, Mahatma Ghandi and Martin 
Luther King, were explicitly non-violent in their approaches. For Rawls, violence will 
nullify the affects of civil disobedience: ‘any interference with the civil liberties of others 
rends to obscure the civilly disobedient quality of one’s act’ (Rawls 1999:321). However, 
scholars have noted the difficulty in specifying an appropriate notion of violence 
(Brownlee 2007). Morreall (1991), for example, has asserted that violence can be 
psychological as well as physical, and that the line drawn by Rawls is arbitrary. Further, 
violence can be justified, he argues, when one person’s rights are superseded by a 
higher moral claim. Arguments against Rawls are also made by Brownlee who notes 
that,
Limited violence used to achieve a specific objective might heighten the 
communicative quality of the act by drawing greater attention to the dissenter’s 
cause and by emphasising her seriousness and frustration (Brownlee 2007).
Hayes (2007) in his discussion of French activists’ destruction of genetically modified 
crops argues that these acts qualify as civil disobedience since, in Rawls’s words, they 
are not ‘acts that are designed to injure and hurt’. Both Brownlee and Hayes also takes 
issue with Rawls’s assertion that civil disobedients should give notice to legal 
authorities of their intentions, since this is very likely to prevent an act taking place.
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They assert that acknowledgement of the act after the event is sufficient to render it 
public.
Aside from debates over violence, scholars also note that civil disobedience can be 
direct or indirect -  the law that is broken does not have to be the law that is under 
issue. Student sit-ins on university campuses to protest the war in Vietnam are an 
example of indirect civil disobedience (Cohen and Arato 1994). Whereas in the case of 
the civil rights movement, contravention of segregation laws through lunch-counter sit- 
ins is an example of direct action, since legislation that prevented black people from 
eating in specific areas were the very laws they wished to see repealed (Tarrow 1995). 
However, the distinction between direct and indirect civil disobedience is not always so 
clear cut, the original civil disobedient Thoreau’s refusal to pay his taxes that supported 
the war against Mexico is a case in point (Brownlee 2007). This ambiguity of action is 
also present in the case of the Sem Teto’s building occupations, as discussed below.
Building occupations can be read as civil disobedience for the following reasons. Firstly, 
according to the penal and civil codes, they are illegal, because they involve trespass 
and the assumption of adverse possession. Secondly, they are undertaken as a protest 
against public policy that houses the poor on the marginal peripheries, rather than in 
the centre of the city, and does not uphold the right to housing. Thirdly, although 
occupations are specifically undertaken covertly, there is no attempt to maintain 
anonymity once the occupation has taken place. Fourthly, the occupiers show fidelity to 
the law -  not only has the movement’s commitment to law been demonstrated by their 
efforts to influence legislation processes, but movement leaders do not resist arrest 
during occupations. Building occupations are, further, an example of the difficulty of 
defining the boundary between direct and indirect civil disobedience. The movement is 
not protesting laws of trespass or adverse possession, per se, but the act of housing its 
members in the centre of the city (both symbolically, in a short-term ‘political’
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occupation, or in a case of ocuparpara morar) is closely related to the policy they are 
protesting.
Justifying an occupation: beyond civil disobedience
Building occupations are, however, an interesting and perhaps particularly Brazilian
variant on civil disobedience, because they serve a further purpose, which is to 
denounce the illegality of other parties. Along with protesting municipal and state 
government failure to provide centrally located housing for the urban poor, they are 
also specifically undertaken so as to denounce the fact that whilst the city’s housing 
deficit remains almost insurmountable, many thousands of buildings are standing 
empty without fulfilling their social function. This is contrary to the articles on urban 
reform set out in article 182 of the Constitution and the City Statute that regulates and 
provides directives for this article. As Anderson remarks, the primary purpose of 
occupations is ‘to give visibility to this situation -  to show that these buildings are 
abandoned’.162 The UMM is therefore denouncing the private landlord who has failed to 
make use of his property, or, where it is a publicly owned building, the state’s own 
abandonment of a public good. For Benjamin, occupation serves “to denounce, to 
society and the authorities, the incompetence of the state and municipal governments, 
in failing to makes these units viable [as social housing] .”l63 Additionally, in the case of 
private landlords, there are often also considerable tax debts associated with the 
property. Indeed, the UMM chooses buildings which it knows to have the most 
‘problems’. As Leide notes, her movement undertook an occupation to denounce the 
case of a landlord who had built illegally on public land and then left the building 
abandoned for ten years.164 Occupations can therefore serve to denounce the building 
owner’s illegality. This function of occupations adds an extra dimension of third party 
illegality to what is already theoretically an illegal act. Further, by housing its members 
in these buildings, the movement is in a sense enforcing the law, by providing the
162 Interview with Anderson 26.06.07
163 Interview with Benjamin 05.06.07
l6« Interview with Leide, co-leader of a highly active regional movement, 26.06.07
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buildings with a social function, generating a type of ‘two wrongs make a right’ 
situation.
The paradox of a housing deficit in a city with many thousands of empty buildings is 
articulated by representatives of all levels of the UMM, from minimally engaged 
members to its most senior leaders, and is used to justify the act of occupation. As 
Edna, who had been involved in the occupation of the Casarao Santos Dumont 
remarked,
This is what it’s like: personally, I don’t think it’s right to break someone’s door and 
knock it down. But there’s just one thing: if you walk about, looking around, you’ll 
see there’s so much that’s closed up, buildings that are boarded up, that ought to be 
useful for someone, for people to live in.l6s
Movement representatives widely acknowledge that adverse possession is a crime 
according to the civil code, and that breaking down the door to enter is against the 
penal code. However, Nora’s justification is typical of many movement representatives, 
as she refers to what is perceived as the government’s illegality.
It is a crime, yes, ok. But I have to tell you that for us as the movement, it’s not a 
crime. Because the crime, if you think about it, is the government not giving people 
housing.166
This adds, again, to the layers of illegality bound up in a building occupation. The 
movement denounces the state’s general failure to house its citizens, and 
conceptualizes this failure as the illegality of the state. This crime is then juxtaposed 
with the minor transgression involved in occupying a building.
Senior leaders will expand upon this type of justification with a more sophisticated 
argument that frames occupations within a rights discourse. The ‘politics of rights’ 
(Scheingold 2004) discussed in the chapter five, becomes an important component of
l6s Interview with Edna 09.10.07
166 Interview with Nora 18.10.07
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the justification of occupations, and a way of rendering occupations legitimate and even 
legal by giving them a basis in a higher moral order. This argument is glossed elegantly 
by Henrique Pacheco, a former student activist with the UMM who eventually entered 
politics supported by the movement.
We broke through the limits of legality, because we superimposed the question of 
justice and rights on top of legality.167
Drawing on the language of rights, a number of UMM leaders argue that protest (and 
by consequence occupation) is permitted by the Constitution.168 This assertion was 
made at movement meetings where local leaders were attempting to rally their 
members to participate in an occupation, and was clearly an attempt to convince a 
somewhat sceptical crowd of the legitimacy of the act they were being asked to 
undertake. Gaetano, in interview, went so far as to suggest that it is the duty of the 
movement to occupy abandoned buildings.l69 But the politics of rights is employed 
more subtly by Adana and other senior leaders who justify occupations by arguing that 
the right to housing, enshrined in the Constitution, not only trumps the civil and penal 
codes, but that it should also prevail over the right to property where that property is 
not fulfilling its social function.
You have two laws in Brazil today that confront each other. [...] You have the right 
to property, which is a ‘sacred right’, a clausula petrea in our Constitution, 
something that can’t be altered. [...] Then you also have the right to housing, which 
is in the Constitution. But now we have die City Statute which limits the right to 
property, [and says that] your property has to fulfil its social function, and if it’s not 
doing that the authorities have the right to do a series of things, including charging 
more taxes, and, ultimately, expropriating. So this is how I understand it: we would 
never occupy land or a building that’s in use. That would be an idiotic thing to do. 
We occupy when the property isn’t fulfilling its social function, is abandoned, 
boarded up, and is only serving a speculative purpose. So that’s why I don’t think
167 Interview with Henrique Pacheco, 08.07.07
168 This argument is put forward by French social movements with reference to article 35 of the 
Declaration des droits de VHomme e t du Citoyen which prefaces the Constitution of 24 June 1793 (Hayes 
2007:303). In the case of Brazil, the ‘right to resistance’ (a term more commonly used by Brazilian jurists 
than civil disobedience), is not explicitly permitted in the 1988 Constitution. However, legal scholars argue 
that the right to resist unjust laws is upheld by the Constitution, since this right is essential for the 
protection of other primary rights such as those to life, human dignity and well-being (Buzanello 2005; 
Farias n.d.; Sadek 2001).
169 Interview with Gaetano 08 .06.07
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occupation is a crime, because it is looking to fulfil a positive purpose, something 
that is set out in our laws, which is the social function of property.170
Adana, therefore, justifies occupations through reference to the Constitution and other 
federal legislation. These arguments are reflected in the legal position taken by lawyers 
working with the housing movement to prevent evictions from occupied buildings. 
Taking this argument one step further, in the specific case of the Prestes Maia 
occupation, the FNRU presented a letter to all three levels of the state defending the 
right of the occupants to remain in the building on the basis of international human 
rights legislation to which Brazil is a signatory, as well as the constitutional right to 
housing.171 Here, it is argued, the human right to dignity and shelter again prevails over 
the right to property.
Defending occupations in this way, with reference to the right to housing and to human 
rights generally, takes the act of civil disobedience to another level, corresponding to a 
type of civil disobedience discussed by Turenne (2004), which has been labelled ‘intra- 
legal*. She explores cases where it is not the fairness or justice of specific laws that is 
brought into question, but the interpretation of law that is at issue.
These are cases in which, though the disobedient acts knowingly in violation of the 
law as it has been traditionally interpreted, he believes that he can argue that this 
traditional understanding is wrong and that his act is already lawful. We can call 
such cases of civil disobedience ‘intra-legal’ (Turenne 2004: 381 emphasis in the 
original).
She continues,
The disobedient must be able to point to some principle or principles which, in his 
view, over-ride the law as currently applied and which open that law to more than 
one interpretation. These overriding principles will be based upon constitutional 
and/or human rights (Ibid: 382).
170 Interview with Adana 06.07.07
171 Source: Email reproduction of FNRU letter distributed to the Forum Centro Vivo web group, 22.02.07
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Movement representatives’ justifications of occupations outlined above acknowledge 
that these violate the civil and penal codes. But they also argue that occupations are 
legal when considered in the light of the Constitution and of human rights legislation. 
They are therefore, a clear case o f‘intra-legal’ civil disobedience.
These justifications have been made in a similar way by the MST with reference to its 
occupations of rural land that is not fulfilling its social function, as noted by Houtzager 
(2005). Examining cases where the legal interpretation of a land occupation has moved 
from the civil/penal code to the constitution, he labels this a change in ‘judicial 
modality’. The argument used by a judge in a favourable decision on an MST 
occupation in the state of Rio Grande do Sul, detailed by Houtzager (2005), echoes 
arguments made by the UMM’s lawyers to prevent evictions from occupied buildings, 
namely that the ‘state has 2m obligation to ‘guarantee fundamental goods as a social 
minimum’, and that ‘when there is a need to sacrifice the rights of one of the parties, 
the property rights should be sacrificed, guaranteeing fundamental rights’ (RENAP 
Caderno Primavera 2001 quoted in Houtzager 2005: 8). In cases where the judge 
accepts this shift and finds in favour of the MST, the act of occupation of land is 
effectively rendered legal retroactively. As Rawls points out,
In a constitutional regime, the courts may finally side with the dissenters and 
declare the law or policy objected to unconstitutional. It often happens, then, that 
there is some uncertainty as to whether the dissenters’ action will be held illegal or 
not’ (Rawls 1991: 321).
When acts of civil disobedience are legitimated in this way, their original status as civil 
disobedience is queried, since illegality is one of its key component. But despite 
employing shifts in legal modality from the civil code to the Constitution, the UMM’s 
members respond ambiguously to questions surrounding the issue of illegality.
Arguments justifying occupations in terms of rights and wrongs enshrined in the 
Constitution -  the right to housing and the illegality of property that fails to fulfil its
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social function -  are commonly employed by the UMM. However, despite this, the 
issue of whether or not occupations are legal or illegal remains unclear. Few members 
state outright that occupations are legal, while those who say they are illegal always 
provide some kind of qualification to justify them. When asked, ‘are occupations 
illegal?’ a number of interview respondents skirted the issue, without giving a clear 
answer. This ambiguity is reflected in Leon’s response:
I don’t know if they are legal or illegal. I know it’s illegal that people don’t have 
their citizenship respected. That’s illegal. [...] But I don’t know about occupations. 
In fact, I don’t even want to answer you in that way, because once a journalist asked 
me if occupations were legal or illegal, and I said I didn’t care whether there were 
legal or not. What I cared about was that families couldn’t carry on living under 
bridges, or in cortiqos [...] That’s illegal. But to you I’m going to say something 
different. I don’t know if they’re legal or illegal, but whatever the case, even if it is 
illegal to occupy, we going to carry on doing it. Because the greater illegality is 
people not having their dignity and citizenship ensured.172
It could be argued that the legal ambiguity of occupations is what gives them their 
strength. On the one hand, the argument that they are legal gives support to the 
movement’s mobilization around the issue of housing as a right. On the other hand, 
they must maintain an element of illegality if they are to denounce the greater 
illegalities of the state and of private landlords, since without the shock factor of a high- 
profile illegal act, society will pay little attention to the claims of the movement. The 
ambiguity surrounding the legal status of occupations is also reflected in the state’s 
response to these acts, as will be now be discussed.
Official responses to occupations
Although the initial incredulous response of the police to the occupation of the Casarao 
Santos Dumont was soon replaced with heightened vigilance, and, at times, forceful 
resistance against occupiers, the attitude of the municipal, state and federal 
governments towards occupations has generally been one of ambivalence. 
Representatives of non-PT governments have a tendency to refer to occupations and
v*  Interview with Leon 07.06.07
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occupiers as ‘invasions’ and ‘invaders’. These are terms strongly rejected by the 
movement because of their undertones of unwarranted aggression. Further, the 
governor of Sao Paulo state from 1995-2001, Mario Covas, whose administration was 
the target of much of the UMM’s contentious activity during the late 1990s was 
reported to have declared that he did not ‘negotiate with invaders’.173 This was also the 
line taken by the director of COHAB, Walter Abrahao.17* However, these strong position 
statements by representatives of Sao Paulo local governments are challenged by a 
history of negotiations with and settlements in favour of the housing movements.
The attitude of the Covas government towards occupied buildings appears to have been 
one of calculated neglect. It at first tacitly and then openly approved the occupation of a 
series of state-owned buildings during the late 1990s as a way of providing a pressure 
valve, or ‘lung’ for people who were being evicted from cortiqos across the city. And yet 
it did very little to find permanent housing solutions for these families who were living 
in extremely insalubrious conditions, sometimes for many years. In the case of a 
building referred to as Aboligao (after the street where it is located) Ivana remarked 
that the state government ‘left people to live there any old how’ anticipating that the 
organized nature of the occupation would crumble under such difficult 
circumstances.1^  A similar case involved a building known as Paulino Guimaraes, also 
occupied by the Forum dos Cortiqos. Lourdes, a member of the Forum during the late 
1990s, remarked that the living conditions in it that she witnessed on visits there were 
‘humiliating’.176 These negative evaluations of the state government’s attitude towards 
occupations were backed up by Claudia Brandao, an architect who has been working in 
the CDHU since 1991. Referring to a third state-owned building used in this way, Ana 
Cintra, she described the decision by the state government to allow people to live in a
173 Interview with superintendent of social housing, Bette Franca, 26.07.07
174 The municipality of Sao Paulo does not have a large property portfolio in the city, and as such is not 
targeted directly by the occupation of empty buildings. However, the municipal government is drawn into 
negotiations when the movement occupies privately owned buildings in the municipality and demands 
their expropriation.
17s Interview with Ivana 01.06.07
176 Interview with Lourdes 30.06.07
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building with ‘no sanitary capacity* as ‘criminal*.177 A similar laissez-faire attitude was 
taken towards the UMM-affiliated MMC occupation of a building Owned by the State 
Secretariat for Culture in the Rua do Ouvidor which lasted for nearly eight years. 
During this time, the state government was granted an eviction order by the judge 
considering the case, and yet the order was never executed. According to Fernanda 
Leao, a public prosecutor and keen supporter of the aims of the housing movement, 
this situation most probably came about as a result of the state government’s lack of 
interest in using the building for any particular purpose and its reluctance to suffer the 
negative effects of a large eviction. (She also considered the failure to follow-up on the 
judge’s decision a lack of respect for the judiciary.)178 Eventually, residents in the 
Ouvidor building were provided with housing solutions elsewhere after another public 
prosecutor in the Ministerio Publico threatened to take the state government to court 
for failing to uphold the human rights of the residents. This was also the final outcome 
of the Aboligao building, where the state government eventually took action, after five 
years, in response to the threat of legal action. In these cases the state government 
appears to choose to leave its citizens and its buildings in a state of legal limbo for as 
long as possible.
But the state government almost always eventually responds to long-term occupations: 
in the case of Pirineus, a building belonging to the state university occupied in 1997, it 
did so on the terms of the Forum dos Cortigos, who demanded that the existing 
buildings be demolished through mutirdo, and the site used to house its members in 
new accommodation. In the case of Ana Cintra, the building was reformed and 
although movement members who had occupied it were not housed there, they were 
provided with housing in another newly built block in the central district of Pari. 
Aboligao and Paulino Guimaraes remain empty, but many of the Forum dos Cortigos 
members who had occupied these buildings were housed through ‘cartas de credito’ -  a 
subsidized credit scheme where families buy an apartment on the open market but with
177 Interview with CDHU employee, Maria Claudia Brandao 07.08.07.
178 Interview with Fernanda Leao 12.10.07
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a state government mortgage. That the state government has indeed responded to 
‘invaders’ is implied by the Forum’s claim to have housed 1200 families through this 
scheme.1?? Ivana further declared in interview that she had come to a personal 
agreement with Governor Covas that she would not carry out further occupations if he 
housed those who were already living in occupied buildings.180 However, both Brandao 
(of the CDHU) and Franca (of the municipal housing secretariat) justified the state 
government’s response in an intriguing way, declaring that all the movement 
individuals and families housed or given credit had been living in cortigos (and even 
that the occupation itself could be qualified as a type of cortigo). This meant that they 
qualified for government assistance under the terms of a specific project, the Programa 
de Atendimento de Cortigos (Response to Cortigos Programme). This glosses over the 
fact that these people had left their homes in cortigos in order to occupy an empty 
building. These public officials therefore claim that the state government is responding 
to poor housing conditions, rather than the collective action of the movement.
This gloss reflects evaluations of the recent agreement between all three levels of 
government to collaborate in the housing of the 468 families occupying the Prestes 
Maia building. Rather than responding to constitutional and human rights claims 
(made by the FNRU and cited above), the residents were designated as ‘at risk’, and as 
such deemed to qualify for emergency re-housing. This despite the fact that the level of 
risk had been aggravated by the movement itself. That the MSTC had acted purposively 
in this way was openly acknowledged by Nancy Cavallete da Silva, an architect and 
career civil servant who had worked in the municipal housing secretariat for twenty 
years. But it was aggressively denied by the financial and commercial director of 
COHAB, (a twenty-eight year old friend of the mayor and former television presenter) 
who refused to contemplate the idea that the movement had acted strategically to force 
a response from government. He further denied that the municipality, with the state
1?9 Source: www.sp.unmp.org.br accessed 01.09.08
180 Interview with Ivana 01.06.07
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and federal government, had negotiated with occupiers on their own terms, arguing, 
that Prestes Maia was,
A totally different case [from other occupations]. It was occupied under the previous 
administration, there had been a fire there, people had died, there was an eviction 
order where 1400 police were going to get the families out. It was going to be a 
catastrophe. People were going to die.181
Abrahao’s version of events, that families were housed because of the high-risk status of 
the building, was echoed by Franca, the superintendent for social housing. Their 
attitude reflects a desire to be seen as efficient public servants who respond not to 
pressure from illegal acts, but from a rational assessment of risk. Their attitude was 
rejected by the chief of staff of the state housing secretariat, Sergio Mendonga, who was 
also involved in the negotiations. Whilst acknowledging the danger that the families 
were in, he also remarked that,
The obligation to attend to these families did not just come about because of the risk 
situation. The authorities acted as they did as a result of the force of the movement 
and its actions. And this is not the only example.182
Mendonga’s words give weight to the movement’s claim, discussed in previous 
chapters, that governments do fear the fallout that can result from occupations, in 
particular the negative press that can harm a politician’s image.l83
Despite Abrahao’s and Franga’s denial that they had eventually given into the demands 
of ‘invaders’ by housing the residents of Prestes Maia, neither of them rejected the 
movement’s strategy of occupation outright. Indeed, not one of the twenty-one current 
and former public office holders interviewed (both those in ‘confidence posts’ and 
career civil servants) categorically opposed building occupations. But it is particularly 
remarkable that political appointees at the municipal level (under a centre-right
181 Interview with Walter Abrahao 15.06.07 
l8a Interview with Sergio Mendonga 01.08.07
l83 Mendonga’s candid account of the Prestes Maia negotiations was surprising. It should be noted 
however, that he is something of an outsider within the housing secretariat, as an academic in the field of 
law and public prosecutor invited personally by the state housing secretariat to work as his chief o f staff.
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political party) should take this line, and perhaps points to a general acceptance of the 
UMM’s tactics. As Abrahao noted,
Abrahao: I’m against empty buildings, but I’m also against occupations.
Lucy: Do you think they are unjustifiable?
A: No, they are justifiable. I just don’t agree with them.
L: Why do you think people occupy?
A: To get things into focus. To get attention. It’s legitimate, don’t get me wrong. I’m 
not here to criticize or reprimand. But I wouldn’t invade. I would do things 
differently. l84
The lack of outright condemnation coupled with a suggestion that the movement 
should behave differently was also articulated by Franga who remarked that 
‘unorthodox methods’ were more justifiable in a non-democratic regime, and that the 
movement did not have to occupy, these days, to get a meeting with her, or even the 
Housing Minister. Nevertheless, she did not regard occupations as a ‘crime’. Similar 
responses were made by her counterparts in the state government’s housing secretariat.
Not surprisingly, the public servants appointed to the Cities’ Ministry by the PT 
government were those most supportive of the UMM’s activities. But even during the 
more conservative presidential administrations of Fernando Henrique Cardoso (1995-
2002) the UMM had managed to force concessions from federal bodies. In response to 
an MMC occupation of an abandoned building owned by the CEF in the centre of Sao 
Paulo, the bank modified one of its building credit schemes, the Programa de 
Arrendamento Residencial or PAR (Residential Leasing Programme) so as to be viable 
for a social movement.18^  The MMC’s departure from the building was negotiated 
through the promise that the occupiers would be housed in another empty federal 
building that would be renovated through the federal PAR scheme. Other movements 
in the centre of the city have since negotiated the renovation of six other buildings for 
its members through PAR funding. In four of these cases the building was occupied 
until financing negotiations were concluded.
l84 Interview with Walter Abrahao 15.06.07
l8s The programme had to be modified to allow ‘popular associations’ to apply for this type of funding -  in 
its original formulation this credit scheme was designed for building contractors,
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Returning to the current PT administration at federal level and its Cities’ Ministry, 
career civil servants tended, like their counterparts in the state and municipal housing 
departments, to evaluate occupations as unnecessary, citing the movement’s 
involvement in the federal level participatory councils as sufficient channels to dialogue 
with government. But again, these civil servants did not condemn occupations as 
unjustifiable. Markedly different was the response from those appointed to ‘confidence 
posts’ who regarded occupations as a key characteristic of the housing movement, a 
crucial display of autonomy, and a way to speed up the processes of government.
Indeed, Raquel Rolnik, former national secretary for urban programmes, asserted that 
occupations of federal buildings could help her own attempts to change federal 
government policy: for her, occupations could be positive despite the increased amount 
of work that they generated, because they would focus ministerial attention on the 
problem of empty buildings belonging to various federal bodies.186 The idea that 
occupations can be a way of kick-starting a bureaucratic and recalcitrant state 
machinery was also put forward by Grazia de Grazia, of the urban programmes 
secretariat of the Cities’ Ministry.
The movement’s actions are necessary so that policy really does get formulated and
implemented. There needs to be a lot of pressure.187
But the issue of responding positively to a building occupation by providing occupiers 
with some kind of housing solution is problematic for civil servants at all levels of 
government, since it involves privileging groups who break the law above those, equally 
in need of housing, who do not engage in transgressive collective action. The UMM 
often stands accused, therefore, of attempting to ‘jump the queue.’ This is the principal 
reason given by representatives of the current state and municipal governments for 
their alleged refusal to negotiate with ‘invaders’. At the same time, there is broad
186 Interview with Raquel Rolnik 17.07.07
187 Interview with Grazia de Grazia, 13.08.07. Her words echo those of Ricardo, interviewed 04.10.07 who 
was appointed to a ‘confidence post’ in COHAB during the Marta Suplicy era. He stated, frankly, that ‘if the 
movement doesn’t occupy, absolutely nothing will get done. You can have discussions about a particular 
building [...] for two years, and still they [the government] won’t do anything.’
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consensus amongst these officials that they have a ‘duty’ to receive movement 
representatives and discuss their demands when these are put forward in a non- 
confrontational manner. All the while, the people they are receiving are, of course, 
movement representatives who have organized occupations in the past and are very 
likely to do so again in the future. However, for former and current PT-affiliated 
officials, particularly those trained as architects, knowing who the client will be before 
building is critical for the good design of a housing project.188 Others assert that it is 
easier to deal with ‘organized groups’ who already know each other and will collaborate 
better once they are living as neighbours in social housing blocks.18? More radically, 
some officials argue that social movement members ‘deserve’ to be attended to, because 
they have proven a type of active citizenship through their involvement in the 
movement.190 On this issue, representatives of the movement themselves are cautious 
about declaring openly that their members, because of their ‘active struggle’, have more 
of a right to housing than those who wait, passively, to be attended to. When queried on 
this issue, many gave a justification that echoed that put forward by Jose Eduardo 
Cardoso, a jurist and federal deputy for the PT who has a history of collaboration with 
housing movements.
* You can only jump the queue when there’s a queue to jump. There aren’t always 
queues involved in the distribution of public buildings in Brazil. And sometimes, the 
queues that exist are fictions -  they are queues made up of those who are owed 
political favours or who are political allies. I would tell you with absolute certainty 
that the movements should not behave as they do if there were a transparent system 
in place in which distribution was carried out according to specific social and 
chronological criteria. But it is almost never like this. [...] If immoral criteria and 
political favours are used in detriment to other people, then we are not dealing with 
a queue, but a heap of people receiving special favours. So, in this case, it is entirely 
legitimate for the movement to make its demands for housing.1?1
Once more, then, the state’s failure to abide by its own rules is perceived as justification 
for the movement both to break the law, and provides it with a moral justification for 
doing so.
188 Interview with Nabil Bonduki 05.06.07
189 Interview with Eduardo Trani 23.07.07
190 Interview with Grazia de Grazia 13.08.07
191 Interview with Jose Eduardo Cardoso 30.07.07
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Figure 8: Police p reven t th e  occupation  o f an  abandoned  federa l build ing in  
th e  cen tre  o f Sao Paulo
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of the key messages communicated by the movement through its act of civil 
disobedience. Not only does the UMM call for low-income housing provision in the 
centre of the city, but it posits this demand in terms of the urban poor’s right to the 
centre. The idea of having a right to live in the centre.has become an unquestioned 
element of the UMM’s general struggle for housing in Sao Paulo, and it was fully 
endorsed by every single movement representative questioned on die issue.
This assertion appears to have developed out of the wording of the City Statute, federal 
legislation introduced in 2001 to regulate the articles on urban development in the 
1988 Constitution. One of the principal purposes of the Statute is to promote and 
facilitate the right to the city, an idea first expressed by Henri Lefebvre (1996) and 
further interpreted by David Harvey (2003; 2008). As Fernandes (2007:208) notes,
The ‘right to the city’ would basically consist of the right of all city dwellers to 
fully enjoy urban life with all of its services and advantages -  the right to 
habitation -  as well as taking direct part in the management of cities -  the right 
to participation. In other words, Lefebvre stressed the need for the full 
recognition of use values in order to redress the historical imbalance resulting 
from the excessive emphasis on exchange values typical of the capitalist 
production of the urban space.
For Harvey (2003; 2008) the right to the city should be adopted as a political ideal, 
intimately linked to the goal of inclusive cities. It should further be understood as a 
collective right, that ‘depends upon the exercise of a collective power to reshape the 
process of urbanization’ (Harvey 2008: 23). Harvey’s and Lefebvre’s articulations of 
equal rights to full access and enjoyment of the city have been highly influential and 
adopted as a rallying cry by urban social movements and intellectuals across Latin 
America. Their influence on the academics within the FNRU who helped draw up the 
City Statute is clear (Fernandes 2007). The Statute seeks to operationalize the idea of 
the right to the city in law and has, according to Fernandes (2007: 212) provided 
‘consistent legal suppoijt to those municipalities committed to confronting the grave 
urban, social and environmental problems that have directly affected the daily living 
conditions of the urban population’.
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But the enactment of the legislation has had other perhaps unforeseen consequences. 
The housing movements in Sao Paulo have made pragmatic use of the City Statute to 
support their claims to housing in the central areas of the city. Of particular importance 
is the wording of the second article of the Statute that sets out the purpose of urban 
policy as follows:
To guarantee the right to sustainable cities, understood as the right to urban land, 
housing, environmental sanitation, urban infrastructure, transportation and public 
services, to work and leisure for current and future generations (Presidencia da 
Republica 2001).
Since the only areas of Sao Paulo where these conditions truly obtain are the central 
districts of the city, the movements have extrapolated from this the idea of the right to 
the centre.
The idea of the right to the city, and by extension the right to the centre is also current 
outside of the housing movement. In a letter to representatives of the executive at all 
three levels of the Brazilian state it was used as a defence against the impending 
eviction of the residents of Prestes Maia by the FNRU, the forced evictions group at 
UN-Habitat and the Sao Paulo research institute, Instituto Polis.
The elements that make up the right to adequate housing are, legal security of 
tenure, habitable conditions, reasonable cost, general accessibility, cultural 
appropriateness, access to infrastructure and basic services and good localization. 
In this case, this means the right of the low-income population to live in the centre 
of the city, since it is equipped with infrastructure and services and is close to 
opportunities for work, leisure, health and education.192
Further, the response from interview respondents outside the movement -  politicians, 
academics, civil servants and members of the executive -  to the question ‘is housing in 
the centre a right?’ varied from indignant affirmation to cautious evasion, through 
reference to the general right to housing within the city. Only one of these respondents,
192 Source: Email reproduction of FNRU letter distributed to the Forum Centro Vivo web group, 22.02.07
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Walter Abrahao of COHAB, emphatically refuted the notion, declaring that it was not a 
right but a ‘preference’ (£ gosto). Of the three practising lawyers interviewed, only one 
responded directly that housing in the centre was not a right, although she qualified her 
answer with reference to the state’s failure to plan adequately for the mixed usage of the 
city c e n t r e . 1^  it should be emphasized here that the right to the centre is not 
specifically grounded in Brazilian legislation. As such, it could be dismissed as mere 
fantasy. However, as Freeden (1991) notes, people do assume that certain rights exist 
and behave accordingly. It therefore remains opportune to
Devote analytical attention to the/act that the belief exists and discuss the impact of 
that fact on both theory and practice. Whether rights exist, or are figments of the 
human imagination, or are what lawyers call legal fictions, is thus analytically 
irrelevant (Freeden 1991:5 emphasis in the original).
In the case of the UMM, it could be argued that the creation of the right to the centre as 
the ultimate justification of an act of civil disobedience is the culmination of the 
movement’s ‘politics of rights’ (Scheingold 2004). This significance of this phenomenon 
will be discussed in detail in the following chapter.
Sum m ary
The UMM has developed building occupations as a particular form of civil disobedience 
that at once communicates its demands for low-income housing in the centre of the city 
through an illegal act, whilst denouncing the illegality of the state and of private 
landlords for having left their property empty and without social function. In a type of 
intra-legal civil disobedience, the movement justifies its action through reference to the 
constitution and to international human rights legislation. However, the legal status of 
occupations remains ambiguous, and this very ambiguity is important, since it serves to 
highlight the failure of the state to adhere to its own legislation. The response of the 
authorities to occupations is similarly ambiguous, with a general recognition of the 
legitimacy, if not the legality, of occupations. The actions of the movement and the
193 Interview with Fernanda Leao 12.10.07
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response of the state to them therefore appear to inhabit a ‘grey zone’ between legality 
and illegality. This legal ambiguity is further problematized by the movement’s 
conceptualization of the right to the centre, which, although it is not a right, has come 
to be accepted as such by politicians, academics and policy-makers with different 
political affiliations. This issue will be discussed in the next (and final) chapter.
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Chapter Eight
Transgressive citizenship: Drawing the line between state and society 
Introduction
This chapter seeks to build upon the theoretical literature on citizenship and state- 
society relations introduced in the opening chapters of this thesis through reference to 
the fieldwork findings presented in chapters five, six and seven. It aims to achieve this 
by responding to the research questions set out at the end of chapter two: (l) what is 
the significance of the adoption of a citizenship discourse by a social movement that 
engages in formally illegal acts of civil disobedience as well as institutionalized 
participation? (2) How does the state respond to movement claims that are made in the 
language of social rights? (3) In what ways can social movement action alter the 
balance of state-society relations? In the course of responding to these questions, the 
chapter suggests a new way of characterizing the collective action of the urban poor as 
acts of ‘transgressive citizenship*.
Insurgent citizens? The em ancipatory po ten tia l o f  law  and text-basedrights
One of the most recent examinations of collective action and citizenship in Sao Paulo is
Holston’s (2008) Insurgent citizenship: Disjunctions o f democracy and modernity in 
Brazil This work puts forward the argument that Brazilian citizenship is distinctive 
because, unlike the French and American variants, it has always been ‘universally 
inclusive in membership but massively inegalitarian in distribution’ (Holston 2008:7). 
Although descendents of African slaves were granted citizenship from 1850, this did not 
eradicate the entrenched discrimination against these and other categories of 
individuals within society. He argues that these people were not discriminated against 
as non-citizens, but because they were particular kinds of citizens. Differences in 
education, occupation, race, gender and access to property were used to exclude certain 
groups from the political process, force them into ‘segregated and often illegal
257
conditions of residence’ and funnel them into labour ‘as servile workers’ (Holston 
2008: 7). Entrenched forms of differentiated citizenship were also used to justify 
privileged treatment for other social groups. Holston argues that a number of perverse 
outcomes have resulted from this differentiation:
The historical norm of citizenship fosters exclusion, inequality, illegality, violence,
and the social logics of privilege and deference as the ground of national belonging
(Holston 2008:6).
However, with the transition to democracy, ‘insurgent citizens’ on the self-built or 
‘autoconstnicted’ peripheries of Brazil’s large cities have begun to challenge 
differentiated citizenship and assert their rights to the legal ownership of property and 
urban services. He argues, therefore, that the city is not just the context of citizenship 
struggles, but also the substance of these struggles (Ibid: 8).
This thesis supports Holston’s general claim that ambiguity of legal status surrounding 
a person’s place of residence (whether Xhefavela, cortiqo, or in Holston’s case land and 
property that has been bought in good faith) causes insecurity and has been a 
mobilizing factor for organized popular action in the city. It also supports, up to a point, 
Holston’s general argument about the increasing use of both the law and the concept of 
citizenship to press for rights amongst members of lower-income groups. However, 
since the bulk of Holston’s work is historical in focus and seeks to show how 
understandings of differentiated citizenship persevere to this day and continue to be 
played out in Brazilian society, the book underplays the extent to which citizenship as a 
concept grounded in the social rights set out in the 1988 Constitution has become 
critical to the projects of groups of the organized urban poor. As chapters five, six and 
seven of this thesis show, it has become central to the discourse and mobilization of 
social movements in the city over the past twenty years. The methodological focus of 
my own research, on contemporary discourse and practice amongst Sao Paulo’s 
housing movement, therefore builds on Holston’s work.
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Holston asserts that citizenship in Sao Paulo can be understood in three ways. Firstly, 
those involved in ‘autoconstruction’ on the peripheries have ‘earned’ their citizenship 
by contributing to the building of the city. Secondly, in a hangover from previous 
historical eras, including that of Vargas and his labour union reforms (see chapter 
three) certain categories of people are still considered more deserving than others of 
the benefits of citizenship, for instance those engaged in formal work. Although 
gradually being levelled out, social hierarchies and special treatment, especially for the 
rich, are still part of Brazilian social interaction. Thirdly, ‘text-based’ rights that draw 
on the Constitution are promoting a more egalitarian society. He argues that these 
three understandings of citizenship are in an ‘unbalanced and corrosive entanglement 
that unsettles both state and society (Ibid: 13) but that, nevertheless, populations on 
the peripheries have radically challenged traditional ideas of citizenship and are 
transforming the relation between state and citizen (Ibid: 235).
I would argue, however, that the focus of Holston’s empirical work on subjects who he 
claims ‘typify the peripheries’ (Ibid:8), skews his understanding of citizenship in Sao 
Paulo more generally, and should not be extrapolated to encompass the majority of the 
urban poor. The UMM can be seen as a movement that is fairly representative of the 
lowest-income groups in Sao Paulo, since the majority of them have family incomes of 
up to three minimum wages and are mainly living in overcrowded rental 
accommodation or in favelas.194 Whilst not all of the movement’s members live on the 
peripheries in geographical terms, their low-incomes and residential insecurity render 
them marginal in social terms. By contrast, the groups of people researched by Holston 
and named as ‘insurgent citizens’ are members of lower-middle-class families who 
bought homes on the peripheries, or purchased land in order to build their homes 
themselves during the 1970s. They have since been involved in labyrinthine struggles to 
ensure legal tenure of their lots, fighting counter-claims of ownership by property 
developers and land-owning families. They have, nevertheless, achieved the ‘dream’ of
x94 The minimum salary currently stands at R $4io  in Sao Paulo, equivalent to £110. Monthly rent of a 
cortigo room can be as high as R$300.
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owning their own homes, and despite the threatening law-suits described by Holston, 
have achieved a considerable degree of security. Indeed, none of his research 
participants were ever evicted from their homes. Holston documents understandings 
of citizenship amongst these individuals as having considerable emphasis on the first 
two conceptualizations of citizenship set out above (as contributors to the city and 
honest workers deserving of rights) whilst underplaying the third (relating to the innate 
equality of all human beings). Yet I would argue that it is the third understanding of 
citizenship that is most critical in contemporary Brazil: it is the demand for equality, to 
be achieved through constitutional rights, and particularly social rights, that is driving 
mobilization amongst some of Brazil’s poorest populations.
As has been shown in the preceding three chapters, the research participants observed 
and interviewed for this study place their faith in and focus on the social rights that are 
enshrined in the Constitution when they speak of their own citizenship, particularly 
with regard to the right to housing. The importance of the document for social 
movements is made explicit by Kelly:
The question of laws has become really central, since for some time now, the 
movements have been able to cloak themselves with this power -  of knowing what’s 
possible and what isn’t. [...] And we know how to spread this knowledge around. 
Because, before, the people who knew about laws were just lawyers, judges and 
prosecutors. Not any more. Any leader of a popular movement will know the 
principle articles from the federal Constitution, and will know the laws that are 
specific to these. Now anyone, from someone who lives in a favela  or cortiqo to a 
lawyer or a government official knows how to talk about these things and have a 
debate. And that’s why the role of popular movements is crucial, because 
movements can do things that the media can’t, and movements do that micro-level 
work which is spreading knowledge to people who don’t have access to this type of 
learning.1^
Whilst the following comment from Lourdes shows how the Constitution links the
rights of an individual to the action of the collective:
I think that everyone has a right to housing. It’s in the constituinte, isn’t it? There 
are some people who fight for it, and some who get lucky. But when we ask people
195 Interview with Kelly 29.05.07.
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to join the movement, it’s for us all to get our rights. Everyone has that right [to 
housing]. We’re not getting involved in politics just for ourselves.196
Returning to Holston’s three conceptions of citizenship, whilst there are echoes of 
contributor rights in the movement’s discourse -leaders and members make claims to 
be improving the city by occupying empty buildings -  this is limited in comparison to 
the rights they claim to be due to them as citizens by their very nature as human beings. 
Taking the articles of the Constitution that deal with social rights as a normative guide, 
representatives of the housing movement measure their own citizenship with reference 
to this text. Crucially, whilst many of them consider themselves to hold a ‘limited’ 
version of citizenship, they state a belief in their ability to become full citizens with all 
their rights respected and needs met at some point in the future. This contradicts 
Holston’s somewhat deterministic interpretation of entrenched inegalitarian 
citizenship. Whilst he explicitly argues against the idea of limited citizenship in favour 
of his differentiated model, he is also forced to admit that the idea of inegalitarian 
distribution of citizenship has little place in post-1988 Brazil where the Constitution 
and its text-based rights are creating conditions for an conceptualization of citizenship 
as ‘universally egalitarian rather than differentiated’ (Ibid: 267). Further, despite 
considerable efforts to define differentiated citizenship as distinct from limited 
citizenship, Holston is, essentially, describing the disjuncture between formal and 
substantive citizenship. If full citizenship must include both formal elements as well as 
substantive ones -  the full set of civil, political and social rights as discussed in chapter 
two -  then the label of ‘limited’ citizenship can be applied to those whose thorough 
enjoyment of these rights is restricted in some way.
Holston does identify change in perceptions of citizenship after the transition to 
democracy, and his research participants also challenge the status quo. However, he 
argues that they continue to assert themselves not with universal criteria of citizenship 
but with reference to their consumption, construction and tax-paying in the city.
196 Interview with Lourdes 30.06.07
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Urbanization resulted in unprecedented access to primary education, mass media, 
market consumption, and above all property ownership, precisely for those poor 
Brazilians who had always been excluded from these fundamental means of 
achieving citizen standing. Such access [...] generated a new and explicit kind of 
argument for participation among these new urban citizens: they began to reason 
that, although poor, they had in fact established ‘real stakes’ in the nation-state as 
city builders, tax-payers, and modern consumers [...] on that unprecedented basis 
they demanded new kinds and qualities of political participation (Holston 2008: 
108).
This is far from the UMM’s assertion of citizenship linked to basic rights held by all 
human beings, and expressed through the idea of the dignity that will be achieved 
through the provision of social rights. Indeed, Holston writes that people on the 
peripheries did not ‘primarily argue for rights on the basis of their needs as human 
beings or even their absolute worth as citizens’ (Ibid: 111). Instead, his research 
participants used historical documents and the law to try and assert their claims to 
land, rather than make a case based on necessity. Further, whilst Holston considers in 
detail the interaction between state and citizens through his exploration of legislation 
and the state’s selective use of the law throughout Brazilian history up to the time of the 
military dictatorship, his examination of contemporary Brazil gives almost no 
consideration to state-society relations. Instead, the new, more egalitarian citizenship 
of post-1988 Brazil appears to be asserted by individuals in the context of their 
interactions with other people in society -  his prime example is that of poorer citizens 
demanding that the rich take their place in a bank queue rather than seeking 
preferential treatment. His assertion that citizens are challenging the state has, 
therefore, little basis in the empirical evidence he presents. Rather than take on the 
state directly, the implication is that self-builders on the peripheries are changing the 
nature of state-society relations through their interactions with others. This reflects the 
general post-structural trend discussed with reference to the literature on citizenship 
and social movements in the opening chapters of this thesis.
This thesis has argued, and Holston would agree, that a citizenship discourse built on 
the text of the Constitution brings the law into play. This presents a challenge to the
262
way in which the use of the law has typically been viewed in the region. For example, as 
O’Donnell notes,
Latin America has a long tradition of ignoring the law or, when acknowledging it, of 
twisting it in favour of the powerful and for the repression or containment of the 
vulnerable (O’Donnell 1999).
Scholars who discuss these issues specifically with respect to Brazil, frequently cite the 
Brazilian proverb, ‘For my friends, everything. For my enemies, the law’1*? (DaMatta 
1991; Fry 1999; Holston 2008; O’ Donnell 1999). This has led Holston to assert that 
traditionally, the law represented ‘disadvantage and humiliation’ for non-elites 
(Holston 2008: 5). But although Holston’s property-owning citizens, like the UMM, 
have made use of the law and therefore challenged its elitism, their engagement with 
the legal system is quite different. The former are involved in civil disputes over land 
ownership with other citizens; critically, they do not use the law to engage with the 
state. Further, they have learnt how to use the complexity of the law to hold-up court 
cases in the hope that a decisive settlement will never be found. This is a practice 
Holston claims to abhor elsewhere (Holston 1991). Despite this he argues that the 
experience of ‘autoconstruction’ on the peripheries,
Fuelled the irruption of an insurgent citizenship that destabilized the differentiated 
at the very sites that had produced differentiation -  political rights, landed 
property, residential illegality, misrule of law, and servility. Although these 
conditions continue to sustain the paradigm of differentiated citizenship, they also 
became the conditions of its transformation. In effect, under different 
circumstances in the peripheries, the sites of differentiation became those of 
insurgence, as the urban poor gained political rights, became property owners, 
made law an asset, and achieved a greater sense of personal competence through 
their urban practices. Moreover, as residents formulated alternative projects o f 
citizenship, they changed the development o f the state and its relation with 
citizens. Their insurgence has thus cracked open the principles of differentiation 
that for centuries legitimated a particularly inegalitarian formulation of citizenship. 
It turned the poor residents of the peripheries into new citizens and launched an 
urban citizenship that transformed Brazil’ (Holston 2008:199 emphasis mine).
197 The expression Aos meus am igos, tudo. Aos meus inimigos, a lei is attributed by O’Donnell (1999) to 
Getulio Vargas.
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I would agree that the discovery of law as an asset is a new development amongst non­
elites in Brazil, but the use of law to protect assets is simply an imitation of the way law 
is employed by conservative groups in society. The assertion that home owners on the 
periphery are radically altering the nature of Brazilian society therefore seems 
somewhat dubious: Holston himself admits that they are entrenching conservative 
attitudes towards property ownership and that they continue to promote inegalitarian 
citizenship based on a depiction of themselves as contributor citizens. But Holston’s 
subjects are also replicating the pattern of spatial segregation within the city in which 
lower-income groups are confined to peripheral areas. As such, his labelling of these 
groups as ‘insurgent’ citizens -  people rising in active revolt -  seems to be something 
of an overstatement. By contrast, as the present research shows, the UMM uses the law 
to challenge spatial segregation in the city by promoting low-income housing in the 
centre. In this way, it is attempting to change patterns of distribution and to ensure 
housing provision for some of the city’s most vulnerable inhabitants. Law is also used to 
contest the state negligence that led to the growth of illegal residences on the periphery 
in the first place and to demand the upholding of social rights by the state to correct 
these historic wrongs. It further aims to effect real change in the way that the state’s 
resources are distributed through its efforts to influence legislation, most notably 
through the FNHIS at federal level. It is in this regard that the movement could be said 
to be attempting a democratization of the law.
Rather than conservative, the use of the law by the UMM can be seen as creative and 
emancipatory (Santos 1995). As was noted in chapter seven, the chief of staff of the 
state-level housing secretariat and public prosecutor, Sergio Mendonga, asserted that 
through the efforts of the housing movements and their allies in the Ministerio Publico, 
the question of housing had been removed from the sphere of the executive and placed 
in the hands of the judiciary -  in his words, judicializado, ‘judicialized’. This is a 
process that is happening elsewhere as countries in both the developed and the 
developing world undertake constitutional reforms and publish bills of rights (Hirschl
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2003). Far from being designed as a progressive move, however, Hirschl argues that 
conservative elites in countries undergoing a political transition believe they will be 
better off handing over significant powers to the judiciary, who they think will remain 
loyal to conservative forces. His arguments fit with some of the more negative 
evaluations of the Constituent Assembly of 1987-88 in Brazil, noted in chapter four. But 
whatever the intentions of the conservative male individuals designing the Constitution 
in their ‘room of mirrors’, the document has become a key weapon in the hands of 
popular sectors, as outlined in chapters five, six and seven. They use it to support a 
discourse of the ‘politics of rights’ and a programme of intra-legal civil disobedience 
whilst also making use of its provisions for participatory engagement in policy making.
This use of the law for progressive ends finds resonance in Boaventura de Sousa 
Santos’s work on the ‘emancipatory’ potential of law, much of which is covered in 
Toward a new common sense: Law, science and politics in the paradigmatic 
transition (1995). The volume brings together discrete pieces of research from the past 
thirty years, including two extended essays based on fieldwork in marginal urban 
communities in Rio de Janeiro in 1970 and Recife (the capital of Pernambuco state in 
the Northeast) in 1980. It includes a discussion of legal pluralism inspired by his 
experiences in the Rio/aue/a that Santos named ‘Pasargada’, that posits a somewhat 
inward-looking and deterministic view of illegality in the urban context (examined in 
chapter three). The destructive power of illegality for marginal urban residents is 
displayed in the words of one resident cited in a separately published discussion of 
these issues. He declares: nos somos e eramos ilegais, ‘we were, and continue to be 
illegal’ (Santos 1993:45). This comment refers to residents’ unwillingness to make use 
of legal process in any areas of their lives, since they would suffer from the stigma 
attached to thefavela and/or draw the attention of the authorities to illegally settled 
areas. Illegality offavela  settlements has also been used by municipal authorities as a 
justification for not supplying the area with essential services. As a response, the 
residents of Pasargada resorted to a parallel system o f‘Pasargada’ law to resolve
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disputes within the ‘illegal’ space of Xhefavela (see chapter three). Santos’s research 
participant was speaking in 1970, but his words have had a lengthy shelf-life. The 
quotation has been cited more recently by Maricato (1996) and Arantes (1998) and 
applied to post-1988 Brazil. For example, Arantes (1998:205) argues that,
. It is as though the illegal possession of a small clandestine subdivision in the 
segregated spaces of the country’s large metropolitan regions has repercussions 
over all other social relations, even those that have nothing to do with housing, 
constituting itself at the epicentre of all exclusions, both inherited and future.
According to Maricato (1996) Sao Paulo state’s water company was still refusing to 
supply certain/aue/as in the city that had been urbanized by the municipal housing 
company as late as the period 1988-1992. However, this is no longer a common 
occurrence, and whilst it may well have been correct to refer to the all pervading 
noxious influence of illegal tenure at the height of repression during the military 
dictatorship, I would contend that it is now incorrect to evaluate residential illegality in 
the urban context in this way. Indeed, Santos’s later work on Recife shows precisely 
how, in a more open political context, social movements are able to use both illegality 
and the law to advance their demands in the context of an irregular urban settlement.
He depicts residents of three favelas in the city of Recife in 1980 resisting occupations 
through the use of human rights legislation (Santos 1995) and engaging in acts of civil 
disobedience. This is an example of the way in which the urban poor and their 
supporters can make ‘transformative’ use of the law by politicizing disputes in their 
appeal to a higher legal sphere, and accusing the state of incivility in its failure to 
support minimal living conditions. Santos therefore shows a transition from the use of 
‘Pasargada’ law, to international law by low-income urban residents. The UMM’s 
practice can be posited as a third phase of this transition where national law is 
employed. This is also indicative of a transformation of the state from authoritarian to 
formally democratic, and of a corresponding shift in positioning by urban popular 
movements as they seek to engage with the state.
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Both this thesis, and Holston (2008) support the view that with the growth in salience 
of constitutionally based legislation, illegality has assumed a mobilizational role in the 
quest for housing and legitimation of tenure. But beyond illegality as a mobilizing 
factor, my research has shown that illegality can be both a weapon with which to 
admonish the state (pointing out its own illegality and its failure to uphold the law) and 
also the medium for civil disobedience. That illegality, through civil disobedience, can 
be used to further claims to constitutional social rights and for a move out of illegality, 
is illustrated by Ivana’s declaration a gente tem que virar um fora de lei para ser 
atendida na lei, which can be translated as ‘we have to become outlaws, to get the law 
to respond to us’.1^8 A similar expression was used by a resident of the long-standing 
occupation of the Rua do Ouvidor building in central Sao Paulo cited in A. Santos 
(2002: 91): O que era antes fora da lei, virou dentro da lei -  ‘what was once outside 
the law is now inside the law’. This is in stark contrast to the perceptions of legality 
voiced by residents of the dictatorship era Rio favela  studied by B. Santos, and can be 
read as a continuation of the practices he depicts of organized favela  residents in Recife 
during the transition to civilian rule. I would suggest therefore, that one of the most 
important contributions of the housing movements in post-1988 Sao Paulo is the use of 
the Constitution to alter evaluations of urban irregularity or illegality. They have 
illustrated the innovative use that can be made of the law.
One example of the movement’s politics of rights and its use of law in an innovative 
way, is that of its ‘creation’ of the idea of the right to the centre mentioned at the end of 
the previous chapter. On first appraisal the right to the centre would appear to be, in 
Hohfeldian terms, a ‘liberty right’1^ , since it falls into the category of action that all 
people should be at liberty to undertake, there being no law specifically prohibiting it 
(Jones 2005). Consequently, movement members and leaders assert their right to live 
anywhere in the city. And yet the lack of adequate housing provision for lower income
*98 Interview with Ivana 01.06.07
x99 Hohfeld categorised rights as either claim rights or liberty rights. Each of these categories was further 
divided into positive and negative categories (Jones 2005).
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groups in huge swathes of Sao Paulo allows them to argue that the state is denying 
them this freedom. On closer examination of the discourse of the movement and its 
supporters, it appears that the right to the centre is being asserted as a positive right, 
since it involves a demand for action from the state to provide adequate housing for the 
poor in these areas (Freeden 1991). In Hohfeldian terms this is a positive claim-right, 
defined as ‘rights to specific goods and services [that] are so called because they call for 
a positive response from those who bear the corresponding duties’ (Jones 2005).
Whilst as Freeden (1991) notes rights do not have to be institutionalized in law to be 
claimed as such, rights-adherents often attempt to formalize their claims. As discussed 
in chapter seven, this can be seen in the way the FNRU and other national and 
international bodies concerned with urban segregation argued against the eviction of 
the Prestes Maia building. They used the definition o f‘adequate housing’ set out in the 
City Statute as a way of asserting a right to housing in central districts of the city, since 
these are the only areas where these conditions pertain. The assertion that the 
inhabitants of Prestes Maia had a right to the centre is of dubious legal merit. However, 
the fact that it has been so widely accepted is credit to the strength of the movement’s 
politics of rights and an example of the creative use of an appeal to constitutional 
legislation.
Civil versus po litica l society: Building on Chatterjeefs  Politics of the 
Governed
The sophisticated legal reasoning that the movement employs to back up its demands 
for centrally located housing as a right and also, as noted in the previous chapter, to 
justify acts of civil disobedience, sets the UMM apart from the breakaway FLM that 
often presents its members as destitute and dependent non-citizens. An example of this 
was the FLM’s tendency to underline the vulnerability and potential destitution of its 
members living in occupations, and literally putting them at the mercy of the state by 
setting up favelas on the street outside the mayor’s offices once eviction orders had 
been carried out. By contrast, the UMM posits its members as empowered individuals
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involved in a collective struggle for full citizenship. It could be argued that these two 
ways of negotiating with the state over housing correspond to Chatteijee’s (2004) 
conceptualization of the two different ‘lines’ between state and society, as discussed in 
chapter two. Based on the Indian context, one of these connections is described as civil 
society and is a channel of negotiation reserved for elite groups in society, ‘founded on 
popular sovereignty and granting equal rights to citizens’ (Chatteijee 2004: 37). The 
other ‘line’ is that of political society, through which the majority of the dispossessed 
Indian population engages with the state. It connects ‘populations to governmental 
agencies pursuing multiple policies of security and welfare’ (Ibid: 38). Due to their 
marginality, these subaltern peoples are not properly rights-bearing citizens; 
furthermore although they may organize themselves in associations, they often live and 
work outside the law, and as such they cannot be treated as members of civil society.
But they cannot be ignored either: the state must look after and control them, since 
they are within the territorial jurisdiction of the nation. State agencies, therefore,
Deal with these associations not as bodies of citizens but as convenient instruments 
for the administration of welfare to marginal and underprivileged population 
groups. [...] These groups on their part accept that their activities are often illegal 
and contrary to good civil behaviour, but they make a claim to a habitation and a 
livelihood as a matter of right. [...] The state agencies recognize that these 
population groups do have some claim on the welfare programs of the government, 
but those claims could not be regarded as justiciable rights since the state did not 
have the means to deliver those benefits to the entire population of the country. To 
treat those claims as rights would only invite further violation of public property 
and civic laws (Ibid: 40).
Chatteijee goes on to note that certain groups get their demands met for reasons of 
political expediency. The relevance of this passage as a whole for the Brazilian local 
state’s response to occupations is very clear. As such, I would argue that this 
categorization of the relationships between state and society is a useful tool for 
conceptualizing both the way the housing movements present themselves to the state, 
and how the state responds to this presentation.
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The FLM’s appeal to the state is very much on the level of the definition of political 
society above -  positing its members as a particular type of marginalized population 
that needs a welfare response from the state. Although the nature of civil society in 
Chatteijee’s account and the elites who constitute it is left somewhat unspecified, they 
are posited as a ‘small section of culturally equipped citizens’ who ‘inhabit the high 
ground of modernity* (Ibid: 41). It could be argued that the UMM’s approach to its 
relationship with the state that involves a discourse of citizenship and recourse to legal 
arguments has more in common with Chatteijee’s idea of civil society as an elite group 
that negotiates with the state on the basis of equality of citizenship. Obviously the 
UMM is not an elite group, but the way its leaders are training as lawyers (bearing in 
mind the deference to the profession discussed in the chapter five) and voicing their 
demands as citizenship rights is perhaps an attempt to gain entry into this elite world. 
Certainly, modern positivist law has been posited as a ‘rationalizer of 800161/ used for 
the ‘scientificization of society* (Santos i995:56).The movement may therefore also use 
the law to appear modern, rational and orderly. As Shamir (1996:233) notes, the law ‘is 
embedded within the aspirations for a transparent, precise, planned, symmetrical and 
organized order.’ By couching its demands for housing in the language of rights, and 
using Constitutional law to defend its acts of civil disobedience, the movement 
distances itself from the common perception of occupations as chaotic acts undertaken 
by semi-criminal bademeiros -  people engaged in low-level vandalism or drunken 
brawling (see chapter seven). It is also a way of distancing itself from a discourse that 
paints movement members as needy, destitute individuals.
Implicit in Chatteijee’s argument, however, is the idea that services and goods 
associated with the fulfilment of basic needs will be communicated through the political 
society channel. This once more serves to reduce social rights to the idea of welfare or 
benefits, and fails to grasp the link between goods of collective consumption, dignity 
and citizenship. I would argue that in its sophisticated legal argumentation and 
attempts to distance itself from welfare issues, the UMM is taking steps to dialogue
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with the state over social rights through the elite channel of civil society. What seems 
clear from my empirical findings, however, is that the response of the state is 
conditioned by party politics. The strident arguments made by the UMM posit housing 
for its members in the centre of Sao Paulo as a manifestation of their rights as citizens: 
rights to housing, to the city and even to the centre itself. These rights are 
operationalized through building occupations. However, examples from the municipal 
government at the time of my fieldwork show the local state framing occupations in a 
very different way. Under a centre-right government, representatives of municipal 
housing departments put forward an understanding of occupations in terms of needs -  
of desperate measures taken by semi-destitute families. For example Walter Abrahao of 
COHAB emphatically denied that there might be some purposive movement strategy 
involved in filling up occupied buildings with as many families as possible.200 As such 
the municipal and state governments justify their response to these situations by citing 
the risk to the personal security of people living in substandard conditions. The 
response to occupied buildings thus becomes the same as a response to other situations 
where housing conditions are considered severe enough for the state to take action: for 
example the worst of the cortigos (being audited by the present municipal government) 
or shacks built on stilts over the city’s water reservoirs. Indeed, many of the UMM’s 
members have been attended to through the state-level programme designed to take 
action on slum tenement housing, in which they are categorized as populations living in 
cortigos, not people who have purposefully left the cortigo to occupy an empty building 
and force the state to respond to their housing needs sooner than would otherwise have 
been the case. This is probably in large part because the local governments do not wish 
to stimulate further occupations. This may also lead members of the bureaucracy to 
deny that occupations have been successful or that they even negotiate with ‘invaders’.
The response of left-wing governments3 to the movements’ demands appears to be 
somewhat different. The PT government of Marta Suplicy (as detailed in chapter six)
200 Interview with Walter Abrahao 15.06.07.
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did take steps to promote housing in the centre of Sao Paulo as a political move, and 
not just as a policy motivated by economic or technical considerations. It was presented 
as a way of redressing the historical pattern of social housing provision on the outskirts 
of the city. As such policy makers and the executive in the PT government appeared to 
accept the movement’s conceptualization of housing as put forward in its politics of 
rights. Ample evidence of support for social housing in the central districts is provided 
in the municipality’s own publications (SEHAB 2004; Prefeitura Municipal de Sao 
Paulo 2004; EMURB 2004) and by Cymbalista and Santoro (2007). Although few of 
these plans came to fruition with Suplicy’s failure to gain re-election, the political will to 
think differently about pro-poor housing in the centre of Sao Paulo did appear to be in 
evidence.
Responding to Chatteijee’s framework, it would appear from my findings that low- 
income groups affected by limited citizenship can draw on the resources normally used 
by elite members o f‘civil society’, and attempt to communicate with the state through 
this channel. (The response, however, is highly dependent on party politics.) This 
would support Corbridge et al.’s (2005) assertion that the poor are not necessarily 
confined to the channels of political society in their dialogue with the state. They reject 
Chatteijee’s rigid dualism and note that it is precisely within the ambit of political 
society that civil society can be made (Corbridge et al. 2005: 257). It is through 
interaction with local level bureaucrats and politicians in political society that poorer 
groups come to gain an understanding of the way the state works, and this interaction 
serves as an ‘incubator’ for a move towards interaction based upon people’s awareness 
of their rights (Corbridge 2007). This thesis challenges the idea that goods of collective 
consumption and basic needs must necessarily be demanded as welfare; they can also 
be conceptualized as social rights that are constitutive of citizenship and presented by 
lower income groups in the language and terms generally employed by the elite. This 
analysis of events also chimes with Gupta’s (2006) take on the distinctions between 
entitlement and empowerment. This can be read as an extension of the work of
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Chatteijee, in which governments’ attempts to focus on the goal of delivering 
entitlements are a way to ‘remove all discussion of empowerment from the discursive 
horizon’ (Gupta 2006: 231). Delivery of welfare to indigent populations responds to 
needs while rejecting assertions of citizenship rights.
This critique corresponds to the debate surrounding Marshall’s privileging of social 
rights discussed in chapter two. His focus on social rights is criticized, and he stands 
accused of depoliticizing citizenship by advocating the creation of welfare dependent 
populations. Yet as Gupta notes government delivery of basic goods and services does 
not necessarily result in depoliticization, quite the contrary.
Entitlement and empowerment [...] are not mutually exclusive. And it is here that 
seizing on the fissures and ruptures, the contradictions in the policies, programmes, 
institutions and discourses of ‘the state’ allows people to create possibilities for 
political action and activism (Ibid).
The UMM can be seen to be deriving empowerment from entitlement in the way that it 
identifies the disjuncture between the text of the Constitution and the reality of life for 
the poor in Sao Paulo. This fissure is then exploited to demand not welfare but social 
rights. This leads to the promotion of empowerment amongst movement members 
who are encouraged to perceive their inadequate access to basic goods and services as a 
political issue. The movement politicizes the question of entitlements by accusing the 
state of limiting the citizenship of its members through the failure to uphold social 
rights.
The problem for the UMM, however, is that even when a ruling government appears to 
share its conceptualization of rights and housing, this does not necessarily translate 
into real gains in terms of long-lasting policy changes or significant increased 
investment in low-income housing provision. The PT administration of Sao Paulo 
municipality under Marta Suplicy, for all its talk of centrally located pro-poor housing, 
was widely evaluated as ‘disappointing’ by members of the UMM. The inauguration of
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Suplicy as mayor in 2001 coincided with a change in movement strategy involving the 
decisions to participate in new ‘invited’ spaces and a sharp reduction in building 
occupations and other types of antagonistic collective action. The movement also 
sanctioned the decision by two movement leaders to take up office within the housing 
department. That these changes occurred finds resonance with political process 
approaches to social movement theory* that contend that movement action is based 
upon threats and opportunities in the external political environment. But the era of the 
Suplicy administration also illustrated how the boundaries between movement, state 
and government can be blurred. That this blurring was not particularly beneficial to the 
movement may have led to the increased entrenchment of an antagonistic stance 
towards the state. This can be understood through the idea of ‘transgressive’ 
citizenship.
D raw ing the line: Transgressive citizenship
The following section builds on key contributions to the literature on the anthropology 
of the state. Recalling discussions from chapter two, this section draws on the work of 
Abrams (2006) that separates out the ‘state system’ from the ‘state-idea’. Abrams 
argues that the state system is ‘a palpable nexus of practice and institutional structure 
centred in government’ whilst the state idea ‘starts its life as an implicit construct’ 
which is then reified ‘and acquires an overt symbolic identity progressively divorced 
from practice as an illusory account of practice’ (Abrams 2006:125-6). Chapters five, 
six and seven showed that whilst leaders and members of the movement were very 
aware of the different levels of the state and the institutions within it, disaggregating 
their own practice according to the power structures at play at any one time in national 
and sub-national governments, the movement’s discourse has a tendency to refer to the 
‘state’ in unitary terms and most often as the enemy. Goldstone (2003) cautions against 
buying into social movements’ own assertions of an oppositional status towards the 
state, arguing that interactions with political parties and the political system are so
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frequent that there should be no distinction between institutionalized and non­
institutionalized politics. He warns,
Social scientists should not treat these strategic or tactical positionings by 
movement actors as if they represented inherent characteristics of movement 
activity (Goldstone 2003:6 emphasis in the original).
However, the question to be answered here is why the movement should take up this 
stance and what benefits it gains as a result. As Gupta (2006:231) notes, ‘one’s theory of 
‘the state’ does greatly matter in formulating strategies for political action’. The final 
part of this chapter argues that this reification of the state serves an important purpose 
in the movement’s politics of rights, and can also be read as a response to the 
problematic porosity of relations between state, government and society.
Much work in the anthropology of the state literature has challenged the reification of 
the state and stressed the need ‘to recognize the blurred and moving boundaries 
between states and societies; and to view states and societies as mutually transforming’ 
(Migdal et al. 2004:3). But while this work has broken down the myth of the ‘state-idea’ 
and accentuated the fluidity of relations between state and society, as Mitchell (1991; 
2006) points out there is still an ‘apparent boundary’ marking the state-society divide. 
According to Mitchell (1991), that this boundary does not mark a real exterior 
contributes to its elusive and unstable appearance. However, ‘this does not mean the 
line is illusory. On the contrary [...] producing and maintaining the distinction between 
state and society is itself a mechanism that generates resources of power’ (Mitchell 
2006:175). For Mitchell, rather than rejecting the idea of the state altogether, the 
crucial object of analysis should be this very boundary and how it is put in place, and 
how an account of reality has been produced where the state comes across as an 
autonomous entity standing apart from the social world (Mitchell 1991).
Mitchell’s work on the illusory line provides a useful starting point from which to 
examine the practice of the UMM and its relations with the state. The current political
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configuration in Brazil, with a political party in power at the federal level that arose out 
of a social movement, complicates attempts to make a clear distinction between state 
and society. Indeed, that the line between state and society is porous has been amply 
shown in the empirical chapters of this thesis. In the example of the political scene in 
Sao Paulo, figures from academia, popular social movements and the more middle class 
NGO sector (such as those that make up the FNRU) cross over into the realm of 
government by standing for election and taking up positions within the state 
bureaucracy at municipal and federal level. Most important for the discussion here is 
the case of Anderson, the leading figure of the UMM who took up a position within 
SEHAB, the municipal housing secretariat, during the PT administration of Marta 
Suplicy, working closely with the housing secretary, Paulo Teixeira. As spokesperson 
and public face of the UMM, it would have been difficult for both career civil servants 
and other political appointees to disassociate him from the context of popular 
movements. Indeed, permanent staff within the bureaucracy of SEHAB and COHAB 
would have had regular contact with him and his movement colleagues in the course of 
the preceding decade as they fronted up to the two previous Partido Progressista 
municipal administrations. The potential for confusion over the role of social 
movement leaders working in government was voiced by Ricardo, an architect working 
in COHAB and by Cristiano, the other UMM member who took up a position alongside 
Anderson in the housing secretariat (cited in chapter six). Cristiano confessed that he 
himself was confused as to his status within the housing department. Further, as 
political appointees within the municipal bureaucracy, Anderson and Cristiano straddle 
the line between social movement and government, but also that between government 
and state.
Referring back to Mitchell and the boundary between state and society, with Anderson 
and Cristiano’s appointments, the precise location of this line becomes somewhat hard 
to pin down. This can be evaluated positively for the movement in a number of ways. 
Anderson is able to move between the bureaucracy and the movement, putting forward
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the aims of the movement whilst bringing understanding of the internal workings of the 
municipality back to the UMM’s other leaders and members. But a more sceptical 
evaluation would see the boundary between state and society not being passively 
erased, but actively manipulated by a government that wishes to reduce potential 
conflict between itself and mobilized sectors of the urban poor. This can be seen by the 
movement’s decision not to undertake building occupations targeted at the municipal 
government during Suplicy’s time in office.
The realization, after the end of the Suplicy administration, that the movement perhaps 
gained more in terms of housing for its members and status as a representative of the 
urban poor when in opposition, as well as having a better sense of its own identity, has 
led to a search for greater clarity between movement and state on the part of the UMM. 
But a more practical example of this search for clarity can be seen in the way in which 
the UMM has taken steps to formalize its relations with the municipal and state 
housing bureaucracies. This is done by promoting the institutionalization of 
negotiations with public servants, calling for regular monthly meetings and submitting 
agendas to be protocolado in advance of these. This formality is in marked contrast to 
the casual use made of computers and office space by movement members in the Cities’ 
Ministry under a PT minister, as described by Rolnik in chapter six. It would suggest 
that the movement sees the utility of pinning down the slippery concept of ‘the state’.
Further, the movement can also be seen to be laying down a clear line, in a sense a 
‘battle-line’, between itself and the state, when it uses the law for litigation purposes.
An example of this is the case taken up by Fernanda Leao and the Grupo de Inclusao 
Social (Social Inclusion Group) of the Ministerio Publico, against the municipal 
government after it failed to maintain rent payments to families that had been evicted 
from housing considered unsafe. By taking the state to court, the movement clearly 
places itself and the state into adversarial camps. This accentuates the ‘us versus them’
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perception of state-society relations, upon which the movement’s antagonistic 
discourse is based, in its politics of rights.
But I would argue that the way that the movement draws the line between itself and the 
state is by putting itself on the wrong side of the law, through its acts of civil 
disobedience, asserting a type o f‘transgressive citizenship’ in the process. This concept 
encompasses a number of key issues surrounding certain aspects of the relationship 
between the urban poor and the state in Sao Paulo as will now be shown. To transgress 
is to go beyond the limits of what is morally, socially or legally acceptable; thus 
breaking the law is a transgression. Sao Paulo was, literally, built upon transgressions. 
The city was founded on illegal and irregular occupation of land; a situation 
exacerbated during the twentieth century by the state’s purposeful neglect of its duty of 
care towards its poorest citizens. Thus negotiations over housing between the UMM 
and the various levels of the Brazilian state already take place within a context of 
fundamental legal ambiguity, if not outright illegality. When the movement undertakes 
a building occupation, it is, in essence, re-enacting an illegal practice that has been 
passively legitimated by the state for centuries. But while this might mitigate the extent 
to which occupations might be perceived as unjustifiable, it is still a transgression of 
social, moral and legal codes to take over possession of another’s property. A building 
occupation is not, however, an active attempt to undermine the state or the rule of law, 
nor are occupations undertaken with criminal intent. The movement’s representatives 
spend much of their time involved in institutionalized negotiations with the state. That 
is, until they take a calculated decision to break the law, in the knowledge that a daring, 
high-profile, formally illegal act will draw the attention of society, and, most 
importantly, force the state to engage with the movement on its own terms. As such, the 
transgressive act of an occupation is part of a project of citizenship, located in an 
ambiguous terrain between the legal and the illegal.
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The act of occupation is undertaken so as to engage with the state and impress upon it 
the need for a change in attitude towards the urban poor. It is also a way of pressurizing 
the state to respect the law and ensure that the constitutional right to housing and the 
social function of property is upheld. Thus occupations are a way of establishing a new 
type of relationship between the state and society, one in which the state is held as the 
law-breaker and transgressor, while by contrast, social movements of the urban poor 
are implementing the law, by giving social function to property and implementing the 
right to housing. They are not just making demands on the state, but proposing a 
response to the housing crisis. Finally, beyond the breaking of boundaries, the term 
‘transgression’ indicates a crossing of the limits of expected or accepted behaviour. In 
the arts, transgression is associated with experimentation and unconventionality; as a 
way of contesting orthodox codes of practice and suggesting new ways of interpreting 
reality. The act of building occupations are transgressive in this sense, since they 
propose a new way of conceptualizing social justice in the city. They contest the 
underlying social codes whereby the space of the peripheries is reserved for and 
identified with the poor in favelas and irregular settlements, or in poorly served low- 
quality social housing on the very edge of the city*s limits. Through building 
occupations the movement also asserts the right to the centre, a creative and 
unconventional reading of the law, that commands a re-evaluation of the use value of 
Sao Paulo’s centre. Thus, in Cornwall’s (2002:21) terms, acts of transgressive 
citizenship become ‘sites of radical possibility* as the movement acts on the state from 
without, rather than engaging in the state’s ‘invited’ spaces.
Through occupations of abandoned buildings in highly valued areas of the city, the 
movement makes a clear distinction between itself and the state. It achieves this by 
setting itself up, in theory at least, as an object of state opprobrium, liable for state 
sanction through the breaking of civil and penal codes, and at risk of repression by the 
law enforcement agencies of the state. This is therefore another way of placing itself in 
the opposite camp to the state in the law courts, although this time as the accused
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rather than the accuser. As noted in chapter seven, civil disobedience is also a way of 
voicing criticism of the state. Occupations express the movement’s condemnation of the 
state’s failure to respond to housing needs and the expulsion of the poor to the 
peripheries. Further, occupations are a way of asserting the movement’s autonomy 
from political parties, specifically the PT. The UMM was criticized for not undertaking 
building occupations in Sao Paulo during the Workers’ Party municipal administration 
under Marta Suplicy, and for having crossed the line that should separate party and 
movement by allowing its leaders to take up positions within the machinery of 
government.201 The accusations that, at best, the movement’s ability to advance its aims 
was weakened and at worst that it ended up being co-opted by the housing secretary 
have had an impact on the strategic planning of the movement. The movement is now 
keen to point out that it has recently been carrying out occupations of buildings in Sao 
Paulo that belong to federal organs, notably the CEF (the federal savings bank) and the 
INSS (national social security institute). This has increased pressure on the Lula 
government to expropriate abandoned buildings belonging to these institutions for 
their renovation as social housing. At the same time as these occupations, on April 11th 
2007, several busloads of movement leaders and members made the journey to 
Brasilia, setting up camp overnight, land occupation-style, outside the Cities’ Ministry 
to reinforce their demands on the federal government. Relating at a UMM internal 
meeting a recent exchange he had had with Walter Abrahao at COHAB, Diogo 
remarked, ‘He asked about our relationship with the PT and whether or not we were 
partisan. I replied that the proof that we’re not party political is the way we’ve been 
demanding that the federal government make good on its promises’.202
Whilst the ‘state-idea’ may be a fiction, as Abrams (2006) points out, it is a useful one. 
Taking the state to court or acting illegally serves as a way of reifying the state, and 
rendering it other to the movement. Not only does this play in the movement’s favour
201 During the Suplicy era, the UMM ‘crossed the line’ but did not ‘transgress’ and was therefore in danger 
of being incorporated into the municipal government machinery.
202 Diogo speaking at a UMM a monthly plenary meeting 11.03.07.
280
for mobilizational purposes by constructing a neatly bound and identifiable ‘enemy*, it 
also helps to create a separate identity for the movement, setting out state and 
movement as two distinct, discrete and opposing entities. As Gupta (2006) notes,
The very same processes that enable one to construct the state also help one to 
imagine these other social groupings -  citizens, communities, social groups, 
coalitions [...]. (Gupta 2006: 230).
But beyond the adversarial stance that this positioning allows, the movement also puts 
forward a rhetoric of compulsion and duty to act as the government’s antagonist. While 
the movement may take advantage of opportunities for engagement with the state, so 
as to fulfil its aims to house its members and be able to call itself democratic, 
movement members are reluctant to renounce the ‘weapon’ of occupations and 
maintain a discourse of constant opposition. This can be seen in Tristana’s declaration 
that, ‘You have to take a firm position, and my position is on the side of the movement, 
always. I’m against the government, when it comes to housing policy.’ Clarifying this 
statement she declared that this opposition was necessary since even when a 
government signs an agreement to build housing the movement must still fight every 
step of the way to ensure that it gets built.203 For both Diogo and Ivana the movement’s 
relationship to the state is a contramao, literally ‘going the wrong way down a one-way 
street’. This eternal fronting up to the state is perceived as a necessity since ‘there will 
always be difficulties’ (Diogo) and ‘no government will ever solve our problems’ 
(Gaetano).2°4 However, these statements gloss over the fact that the movement has not 
always fronted up to the state -  the example of the Marta Suplicy era is proof of this.
The poor returns from this more collaborative era were implicit in Ivana’s frequent call 
for the movement to recapture the attitude that it displayed during the ‘golden age’ of 
occupations of the late I990s.2°5 It was during this period that the UMM achieved a 
number of successes in the city, notably the reformulation of a federal housing 
programme (see chapter seven).
2°3 Interview with Tristana 26.03.07
2°4  Interviews with Ivana 01.06.07, Diogo 12.06.07 and Gaetano 08 .06.07
2°s UMM meeting 05.07.07.
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Learning from its experiences at the municipal level, the movement asserts the need for 
a change of attitude towards the PT at the federal level. The need for antagonism 
between movement and the state is emphasized through assertions that the movement 
must show its force and strength, and that its actions are designed to generate fear and 
anxiety for politicians and bureaucrats. Anderson gives depth to this idea of constant 
opposition:
The government, in its own analysis, is always going to evaluate itself as doing the 
best job possible. And the role of social movements is always to be saying that what 
it is doing isn’t enough. If ever a movement thinks that what the government is 
doing is sufficient, that movement has sold itself to the government. So, it’s 
important to analyse the UMM from that point of view. Looking at the UMM’s 
documents, its agenda, has it given itself over to the government’s agenda? Does it 
applaud and think that what the government has done is enough? If it has, then 
we’ve reached the end. We will have stopped being a movement to have become an 
extension cable of the government. [...] So, our agenda and our strategy should 
never be totally identical to that of the government. We can even say that we think 
the government has done something well, but we must say ‘there’s still a bit more to 
be done. This and that are missing, and this as well’. That must always be said. And 
sometimes the government will get angry with us and will think, ‘bloody hell, 
nothing we do is good enough’, and we will say ‘that’s right. Nothing that you do is 
good enough.’ If we have this understanding of everyone’s place and role then it is 
possible for us to build, with some skill, a degree of autonomy in this interaction 
and relationship with the state.206
I would argue that this assertion of constant opposition further emphasizes the 
movement’s commitment to acts of ‘transgressive citizenship’. It suggests that the 
movement must always be prepared to confront and oppose the state through a 
transgressive act of some kind. By critiquing current limited levels of citizenship 
through illegal action, the movement manages to redirect the finger of blame and 
apportion criminality on the state. At the same time, in a twist on the traditional idea of 
civil disobedience, it asserts the legality of its own practice, by representing occupations 
as an operationalization of the articles of the Constitution that defend the right to 
housing and the social function of property. By asserting the illegality of the state 
through civil disobedience, and challenging its wilful neglect of the urban poor, the 
movement creates a new relationship between state and society, based on ‘transgressive
206 Interview with Anderson 26.06.07
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citizenship’ located in the ambiguous ground between legality and illegality. It uses this 
space to promote unconventional readings of the law such as the right to the centre, 
confront entrenched perceptions of the peripheries as the place of the poor in the city, 
and to challenge the state to live up to its stated commitment to social justice. These 
findings would suggest that it is not just the state that can generate ‘resources of power’ 
(Mitchell 2006:125) from defining the boundary between itself and society, but that 
social movements are also able to define the state and their relationship to it through 
acts of transgression.
The final question that must be considered here is whether t)ie movement’s acts of 
transgressive citizenship and its advocation of constant opposition points to an 
overriding failure on its part to make the transition to democracy. On the one hand, it 
could be argued that the movement’s stance and behaviour illustrates an unwillingness 
to accept that in a democracy all settlements must be negotiated in some way, and 
acceptable to more than one group in society. In this view, the movement resorts to 
occupations when it does not get its own way, and is therefore refusing to engage in 
democratic compromise. However, evaluations of the movement’s actions must be 
made in the context of Brazil’s problematic transition to formal democracy, in which 
levels of inequality, discrimination and social segregation remain extremely elevated. 
Indeed, they are so high as to deny much of the population their basic rights. 
Representing thousands of people whose citizenship is effectively limited, social 
movements have an important role to play as agitators of government. Through their 
acts of transgressive citizenship, the leaders and members of the Uniao de Movimentos 
de Moradia of Sao Paulo force debate on low-income, well-located housing onto the 
government agenda at municipal, state and federal level and demand that the agencies 
of the state reflect on their own relationship with the law, the Constitution and its 
citizens. Although the movement’s relationship with democracy is problematic, its voice 
is a counterweight to centuries of domination of the political field by conservative 
moneyed elites.
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Sum m ary
This chapter set out to build on the theoretical literature on citizenship and the 
anthropology of the state that has guided the methodological and epistemological 
approaches of this thesis. Firstly it set out to update James Holston’s conceptualization 
of urban citizenship in Sao Paulo. Although I would agree that there has been an 
‘insurgence’ of citizenship on the peripheries of the city, this argument is not supported 
by the empirical focus of his work. Holston does note the importance of text-based 
ideas of citizenship based on the Constitution, but he fails to give them the weight they 
are due in post-1988 Brazil. He continues to emphasize a model of ‘differentiated 
citizenship’ which does not correspond to the normative value placed on social rights 
amongst marginalized individuals for the potential to become full citizens. This chapter 
also argued that his demonstration of the use of the law is deeply conservative, and 
does not adequately recognize the way in which law can be used as an asset not against 
other groups in society, but against the state. Moving on from Holston, the chapter 
builds on the work of Partha Chatteijee by suggesting that limited citizens are not 
restricted to interaction with the state through political society, but that through the 
use of the elite language of law, are attempting to dialogue with the state through more 
privileged channels. Noting that the state does not always respond in kind, the chapter 
discussed, following Mitchell, the way in which the boundary between state and society 
is both porous and moveable. Through acts of acts of ‘transgressive citizenship’ founded 
on civil disobedience and a rhetoric of constant opposition, the UMM draws a clear line 
between itself and the state forcing the latter to reflect on its own practice and to take 
the movement’s demands for social housing into account.
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Conclusion
M ethodological underpinnings o f  the stu dy
This study set out to examine the engagement between the state and the urban poor in 
Brazil through a case study of a social movement that organizes around social rights. As 
such it is grounded in and builds upon theoretical literature on social movements, 
citizenship and the anthropology of the state. The work is based on the premise that 
social movement theory in the resource mobilization and political process approaches 
has failed to examine in detail the interaction with the state that results from collective 
action, tending instead to examine the internal workings of social movement 
organizations, or the political opportunities that promote, sustain or constrain 
mobilization. Furthermore, it was argued that a post-structural turn has affected 
research into social movements particularly in the Latin American context. This has led 
to a tendency to study ‘new’ social movements that centre around issues of identity 
rather than those that focus on ‘old’ issues of collective consumption. As a result, there 
is a marked emphasis on collective action as a vehicle for culture and identity and the 
impact of movement activity on society itself. This takes examination of collective 
action away from material politics. A similar shift can be seen in discussions of the 
notion of citizenship that privileges examination of relations within society and 
amongst citizens, rather than between citizens and the state.
This study acknowledged the importance of identity as a mobilization tool for social 
movements. Indeed, the case study movement on which this thesis is based, the Uniao 
de Movimentos de Moradia, puts great emphasis on the identity of its members as 
citizens, and structures its discourse around claims for full citizenship. However, for 
this movement of the urban poor, identity as a citizen is grounded in social rights and 
in concrete goods: particularly housing and urban services. This research project 
therefore sought to break down boundaries between ‘old* and ‘new’ social movement 
theory by rejecting any strict dichotomy between different types of collective action and
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acknowledging the overlap between identity as a citizen and the goods of collective 
consumption claimed as social rights. It also aimed to generate further investigation 
into the significance of social rights, that have been reduced in much literature to 
socioeconomic or welfare rights.
This thesis therefore aimed to reintroduce the state to an examination of social 
movements and citizenship. It does so through reference to the work within the 
anthropology of the state canon, that advocates both the recognition of a ‘state idea’ 
and a disaggregation of the many facets that make up the state as institution. In 
particular, it took up the challenge of Mitchell (1991; 2006) to investigate the porous 
boundaries between state and society and to analyse the way in which an invisible line 
is effectively drawn between the two. It seeks to build on analysis of state-society 
relations through the lens of citizenship and by developing Chatteijee’s work on 
‘political society’ that highlights the different channels used by the state to 
communicate with different types of populations.
Drawing on these bodies of literature, the study sought to (i) document the micro­
negotiations between state and social movements so as to examine the impacts of 
collective action on spaces for engagement, (ii) generate greater understanding of the 
meanings of citizenship, and particularly of social rights, for low-income urban 
populations in Sao Paulo (iii) investigate how these understandings affect the way in 
which the movement views the state and (iv) illustrate how the use of a discourse of 
citizenship impacts upon movement action and the policy responses of the state. Over 
the course of a year’s fieldwork, findings emerged that highlighted the salience of the 
issues of law and illegality. The way in which the movement negotiated the legal terrain 
through litigation, involvement in legislative processes and engaging in formally illegal 
acts to advance its claims, are key to answering the questions posed by this thesis on 
understandings of citizenship and the relationship between social movements and the 
state. The intersection of the issues of law and legality with those of state-society
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relations are discussed in the concluding chapter. Examining the way in which die 
boundary between state and society can be manipulated, this thesis has suggested that 
the relationship between the Sao Paulo housing movement and the state is often 
characterized by ‘transgressive citizenship’.
Critical fin d in gs o f  the thesis
This research project is situated in the context of a highly inegalitarian and socially 
segregated city. The processes by which Sao Paulo grew in such an unequal manner are 
presented in chapter three. This discussion makes it clear that housing for low-income 
populations in the city has almost always been based upon illegality, whether in 
overcrowded cortigos in the central districts, or in peripheral/aueZas and irregular 
setdements. This displays a calculated negligence on the part of the local state that 
passively encouraged self-building in under-serviced areas of the municipality’s ‘rural 
zone’ so that demands for housing were met without state intervention, labour costs 
were reduced and investment could be channelled towards industry. The extent to 
which Sao Paulo’s residential accommodation was built outside of the law has led a 
number of scholars writing on the city to draw a strict division between the legal and 
the illegal city; also characterizing undocumented parts of the peripheries as the ‘non­
city’ as opposed to the ‘real’ or ‘official’ city that exists in legislation. However, chapter 
three shows that these stark divisions paint those living in irregular or illegal housing 
with a deterministic brush and further tend to grant greater power to the formal letter 
of the law than is warranted.
Firstly, the categorization of the peripheries as ‘illegal’ fails to acknowledge the fact that 
the state does still engage with these areas, managing them as part of the city despite 
irregularities in the way that they are built. Secondly, it does not acknowledge 
important work in the area of legal pluralism that illustrates how ‘local law’, sanctioned 
by the state, can evolve in favelas and other irregularly built areas as a way of 
responding to specific needs of residents, that have in part arisen as a result of
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irregularity. Finally, and most importantly for this thesis, the spaces between the law 
on paper and the reality of urban existence can be exploited by organized low-income 
groups for mobilization purposes and can then be used to support claim-making. This 
is illustrated by the activities of popular movements and associations on the peripheries 
of Sao Paulo since the late 1970s. It is therefore no longer correct to assume that 
poorer urban populations are always to be defined by the illegality of their residences.
The power of the law that is being harnessed by social movements in Sao Paulo, and 
particularly by the UMM, is rooted in the Constitution promulgated in 1988 that 
marked the end of the dictatorship. Chapter four documents the recent political history 
of Brazil and shows how despite repression, poorer sectors of society, particularly those 
on the peripheries of Sao Paulo, began to organize in response to the harsh conditions 
of daily existence. Supported by progressive elements within the Catholic Church and 
inspired by the new unions in the city’s industrial areas, inwardly-oriented 
neighbourhood associations became more openly critical of the state as the military 
began to liberalize in the late 1970s. This marked a turning point for union 
organization, the focus of which shifted from an emphasis on pay and working 
conditions for members, to the basic needs of whole communities where workers were 
living. This occurred at a time of economic slow-down, and thus bucks a trend which 
generally sees union activity at its most belligerent in times of full employment and 
economic growth. The trajectory of movements at this time shows a link between 
industrial action and mobilization around collective consumption. But the gradual 
assumption of a discourse of rights around basic goods needed for human flourishing 
that occurred during the transition adds a political dimension to this type of collective 
action, suggesting an overlap between these different types of mobilization. The role 
played by newly formed social movements in directing the path of the transition to 
civilian rule is also discussed in this chapter. Much of the literature on Brazil suggests 
that these movements had their high point in the campaign for direct elections, but that 
the failure to secure these led to their demobilization, as did the eventual transition to
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democracy. This resonates with more general theories of social movements that suggest 
that political activation will be channelled towards the realm of formal politics in a 
democracy. However, this chapter maintains that social movement activity was 
sustained throughout the 1980s in Sao Paulo, much of which was directed towards the 
participatory process by which the Constitution was drawn up, through the Constituent 
Assembly or Assembleia Constituinte. The late 1980s also saw the founding of the 
UMM that w;as set up to bring together a number of movements in different areas of the 
city campaigning for similar issues.
The involvement of social movements in the drafting of the Constitution has had a 
lasting effect on these popular actors, who, along with progressive lawyers, have come 
to use the document to guide and give legal weight to their claims and activities.
Chapter five examines the way in which movement members and leaders ‘see the state’, 
preparing the way for an examination of how these perspectives on the relationship 
between the state and the poor are played out in practice. After providing an 
introduction to the movement’s leaders and members, the chapter examines the way in 
which housing is linked to citizenship. This is based not only on the right to housing 
enshrined in the Constitution, but also on the connections made by the movement’s 
members between dignity, having a place in society and adequate housing. Housing is 
also posited as the means by which low-income families will achieve other human 
development goals, notably health, education and employment. That housing is 
discussed in these terms contributes to the movement’s ‘politics of rights’. Following 
Scheingold (2004) this involves an appeal to a general belief within society in the ‘myth 
of rights’ -  the idea that legislation will necessarily lead to the implementation of laws 
and to real social change. By pointing out the gap between law and reality, a politics of 
rights can achieve through political means what has not been achieved through legal 
means. The chapter noted the applicability of the idea of the myth of rights to Brazil: 
although the justice system and the rule of law in Brazil are problematic areas, there is 
a generalized pride in and commitment to the goals of the ‘social’ Constitution within
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Brazilian society. However, the movement’s politics of rights, in which it points out how 
the state is failing its poorer citizens by not upholding the right to housing leads to an 
antagonistic stance on the part of the movement, expressed through ‘fighting talk’. 
Despite this, the movement is fundamentally reliant on the state for the provision of 
housing.
Having detailed the way in which the movement speaks of the state. Chapters six and 
seven examine in detail its actual interaction with the three levels of government 
through formal, institutional channels and through the direct action of occupations. 
Chapter six is framed by Gaventa’s (2004) and Cornwall’s (2002) work on ‘spaces’ for 
citizen participation in government, which can be both ‘invited’ or ‘created’ (Gaventa 
2004). They also note the existence o f‘closed’ spaces, where policy decisions are made 
without the scrutiny of groups and individuals outside of the government. The chapter 
traces the activities of the movement at each level of the state, noting how the 
movement’s own strategies are carefully worked out according to the play of political 
forces. Findings from fieldwork with the movement reveal significant differences in 
interaction according to the nature of the political party in power. The movement’s 
connections with the Workers’ Party, which is its historical ally, provided opportunities 
for more informal interaction with representatives of the housing secretariats at 
municipal and federal level during the administrations of the PT mayor Marta Suplicy 
and president Lula. These can be understood as ‘created’ spaces. During these periods 
key movement leaders took up paid positions within the bureaucracy, thereby getting 
the chance to operate within the closed spaces of government.
However, when its allies are not in power, the movement must rely on formal invited 
spaces for participation in housing councils. The UMM was also seen to be attempting 
to institutionalize its meetings with representatives of the municipal and state level 
housing companies and secretariats. In a twist on Gaventa and Cornwall’s work, these 
can be seen as ‘created invited’ spaces. This chapter also examined the problematic
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functioning of the municipal housing council in light of much of the very positive 
literature on this type of participatory experiment. Finally, although the movement 
does clearly attempt to make use of different types of space for engagement with the 
state, it is difficult to separate out these negotiations or collaborations from the radical 
collective action for which the movement is well-known. The threat of occupations is 
always present in the UMM’s dealings with the state. This therefore challenges a 
traditional distinction in social movement literature often made between tactics of 
‘moderation’ and ‘disruption’ and, by consequence, in making a clear divide between an 
‘invited’ and a ‘claimed’ space in which to negotiate with government. Whilst the 
movement must maintain negotiations with the state so as to be perceived as a 
‘democratic’ actor and to support its politics of rights, recent disappointments with PT 
governments where it has relaxed its antagonistic stance has led to a reinforcement of 
belief in the power of occupations.
Chapter seven, the final empirical chapter, looks at the issue of occupations in more 
detail. These are shown to be borrowed from the ‘repertoire’ of contention established 
by the landless workers movement, the MST, that occupies unproductive land in rural 
areas of the country. The UMM had undertaken numerous occupations of urban 
peripheral land in the 1980s, but the transposition of the tactic to empty buildings in 
the centre of Sao Paulo in 1997 marked a turning point for the movement. It served to 
draw attention to the fact that inequality of land ownership is an urban issue, not just a 
rural one. It also highlighted the paradox of having huge numbers of buildings left 
empty and abandoned in central areas of a city with a serious housing deficit. Finally, it 
critiqued the pattern of social segregation in the city in which poorer residents are 
forced to live in far-flung and under-serviced peripheries miles from their places of 
work. Occupation of buildings, in theory, breaks both the civil and penal codes in 
Brazil. Whilst this tactic might seem to be in contradiction to the movement’s 
institutional engagement detailed in chapter six, and its use of the law through its 
involvement in legislation, litigation and appeals to the Constitution, this chapter
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argues that occupations are an extension of the movement’s politics of rights. The 
movement’s discourse points out the gap between the law on paper and the real 
situation in the city for its poorest residents. Through an interpretation of occupations 
as acts of civil disobedience, they become an extension of this discourse of the 
disjuncture between law and reality. Building occupations can be categorized as acts of 
civil disobedience according to classical definitions in that they break the law, but at the 
same time show fidelity to law, as they are intended not to overthrow the political 
status quo, but to improve it. They achieve this by highlighting the injustice of housing 
poorer people on the peripheries when they could be housed in more central areas.
They also flag up the illegal behaviour of the state in failing to uphold the right to 
housing and the social function of property. But occupations are also a particular form 
of civil disobedience, referred to as ‘intra-legal’, in that they are justified by the 
movement as legal through appeal to a higher form of law. This is because the 
Constitutional right to housing trumps the civil and penal codes. Further, landlords are 
contravening the terms of the Constitution by failing to ensure that their property 
fulfils a social function. In this way, the movement can be seen to be implementing 
these laws. The legal status of the occupation is thus cast in an ambiguous way. On the 
one hand, it must be illegal if it is to count as civil disobedience and to point the finger 
of blame at the state’s own illegal behaviour. On the other hand, the movement can 
justify its actions as legal since they are operationalizing the Constitution.
The final chapter provides more detailed analysis of the theoretical literature discussed 
in chapter two in light of the empirical content of the thesis. Firstly it presents a 
critique of a recent work on citizenship in Sao Paulo, Holston’s Insurgent citizens, 
arguing that his focus on the legal wrangles of lower-middle-class property owners in 
the city’s peripheries cannot provide a conceptualization of citizenship relevant to the 
city’s poorer residents. Privileging the issue of civil rights, the empirical focus of his 
study leads him to discuss citizenship as a relationship between citizens, rather than 
between citizens and the state, despite his claims to the contrary. The findings of the
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present study highlight the importance of social rights discourse for the poor, and the 
use by social movements of the Constitution to put forward their claims on the state. 
The findings also revealed the creative use of the law by social movements, which is 
employed not to defend property rights within the city as it stands, but as a way to 
promote a different vision of the way in which different social groups inhabit urban 
space.
Building on the work of Chatteijee (2004), the creative use of the law by the UMM also 
suggests that the movement is attempting to engage with the state through channels 
traditionally used by the elite, rather than through the channel of welfare and benefits. 
However, empirical findings showed how sections of the Brazilian state respond to 
sophisticated demands for the right to housing as at-risk populations rather than 
empowered citizens. Finally the chapter addressed the issue of the way in which the 
movement attempts to alter the balance of power between state and society. While the 
movement engages in the state’s ‘invited’ spaces, and leaders have taken up positions 
within the state bureaucracy, this can lead to an unhelpful blurring of the boundary 
between the movement and the state when the PT is in power.-This has led to 
allegations of cooptation, and is seen to have hindered the UMM’s advancement of its 
goals, as it withdrew from its programme of building occupations during a recent PT 
administration of the municipality. As a result of this, the UMM is now taking a more 
antagonistic position vis-a-vis the PT government at federal level. In conclusion, the 
chapter argues that the housing movement attempts to redraw the line between itself 
and the state by undertaking acts of ‘transgressive citizenship’. By carrying out a 
building occupation, the movement makes a calculated decision to cross moral, social 
and legal boundaries, and enters an ambiguous zone between legality and illegality. 
From here it asserts its autonomy vis-a-vis the state, whilst simultaneously accusing the 
state itself of transgression, for failing to uphold the Constitution. Rather than 
attempting to undermine the state, the act of transgressive citizenship is an attempt to 
interact with it, and force it to engage with the movement’s own agenda. Occupations
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also become the ‘site of radical possibility’ within which the movement can put forward 
its alternative vision of low-income housing, promoting the ‘right to the centre’ and 
forcing both state and society to rethink the place of the poor in the city.
A reas fo r  fu tu re  research
There are a number of areas for further research with the Uniao de Movimentos de 
Moradia that were not covered by this research project and that are of potential broader 
relevance to the study of social movements, citizenship and the state. One area for 
future research involves the question of the movement’s relationship to the Workers’ 
Party, or PT, particularly the fraught issue of movement leaders’ employment within 
the political offices of elected politicians. I did take steps to investigate this relationship 
during the fieldwork year, through a series of interviews with PT politicians and by 
raising this (extremely sensitive) issue with leaders who had worked or were working as 
assessores de gabinete. However, responses to interview questions provided generic 
answers on the benefits of this type of interaction and elicited the repetition of the 
mantra ‘movement is movement, party is party’ by movement leaders. As such, a period 
of participant observation within the political office of a PT politician who was 
employing movement members could provide an important insight into the nature of 
this relationship. Specifically, it could lead to greater understanding of the extent to 
which movement leaders make substantive contributions to the preparation of 
legislation on programmatic issues related to housing and the city, and the 
commitment of the politician to the goals of the movement. Participant observation 
with a movement leader and assessor during an election campaign would potentially be 
extremely enlightening, given that it could reveal whether party political campaigning 
infiltrates rights awareness work at the grassroots level. This more micro-level 
investigation into the relationship between the movement and the PT has the potential 
to illuminate broader questions of the UMM’s overall engagement with the party, and 
the extent to which it is prepared to engage in acts of transgressive citizenship targeted 
at PT governments.
2 9 4
Another possibly profitable area of study is the connection between housing, class and 
citizenship. Although it is a large and problematic subject to tackle, the issue of class 
mobility is clearly one of relevance in the study of a social movement that is, at heart, 
oriented towards the acquisition of property for its members. Although movement 
leaders were careful to assert the right to housing rather than the right to property 
ownership in public discourse, the almost complete absence of social rental housing in 
the city meant that, by default, the UMM was demanding the right to subsidized credit 
for its members to purchase a home. Acquisition of property has an impact on 
perceptions of social status, and a number of interview respondents made references to 
the way in which their self-perceptions had altered as a result of gaining a house 
through the movement. More in-depth life history interviewing could shed greater light 
on this issue. Whether or not the question of property ownership significantly 
undermines the movement’s use of a discourse of social rights, or indeed, is highly 
compatible with it in a city without social rental options and where housing gives 
security to vulnerable families, is a matter for further study.
Finally, this piece of research has the potential to contribute to broader comparative 
understanding of urban social movements and the nature of their relationships to 
national and local states. While it has focused on a single case and as such its findings 
cannot be generalized, the implications of this study are relevant beyond Brazil. This 
thesis has shown that there is still much to be learned from ‘old’ social movements that 
are mobilized around collective consumption and social rights: in particular their 
representatives’ understandings of citizenship and of the nature of their relationship 
with the state, as well as their engagement with national-level law. Countries across the 
developed and developing world are undertaking constitutional reforms and updating 
their bills of rights with implications for state-society relations and the collective action 
of marginalised groups in very different contexts. Here lessons from the Brazilian 
experience could be salutary. In this regard, the idea of ‘transgressive citizenship’ could
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be usefully employed as a lens through which to examine the activities and political 
positioning of social movements in other parts of the world that interact with the state 
through formal institutional mechanisms and that engage in transgressive acts of civil 
disobedience.
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Methodological Appendix
Sam pling
The bulk of the empirical material upon which this thesis is based comes from 68 
interviews undertaken during the second half of the fieldwork year. I carried out a total 
of 34 formal interviews with movement leaders and members and a further 32 
interviews with politicians, academics and NGO workers associated with the housing 
movement, as well as government representatives in the housing secretariats at 
municipal, state and federal levels. Interviews with movement leaders lasted between 
60 and 90 minutes. Those with politicians and civil servants were shorter, lasting 
between 30 and 60 minutes, due to constraints of their work schedules. I also 
undertook a series of brief interviews of up to 30 minutes with individuals who had 
been involved in occupations of empty buildings organized by the movements. These 
informants were generally less forthcoming than regular attendees at movement 
meetings - they had limited contact with the housing movements, were unaccustomed 
to being interviewed and were perhaps intimidated by the presence of a foreigner.
The choices of who to interview were made after placing potential respondents into two 
broad categories: ‘movement’ and ‘non-movement’. I divided the movement category 
into five sub-categories according to its own internal hierarchy, from members with no 
leadership responsibilities up to leaders involved in national level organization. I then 
chose roughly equal numbers of people to interview from each sub-categoiy. Sampling 
was purposive, in that I chose to interview the people who I considered able to provide 
me with the most relevant information. The ‘non-movement’ category was divided up 
into sub-categories of politicians, current and former employees of housing 
departments and NGO workers/other ‘observers’ who had close links to the movement. 
The categories of politicians and government employees were further classified along 
municipal, state-level and federal lines. Sampling of the non-movement category was
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generally based on convenience, as it was often extremely difficult to get responses to 
requests for interviews with those involved in the business of government.
All of the interviews were recorded, apart from three of the shorter interviews 
undertaken with residents of an occupied building. Here use of recording equipment 
was inappropriate because of high levels of background noise or the apparent unease of 
respondents. Before undertaking interviews I would explain who I was and what my 
research interests were. I asked permission to record the interview, with the proviso 
that the recording would not be played to anyone else and that no real names would be 
used in the final write-up of the study. Public officials, however, generally declared that 
they would be speaking on the record.
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M ovem ent leader in terview  guideline
1. Tell me about the local/regional movement that you lead -  what special 
characteristics does it have?
2. What is the main aim of your movement?
3. And of the UMM generally?
4. What do you think is the main achievement of the UMM since it was founded?
5. What role do you think social movements have in Brazilian politics and society?
6. What is it that unites the grassroots of the movement?
7. How does joining a movement impact upon individuals?
8. What kind of impact does living in an occupation have on people and their 
families?
9. Do you think movement members are different from their neighbours in the 
favelas and cortigos who aren’t in a movement?
10. How do you choose which buildings to occupy?
11. At what point do you decide to occupy?
12. What’s the point of occupations?
13. Does it make any difference if the building is public or private?
14. How does government react to occupations?
15. Which level of government do you think the UMM should be focusing its 
activities on at the moment?
16. How does the relationship between government and UMM change when there is 
a friendly political party in power?
17. How did things change when Marta Suplicy became mayor?
18. What do you think of the decision of some UMM leaders to work for politicians? 
Does it help the movement?
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19- Does your local/regional movement have regular contact with politicians?
20. Do you think it is worthwhile for UMM members to run for seats on the 
Municipal Housing Council?
21. Did the election of Lula have an impact on the movement’s activities?
22. Has anything changed in the relationship between the UMM and the federal 
government now that the second mandate has started?
23. What does the term ‘citizenship’ mean for you?
24. [If not mentioned] What are the responsibilities of being a citizen?
25. Do you consider yourself a citizen?
26. How does the UMM contribute to citizenship?
27. Is housing in the centre a right?
28. Do people who ‘fight’ for the movement have more right to housing than those 
who don’t?
29. If the UMM didn’t exist, what would Sao Paulo be like?
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M ovem ent m em ber in terview  guideline
1. How did you first hear about the housing movement?
2. What did you think about housing movements before you joined?
3. How did you become a member?
4. Why did you become a member?
5. What type of activities did you get involved in?
6. How many occupations have you taken part in?
7. Can you tell me how the leaders described occupations to you?
8. What did you think of the idea of occupations?
9. Was it a difficult decision to go along to an occupation?
10. Tell me about the occupation that you have been most involved with. Where was 
the building, how did you get in, how long did you stay? etc.
11. Where were you living before you occupied?
12. Did you move out of your home to go and live in the occupied building?
13. How would you rate living in an occupation? Did/do you enjoy it? Are there 
dangers, problems?
14. When you tell friends and people you work with you live in an occupied 
building, how do they react?
15. When you got involved in the occupation, how long did you think it would last?
16. What were/are your long-term expectations of the occupation?
17. Why do you think the movement organizes occupations?
18. Do you think it’s illegal?
19. If you were offered a place in a social rental building, would you take it?
301
Public servan t questionnaire
1. Could you explain what your position in this government department is?
2. How often do you meet with housing movement representatives?
3. Why do you agree to meet with them? Does your department have a policy of 
receiving movement members or is it a personal decision?
4. What do you hope to achieve through these meetings?
5. What is the overall aim of the UMM, as far as you’re aware?
6. Can you differentiate between the different regional movements that make up 
the UMM?
7. Would you agree that the UMM is a recognized interlocutor of the housing 
departments at all three levels of the state? If so, how do you think it achieved 
this status?
8. In your opinion, what type of person gets involved in a social movement?
9. Do social movements have a role to play in Brazilian politics and society?
10. Have the housing movements had any impact on housing policy at 
municipal/state/federal level over the past two decades?
11. What is your reaction when the movements occupy buildings?
12. Is it illegal?
13. Does it make a difference if the building is public or private?
14. Do you attend to people who have been involved in an occupation?
15. How do you justify the fact that people who have been involved in occupations 
have been housed sooner than those who are not organized?
16. What is your department’s current policy for the centre of Sao Paulo?
17. Is it possible to house low-income groups in the centre?
18. Is housing in the centre a right?
19. Is there any link between housing and citizenship?
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Politician questionnaire
1. From what I understand of the formation of the PT, social movements played a 
big role at this time. Has this linked between social movements and the PT been 
maintained?
2. What challenges is this relationship facing?
3. How does the relationship with the grassroots change when the PT wins a 
municipal election?
4. What role do social movements play in Brazilian politics and society today?
5. It seems that the UMM manages to be an interlocutor with governments in Sao 
Paulo over housing issues, even when they are not run by the PT. How do you 
think the UMM achieved this status?
6. I understand that you’ve employed UMM leaders to work in your office, can you 
explain this relationship?
7. What benefit do the leaders gain from these periods of employment, apart from 
a regular salary?
8. What do you gain from this relationship?
9. What does your mandate have in common with the aims of the UMM?
10. I’ve heard UMM leaders say of their work as cabinet assistants that ‘politics is a 
machine, and you have to know how to use it’. What do you think of that 
statement?
11. Do you think that movement leaders who work for politicians lose credibility 
when they come to negotiate with representatives of non-PT governments?
12. Have you ever taken part in a building occupation?
13. How do you evaluate occupations as a strategy:?
14. Are they illegal?
15. Is housing in the centre a right?
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Name Date o f interview Details
M ovement Leaders and M embers
Adana
Ana
Anderson
06.07.07
19.06.07
26.06.07
Arturo 05.07.07
Benjamin 05.06.07
Cristiano 09.08.07
Daiana 28.06.07
Diogo 12.06.07
Edna 09.10.07
Ernesto 14.03.07
Felipe 14.07.07
Francisca 24.07.07
Gaetano 08.06.07
Ivana 01.06.07
Joana 09.10.07
Joanadarc 23.04.07
Kelly 29.05.07
Leide 26.06.07
Leon 07.06.07
Adviser to UMM and national level movement UNMP 
Provides support to leaders of a regional movement.
Member of the executive of national UNMP, principal founder and effectively the 
director of the UMM but not named as such.
General coordinator of the FLM
Leader of regional movement, UMM treasurer, principal mediator between the 
movement and the municipal and state housing secretariats.
Leader of small local association in the centre. Employed by housing secretary 
during Marta Suplicy municipal administration.
Leader of high-profile FLM affiliated movement that organizes frequent 
occupations
Leader of a large centrally based movement
Formerly active movement member involved in occupations in 1997 
Leader of a centrally-based movement affiliated to the FLM. At the time of 
fieldwork he was in charge of an occupation of an abandoned hotel in a central 
area.
Movement member living in an occupied building
Movement member living in an occupied building
Leader of a regional movement, member of national level UNMP executive
High profile leader of a historically important centre-based movement
Movement member living in a building renovated after occupation
Leader of a small association representing families living in an occupied building in
the centre
Member of UMM executive, represents the movement in international forums, 
particularly on women’s issues.
Co-leader of a regional movement
UMM spokesperson and politically active leader of centre-based movement that 
undertook a long-term, high-profile building occupation 1997-2005
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Lourdes 30.06.07 Leader of a small centrally based association
Luciene 09.10.07 Movement member living in a building renovated after occupation
Macareno 05.07.07 Director of an urban issues NGO that provides support for the FLM, and generally
considered to be the leader of the FLM, although not named as such.
Marcia 24.07.07 Movement member living in an occupied building
Maria 28.03.07 Co-leader of a centre-based movement
Nina 09.10.07 Member of a local movement affiliated to the UMM, living in social housing
renovated after an occupation 
Nora 08.10.07 Leader of a small association based in the centre
Pedro 18.09.07 Leader of a regional movement, member of UMM executive
Placida 24.07.07 Member of a FLM affiliated movement, living in an occupied building
Rebeca 05.06.07 Leader of a small centre-based association
Renata 24.07.07 Movement member living in an occupied building
Renato 09.10.07 Movement member living in an occupied building
Suraya 09.10.07 Former movement member living in a building renovated after occupation
Tristana 26.03.07 Leader of a regional movement, member of UMM executive
Wanda 24.07.07 Movement member living in an occupation
P olitic ians, civil se rv an ts  a n d  o b serv ers
Alonso Lopes 26.07.07 Head of cortiQos programme in COHAB
Bette Franca 26.07.07 Superintendent of social interest housing in SEHAB
Chico Macena 09.08.07 PT city councillor in Sao Paulo
Cid Blanco Jr 17.07.07 Chief of staff to the national housing secretary
Eduardo Trani 23.07.07 Head of planning in CDHU
Fernanda Leao 12.10.07 Public prosecutor involved in the Social Inclusion group within the Ministerio
Publico
Francisco Chagas 21.06.07 PT city councillor in Sao Paulo
Grazia de Grazia 13.08.07 Senior manager in Secretariat for Urban Programmes in the Cities’ Ministry
Guilherme 08.09.07 Swiss volunteer within the UMM
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Jose Carlos de 09.08.07 Public prosecutor involved in housing and urban environment within the
Freitas Ministerio Publico
Jose Eduardo 30.07.07 PT Federal Deputy. Renowned jurist.
Cardoso
Lair Krahenbuhl 08.08.07 Sao Paulo state housing secretaiy
Luciana Bedesci 09.10.07 Lawyer working for urban issues NGO
Luiz Kohara 27.03.07 Activist working for urban issues NGO
Maria Claudia 07.08.07 Head of cortigos programme in CDHU
Brandao
Maria Tereza 08.08.07 Senior manager in CDHU
Silveira
Mario Reali 18.07.07 PT state deputy, Sao Paulo
Marta Garske 16.08.07 Cities’ Ministry employee working on housing credit programmes
Mirna da Silva 14.08.07 Career civil servant employed in Cities’ Ministry
Nabil Bonduki 05.06.07 Architecture professor, former PT city councillor, long-term collaborator with
UMM
Nancy da Silva 07.08.07 Senior manager in social interest housing department, COHAB
Paulo Teixeira 08.08.07 Federal PT deputy and former municipal secretary for housing in Sao Paulo
Raquel 03.10.07 Architect, employed to work on low-income areas in the centre during Marta
Suplicy administration
Raquel Rolnik 17.07.07 Former national secretaiy for urban programmes in Cities’ Ministry and member of
the FNRU
Renato Balbim 15.08.07 Cities’ Ministry employee
Renato Simao 29.06.07 Former PT state deputy, Sao Paulo
Rogerio 09.10.07 CEF employee
Rosemary 18.09.07 Swiss volunteer within the UMM
Sergio Mendonga 01.08.07 State housing secretary's chief of staff
Simao Pedro 23.07.07 PT state deputy in Sao Paulo
Wagner 04.10.07 Architect employed at COHAB during Marta Suplicy administration
Walter Abrahao 15.06.07 Commercial and social director of COHAB
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